China, just like Russia, is multiplying its political and diplomatic contacts in the Latin American countries. The two giants of communism, one Euro-Asian and the other totally Asian, are determined to consolidate positions that are subversive for inter-American democracy in the region. Right now, Chinese President, Hu Jintao, has just paid an official visit to the Republic of Costa Rica. Costa Rica is the only Central American country that has diplomatic relations with China, having broke diplomatic relations with Taiwan before establishing diplomatic ties with continental China in June 2007.
It is significant that one of the countries with more democratic prestige, not only in the Americas but also in the world, Costa Rica, has broken relations with Taiwan, the democratic China, to establish them with communist China, the gigantic Asian power.
After Costa Rica, the Chinese president, who travels with its Prime Minister and an important entourage, will visit the Cuba of the Castro brothers, the totalitarian Marxist-Leninist tyranny that soon will mark its fiftieth year in power. The travels of President Jintao, who is a communist dictator, will continue with a visit to the Republic of Perú where, as in Costa Rica, there is a democratic government. All this means that China's policies are aimed at exerting important and dangerous influence in this strategic region of the world known as the Western Hemisphere.
Cuba is returning to Russia's embrace in a foreboding way. It had lost that safe haven after the fall of the Soviet Union. However, ties between Havana and Moscow have remained, albeit in not too advantageous conditions for the Castros' tyranny. But now, for some time, it has been noticeable that Moscow is trying to reestablish its imperialist ties. Russia today is in a much better financial situation and, consequently, it is in a better position to help the Castros' tyranny, although not at the same level of the past.
China's efforts of penetration in Latin America should be followed closely. The Chinese government is spreading communism in some Latin American governments, not only to accentuate a confrontation with the first democratic power of the world, the United States of America, but also to consolidate its Marxist-Leninist penetration in those countries. And this penetration is certainly very serious for democracy in those nations.
November 20th, 2008, 17:14
vector7
Re: China's Penetration in Latin America
Beijing's thrust into Latin America
By David Shambaugh
Published: November 20, 2008 http://img.iht.com/images/dot_h.gif WASHINGTON:
History might mark the meeting last weekend of the Group of 20 nations in Washington as formal anointment of China as a major world economic power. On the heel of that historic meeting, President Hu Jintao of China heads south to Latin America to mark another milestone in China's growing power and influence.
While the principal purpose of the trip is to join 21 other leaders at the annual Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation conference in Lima, Hu's tour highlights China's growing ties in the region. Since his last Latin American tour in 2004, China has burst onto the regional stage with a flurry of investments, trade, military exchanges and diplomacy.
Latin American countries also embrace China as part of their new multidirectional diplomacy. No longer content being the "backyard" of the United States, Latin nations have reached out to Europe, Asia, Africa, the Middle East and one another in recent years. This diversified diplomacy has introduced a new set of relationships in world affairs, and China's rapid rise in these regions has made Beijing a truly global actor, if not a global power.
As such, among other consequences, the U.S.-China relationship has become more global, with Beijing's and Washington's interests intersecting in unforeseen ways.
Before arriving in Peru, Hu will visit Costa Rica and Cuba. His stop in San José, Costa Rica's capital, rewards that nation's break of diplomatic relations last year with Taiwan and could entice others in the region to follow suit. Eleven of the remaining 23 nation-states in the world that diplomatically recognize Taiwan lie in the Caribbean and Central America - the other nine are in Africa - with Paraguay and Nicaragua on the verge of changing, which could set off a cascading effect for the remaining Central American republics. Today in Opinion
Hu's stop in Havana is indicative of close ties between the two nation's ruling Communist parties. Beijing extends extensive aid to Cuba's lagging economy, has fairly extensive trade and military ties with the island and engages in regular party-to-party diplomacy with the socialist state.
China's ties with Central and South America are anchored in trade and driven by an insatiable hunger for natural resources. Trade soared eightfold, from $12.6 billion in 2000 to $102.6 billion in 2007; with growth of 47.2 percent during the first half of this year, it's likely to be in the range of $150 billion for 2008. In 2007 China's top 10 trade partners in the region were Brazil, Mexico, Chile, Argentina, Peru, Venezuela, Panama, Columbia, Costa Rica and Cuba.
Venezuela is the seventh largest source of Beijing's external oil supplies.
During his October visit to Beijing, his fifth, President Hugo Chávez agreed to double his country's daily exports of oil to 200,000 barrels per day.
The line between Beijing's aid and direct investment is a fine one. China's regional investments totaled $1.89 billion in 2007. Facilitating trade and investment is the fact that 15 Latin American countries have granted Beijing "market economy status." China signed free-trade agreements with Chile and Peru, with more in the offing.
The rise to power of leftist governments in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Paraguay and Venezuela has strengthened bilateral diplomatic relations. China established a series of "strategic partnerships" and "strategic dialogues" with a number of Latin states, and also shares a common "South-South" perspective on many global issues, particularly with Brazil.
Beijing maintains extensive party-to-party ties with political parties across the continent. Led by the Chinese Communist Party's International Department, this active feature of Chinese diplomacy abroad goes unpublicized.
Military ties are extensive, but quiet. Four members of China's leading Central Military Commission visited the continent in the last two years - more than any other region in the world - while a steady stream of Latin defense ministers visit Beijing. China also trains Latin officers in its staff academies and sells arms to Latin countries.
Educational exchanges are needed. Only two bona fide university programs in Chinese studies exist in the region - Mexico City and Buenos Aires.
Beijing's community of Latin American experts in universities, think tanks and government far outstrip their Latin counterparts, and the dearth of expertise means that Latin governments lack Chinese speakers and specialists to cope with Beijing's blitz into the region.
China is also developing cultural ties, establishing six "Confucius Institutes" across the region to increase knowledge about the country.
While ties expand rapidly in many spheres, not all is positive from the Latin American perspective. Chinese goods are dumped without duties into many markets. Mexico and Argentina have been particularly hard hit by China's flood of low-end manufacture exports. As a result, as in other parts of the world, anti-China sentiments are rising in the region.
SAN JOSE (AFP) — China and Costa Rica on Monday began talks for a free trade treaty under which the Central American nation hopes to export meat, plants, fruit and coffee to the Asian giant, officials said.
