The FSB: A Threat Within Russia

The FSB: A Threat Within Russia

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The FSB: A Threat Within Russia

Igor Kotler and Maxim Safiullin

The FSB,^[1] heir and successor of the notorious KGB, is, with no doubt, one of the major institutions of Russia. The role of the agency has been vital for the Soviet and the modern Russian regimes. The presence of the FSB is felt everywhere in the country: the word in the news, conversations, rumors and whispers. This word, FSB, has almost the same horrifying meaning in Russia today as the KGB before the demise of the Soviet Union.

Throughout the whole history of Russia since the Bolshevik revolution in 1917 the secret service played very significant, if not the leading, role in the political and civil life of the country being the main instrument of keeping the population in fear and thus in submission to the ruling circles. For those purposes it was given a great power and from that power came the ambition to be the one and only rulers of the country.

John Barron, a prominent specialist on the Soviet Union, writes, “The KGB is a unique phenomenon of this century. Having no true counterpart, either in history or the contemporary world, it cannot be fully comprehended through analogy with the other organizations, or adequately by Western terminology. But something of the importance of the KGB can be seen in the void its disappearance would create in the life of the Soviet Union.”[2]

Now, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the FSB is not held back neither by the ruling power of the Communist Party, nor by the civil control (due to the lack of legal support for it); the “chekists”[3] have learned from their mistakes and they fully understand that the times of reforming and turmoil are the best times to gain influence and through that control and power. They have their people everywhere; they control newspapers, factories, businesses, banks; even the President of Russia is a former head of the FSB.


1. A short history of FSB


On December 20 1917, less than two months after the Bolshevik revolution and the establishment of the Communist regime, the VChK (All-Russian Extraordinary Commission) was found to fight sabotage and anti-revolution elements. According to a Communist Party Central Committee diktat it was meant to be “a special organ of merciless execution”.^[4] Very soon it was given the power of summery trials and execution of sentences, which included the death sentence.^[5]

After several reforms meant to strengthen it the service became a perfect machine of terror and submission in the hands of Stalin. Several times it changed the name to the GPU, OGPU, NKVD, NKGB, back to NKVD, MGB and the KGB, but never changed its essence. The scale and cruelty of VChK-NKVD-KGB actions were teriifying. “Liquidation” of entire classes of people, mass deportations, concentration camps, the notorious GULAG, to name just a few of them.^[6]

After Stalin’s death some changes in the structure of the service were made, but not to limit its power and influence in the country. The new rulers of the state understood, that they can’t exterminate the whole population in order to keep the country under control; and besides the Cold War was developing quickly - and so the service was reformed and reoriented to fight the external enemy (without loosening the grip inside the country, of course). It received its so well known name KGB. The new external enemy was the NATO and especially former allies, the British and the Americans. The internal enemies were the same: “bourgeois” nationalists, clerics, and dissidents.

The last two decades of the existence of the USSR were the time of a certain crisis for the KGB - both in methods and ideology. Agent networks, so efficient in the 1950s and the 1960s, diminished their significance with the technological developments of the 1970s and the 1980s.^[7] Ideologically the KGB was paralyzed by the agonizing Communist Party and could not act effectively because of the limitations applied by the Central Committee of the Communist Party.^[8] That was one of the reasons why the KGB at first supported Gorbachev’s economic reforms – the “chekists” understood that modernizing of the stale Soviet system was the only way of its survival. Only later, in 1991, when they lost control over this process, they decided to stop the reforms through the participation in the failed August putch.^[9]

Initially, the KGB was created to defend “the gains of socialism against encroachments by external and internal enemies.”^[10] It was “the arm hand of the party.” Naturally, with the collapse of the Soviet Union all “the gains of socialism” were lost. But its Cerberus remained - but what is it doing now, without strictly defined “external and internal enemies“, without limitations and control from the Central Committee of the Communist Party? With this question the history ends and the present day begins.


2. Criminals Under “Control“ of FSB.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 Russia chose the path of some political and economical liberalization. This meant restructuring of the KGB, and seemingly the limitation of its powers. It was several times renamed with the final name the FSB and three services: Frontier Guards, Foreign Intelligence Service and Federal Agency of Governmental Communication and Information (FAPSI in Russian) were taken out of control of FSB. Several former departments of KGB also formed Presidential Security Service, Federal Guarding Service and Head Administration of the Special Programs of the President.^[11] Nonetheless, the backbone was not destroyed and the FSB was given time to recover. A lot of former KGB officers had to quit, were fired or transferred to other agencies because of restructuring and reorganization. A most of those, who no longer wore uniforms, became businessmen and politicians. But losing their job didn’t mean loosing their connections, and a wide spreading of the former KGB officers allowed the FSB to build a large network all over the country, and thus achieve control over numerous aspects of social and political life in Russia.

