I believe that many of our present problems with Russia might be better understood if we realize that China is the long-term enemy of Russia, and that Putin & co. are buying them off like the Russian Princes did during the yoke of the Golden Horde in the 13th century. Ditto with Iran. An article for your consideration;
Russia-China relations in perspective Russian and Chinese leaders regularly proclaim a bilateral identity of interests between their governments. But closer scrutiny of Russo-Chinese relations belies this idyllic assessment. Admittedly both sides currently require a friendly and normal relationship with the other as they concentrate on economic development and other, more critical, ‘theaters’ of interest. For Russia in particular, Siberia and Russian Asia, the source of most of its present and future energy and raw materials wealth is something of a strategic liability because it can only be defended against China with its own indigenous resources. If war broke out China could cut Moscow’s links to Asia in a day or less. Thus militarily these areas are an austere or economy of force theater that can only survive through their own resources. Therefore nuclear deterrence is Russia’s strategy here as it is towards America. And deterrence is a strategy for relations with adversaries or potential adversaries not friends.
Posted in: Long Posts on – by Stephen Blank
China is also the main investor in Siberia and Eastern Russia, investments that are critical to Russia’s becoming the independent Asian great power that it dreams of becoming. Russia’s many manifestations of ‘illegitimate governance’ rent-seeking, corruption, criminality, malfeasance, and hostility to foreign investment have multiplied the difficulties for all investors, including China. Nevertheless Beijing persists for strategic reasons, i.e. the need for a quiescent Russia on its north and for Siberian energy supplies that go to it alone and therefore bypass Japan or South Korea and the Strait of Malacca.
Consequently on issues of Asian regional security from the Arctic to the South China Sea and Central Asia it is easy to discern rivalry, growing Russian anxieties about Chinese power, and Chinese encroachment on Russian. Indeed, arguably despite China’s increased aggressiveness vis-Ã*-vis Japan, the United States (US), Southeast Asia, and India, it has only succeeded in making enduring strategic gains against Russia. In Central Asia Chinese economic power, as displayed in numerous huge deals for infrastructure, energy pipelines, telecommunications, roads, railways, energy pipelines, minerals, etc. has eclipsed Russia. According to Alexandros Petersen of the US’ Woodrow Wilson Center, China is already the most powerful and consequential foreign actor in Central Asia and this author and Barnard University Professor Alexander Cooley have argued along similar lines.
In the Arctic Russian energy explorations now depend on deals with China. Meanwhile China has leapt ahead in commercial exploitation of the Northern Sea Route. Russia unsuccessfully opposed Chinese observer status in the Arctic Council and the recent People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) circumnavigation of the Sea of Japan, hitherto a Russo-Japanese lake, and the purchase of the North Korean ports of Rajin-Sonborg and Chongjin, plus its investments and interests in other North Korean ports signify not just China’s burgeoning interest in the Arctic but also its eclipsing of Russia in regard to influence and presence in North Korea.
China’s recent unilateral proclamation of an Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) over parts of its own, South Korean, and Japanese airspace plus warnings that similar moves are to be expected in the South China Sea, can only heighten not only Asian but Russian apprehensiveness over the likelihood of similar unilateral encroachments on Russian interests and capabilities. Indeed, the reinvigorated Russo-Japanese normalisation dialogue owes much to both sides’ mounting concern about China as does Russia’s recent strategic partnership agreement with Vietnam, its readiness to sell Vietnam more weapons and continuing investment in offshore Vietnamese energy platforms in the South China Sea. Though Russia does not flaunt these decisions, Beijing fully grasps their import.
Nevertheless Moscow’s capacity of conducting an independent policy in Asia towards China is also gradually being eroded. It already had to build the East Siberian Pacific Ocean oil pipeline exclusively to China, and the recent mammoth energy deals with Rosneft have made that company almost a wholly owned subsidiary of China incorporated. This may line Igor Sechin and his retainers’ and Putin’s pockets, but energy deals and pipelines to one customer hardly gratify Russian interests. Similarly Russia is losing the battle to sell China gas at market prices. Its alternative of a trans-Korean pipeline has gone nowhere and Putin now discusses building an underwater pipeline to South Korea.
China demands below market prices for Russian gas and does not need to buy it, and if Russia cannot sell its Siberian and Asian gas those resources will be ‘stranded’ in the ground. Likewise, apart from China’s domination of foreign investment in Russian Asia, Moscow has now had to sell China better weapons than India gets, namely the SU-35 Fighter and the Amur Class Submarine. This marks an unprecedented reversal of past Russian policy and demonstrates Chinese leverage as well as the Russian arms industry’s dependence on China as seen, if not by arms sellers than by the Russian government.
This litany hardly catalogues an identity of interests. That identity is largely for issues on the global stage directed against Washington on issues like democracy promotion, intervention abroad, non-proliferation, regime change, and the like. Indeed, Russia’s China policy has been particularly targeted at the global strategic triangle seeking to use China to force Washington to take it more seriously. But it long ago became impossible to use China for anyone else’s purposes. However, if Russia cannot reform its own governance and compete peacefully but effectively with China it may not be long before Beijing can use Moscow for its purposes.
Therefore Russian-Chinese relations have more than an academic or passing interest for Europe. As the current Ukrainian crisis shows, Moscow has declared hostilities on European security institutions and Europe as such. It now prefers to seek real gains in the East. But it is quite unlikely to succeed due to its own debilities and China’s increasingly superior capabilities. Thus it is likely that sooner or later Moscow will have to recoil from its ‘Ostpolitik’ to find new gains in Europe, its priority theatre of operations in every sense. Is Europe ready for either Sino-Russian partnership or for the subordination of Russia to Chinese ambitions, or for an increasingly defeated Russia turning back from an abortive Asian turn to Europe? Europe’s own security is bound up with whatever Moscow decides to do and if it turns Russia’s back on Europe that creates both challenges and opportunities for European governments and security institutions. However, in that context we must ask whether or not European institutions both understand those challenges and opportunities and whether they can or will respond to them. Much of the future of European security may ride on those questions.
• Image credit: Tony Lin.
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