Chinese President Hu Jintao announced the talks in November, during the highest-level visit by a Chinese official to Costa Rica, a little over a year after San Jose gave up six decades of ties with Taiwan.
Costa Rica is the third Latin American country to negotiate a free trade deal with China after Chile and Peru, which concluded its deal late last year.
A major exporter of computer components, Costa Rica has dismissed fears of an invasion of Chinese products into the country as it seeks to diversify ties amid worldwide financial woes.
The first round of talks in the Costa Rican capital, recently rocked by a strong earthquake, are due to end Friday and the process is due to end before President Oscar Arias leaves office in May 2010.
"We're going to make a road map" during this time, said Costa Rican negotiator Fernando Ocampo at the start of the talks.
Costa Rica became the first country in the region to establish diplomatic ties with China on June 1, 2007.
China has steadily won over former Taiwan allies over the years as its growing economic and diplomatic clout trumps Cold War alliances.
Mr Xi, 55, is touring South America in his role as deputy president and, although it is widely acknowledged that he will be Hu Jintao's successor as China's leader, very little is known about him. Despite his high rank, he keeps a far lower profile than either Mr Hu or Wen Jiabao, the current prime minister. Until Mr Xi was appointed to the politburo last year, he was most famous for being the son of Xi Zhongxun, one of the founders of the Chinese Communist Party.
While passing through Mexico, however, Mr Xi launched into an outspoken rant that provided a rare insight into his character. After proudly claiming that China has already made its contribution to the financial crisis by making sure its own 1.3 billion people are fed, he said that "there are a few foreigners, with full bellies, who have nothing better to do than try to point fingers at our country". He added: "China does not export revolution, hunger, poverty, nor does China cause you any headaches. Just what else do you want?"
Commentators suggested that Mr Xi was lashing out at his Mexican hosts for siding with Britain and the United States in calling for China to improve its human rights record.
China has also recently come under attack from the US for "manipulating" its currency and distorting world trade, although these comments were toned down at last week's G7 meeting in Rome. The phrase "having a full stomach and nothing better to do" is an earthy insult in Chinese for cynical troublemakers. His speech was judged far too inflammatory by censors inside China, and was instantly deleted from websites and news reports.
Chinese nationalists instantly jumped on Mr Xi's words, offering support for his hardline position and criticising the government for being too diplomatic in its dealings with foreigners. They lauded Mr Xi's frankness in comparison to the staid caution of Mr Hu and Mr Wen.
However, their support was shortlived. Bloggers trying to write about Mr Xi's speech soon had their posts taken down by censors.
By SIMON ROMERO and ALEXEI BARRIONUEVO
Published: April 15, 2009
CARACAS, Venezuela — As Washington tries to rebuild its strained relationships in Latin America, China is stepping in vigorously, offering countries across the region large amounts of money while they struggle with sharply slowing economies, a plunge in commodity prices and restricted access to credit.
In recent weeks, China has been negotiating deals to double a development fund in Venezuela to $12 billion, lend Ecuador at least $1 billion to build the country’s largest hydroelectric plant, provide Argentina with access to more than $10 billion in Chinese currency and lend Brazil’s national oil company $10 billion. The deals largely focus on China locking in natural resources like oil for years to come.
China’s trade with Latin America has grown quickly this decade, making it the region’s second largest trading partner after the United States. But the size and scope of these loans point to a deeper engagement with Latin America at a time when the Obama administration is starting to address the erosion of Washington’s influence in the hemisphere.
“This is how the balance of power shifts quietly during times of crisis,” said David Rothkopf, a former Commerce Department official in the Clinton administration. “The loans are an example of the checkbook power in the world moving to new places, with the Chinese becoming more active.”
Mr. Obama will meet with leaders from the region this weekend. They will discuss the spreading economic crisis, including a plan to replenish the Inter-American Development Bank, a Washington-based pillar of clout that has suffered losses from the financial crisis. But the summit meeting is also expected to focus largely on efforts by the United States to thaw relations with Cuba.
Meanwhile, China is rapidly increasing its lending in Latin America as it pursues not only long-term access to commodities like soybeans and iron ore, but also an alternative to investing in United States Treasury notes. The government in Beijing has recently expressed concern about its huge exposure to the American economy.
One of China’s new deals in Latin America, the $10 billion arrangement with Argentina, would allow Argentina reliable access to Chinese currency to pay for imports from China. It may also help open the way for China’s currency to eventually be used as an alternate reserve currency in parts of the world. The deal follows similar ones China has struck with countries like South Korea, Indonesia and Belarus.
As the financial crisis began to whipsaw international markets last year, the Federal Reserve made its own currency arrangements with central banks around the world, allocating $30 billion each to the central banks of Brazil and Mexico. (Brazil has opted not to tap it for now.) But smaller economies in the region, including Argentina, which has been trying to dispel doubts about its ability to meet its international debt payments, were left out of those agreements.
Details of the Chinese deal with Argentina are still being ironed out, but an official at Argentina’s central bank said it would allow Argentina to avoid using scarce American dollars for all its international transactions. The country’s earlier decisions to nationalize its main airline and take over billions of dollars in private pension funds led Argentines to pull nearly $23 billion out of their country last year.
Dante Sica, the lead economist at Abeceb, a consulting firm in Buenos Aires, said the Chinese overtures in the region, including the Argentine deal, were made possible by the “lack of attention that the United States showed to Latin America during the entire Bush administration.”
“And now, when the new Democratic administration wants to pay attention to the region again, they arrive at a moment when the greatest worries are internal, not external,” Mr. Sica said, referring to the United States’ own economic problems.
China is also seizing opportunities in Latin America when traditional lenders over which the United States holds some sway, like the Inter-American Development Bank, are pushing up against their limits.
Just one of China’s planned loans, the $10 billion for Brazil’s national oil company, is almost as much as the $11.2 billion in all approved financing by the Inter-American bank in 2008. Brazil is expected to use the loan for offshore exploration, while agreeing to export as much as 100,000 barrels of oil a day to China as early as this year, according to executives at the oil company.
The Inter-American bank, in which the United States has de facto veto power in some matters, is trying to triple its capital and increase lending to $18 billion this year. But that involves delicate negotiations among member nations, made all the more difficult after the bank lost almost $1 billion last year.