On the other hand, the demise of the Soviet Union brought chaos and destabilization to the society and offered unique possibilities to gain power and money to those, who were able to use them. And those circumstances made that time both very dangerous and very promising for the secret service of Russia. A major destabilization of economical and political situation in Russia led to general criminalization of the society. The FSB tried, and successfully, take the criminal situation in Russia under control. But not in the sense of legal prosecution of criminals. The agency became an integral part of the Russian criminal world and took a row of very power full gangs under protection and formed some of its own, usually using both former and actual officers and criminals.

The method of taking economical control over businesses was usually the same. After criminals or racketeers had attacked a certain business, the representatives of secret services showed up and offered help out of the situation. After that the business lost its independency completely. It usually received financial credits and licenses to operate in a profitable field of economy, but in return most of the money was collected by the secret service, which also integrated more and more of its agents in the structure of the business.^[12]

One if the most well know examples of this type of mixed FSB-criminal groups was Maxim Lazovsky’s gang. The trail of their case was finished in July 2002; by that time the most significant of the gang members, including Maxim Lazovsky himself, were dead. The sentence seemed to satisfy only higher officials but neither press, nor public were too happy about it.

The court was looking over the events of the past ten years, beginning 1992, when in October one of the former partners of Lazovsky’s firm “Lanako” was killed. In the period from 1992 till 1996, when Lazovsky was first arrested, he is said to have organized and sometimes participated in numerous murders, including the killing of his business and criminal partner Atlan Nataev and his brother Seid Nataev in September 1994, shootings in “Dagmos” restaurant, when 7 members of a Dagestan organized criminal gang were killed, killing of the director of the Tuapse oil refinery and many more. This would be quite an ordinary criminal case, if not for a couple of unordinary circumstances, information about which was gathered by the investigators.

First, at least six officers of the FSB were a part of the gang. Numerous evidences point at that fact that most of the high-rank members of the gang, including Lazovsky himself, had official documents of the FSB, the FAPSI and the External Intelligence Service; in the testimonies of the witnesses and the defendants during and before court trial this fact is clearly stated.^[13] “Your honor, they worked under protection of the FSB. Lazovsky had field officers in the staff of his firm “Lanako,” all the fighters had official documents… Atlan Nataev, whom Lazovsky sentenced to death, was taken to the place of execution by the FSB officers. The same officers were present at the scene of the shooting of Atlan’s brother Seid.” This is a quote from a testimony of one of the former fighters of Lazovsky’s gang, Vladimir Bolshakov.

When Lazovsky was detained and arrested for the first time in February 1996, along with him was detained a major of the Moscow FSB Aleksei Umashkin and his subordinates, the officers Karpychev and Mehkov. This fact, and many other similar facts, when FSB officers were seen in presence of criminals arouse suspicion of Russian parliament’s deputy Yuri Schekochikhin, who sent a deputy’s inquiry to the FSB, demanding investigation. The answers were rather unclear: the FSB director (at that time) Kovalev named a lack of professionalism and field experience as reasons of this incident.^[14] Did he mean to say that, if Umashin and the others were more professional they wouldn’t get caught? In any case, the lack of those demanded qualities didn’t bother the leaders of the FSB when they promoted Umashkin to the rank of lieutenant colonel in 1999.

Sergey Trostanetsky, in whose apartment Lazovsky and the others were arrested in 1996, clearly stated in his testimony to the court, that Lazovsky was an FSB officer and that the actions of the gang were discussed in the FSB headquarters. He also confirmed the fact that FSB officers met Lazovsky in the airport of Tuapse, where he came for the negotiations with A. Vasilenko, the director of oil refinery, who was later killed by his gang. Besides that he described an episode, that had happened to his a few day before the court: several people met him by his house, took him to Lubyanka FSB office, where one of the higher officers warned him not to go and testify in the court about anything, that concerned Lazovsky and his group.^[15]

No investigation of the fact of participation of the FSB officers in a criminal gang was undertaken. Those, who tried to do it, the vice-director of the FSB at that time A.Trofimov, for example, were removed from the secret service.^[16]

Second, the group is accused of organizing and executing of violent explosions in Moscow. One, on November 18, 1994, on a railway bridge, when it was almost destroyed and a sapper himself was blown up in the air, and the second, on December 27, 1994, in a public bus, though nobody was hurt except for the driver. The first question one might ask those explosions, why would a simple criminal racketeering gang undertake such an obviously unprofitable for them action? On the other hand, those accidents received a wide publicity and became if not a spark, than at least on of the wires in the ignition of the First Chechen War, for the first who were blamed were Chechen terrorists.

