China’s Emerging Arctic Policy

China’s Emerging Arctic Policy

China has a clear (though as yet unwritten) strategy for the Arctic

December 14, 2016

China’s recent construction of a research station in Iceland has once again generated interest as to what China’s Arctic ambitions are. Indeed, the Chinese government has yet to publish its official Arctic policy, in contrast to other major players in the Arctic, such as the United States and the European Union. Consequently there has been much speculation as to what China’s plans are for the Arctic.

Given China’s growing Arctic interests, it ought to articulate its objectives. To allay the concerns of Arctic States, high-level Chinese diplomats have started to publicly articulate what China sees as its role in the region.

At the third Arctic Circle Assembly in Reykjavik, Iceland in 2015, Zhang Ming, China’s vice minister of foreign affairs, delivered a keynote speech titled “China in the Arctic: Practices and Policies.” The following year, Gao Feng, China’s chief negotiator for climate change, gave another speech about China’s view on Arctic cooperation at the fourth Arctic Circle Assembly. Furthermore, Xu Hong, head of the Department of Legal Affairs in China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, talked about China’s view on Arctic economic development at the sixth International Meeting of Representatives of Arctic Council Member States, Observer States, and Foreign Scientific Community, hosted by the Russian Federation between August 29 and September 2 of this year. Though not published in a single document, these speeches evidence an emerging Chinese Arctic Policy.

What does China’s Arctic policy look like? What does it mean for the Arctic?

China now clearly identifies itself as a “near-Arctic State” and a major stakeholder in the Arctic. China believes that the changing environment and resources of the Arctic have a direct impact on China’s climate, environment, agriculture, shipping, and trade as well as its social and economic development. China also has the political will to contribute to shaping Arctic governance.

The three main pillars of China’s Arctic policy are respect, cooperation, and “win-win” solutions. First, China respects the rights of the Arctic States and indigenous people as enshrined in international law. This means China recognizes the sovereignty, sovereign rights, and jurisdiction of Arctic States under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. In return, China would seek recognition of its own legitimate rights in the Arctic under international law. For example, China enjoys certain freedoms in the high seas portions of the marine Arctic, such as the freedoms of navigation, overflight, research, and fishing. China has expressed its intention not to challenge the existing governance regime in the Arctic. Rather, China would prefer to be involved in shaping the development of Arctic governance to China’s benefits. This is evidenced by China’s accession to the Arctic Council, the most important regional forum for discussion of Arctic issues, as an observer.

Second, China wants to be involved in collaboration for Arctic development and to share the fruits of such a partnership. China reiterates that Arctic issues are comprehensive, multi-level, and interconnected. It therefore argues that Arctic collaboration should expand from scientific cooperation to all Arctic issues such as the environment, climate change, sustainable development, and cultural and human resources exchange. It is also interesting to note that China believes a better institutional system could be put in place for sustainable development in the Arctic through diversified cooperation.


Third, China now has the funding, technology, and the market to be of interest to the Arctic States. China is also a potential user of the Northern Sea Route, a set of marine routes from Russia’s Kara Gate (south of Novaya Zemlya) in the west to the Bering Strait in the east. In 2014, China hosted the fifth World Reindeer Herders Congress in Beijing. This is a good example of how China is working to bridge the gap between traditional industries in the Arctic and the vast Chinese market. To build on this however, political trust and mutual respect need to be enhanced to achieve win-win business cooperation between China and the Arctic States.

Though China has a clear (albeit unwritten) Arctic policy, it is still improving its capacity to play more than just a symbolic role in Arctic affairs. To date, it has just one Arctic research station (Yellow River) in the Norwegian archipelago of Svalbard. In contrast, China has four research stations in Antarctica, with a fifth on the way. If we look into Chinese practice in Arctic-related decision-making processes, such as the adoption of International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters (Polar Code) within the International Maritime Organization and the current negotiations on regulation of fisheries in high seas portions of the central Arctic Ocean, China is generally quiet and collaborative. China rarely poses a confronting position during negotiations. In a similar vein, China is likely to be a collaborative partner in the Arctic. The key objective of China’s Arctic Policy is not to be left behind in the changing governance of the resource-rich North Pole.