For the first time, China will also have a role in these negotiations, having become a member of the bank this year. It joined two other Asian members, Japan and South Korea.
China has also pushed into Latin American countries where the United States has negligible influence, like Venezuela.
Venezuela’s government in some ways pioneered the role that China is playing today, using its oil wealth to help finance the left-leaning governments of Argentina, Bolivia and Ecuador. But with oil revenues plunging, Venezuela is cutting back on that support and turning to China for loans itself.
In February, China’s vice president, Xi Jinping, traveled to Caracas to meet with President Hugo Chávez. The two men announced that a Chinese-backed development fund based here would grow to $12 billion from $6 billion, giving Venezuela access to hard currency while agreeing to increase oil shipments to China to 1 million barrels a day from a current level of about 380,000 barrels.
Mr. Chávez’s government contends the Chinese aid differs from other multilateral loans because it comes without strings attached, like scrutiny of internal finances. But the Chinese fund has generated fierce criticism among his opponents, who view it as an affront to Venezuela’s sovereignty.
“The fund is a swindle to the nation,” said Luis D*az, a dissident lawmaker who claims China locked in low prices for the oil Venezuela is using to pay back the money.
Despite forging warm ties to Venezuela and extending loans to other nations that have chafed at Washington’s clout, like Ecuador, Beijing has bolstered its presence in Latin America without bombast, perhaps out of an awareness that its relationship with the United States is still of paramount importance. But this deference may not last.
“This is China playing the long game,” said Gregory Chin, a political scientist at York University in Toronto. “If this ultimately translates into political influence, then that is how the game is played.”
All but invisible in Latin America a decade ago, China now is building cars in Uruguay , donating a soccer stadium to Costa Rica and lending $10 billion to Brazil's biggest oil company.
It's supplanted the United States to become the biggest trading partner with Brazil , South America's biggest economy.
China has moved aggressively to fill a vacuum left by the United States in recent years, as the U.S. focused on wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and the global economic crisis sapped its economy.
" China is rising while the U.S. is declining in Latin America ," Riordan Roett , a professor of international relations at Johns Hopkins University , said by telephone while visiting Sao Paulo . " China is all over this region. They are following a state-driven policy to expand their peaceful presence."
China is beefing up its embassies throughout Latin America , opening Confucian centers to expand Chinese culture, sending high-level trade delegations throughout the region and opening the door for ordinary Chinese to visit Machu Picchu , Rio and other tourism hot spots.
Aiping Yuan came to Rio de Janeiro from Beijing in 1997 on a lark, fell in love with the city and decided to stay. She studied Portuguese, and when Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva made his first visit to China in 2004, she opened a small school in Rio to teach Mandarin.
She began with six students and today has 300, including senior executives at Petrobras, the country's biggest oil company, and Vale do Rio Doce , the biggest mineral producer. Both have growing business with China .
"Chinese is the language of the future for Brazil ," Yuan said with a big smile.
China has forged a strategic alliance with Brazil that's allowed the two countries to partner with India and Russia in the so-called BRIC grouping, which is demanding a greater voice in global political and economic affairs. Indeed, China is making inroads with developing countries worldwide.
Beijing's main interest in Latin America has been guaranteeing access to the region's raw materials — principally oil, iron ore, soybeans and copper — to fuel its continued rapid growth. For many countries, there's a downside in the China trade, through which cheap imports have displaced local textiles.
China's growing role has alarmed policymakers in Washington . However, China has been careful not to establish a military presence in the region, since doing so would antagonize Washington . The U.S. has considered Latin America to be in its sphere of influence since the Monroe Doctrine of 1823.
China "treats ( Hugo) Chavez as they do ( Alvaro) Uribe and Lula," said Alexandre Barbosa , a consultant to the Sao Paulo -based consulting firm Prospectiva, referring to the presidents of Venezuela , Colombia and Brazil , respectively. "They're interested in business."
And what a voracious interest in business they've shown. Trade between Latin America and China rocketed from $10 billion in 2000 to $140 billion in 2008. China is buying zinc from Peru , copper from Chile and iron ore from Brazil . It's shipping electronic equipment to Brazil , buses to Cuba , clothes to Mexico and cars to Peru .
Peruvian President Alan Garcia is trying to position his country as a major commercial hub for China in South America . He's hoping to capitalize not only on Peru's ports in the center of South America but also on a shared history: Thousands of Chinese emigrated to Peru in the 19th and early 20th centuries to do manual labor. These immigrants have left a legacy of the so-called "chifa" restaurants, which offer Chinese food throughout Peru .
Today, China's biggest appetite is for Peru's plentiful minerals.
Two Chinese companies are moving forward with major mining projects in Peru while companies from other countries are suspending or canceling theirs, said John Youle , the executive president of ConsultAndes, a Lima -based firm.
China generally has been investing little money in Latin America , however. This has prompted criticism that it's simply tapping into the region's vast raw minerals, just as colonial powers did for centuries.
Although China has become a major player over the past decade, trade between the United States and Latin America still dwarfs China's trade with Latin America .
Beyond trade, China suddenly is rivaling the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank as a major lender to Latin America , at a time when China is flush with cash and many companies can't get access to bank loans.
Petrobras is borrowing $10 billion from China , to be paid off by shipping 150,000 barrels of crude per day to China this year and 200,000 barrels per day for the next nine years, said Erico Monte , a Petrobras spokesman.
Ecuador is borrowing $1 billion from China to finance investments by its state oil company and another $1.7 billion to build what would be the country's largest hydropower dam.
Venezuela is buying high-tech oil-drilling platforms from China and is sending some 380,000 barrels of oil there per day as Chavez diversifies Venezuelan exports away from the United States , his chief nemesis.
"But China has shown little enthusiasm in becoming entangled in Chavez's larger goal of counterbalancing U.S. influence in the hemisphere," Dan Erikson , a Latin American expert at the Inter-American Dialogue, a nonpartisan research center on Western Hemisphere affairs, wrote recently.
Erikson said China was especially attractive to Latin American leaders because of its no-questions-asked foreign policy.
" The United States talks about the need for a battle against corruption, the need for transparency and improved human rights," Erikson told McClatchy . " China is less ideological in its approach to Latin America than the U.S. is."