Witnesses and action figures of the explosions, though, clearly point at the FSB. In particular, M. Sosedov, a friend and a roommate of V. Akimov, the driver for the both explosions, testified that Akimov told him that when the group had arrived at the railroad bridge, the executioner, Schelenkov, double-checked the details with somebody from the the FSB by the name Vladimir over the cell phone. He also said, that Akimov suspected, that the fact, that Schelenkov was blown up with his bomb was not a mistake, neither an accident but that he was killed, because of the argument he had with Lazovsky about those actions being unprofitable for the gang. This suspicion is based on the fact that there were two remote controls for the bomb.^[17]

Lazovsky himself was killed on April 28, 2000, soon after the second order for his arrest was issued. It seems that somebody didn’t want him to say more than he had already said; or maybe this somebody just got tired of taking care of the unfortunate businessman. However, there is another version that says that the person killed was not Lazovsky, but his double because the description and the protocol from the scene of the crime are very unclear.^[18]

Taking all those facts into consideration the court decided that only two out five living leaders of the gang would be sentenced to prison; one for four (murder and racketeering) and one for 13 years (also murder and racketeering). The words “FSB” and “terrorism” were never even mentioned in the verdict. It turns that terrorism and organized crime are quite safe activities in Russia for those who found themselves protectors in the secret services (or happen to be officers of these services). That is why this gang is only one out of a long row of the most notorious and sanguinary gangs, all under “control” of the FSB. This particular one attracted our attention because it was connected with one more side of shady FSB activities - terrorism and explosions.

3. Terrorists In Uniforms.

In September 1999 the whole Russia was grievous and outraged at the same time: a row of horrible tragedies froze every heart. On September 4, 1999 in Buinaksk, Dagestan, an explosion in an apartment building killed 62 people. Five days later, on September 9, an explosion destroyed a house in Moscow resulted in the death of 94 people and injures of 164. Then, on September 13 another apartment building in Moscow was blown up with 119 victims this time, and, finally, the September 16 brought the fourth tragedy when a similar explosion of a building in Volgodonsk killed 17 innocent people.

Nobody until this moment has taken responsibility for these actions. But Russian officials have made their minds very quickly accusing Chechen terrorists, who else? And the Second Chechen War immediately bursts out. It was called this time an anti-terrorist operation. Chechnya was bombed again and more peaceful people died. At the same time popularity of a new Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, who promised to find and destroyed terrorists by any means necessary, grew very fast.

It is a well-known fact, that in politics, if one wants to find who is responsible for this or that accident, one should see who benefited from it. It is doubtful that destroyed Chechen towns and burnt Chechen villages are the benefit the terrorists were looking for; and the military response of Russia to explosions of the houses was the only possible variant and nobody would expect anything else. The fact that the Chechens never took responsibility for the terrorist acts makes these acts senseless. Who needs a statement without a speaker? Wouldn’t it be more reasonable for the Chechens to strike at the military objects and regiments that were being gathered at the borders of Chechnya during the summer of 1999, and not transport explosives to Moscow, which is 1500 miles away?

But those questions are not the last ones that occurred concerning those explosions. In fact, there was supposed to be another explosion on September 22, in Ryazan, but it was prevented by the local citizens and security forces. This incident was also the main reason why the FSB became one of the suspects in this case.

Late in the evening of September 22, 1999 one of the tenants of an apartment building in Ryazan noticed three persons unloading a car near the entrance to the basement. The car raised his suspicion and he called the police. When the police arrived they found three big bags of explosives (hexogen - according to the results of preliminary expertise) and a detonator. People were evacuated and had to spend a night on the street and in a neighboring movie theater. None of those who were there doubted that the situation bore a lethal danger.^[19]

The next day Prime Minister Putin expressed his satisfaction of how people reacted to the situation and helped to prevent a terrorist attack. Moscow mayor Luzhkov suggested that security services intensify their work in his city. And the same day Russian Air Forces initiated a bombing of Grozny’s airport, which Putin commented, “If the terrorists are at the airport we will strike at them at the airport.” It seems that he already knew where the terrorists were.^[20] But they happened to be somewhere else.

At the same time the police and the local office of the FSB in Ryazan were on high alert and performing necessary actions to catch terrorists. The result came the very same night when one of the employees of the Ryazan telephone-telegraph station intercepted a call from Ryazan to a Moscow telephone station serving the headquarters of the FSB. The topic of the conversation was a possible way of escape from Ryazan for three individuals. After the initial number was detected the Ryazan FSB and police prepared to detain possible terrorists.

It was in the morning of September 24, 1999. In Moscow a strange thing happened at that time. Minister of Internal Affairs Rushailo congratulated all the members of security services with prevention of an act of terrorism in Ryazan. A half an hour later director of the FSB Patrushev made an official statement, in which he said that the incident in Ryazan was not a terrorist attack rather it was an exercise of the FSB and that there were no explosives, and the detonator was a plaster cast.

This, of course, makes us face another set of questions. Why did he have to wait for two days to reveal this fact, letting his Prime Minister, his colleague from the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Moscow mayor make fools of themselves? (The FSB had a chance to do that because the day before, on September 23 the director of the FSB Public Relations Department general Zdanovich participated in a popular TV program and didn’t say a word about exercises.) Why did he name this incident an exercise right when the possible terrorists were about to get arrested? How was it possible that preliminary expertise found a trace of hexogen in the bags? Who gave Patrushev the authority to exercise on civilians and use real explosives during this exercise? The deeper one goes into details of this case the more questions like these he faces.