China’s Increasing Role in the Arctic

February 11, 2020

America’s interests in the Arctic region will only increase in the coming years. As other nations devote resources and assets in the region to secure their national interests, America cannot afford to fall behind. The U.S. must champion an agenda that advances its national interest and devotes the required national resources to the Arctic region. With the focus on China’s dubious and aggressive claims of sovereignty in the South China Sea, massive infrastructure investments in Central Asia and Africa, and trade war with the U.S., it is easy to overlook another aspect of Beijing’s activities in the Arctic. The Administration must continue to monitor China’s activity in the region, promote economic freedom in the Arctic, and refuse to recognize China’s self-proclaimed status as a “near Arctic-State.”

“Near Arctic State”

In the simplest terms, China sees the Arctic region as another place in which to advance its economic interests and expand its diplomatic influence. As a non-Arctic country, China is mindful that its ambitions in international Arctic institutions are naturally limited, but this has not stopped Beijing from increasing its economic presence in the region.

China’s Arctic strategy published in 2018 offers a useful glimpse into how Beijing views its role in the region. (State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, “China’s Arctic Policy,” White Paper, January 26, 2018, http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/wh...6026660336.htm (accessed January 23, 2020).)

Running 5,500 words in its English translation, the strategy is littered with all the Arctic-related buzzwords, such as “common interests of all countries,” “law-based governance,” “climate change,” and “sustainable development.” The irony is not lost on observers of the South China Sea, where China has shunned international norms to claim sovereignty, or the fact that China is the world’s largest emitter of greenhouse gases.

Even though China’s closest point to the Arctic Circle is more than 800 nautical miles away, Beijing refers to itself as a “near Arctic State” —a term made up by Beijing and not found in the lexicon of Arctic discourse. In fact, extending Beijing’s logic to other countries would mean that Belarus, Estonia, Germany, Ireland, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, and the United Kingdom are also “near Arctic” states. These are hardly the countries that one imagines when thinking about the Arctic. As Secretary of State Mike Pompeo has said: “There are Arctic states, and non-Arctic states. No third category exists. China claiming otherwise entitles them to exactly nothing.” (Radio Canada International, “US Stuns Audience by Tongue-Lashing China, Russia on Eve of Arctic Council Ministerial,” May 6, 2019, https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/ar...il-ministerial (accessed January 23, 2020).)

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China’s Motivation

But even with its self-professed and exaggerated role in the Arctic, China does have legitimate interests in the region. After all, China is a global trading nation with the world’s second-largest economy. It holds a permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council. China is motivated be an Arctic actor for five primary reasons:

1) New Shipping Routes. China is unique in modern times in being a continental power that is almost entirely dependent on the sea for food and energy. (Dean Cheng, “The Importance of Maritime Domain Awareness for the Indo–Pacific Quad Countries,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3392, March 6, 2019, https://www.heritage.org/global-poli...quad-countries.) New sea-lanes in the Arctic have the potential to play an important role when it comes to diversifying China’s import dependencies.

2) Economic Influence. China sees itself as a global power, and the Arctic is just another region in which to engage. China hopes to complement its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)—a vast trading network being constructed by China on the Eurasian landmass and beyond—by investing in and constructing major infrastructure projects along the emerging sea-lanes in the Arctic.

3) Scientific Research. Whether it is for China’s sea-based nuclear deterrent, natural resource extraction, or commercial shipping, research on polar high-altitude atmospheric physics, glacial oceans, bioecology, and meteorological geology is important for China’s strategic interests. As a signatory of the Svalbard Treaty, China is allowed to conduct scientific research on Svalbard and has done so since 2004 at its Arctic Yellow River Station located in Ny Ålesund. China has a total of eight scientific research stations in the Arctic. (Xian Jiangnan and Liang Jun, “China’s First North Pole Station Begins Expedition,” People’s Daily Online, May 27, 2019, http://en.people.cn/n3/2019/0527/c90000-9581728.html (accessed January 23, 2020).)

4) Laying the Groundwork for Future Military Activity in the Region. Currently, China’s military involvement in the Arctic is limited. The People’s Liberation Army Navy has never sailed into Arctic waters. However, the director of the Norwegian Intelligence Service, Lieutenant General Morten Haga Lunde, stated recently that “[i]n the long term, we must be prepared for a clearer Chinese presence also in our neighboring areas.” (Thomas Nilsen, “’We Must Be Prepared for Clearer Chinese Presence in Our Neighborhood,’” The Barents Observer, February 11, 2019, https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/se...e-presence-out (accessed January 23, 2020).) The Pentagon recently warned “that China could use its civilian research presence in the Arctic to strengthen its military presence, including by deploying submarines to the region as a deterrent against nuclear attacks.” (Phil Stewart and Idrees Ali, “Pentagon Warns of Risk of Chinese Submarines in Arctic,” Reuters, May 2, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-u...-idUSKCN1S829H (accessed January 23, 2020).)