Still, China uses its aid as a strategic tool to get countries to shift their diplomatic ties from Taiwan to the communist nation.
After Costa Rica became the first Central American country to establish ties with China , the communist country bought $300 million in Costa Rican bonds. More important to average Costa Ricans, China is spending $74 million to build a new national soccer stadium in San Jose . It's scheduled to open in 2011.
Not everyone in Latin America welcomes China's growing presence.
Chinese companies are taking business away from Mexican firms that exported clothes to the United States .
Peruvians have tried to block the expansion of a Chinese mining project near the border with Ecuador that they say would pollute local rivers.
China has angered Brazilian companies by taking their place as the biggest exporter of clothing and textiles to Argentina .
Whether it's seen as a friendly uncle or a ruthless competitor, China's continued expansion in Latin America seems inevitable.
EBX is expanding its port in Rio de Janeiro state to handle Brazil's iron ore exports to China and has signed an agreement with China's Wuhan Iron and Steel to build a mammoth steel plant next to the port.
In May, Lula made his third trip to China , spotlighting the fact that China has become Brazil's biggest trade partner.
The development surprised Rodrigo Maciel , the executive secretary of the Brazil-China Business Council , based in Rio.
"We weren't expecting China to pass the U.S. as China's biggest trading partner until 2011 or 2012," Maciel said.
Venezuela has announced a $16bn (£10bn) investment deal with China for oil exploration in the Orinoco river.
The move comes shortly after Venezuela signed a similar agreement with Russia, which is estimated to be $20bn (£12bn).
President Hugo Chavez said the deals would boost oil production in Venezuela by about 900,000 barrels per day.
Investors in Venezuela's oil industry have complained for months that a lack of government investment in infrastructure has hurt production.
Multi-polar world
Speaking on state television, Mr Chavez said the deal with China was over three years and that the investment would go towards developing heavy crude oil resources in the Orinoco River belt.
For President Chavez it is part of a wider effort to increase his base of bilateral partners in the oil industry.
The socialist leader often speaks of what he calls a "multi-polar world" in which Latin American countries are less dependent on Washington.
However, US companies and the US government are still the mainstay of the Venezuelan energy industry.
The Venezuelan leader will hope that these multibillion dollar deals, signed with countries which are more friendly to his "21st Century Socialist Revolution", will give him further economic independence from Washington.
Since 2008, the People's Republic of China (PRC) has moved forward with a series of large aid and investment deals, indicating that the PRC is raising its stake in Latin America to a new level [1].
The impact of China's expanding commitment in Latin America extends far beyond the PRC's immediate goals of securing access to Latin American markets and reliable sources of primary products at favorable prices. The implications of this trend can be understood in terms of four overlapping effects:
The interaction is transforming the physical, economic, educational and social structure of the region.
It is enabling the survival and spread of regimes oriented against the United States, Western-style democracy and economic models.
It is enabling the emergence of Brazil as a regional powerbroker.
It is undermining the United States as a source of political and economic influence in the region, as well as US options for regional engagement.
While China is transforming Latin America through such effects, this does not imply that they are the result of deliberate, primary objectives of Chinese foreign policy towards the region.
The mechanism by which Latin America's expanding relationship with the PRC is transforming the region has as much to do with expectations by Latin American investors of future business with China. Inspired by expectations of selling to, or importing from China, Latin Americans are investing to improve their infrastructure, including the expansion and modernization of Pacific ports such as Ensenada in Mexico, Buenaventura in Colombia, Manta in Ecuador, Peru's Callao and Chile's Iquique, among others.
The desire to facilitate commerce with China has also breathed new life into contemplated but long unfunded infrastructure projects to connect the continent to its Pacific coast, including the Manta-Manaus (Brazil) corridor, inter-oceanic corridors to Paita and Ilo in Peru, and the bi-oceanic corridor connecting Sao Paolo in southern Brazil with the port of Iquique.
Beyond physical infrastructure, the belief held by students in the region that China is the wave of the future has driven the establishment of China-oriented programs throughout Latin American universities, as well as a wealth of offerings for learning Mandarin, from private institutes to university language programs, including the establishment of 18 officially sanctioned Confucius Institutes in the region.
Chinese engagement is also shaping the politics of the region. One such impact is the contribution of Chinese aid and investment in the survival of the "caudillo [political-military leader] socialist block" (Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia). The PRC has been extremely cautious to avoid associating itself with the anti-US proclamations of leaders such as President Hugo Chavez in Venezuela. Nonetheless, the PRC benefits from the policies of these regimes insofar as their disruption of relationships with Western companies, and the personalistic character of their regimes creates opportunities for Chinese companies to gain access to their resources and deepen penetration of their markets.
The principal example of how China has enabled "caudillo socialism" in the region is its relationship with the Chavez regime in Venezuela. As Chavez has consolidated control of the petroleum industry and other sectors of the Venezuelan economy, China has played an increasingly important role in buying Venezuelan oil, working the oilfields and loaning money to the Chavez regime.
Over the past two years, China Development Bank has loaned US$8 billion to Venezuela, to be repaid in future oil deliveries, and is currently negotiating an additional loan of up to $4 billion. Although initially intended for Venezuelan infrastructure projects, these funds arguably helped the Chavez regime to meet its internal and external commitments when oil prices fell from $140 per barrel to less than $40. China National Petroleum Company (CNPC) has expanded its Venezuelan oil operations while Western companies pulled out, and in September 2009 announced its intention to invest an additional $16 billion.
In Ecuador, like Venezuela, China has helped to maintain the solvency of that country's anti-US regime, issuing a $1 billion loan, which helped the government of Rafael Correa to manage a liquidity crisis associated with the repayment of foreign debt obligations, as well as a $2 billion 1.5 gigawatt hydroelectric plant, 90% self-financed by the Chinese company that performs the work.
The Chinese consortium Andes Petroleum is a key investor in Ecuador's oil sector, and has become increasingly important as other companies have pulled out in response to the Rafael Correa administration's move to force them to re-negotiate the terms of their concessions. Even in Bolivia, where the Chinese have proceeded cautiously, the state petroleum company YPFB is pursuing a strategic partnership with CNPC for the investment and technical expertise that it requires to maintain Bolivian gas production.