The answers given by the FSB are either uncertain or unclear or both at the same time. On the other hand, if we assume that FSB did organize or at least participate in the explosions, all the answers form a clear picture.

The operation in Rayzan was a failure. The explosives were discovered but still the FSB could boast about preventing a terrorist attack. And when the local Ryazan FSB suddenly (not knowing about the plans of their Moscow leaders) found the base of the terrorists and was about to arrest them, Patrushev directed to stop the operation and called it all an exercise. That is why neither the Minister of Internal Affairs, nor the mayor of Moscow knew about the “exercise.“ That is why this prevented explosion was the last case of this kind in a whole row of them because failed once, FSB didn’t want to repeat itself.

They only question remained is whether Putin knew about the actions of his minister, hidden and open. If he did, he must have participated in them. Because he obviously benefited from what happened because the explosions gave him a formal reason to begin an anti-terrorist war in Chechnya, which made him a national hero and after that the President of Russia. And that is the reason why there was no further investigation of numerous publications in press concerning participation of the FSB in the terrorist acts. If he didn’t, it means that he doesn’t control anything in the country he rules, because otherwise his actions should have been to fire Patrushev immediately after this scandal (he is still working) and initiate investigation.

Later more evidences proving this hypothesis were found and published. Among them is a testimony of Nikita Chekulin, a former head of an explosive-making factory in Russia, now seeking political asylum in Great Britain, clearly pointing at the leaders of the FSB. Similar statement was made by the members of execution groups who took part in Moscow explosions, Achemez Gochiyaev, Usuf Krymshamhalov and Zaur Batchaev. They also say that Maxim Lazovsky (see “Criminals Under “Control” Of FSB) was involved in the incidents in Moscow and Volgodonsk.^[21]

The explosions that happened two years ago keep taking human lives. On April 17, 2003 a deputy of Duma (Russian Parliament) and a vice-president of the Duma Committee for Investigation of September 1999 Explosions Sergey Yushenkov was killed in Moscow a few days after he came back from London, where he received important evidences from Chekulin.^[22]

His death became the last known episode in a long row of political murders in Russia after Galina Starovoitova and Vladimir Golovlev fell the victims of their tendency to speak and act against the will of the secret services. Though the FSB insists that the motives of the killings were strictly commercial, the fact that the victims of three most discussed murders in the past years were all representatives of liberal, democratic parties makes it looks like the FSB was just getting rid of political opponents. The absurd of the situation is obvious though the killers investigate the crime themselves.

Under these circumstances there is no surprise, that the trail on this case is over, and the FSB managed to find some phony Chechens who took the blame, but still a lot of questions remain unanswered.

4. The President Understands Freedom Of Speech Differently

In 2000 Russia changed its President and for the first time in more than 1000 years of Russian history this event was based seemingly on the principals of democracy and was held in accordance with the laws. Does that mean that Russia has finally acquired democracy and that the new leader will respect all the human right and liberties? We would like to believe so, but President Putin’s actions tell a different story.

Lets see how Mr. Putin began his ruling. On May 7, 2000 President Vladimir Putin was inaugurated; but what happened four days later made everybody think, “It has began.” On May 11 the head the officers of the FSB and employees of the General Procurator’s office searched office of the biggest independent mass-media company in Russia “Media-MOST”. It was done in a course of investigation of a criminal case of invasion of privacy, opened against the company. The true reasons of this attack are quite different: Putin was very unsatisfied with the way the TV channel NTV and other companies forming “Media-MOST” spoke about war in Chechnya and his own past as a KGB officer. He was very unpleased with the fact that the journalists working for the company were trying to investigate FSB’s attempt to blow up an apartment building in Ryazan and obviously considered the general note of the sound of the company dangerous for him and his power.^[23]

It is also a known fact that the secret services of Russia made plans to get rid of the president of the “Media-MOST” Vladimir Gusinsky, who was not only a businessman but also a very important civil and human rights activist; in particular, in 1996 he became one of the founders of Russian Jewish Congress and became its president. Also four months before the attack he was elected a vice-president of the World Jewish Congress.^[24] It is also known that he supported the liberal democratic party “Yabloko”, opposed to Putin and his regime. That’s why in 1999, when Putin was still a director of the FSB, a decision was made to “squeeze” Gussinsky and another big shot in mass media Boris Berezovsky, also a person of the Jewish origin out of Russia.^[25]

In fact, the purge of private persons who controls the media is very symptomatic. Boris Berezovsky, the former owner of the major TV company “ORT” is seeking political asylum in Great Britain and the chief of London police told a counsel in presence of his lawyers that the FSB is planning to kill him in London. Boris Berezovsky stated that Russian Secret Service FSB is a terror organization.^[26] His TV company is now under control of the state.