5) Access to Minerals, Fishing, and Other Natural Resources. China also sees the Arctic region as a way to satisfy its growing demands for energy and food. China is a significant investor in Russia’s Yamal liquefied natural gas (LNG) project. Beijing received the first shipment of Yamal LNG in July 2018 and will import 3 million tons of Yamal LNG every year beginning in 2019. (Xinhuanet, “Yamal LNG Project Reaches Full Production Capacity,” December 12, 2018, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/201..._137666821.htm (accessed January 23, 2020).) The dietary needs of China’s growing population can be met partly by increased fishing in the Arctic region. (Lyle J. Goldstein, “What Does China Want with the Arctic?” The National Interest, September 7, 2019, https://nationalinterest.org/feature...t-arctic-78731 (accessed January 23, 2020).)

For now, however, China’s primary motivation in the Arctic is economic. In its Arctic strategy, China also coined the term “polar silk road.” The goal of the Polar Silk Road is to compliment China’s BRI by investing in and constructing major infrastructure projects along the emerging sea-lanes in the Arctic. (For a comprehensive overview of China’s BRI, see Jeff M. Smith, “China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Strategic Implications and International Opposition,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3331, August 9, 2018, https://www.heritage.org/asia/report...nal-opposition.)

America’s Backyard

China is also becoming more involved in America’s backyard with an eye to investing in Greenland and Iceland, although it must be pointed out that in the case of Greenland, China’s role is often greatly exaggerated. For example, China has a license for only one mine in Greenland.

The Chinese embassy in Reykjavik can accommodate a staff of up to 500 people, underscoring the importance that China places on its presence in Iceland. The U.S. embassy in Reykjavik has about 70 people. In 2013, tiny Iceland, with a population of slightly more than 330,000 people (the population size of a small Chinese town), became the first European country to sign a free trade agreement (FTA) with China. However, Iceland has so far refused formal membership in China’s BRI. (“Remarks by Vice President Pence and Prime Minister Jakobsdóttir of Iceland Before Bilateral Meeting,” The White House, September 4, 2019, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings...lavik-iceland/ (accessed January 23, 2020).)

Raising Awareness

The Trump Administration has used every available opportunity on the international stage to raise awareness of Chinese ambition in the Arctic. During a recent trip to Iceland, Vice President Mike Pence made Chinese economic activity in the Arctic one of the focal points of his visit. (Reuters, “Pence, in Visit to Iceland, to Discuss ‘Incursions’ into Arctic Circle by China, Russia: Official,” August 28, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-u...-idUSKCN1VI1QW (accessed January 23, 2020).) During the 2019 Arctic Council Ministerial meeting, Secretary Pompeo devoted a sizable amount of his speech to highlighting the threat that China poses to U.S. interests in the region, saying that “[t]he United States and Arctic nations welcome transparent Chinese investment that reflect economic interests, not national security ambitions.” (Simon Johnson, “Pompeo: Russia Is ‘Aggressive’ in Arctic, China’s Work There Also Needs Watching,” Reuters, May 6, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-f...-idUSKCN1SC1AY (accessed January 23, 2020).) To build on this awareness, the U.S. should:

Continue to raise awareness of China’s questionable ambitions. China has declared itself a “near Arctic state”—a made-up term that previously did not exist in Arctic discourse. The U.S. should work with like-minded partners in the Arctic Council to raise legitimate concerns about China’s so-called Polar Silk Road ambitions.

Check China’s desire to influence the Arctic Council. The U.S. should make sure that China does not try to exceed what it is allowed to do under its status as an observer in the Arctic Council.

Keep an eye on China’s activities in America’s backyard. So far, China’s motivation in Greenland and Iceland seems to be more about economics and less about security, but considering the massive debt that China has left in Sri Lanka, Djibouti, and elsewhere, it is only reasonable to question China’s motivations in the Arctic.

Promote economic freedom in the Arctic. Economic freedom spurs prosperity, respect for the rule of law, jobs, innovation, and economic sustainability in the Arctic region. Most important, economic freedom can help to keep the Arctic stable and secure. It should be the focal point of broader U.S. engagement in the region.

Preparing for Peace

The U.S. needs to champion an agenda that advances the U.S. national interest and devotes the required national resources to the region. These measures are not preparations for armed conflict. They are preparations for a peaceful future. With the Arctic becoming increasingly important for economic and geopolitical reasons, now is not the time for the U.S. to turn away from its own backyard.