In addition to contributions as a resource provider and customer, China is also playing an expanding role as an alternative provider of technology and military goods. China has helped Venezuela to create a factory to assemble drilling rigs to develop its oil, as well as other joint ventures for producing cars and cell phones. The PRC also launched a telecommunications satellite for Venezuela in 2008, and has become an important telecom infrastructure provider. In addition, the PRC sells the country increasingly sophisticated military end items, including air surveillance radars and military aircraft [2].
Ecuador and Bolivia have followed Venezuela's lead with respect to military purchases from the PRC. Ecuador, which had previously leased two MA-60 transport aircraft from the Chinese in 2007, is negotiating to purchase four more, as well as taking delivery of two Chinese radars for evaluation, and purchasing four more, to be delivered by the first quarter of 2011.
Bolivia, which previously received trucks, small boats and night-vision goggles from the PRC, is now working with them to launch a satellite and purchasing six K-8 aircraft for counter-narcotics missions after being denied access to US and European planes.
In addition to providing resources, technical support and military goods that have contributed to the survival of the "caudillo socialist block", the PRC has also been contributing to Brazil's ascendancy as a regional power broker. Brazilian economic performance has been driven, in part, by its export-oriented iron and soy industries, for which China is a key customer.
Indeed, the global recession emphasized and magnified the importance of China to Brazil. While Brazilian exports to the United States fell 37.8% in the first quarter of 2009, exports to the PRC increased by 62.7% thanks in part to a Chinese stimulus package that included $740 billion in infrastructure projects, thus maintaining high levels of Chinese demand for factor inputs such as iron, purchased from Brazilian suppliers such as CVRD.
Consequently, in the first half of 2009, China became Brazil's number one export destination. China has also emerged as a key financier as Brazil reaches out for the $174 billion that it requires to develop newly discovered deepwater oil reserves in the Campos and Santos basins. In discussing a $10 billion loan from China Development Bank to Brazil, the president of Petrobras, Sergio Gabrielli, noted, "There isn't [sic] someone in the US government that we can sit down with and have the kinds of discussions we're having with the Chinese".
The PRC is also an increasingly important partner in technology transfer for Brazil. The two nations are pursuing a range of important joint ventures, including joint production of mid-sized business jets, the China-Brazil Earth Research Satellite (CBERS) program and other space cooperation programs.
Brazil's expanding trade with China is also giving Brasilia reasons to become more interested in the affairs of its neighbors. In cities such as Manaus in the interior of Brazil, the economics of importing factory inputs from the PRC is greatly facilitated by routes linking the Brazilian Amazon to Pacific ports. Projects currently underway include highway corridors from the Amazon River over the Andes Mountains to the Peruvian ports of Paita and Ilo, as well as a possible multi-modal corridor linking Manaus, with its free trade zone, to the Ecuadorian port of Manta. In a similar fashion, Brazil's growing commerce with China also heightens its stake in the trade policy and political stability of its Pacific neighbors, as well as major infrastructure projects affecting the economics of that trade such as the expansion of the Panama Canal.
In addition to sustaining the "caudillo socialist" bloc and contributing to the rise of Brazil, in a broader sense, Chinese investment and aid in Latin America is undermining the primacy of the US role as an economic and social actor in the region. This can be seen in the re-orientation of Latin America's trade structure away from the United States, Latin American efforts to either please or avoid offending China, and in the declining power of the United States as a "reference model" for economic development and democracy.
With respect to trade structure, PRC financial deals to facilitate commerce, such as the $10.2 billion debt swap with Argentina in March 2009, represent an expanding challenge to the primacy of the dollar as an international reserve currency. Brazilian President Lula explicitly argued for working with China to move away from the dollar during his trip to China in May 2009.
Even before such challenges to the primacy of the dollar, however, the lure of China as a market was arguably one factor that helped to permanently derail the proposed "Free Trade Area of the Americas". Chinese bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) with Chile and Peru, and FTA negotiations with Costa Rica can have the effect of moving the region away from a structure of trade relationships and incentives focusing the region on the US, to a world in which Latin American states are more independent global actors.
At the individual country level, such influence can be seen in Chile, the foreign economic policy of which focuses on positioning the country as a gateway between Asia and Latin America. A similar enthusiasm can be seen in Peru, which hosted the 2008 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit, and in which the PRC has made important investment commitments in the oil and gas sector, purchases of fishing fleets and fishmeal processing facilities, and mines in Toromocho, Rio Blanco and Maracona. It is also evidenced in the desire of countries such as Colombia and Costa Rica to tie themselves more closely to the Pacific economic community by joining APEC.
In the realm of what has been called "soft power", the US is also losing influence in the region where US initiatives conflict with Latin America's desires to maintain a positive relationship with the PRC for economic reasons. The decision by the Ecuadorian Correa government not to renew the agreement giving the US access to the port city of Manta was a necessary step in inviting the Chinese to develop the airport into a hub for trans-Pacific flights, even though the two were probably never explicitly connected by the Chinese.
In the future, as Latin American regimes contemplate whether to allow potentially intrusive cooperation with US law enforcement in areas such as counter-narcotics, telecommunications, or banking, the impact of such cooperation on attracting investment from partners such as the Chinese will cast a growing shadow over their decisions.
The desire of Latin American leaders to court, please, or avoid offending the PRC, is becoming increasingly evident. When Costa Rican President Oscar Arias switched his country's diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to the PRC in May 2007, a key factor was his belief that the emergence of the PRC as a global power made being on the "right side" of the China/Taiwan issue in Costa Rica's interest [3].
The importance that Latin American leaders place on China can be discerned by the number of its presidents who have led delegations to the PRC in recent years: in addition to the six trips to China by Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez and multiple trips by Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa and Bolivian President Evo Morales, virtually all the rest, including President Lula of Brazil, Colombia's President Alvaro Uribe, Mexican President Felipe Calderon, Uruguay President Tabare Vasquez, and Costa Rican President Oscar Arias.
To date, the PRC has limited its attempts to exert influence over its Latin American partners to areas tied to core Chinese interests, such as their recognition of Taiwan or Tibet, the opening of their markets to Chinese goods, and favorable or neutral positions with respect to China in forums such as the Inter-American Development Bank and the World Trade Organization.