This process began as soon as Putin felt a solid ground of presidential power under his feet. One month after the search, on June 13, 2000, Vladimir Gussinsky was summoned to the General Procurator’s office for questioning, where he was arrested without any accusations and transferred to the Butyrskaya jail. Only a few hours later an accusation in fraud was brought against him. Three days after that he was released for a written undertaking not to leave Moscow. On July 19 all his property was arrested.

Suddenly, on July 27, all the accusations were withdrawn because of the absence of corpus delicti and Gussinsky left to Spain to his family.

What happened in the period between July 19 and July 27? Maybe General Procurator received new evidences? Something happened, indeed, but it had nothing to do with the accusations brought up against him. Everything is much more simple. On July 20 Gussinsky signed an agreement with the “Gazprom-Media”, one of the companies forming the “Gazprom Group,” the gas and oil monopolist controlled by the Russian government. According to this agreement Gussinsky gave his controlling part of the share in the “Media-MOST” to the “Gazprom-Media” and in return “Gazprom” promised discontinuing of the criminal case against Gusinsky and safety for him and his family. The formal reason for this transfer was a debt of the “Media- MOST” before the “Gazprom”.

And again, as always when one deals with information about the FSB and other security services’ activity, we face a question, How could a commercial institution ensure discontinuing of a criminal case? Despite of the seemingly impossibility it was done (which, of course, immediately raises a question about independency of judicial system in Russia). This time the FSB decided to use commercial structure, just like it chose to use criminal gangs in another case. But again this job was not finished perfectly and traces to the initiators were left.

After Gussinsky felt more secure under the protection of the Spanish flag, he tried to make sure that at least the “Gazprom-Media” doesn’t get the whole company and receive part of its debt through other financial instruments than stocks. He tried to sell 25% of his share to an independent media company. The “Gazprom” was outraged and started another criminal case of fraud again, but different circumstances. The Procurator General launched a federal and later international search for Gussinsky because he didn’t show up for a questioning as he did once and got arrested right away. Meanwhile the “Gazprom-Media” declares that the agreement signed is inefficient and the negotiations will continue, i.e. they feel that their total victory is getting close, especially after the Procurator General reopens the case closed on July 27. Gussinsky understands the danger and the “Media-MOST” sings another agreement with the “Gazprom”, but it is too late and Gussinsky gets arrested in Spain.^[27] After which the “Gazprom” say that they have no claims against Gussinsky and the “Media-MOST”. It happened due to the fact that they already had a controlling share.

This long and overcomplicated story ends predictably: the government achieves total control over the “Media-MOST,” thus taking control over the three major TV companies in Russia the “ORT“ (former owner - Berezovsky), the “NTV“ (former owner - Gussinsky) and the “RTR“ which always has been under state control.

This outcome became an indication of the total victory of the FSB over free speech in Russia. This operation has been planned and rehearsed many times. First, with Grigory Pasko, a journalist of a Vladovostok newspaper who managed to collect information about the Russian military polluting the Pacific Ocean. The fact that he worked with Japanese mass-media companies allowed the FSB to accuse him in high treason and despite the efforts of his lawyers and numerous civil societies sentence him to four years in prison.^[28]

Another similar story happened in 2000. It was meant to be a message to international mass media. One of the reporters of the Radio Liberty in Russia, Andrei Babitsky was arrested by the FSB with various accusations in February 2000. In January 2000 he agreed to be exchanged for several Russian soldiers, held by Chechens, in order to collect information about the war on the Chechen side. After he was released the FSB arrested him. He officially pointed at the political reasons of that and also stated that he warned against spreading any information about his arrest.^[29]

And then again it is not the only example when the ruling circle used the FSB and other security services to take control over businesses, there were other people and other companies, this is just the most well-known example.^[30] But the FSB is not used to being used, but it is more likely, that it pursued its purposes together in order to achieve control over mass media and manipulate the public opinion in the country.

4. The Vertical Line Of Power

No doubt that President Putin is looking for the support in the military and secret services, especially the FSB. This is understandable due to the fact that he came from that service, knows its structure and is closely connected to its leaders. Paying back their loyal support he recently boosted up their powers.

In 2000 seven Federal Districts were formed, and their territory coincided with the territory of military districts in Russia. The heads of those districts are assigned by the President of Russia and most of them wear uniforms.^[31] On March 11, 2003 President Putin signed a decree according to which the services of the Frontier Guards and the Federal Agency of Governmental Communication and Information (FAPSI) returned under the ruling of the FSB, which lost them after major KGB reforms in the beginning of the 1990s. Dominion over the border guards will hand the FSB control of more than 100,000 troops, as well as artillery, boats, and planes and the integration of the FAPSI into its structure will give them extended recourses for electronic intelligence gathering, including telephone and Internet monitoring.

