Return of the chekists

The war on terror obscures another threat: Russian spying

October 04, 2006

America’s focus on counterterrorism could lead the country to subordinate counterintelligence to a dangerous degree, as it partners with nondemocratic countries that engage in substantial and sophisticated espionage against it. Professor and research associate Paul Goble observed recently that the U.S. is not paying attention to the threat posed by Russia, its ally in the war on terrorism.

Immediately following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Russian president and ex-foreign intelligence officer Vladimir Putin, calculating that the U.S. military would respond with force against Osama bin Laden’s Taliban hosts in Afghanistan, conveyed to President Bush that Russian forces would stand down. In an unusual convergence of interests, Moscow, Tehran and Washington all supported action to crush the Taliban and thwart the expansion of radical Sunni Islamic influence in Central Asia.

From an intelligence perspective, the warming of U.S.-Russia relations following 9/11 was remarkable. Only seven months prior, FBI Special Agent Robert Hanssen was arrested for spying for Russia and 50 known or suspected Russian intelligence officers were expelled from the U.S. Although the impact on Russian foreign intelligence was less severe than the mid-1980s Operation Famish that followed the arrest of notorious Navy spy John Walker and resulted in 100 Soviet spies being expelled from the U.S., it was, nonetheless, significant.

Putin thereafter intensified his efforts to rebuild the Russian intelligence presence in the West, using cooperation in the war on terrorism as a means of access to U.S. intelligence and military forces. His cooperation also provided the political cover needed to seed other countries with intelligence officers and agents at levels not seen since the height of the Cold War. From the Baltics to the new NATO member Eastern European countries to Latin America, the number of Russian foreign and military intelligence officers active today exceeds any period in the 20th century.

The intelligence threat emanating from Russia is growing its presence and influence by means of lucrative oil and arms deals throughout the world. Putin’s oft-expressed desire to regain for Russia the power and influence of the old Soviet Union means foreign policies and the intelligence tasking to support them are designed to reduce Western influence and subvert American political-economic goals while stealing military-technical and political-economic information.

With Russia’s manufacturing and technological base deteriorating, the most practical way for it to speed development is through espionage, using primarily human intelligence, a Russian tradition and the chekists’ long-time forte, to steal Western technology. The revelations of the 1981 Farewell case, in which KGB Col. Vladimir Vetrov revealed to French Intelligence that the Soviets had saved billions of dollars in weapons research and development through espionage from 1975-80, is instructive in this regard.

Putin, an old-school Soviet chekist (the term endures from the days of the Cheka, the secret police organization established in 1917), retains fierce loyalty to his intelligence services, which serve as his main support base, with chekists dominating the Russian government at all levels. Their political power has expanded into control over economic policy and key enterprises, with corruption reaching new heights because they closely partner with organized crime in a symbiotic relationship based on maximizing profits.

Thus, the police state that has taken shape under Putin’s tutelage is taking in billions of dollars derived from its control over strategic resources such as oil and gas and arms exports, with intelligence tasking directed toward geopolitically shaping a world that only enhances its substantial wealth and growing power. At the same time Russia has been America’s ally in the war on terrorism, the Kremlin has significantly intensified its espionage against the U.S. and its allies.

This is just a part of this report and can be read in full at......

http://www.c4isrjournal.com/story.php?F=2033937

Jag