As China sinks more investment in Latin America, and becomes more dependent on the region as a market and a source of supply, it is logical that China would seek to motivate Latin American leaders to protect these interests. Although it is difficult to imagine the PRC demanding that a Latin American state not cooperate with the United States on police and security matters, it is increasingly easy to imagine that such a state might think twice, if it believes that a US presence could jeopardize a major PRC purchase or investment in the country.
Finally, in the world of ideas in Latin America, the rise of China can become a powerful force in derailing the US political, economic, and human rights agenda in the region. The ability demonstrated by the PRC to sustain growth rates in excess of 10% and recover rapidly from the global recession, by contrast to the United States, which precipitated the financial crisis and continues to contract, sends a powerful message to Latin American states that US-style political pluralism may not be necessary for development, and in some circumstances, may be detrimental to it.
Notes
1. Analysts have generally acknowledged that Chinese aid and investment in Latin America is relatively small, compared to comparable investments by the United States and the European Union. Cumulative aid from China to Latin America from 2002 through 2007 was less than $25 billion, compared to $620 billion from the European Union and $340 billion from the United States over the same period. Thomas Lum, et al China's Foreign Aid Activities in Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia. Congressional Research Service. Doc. No. 7-5700. R40361. www.crs.gov. February 25, 2009. Nonetheless, such figures overlook both the order-of-magnitude increase in Chinese aid to Latin America that occurred in 2008, as well as the disproportionate impact that Chinese aid has on the region because of the hopes of attracting even more such aid from the PRC as an emerging market and rising power.
2. China has sold Venezuela 18 K-8 aircraft, which are designated as trainers, but which can be given combat capability by outfitting them with missiles and other munitions. Venezuela is also exploring the purchase of a more advanced type of trainer from the PRC, the L-15.
3. Based on a series of interviews with Costa Rican government leaders in January 2008. See R Evan Ellis China in Latin America: The Whats and Wherefores. Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1989.
Chinese Defense Minister Liang Guanglie (R) meets with Alvaro Lopez Miera, vice minister and chief of the General Staff of Cuba's Revolutionary Armed Forces in Beijing, capital of China, on April 26, 2010. (Xinhua/Zhang Duo)
BEIJING, April 26 (Xinhua) -- China pledged to further develop military ties with Cuba during a meeting of senior military officials from the two countries on Monday.
"The years since China and Cuba forged diplomatic ties in 1960 have witnessed a stable development of bilateral relations and fruitful cooperation in various fields," Chinese Defense Minister Liang Guanglie said when meeting with Alvaro Lopez Miera, vice minister and chief of the General Staff of Cuba's Revolutionary Armed Forces.
The armed forces of China and Cuba have maintained frequent high-level visits and good communication, Liang said, citing the expansion of exchanges and cooperation in personnel training.
China has always believed that the development of China-Cuba relations and their military ties are in the fundamental interests of both nations' people, he said.
Liang, also a state councilor, said he would like to work with Cuba to further upgrade military ties.
Lopez praised China's achievements in social and economic growth, adding that Cuba is willing to learn from China's experience.
He also offered his condolences to the the victims of the 7.1-magnitude earthquake jolting northwest China's Qinghai Province on April 14, expressing his hope the two countries can enhance military cooperation in disaster-relief work.
Arriving in China April 24, Lopez is scheduled to conclude the official goodwill visit on April 29.
He held talks with Chen Bingde, chief of the General Staff of China's People's Liberation Army, here on Sunday.
SHANGHAI, May 3 (UPI) -- Russia is interested in joining Chinese developers to exploit oil and gas reserves locked in the Russian section of the Arctic, regional officials said.
Dmitry Kobylkin, the governor of the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous region in the Russian Arctic, expressed interest in a Chinese partnership in oil and gas development during the World Expo 2010 Exhibition in Shanghai.
He said he was ready to offer partners in China a "mutually advantageous and constructive cooperation" in the regional natural resources sector, Russia's state-run RIA Novosti news agency reports.
The Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous region accounts for more than 90 percent of the natural gas production and around 12 percent of the oil production in Russia.
"We are ready to act as intermediaries between an investor country and the oil and gas sector and create a good investment climate," said Kobylkin.
The World Wide Fund for Nature, an environmental advocacy group, said the oil spill in the U.S. Gulf of Mexico raises alarm about the possibility of exploring the Arctic for oil and gas. The WWF said it was renewing its call for a moratorium on oil and gas development in the Arctic until environmental risks are better understood.
China now finances a majority of the public energy projects underway in Ecuador. Recent deals include an 85% stake in a hydroelectric dam that will cover a third of the country's energy needs by 2016. Chinese firms will also take charge of most construction.
As you can imagine if another country controlled our utilities, many Ecuadorians are extemely anxious, reports Asia Times:
For his part, former Ecuadorean vice president Leon Roldos (1981-1984) maintained that the loan is illegal, because it finances a "turn-key contract" without "definitive studies or detail engineering", which he said is expressly prohibited by law.
Ecuadorians are also upset by loans they call larger than necessary:
Another contradiction, Roldos argued, is that although it is a fixed price contract, the financing deal is based on price indexing - adjusting amounts by the change over time in prices - for materials and labor power "using a more generous formula than the one normally used for Ecuador's public procurements".
In an article published last week by the El Comercio newspaper, the former vice president said the dam was "severely overpriced" because the $1.98 billion price tag is $400 million higher than the cost projected in 2008.
Is China purchasing its own Latin American country?
Meanwhile see how China has cornered the international oil market:
June 29th, 2010, 16:58
vector7
Re: China's Penetration in Latin America
Meanwhile, Here Are 20 Signs That China Is Cornering The Global Oil Market
1/20
$1.3 billion to buy 45% percent of an Alberta project
Deal signed May 2010: China Investment Corp. paid $817 million to take a 45% share of a Penn West Energy Trust project, worth up to 50,000 barrels per day. They also paid $435 million for a 5% stake of Penn West, according to Globe And Mail.
Background: Canada has the world's second largest oil reserves, with relatively minuscule production. It needs foreign capital to fund major new developments in the Alberta Oil Sands, which include shale oil projects.
In response to the BP's Deepwater Horizon disaster, President Obama has launched a 6 month moratorium on new deepwater exploration contracts and other oil drilling restrictions.