President also formed another security agency, an analogue of the American DEA and assigned a former KGB officer Victor Cherkesov to be the head. Before that Cherkesov was the head of North-Western Federal District.^[32]

Duma Deputy Sergey Yushenkov, recently killed in Moscow (see “Terrorists In Uniforms”) said the FSB reorganization represents a dangerous tendency in which the authorities are extending control over the public's actions and thoughts. "This, in fact, signals the rebirth of the KGB. It signals the strengthening of control over the activity of active citizens, first of all, in the sphere of politics, as well as business. The concentration of information and enforcement resources in one agency effectively signals the liquidation of freedoms and the previously confirmed separation of power between the branches of power in our system," Yushenkov said.^[33]

In 1992 President Yeltsin tried to recreate a secrete service similar to the KGB from the agency, but the Constitutional Court decided that it would disagree with the Constitution. In 1998 the Security Council of Russia decided to optimize the structure of the security forces, which numbered almost fifteen organizations instead of the KGB, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of Defense.

Experts say that the main reason of the FSB’s usurpation of power is a lack of civil control over its activities.^[34] It is also the reason of numerous bloody incidents in the past ten years that could be prevented if the FSB had any limitations in their activities. Now the hope for such limitations is almost gone.

5. Profitable Deal

Another big question that appears concerning the activity of the FSB is usually worded like this. What if it is all true and they really have committed those terrible crimes but who sponsored all that? Could they make enough money for terrorist attacks, presidential campaign and other expensive projects just by controlling racketeering gangs? It is hardly possible.

All terrorists interact with each other and each side tries to profit from those interactions. One of the examples of those profitable for the FSB situations is a delivery of various weapons, including missile technology, and scientists to Iran.

Russia inherited a mutual military cooperation agreement with Iran from the Soviet Union. Since than Russia has supplied Iran with military equipment and services for more than $4 billion. Between 1992 and 2000, Russia sold Iran 3 Kilo-class submarines, over 200 T-72 tanks, 10 Su-24 and 8 MiG-29 aircraft. Moreover, Iran has acquired licenses for the production of T-72C and BMP-2 armored fighting vehicles.^[35]

Despite of numerous reports of Israeli and US intelligences that the Russian government insists has been no significant transfer of missile technology to Tehran, although it admits that Iran has actively tried to acquire Russian technology and that some individual Russian specialists may have worked in the Iranian missile program. Russian officials have repeatedly insisted that Russia is fulfilling its obligations under the Missile Technology Control Regime and President Yeltsin in 1997 has "categorically denied" US allegations of supplying Iran with missile components and technologies.^[36]

In July 1998, under the pressure from the Clinton administration, the Russian Government Commission on Export Control launched an investigation of nine companies and institutions suspected of violating Russian export control laws. However, the list of enterprises investigated by the Russian government does not include the FSB that Western and Israeli sources have charged with complicity in covert transfers of Russian missile technology to Iran.

In March 1998, an article in Russia's Novaya gazeta, which included an interview with a Russian specialist whom Iranian agents had attempted to recruit, raised concerns over the deliberate acquiescence, or even active involvement, of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) in recruitment of Russian experts for work on Iranian missiles. In April 1998, an article in the Washington Post, citing “Russian and diplomatic sources,” reported that the FSB had quietly recruited Russian missile experts for work in the Iranian missile program. According to this report, once the specialists were recruited, they negotiated their own contracts with Iran, in order to allow the Russian security agency and the Russian government to deny involvement in the deals. The article also cited a Russian official as saying that the government now intends to stop the practice and restrict travel to Iran by Russian experts. The scope and recipients of these alleged FSB efforts, and their relationship, if any, to FSB enforcement of Russian export controls, cannot be determined.

In January 2002 Vadim Varobey, one of the professors of Moscow Aviation Institute told The Washington Post some details on his work with the Iran military system. In the mid-1990s Russian science was desperate for money and the FSB used that to offer significant sums of money to Russian educational institutions and scientists for lectures in Iran, training of Iranian students in Russia and work for military projects in Iran. When Vorobei first began traveling to Tehran in 1996 his passport was arranged officially through the Foreign Ministry and the state security service, the FSB.

According to Yevgenia Albats, a prominent Moscow journalist who has studied Russian missile proliferation, the FSB officials routinely took commissions from Iranian procurement agents in return for facilitating the travel arrangements of Russian experts. Some Western intelligence officials believe this indicated high-level Kremlin approval for missile cooperation with Iran.^[37]

In 1995, Russia and the United States reached an agreement in the framework of the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission under which Russia agreed not to complete new arms deals with Iran after fulfilling all its current contractual obligations in exchange for lifting some U.S. restrictions on high-technology exports to Russia. But the business turned out to be too profitable for the FSB and when Putin became President he could not betray the FSB and decided to abrogate the Gore-Chernomydin understanding and failed to halt arms sales to Iran. It appears that in early November 2000 Russia informed Washington that it was to withdraw from its commitments not to supply Iran with conventional weapons because of the profits to be made from further sales to Iran.^[38]

At this time Russian officials, including officers of the security services is still reported to have contacts with Iranian military programs thus posing a threat to the international community.