But China isn't stopping.
Just this month, state-owned Chinese companies have signed contracts worth over $50 billion in Canada, Brazil, Argentina, Iraq, Venezuela, and Nigeria.
Most deal include an export clause, locking down energy supplies for the growing Chinese economy. If America's demand ever increases, these deals would present a serious problem.
And Beijing has no qualms about offshore drilling.
Publication: China Brief Volume: 10 Issue: 14
July 9, 2010 12:20 PM Age: 4 days
Category: China Brief, Military/Security, China and the Asia-Pacific, Latin America, Home Page
By: Evan Ellis
In China’s first white paper on the country's relationship with Latin America released in November 2008, the only reference to cooperation on space issues accounts for a portion of one sentence within the long document: “The Chinese side will also strengthen cooperation with Latin America and the Caribbean in aeronautics and astronautics … and other areas of shared interest” (People’s Daily Online, November 6, 2008). Yet, just one month before the Chinese government released the white paper, China Great Wall Industries Corporation (CGWIC) launched into orbit the first wholly indigenous-built satellite for a Latin American customer. In the four years since 2006, China has made major inroads in space cooperation with Latin America, launching its third satellite in a collaborative venture with Brazil, launching a wholly Chinese-built telecommunications satellite for Venezuela, contracting with Bolivia for a similar satellite, launching a new Beijing-based regional space cooperation organization that includes Peru, and pursuing significant space-related projects in Argentina and Chile. As these examples suggest, advancement in China-Latin America space cooperation is occurring, although largely out of the public eye, and is important, following a pattern shaped by the varied interests and space-related capabilities of Latin American states, as well as the growing ideological divisions in the region.
For the PRC, space-related initiatives in Latin America are oriented to support the development of this strategically important sector while strengthening partnerships with countries that it regards as important. This paper focuses on three categories of Latin American countries with which the PRC has space-related interactions: (1) populist regimes acquiring satellites, (2) other countries developing limited space capabilities, and (3) Brazil as an emerging regional power with a multidimensional space program.
Populist Regimes Purchasing Chinese Satellite Systems
China’s most significant advances in space cooperation in Latin America have been with populist regimes politically disposed to do business with the PRC, yet restricted in obtaining technology from the West.
In 2005, Venezuela signed a contract with CGWIC for a telecommunications satellite (El Universal [Venezuela], January 10, 2009), the first satellite to be completely developed and launched by China for a Latin American client [1]. The total project cost to Venezuela was $406 million (El Mercurio [Chile], October 30, 2008), including $241 million for the satellite itself (El Universal [Venezuela], January 10, 2009). As part of the venture, Uruguay came to hold rights to 10 percent of the satellite’s bandwidth in exchange for allowing the use of an orbit reserved for Uruguay (Asia Times Online, August 6, 2009).
The satellite became operational on January 10, 2009 (El Universal, January 10, 2009), although reports from mid-2009 indicate possible technical problems (Asia Times Online, August 6, 2009). Venezuela and China also plan to launch a second satellite, for reconnaissance, in 2013 (El Universal, April 5, 2009).
Beyond its commercial and technical value, the Venesat-1 project provided the PRC with significant opportunities to build relationships with the new cadre of Venezuelan space professionals created by the program (Venezuelanaysis, August 18, 2008). As part of the project, China trained 150 Venezuelans in the PRC to operate the satellite from its ground stations in Guárico and southeastern Bolivar states, in addition to giving scholarships to 30 Venezuelans to write doctoral dissertations in China on related topics (Venezuelanaysis, August 18, 2008).
China’s second satellite development and launch contract in the region is with Bolivia. On April 2, the Evo Morales government contracted the Chinese Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC) to develop and launch the telecommunications satellite “Tupac Katari” (Satellite Today, April 6). As with Venesat-1, the project will include the development of the satellite and its launch from China by CGWIC (El Comercio [Peru], April 1), as well as the training of Bolivian personnel to operate it (Satellite Today, April 6) from two ground stations to be built in Bolivia- one in Pampahasi and one in La Guardia in the department of Santa Cruz (Satellite Today, April 6). The total cost will be approximately $300 million, of which all but 15 percent will be financed by Chinese banks (El Mercurio, April 3).
The Venezuelan and Bolivian satellite projects are important for the PRC's satellite program. They allow it to prove the reliability of its launch services and satellite technology, gain experience in doing business in the space sector of the region, and position it to compete for the business of other countries in which China has fewer ideological inroads.
Other Countries Developing Limited Space Capabilities
In addition to Venezuela and Bolivia, China has sought to build relationships on space issues with at least three other Latin American countries possessing relevant technologies or programs: Argentina, Chile and Peru, and possibly Mexico.
In November 2004, during the visit of President Hu Jintao, Argentina signed a framework agreement on space cooperation with China that included an expression of interest by the PRC to provide Argentina with commercial launch services and satellite components and other technology. A more specific agreement signed in May 2005 covered possible Chinese technical support and equipment for the Argentine satellite manufacturer INVAP, in support of its ARSAT program [2]. In the end, however, INVAP contracted with Astrium and Thales Alenia Space for the satellite (SpaceNews, June 28), while the French firm Arianespace was selected to launch it (SpaceNews, June 28).
Beyond ARSAT, China National Astronomical Observatories (NAO) and the China National Academy of Sciences (NAS) have collaborated with San Juan University in Argentina to construct a satellite laser ranging facility (People’s Daily Online, September 9, 2005), with plans for ongoing collaboration there in the future [3]. China is also investigating the construction of a space antenna in the Argentine provinces of Neuquén, Mendoza or Rio Negro. A PRC delegation will travel there in July 2010 to evaluate possible sites (Space Daily, June 9), with the possibility that the PRC would leverage this investment to win other space-related work in Argentina.
Recent news stated that Adolfo Italiano, a representative of the provincial government of Neuquen, Argentina, has noted that China is in conversation with his country for the installation of a space antenna. Chinese officials also reportedly visited two other Argentine provinces, Rio Negro and Mendonza, before traveling to Chile. China is already constructing an antenna in Mendonza, which will debut in 2012 (NASA Spaceflight, June 14).