6. FSB Control Over Religion and Ethnic Issues

The struggling between the FSB and Russian media moguls and the FSB’s dirty deals with the Middle Eastern terrorists seems to be matters of high politics that have little to do with common people and their lives. But the FSB clearly understands that in order to achieve total control over the country it shouldn’t neglect even the smallest bursts of free thought in Russia and immediately oppress anything that’s trying to act against their will. The oppression of various human rights is a significant part of the FSB’s activity and they pay attention even to relatively small incidents, especially when it concerns civil and religious life. The FSB continues the old KGB tradition and is very interested in Russia’s religious life and ethnic developments.

The FSB intervened openly into an ethnic conflict in the late summer of 1994 when the head of the agency Sergei Stepashin persuaded President Yeltsin that an attack on Grozny, the Chechen capital, would overthrow its rebellious president, Dzhokhar Dudayev, almost overnight and bring Chechnya back under direct control from Moscow.[39] It was a start of an almost decade bloodshed initiated by the FSB.

In January 2000 President Putin gave the operational control over Chechen republic to the FSB by the presidential decree. Since then numerous human rights organizations report tortures, disappearing of people and executions in Chechnya. The FSB is directly accused of arresting and then killing innocent people, pillages and other violations during “purges” in Chechnya. Some local officials tried to send in for the resignation as a protest against cruelty of military forces and the FSB in their regions.^[40]

Some, like Malika Umazheva, the mayor of Akhal-Kala village, were not even given a chance to do so. She was killed on December 1, 2002, reportedly by the FSB forces in Chechnya. She was a type of person who thought about her people first, not about complying with demands of higher officials. She refused to cover up thefts, document frauds and other violations of higher ranks of Chechen administration. The FSB could not find or produce any compromising documents and couldn’t simply fire her, because she was largely supported by the villagers - so the only way to get rid of her was a bullet^[41]. It became another political killing in Russia, not as well known as the cases of Galina Starovoitova, Vladimir Golovlev or the resent killing of Sergey Yushenkov, but it proved again that the profession of politician in Russia is lethally dangerous.

To a certain degree it’s true for any kind of social life in Russia controlled by the FSB. Religion is, of course, no exception. And the intense interest of the secret services to the religious life in Russia is quite understandable - if they manage to achieve control over church it will give them access to the very souls and minds of the churchgoers.

It is well know fact that a considerable number of Russian Orthodox priests were the agents of KGB in the Soviet times. Many still call the Russian Orthodox Church just a department of the FSB.^[42] Being so closely bound historically they find not problems cooperating with each other. But relatively new churches and confessions sometimes face significant problems and are closely watched by the FSB.

The Church of Scientology, as well as Jehovah’s Witnesses, the Unification Church and other western religious mission and organizations became targets of a humiliating mass-media campaign, organized by the FSB. They were called “totalitarian sects” and their leaders were accused of illegal medical practice and commercial activity, and brainwashing their members. After that the FSB started investigation of those reports and started a number of criminal cases. They failed to prove anything illegal, but the churches had to deal with serious obstacles and difficulties.^[43]

But not only western religious organizations face those problems in Russia - a native True Orthodox Church, formed in the 1920s as an opposition to the Russian Orthodox Church, that started cooperating with the communist security services, is jeopardized too. First, the FSB collected information and along with the Ministry of the Internal Affairs released a document, which named the True Orthodox Church, along with the Jehovah's Witnesses, the Unification Church, the Church of Christ of the Latter Day Saints and the New Apostolic Church as elements which contributed to the general disorder of society and whose activities were undesirable.

This was a written threat to those churches. Then it came to physical threats. On January 8, 1997 a True Orthodox Church bishop Amvrosi Von Sievers was detained in Moscow by the FSB officers, pushed into a car and taken out of the city to a forest, where he was searched and beaten up and after that released. There were also reports of disappearing of priests and members of the Church.^[44]

Through all the FSB is trying to gain the maximum level of control over social and religious life in Russia (meaning control over the minds and souls of Russian citizens) in order to manipulate them as desired.

7. Conclusion

The FSB is responsible for a number of terrible tragedies in Russia including explosions, murders, shady commercial activities and violation of various human rights and liberties. It also acquired enormous political benefits from those actions. One of the benefactors is President Putin, while others control various fields of economical, social and political life. It gives the agency large possibilities of influencing all aspects of life in Russia and further expansion its power and control and the FSB uses them to full extent.

Now it is hard to say, if this process can be reversed or not, but one thing is quite clear - while the present state of things remains it is absolutely impossible to speak about Russia as a democratic country, and the rights and liberties and possibly the very life of every Russian citizen and those who visit the country are in danger and even being a member of a security service doesn’t ensure one’s safety, because the activities of the FSB and other secret services under control of the FSB find no limits neither from the laws, nor from civil controlling organizations which makes their power in the country overwhelming and their ambitions gigantic.

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^[1] Stands for Federal’naia Sluzhba Bezopasnosti (Federal Security Service) in Russian.

[2] John Barron. KGB: The Secret Work of the Soviet Secret Agents. New York: Reader’s Digest Press, p. 1.

[3] The term ‘chekist’ derives from the name of the first Soviet secret service VChK and means a member of the agency. This term was romanticized in the Soviet Union and preserved until today.

^[4] J. M. Waller The Secret History of the KGB 1999 News World Communications, Inc.

^[5] Aileen O'Carroll The Cheka during the Russian revolution (notes for a talk given in Dublin, March 11th 1992)

^[6] J. M. Waller The Secret History of the KGB 1999 News World Communications, Inc.

^[7] Ibid.

^[8] Mikhail Makeev. Interview with Filipp Bobkov: Subversive Nature of the Cold War Russian Who Is Who Magazine #6 (15) 1999.

^[9] Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty Researcher Says “KGB Lost To History” http://www.rferl.org/welcome/english...kgb980616.html

^[10] J. M. Waller The Secret History of the KGB 1999 News World Communications, Inc.

^[11] A. Litvinenko, U. Feltshinsky. Blowing Up Russia. Liberty Publishing House, Inc., 2002.

^[12] A. Litvinenko, U. Feltshinsky Blowing Up Russia 2002 Liberty Publishing House, Inc.

^[13] Georgiy Rozhnov Cleaners Novaya Gazeta 07.18.2002

^[14] A. Litvinenko, U. Feltshinsky Blowing Up Russia 2002 Liberty Publishing House, Inc.

^[15] Goergiy Rozhnov Lazovsky Was An FSB Officer Novaya Gazeta 04.01.2002

^[16]A. Litvinenko, U. Feltshinsky Blowing Up Russia 2002 Liberty Publishing House, Inc.

^[17]Goergiy Rozhnov Lazovsky Was An FSB Officer Novaya Gazeta 04.01.2002

^[18]Dmitry Muratov Terrorists Requested $3,000,000 For The Testimony Novaya Gazeta 12.09.2002

^[19]A. Litvinenko, U. Feltshinsky Blowing Up Russia 2002 Liberty Publishing House, Inc.

^[20]Ibid.

^[21]Dmitry Muratov Terrorists Requested $3,000,000 For The Testimony Novaya Gazeta 12.09.2002

^[22]Sergey Antonov General Procurator’s Office Received A Package From London Nezavisimaya Gazeta 04.23.2003

^[23]Jorg Metke Brutally And Vindictively Der Spiegel #7 2001

^[24]Grani.ru Curriculum Vitae Of Vladimir Gusinsky

^[25]Dmitry Muratov Terrorists Requested $3,000,000 For The Testimony Novaya Gazeta 12.09.2002

^[26]Agency Caucasus Berezovsky: FSB Is A Terror Organization 03.04.2003

^[27]Polit.ru MOST-Kokh-Procurator: take-2

^[28]Agentura.ru FSB Against Pasko 01.09.2002

^[29]Vitaliy Romanov Babitsky Thinks He Was Held Prisoner By FSB Segodnya #47 03.02.2000

^[30]Newsru.com/Itogi Another Episode Of “Mask-Show” 02.11.2001

^[31]Lydia Andrusenko The Vertical Line Of Power Is Strengthened By “Forces” Nezavisimaya Gazeta 08.02.2000

^[32]Gregory Feifer Russia: President Boosts Powers Of Security Services Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/20...2003181150.asp

^[33]Ibid.

^[34]Polit.ru A Reform Of Forces By Putin - Strengthening Of FSB.

^[35]Oksana Antonenko Russia’s Military Involvement In The Middle East MERIA Journal Volume 5, No 1, March 2001

^[36]Interfax, 26 September 1997; Yeltsin Rejects US Nuclear, Missile Iran Transfer Charge FBIS-SOV-97-269.

^[37]Michael Dobbs Collapse Of The Soviet Union Proved Boon For Iranian Missile Program The Washington Post, 01.13.2002

^[38]Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty Newsline, Part I, 27 November 2000, quoting Vremya Novostei and Nezavisimaya Gazeta.

[39] Christopher Andrew, Vasili Mitrokhin. The Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive and the Secret History of the KGB. Basic Books, 1999, p. 563.

^[40]HRI.ru Reports Of The Human Rights Watch On Chechnya February 2002

^[41]Anna Politkovskaya Liquidation For A Lack Of Comromising Info Novaya Gazeta 12.23.2002

^[42]Vesti.ee ONPE Lost The Orthodox Church 06.21.2001

^[43]Galina Krylova Controversies about the Church of Scientology in Russia. Legal Methods of Defense of the Right for Freedom of Religion Report on a 2001 Conference of the Center For Studies On New Religions

^[44]Xenia Dennen Persecution Of The True Orthodox Church Today: Russian Authorities Use Repressive Methods Of Soviet Past The Shepherd, April 1997

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