As in Argentina, China has also sought to participate in the construction and launch of a Chilean satellite, the Sistema Satelital de Observación de la Tierra (SSOT), although the development contract was ultimately awarded to the European firm EADS Astrium (EADS Astrium Official Website, February 9), and the launch contract was awarded to Arianespace (SpaceNews, December 21, 2008). Sites in Chile have also been evaluated for a future Chinese space antenna.
In Mexico, although there has been little interaction to date with China on space issues, the April 2010 legislation establishing a Mexican Space Agency (El Universal, April 20) creates important new opportunities for Mexican-Chinese space collaboration, as does Mexico’s role in hosting the “Space Conference of the Americas,” in November 2010 (Official Website of the Mexican Space Agency, May 11).
In the case of Peru, the nation was one of the founding members of the Beijing-based “Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization” (APSCO), when it was established in October 2005 (Space Daily, October 12, 2006). Peruvians have participated in various APSCO activities, such as its space navigation course, and its foreign minister has visited its headquarters (APSCO official website, March 29).
Brazil as an Emerging Regional Power with a Multidimensional Space Program
China’s most longstanding and multidimensional space cooperation in Latin America has been with Brazil. This cooperation began in the late 1980s, at a time in which the new U.S.-led Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) was beginning to constrain Brazil’s ability to obtain space-related materials and components from the United States and other participating countries. This loaned particular importance to an offer by the PRC in 1989 to transfer launch technology that would benefit Brazil’s development of its VLS-1 launch vehicle, in exchange for selection to launch a Brazilian satellite, although France ultimately was selected to launch the satellite [4].
The China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite (CBERS) program was first established in 1988 to collaboratively develop satellites and put them into orbit via Chinese launch vehicles. To date, three CBERS satellites have been launched: in 1999, 2003 and 2007 [5], and a fourth is scheduled in mid-2011 [6]. Brazil covers approximately 30 percent of the cost, while China assumes the remaining 70 percent, including the ground stations [7].
The CBERS program has received official praise from both countries. Upon assuming his post in March 2008, the head of the Brazilian Space Agency stated that Brazil cherished its ties with China, and would deepen its cooperation in the field of space technology (Space Daily, March 27, 2008). However, despite such positive discourse, the program has experience problems. The launch of the first satellite was originally scheduled for 1992, but delayed until 1998 [8]. A malfunction put an end to all data transmissions from the first satellite in August 2003, while one of two PRC-supplied imaging devices on the second CBERS satellite stopped working in April 2005 [9].
Implications for the United States and for the Region
China’s space cooperation with Latin America is transforming the region. For the new generation of space technicians in Venezuela and Bolivia, Chinese workers, equipment, and training are becoming part of the culture, just as Soviet equipment, technology and personnel shaped the experience of a generation of Cubans and Nicaraguans. Moreover, it is likely that the Venezuelan and Bolivian precedents, in combination with other Chinese investments, will eventually open up the Chilean and Argentine space markets, even as Chinese space diplomacy builds inroads in Peru, possibly Mexico, and eventually in other nations such as Colombia. Each of these developments will advance the PRC’s presence in the technical infrastructure of Latin American while moving it toward an ever more capable, multidimensional space capability—a reality to which the United States and other global players will have to adjust.
Notes
1. Although China’s has also worked with Brazil since 1988 on the China-Brazil Earth Research Satellite (CBERS) program, these satellites were more fully collaborative efforts between the two countries.
2. Janie Hulse, “China's Expansion into and U.S. Withdrawal from Argentina's Telecommunications and Space Industries and the Implications for U.S. National Security,” U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute (Carlisle Barracks, PA. September 2007).
3. T. Wang, F. Qu, Y. Han, W. Liu, E.L. Actis, and R. Podesta, “New SLR Station Running in San Juan of Argentina,” Official NASA website, cddis.gsfc.nasa.gov/lw15/docs/papers/New%20SLR%20Station%20Running%20in%20San%20Juan%20 of%20Argentina.pdf.
4. Luis Bitencourt, Developing Countries and Missile Proliferation: The Cases of Argentina, Brazil and India, PhD dissertation (Washington D.C.: Catholic University of America, 2001).
5. “Satellites: CBERS-1, 2 and 2B | CBERS-3 and 4,” China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite (CBERS) Official Website, www.cbers.inpe.br.
6. “Chinese Space Policy: Collaboration or Competition,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, csis.org, March 23, 2010.
7. Fab*ola de Olivera, O Brasil Chega Ao Espaço: SCD-1 satélite de coleta de dados [Brazil Reaches the Space: SCD-I Data Collection Satellite], São José dos Campos (São Paolo, Brazil, Instituto Nacional de Pequisas Espaciais, 1996): 81.
8. Ibid.
9. Gyanesh Chander, “An Overview of the CBERS-2 satellite and comparison of the CBERS-2 CCD data with the L5 TM data,” U.S. Geological Survey, Presentation, March 16, 2006.
July 22nd, 2011, 16:13
vector7
Re: China's Penetration in Latin America
An email I got today:
Dear vector7,
Latin American issuers/fund managers and Chinese investors continue confirming their participation in The 3rd Latin America China Investors Forum (LA-CIF), being held on September 13th & 14th at the Westin Beijing Chaoyang.
With 8 weeks until the event, over 125 China-based investors are already confirmed from institutions including E-Fund, Harvest Fund, China Investment Corporation, China Asset Management, China Life Asset Management, HuaAn Asset Management, Yinhua Funds, China Datang Overseas Investment, China Exim Bank, China National Social Security Fund, China Construction Bank, Citic, ICBC, CCB Principal Asset Management, Pacific World Fund Management, Vermilion Partners, First State Investments, Yorkville Advisors, Lombard Odier Darier Hentsch Asia, Hongkong & Shanghai Hotels, China Guodian, China WindPower Group, Suzlon Energy, China International Energy Group, Minmetals, Baosteel, Shougang, Sinosteel, Hydrochina, Sinohydro, Metallurgical Corp of China and MCC Overseas, ZTE Corporation, Wanxiang Resources, Sinochem, and more. View list of investors available for private 1-1 meetings.
Limited space remains. Register now or call me for more details Register here or contact me at +1.305.428.6281, email acechinel@latinfinance.com
On the LatAm side, in recent weeks we have confirmed Jose Antonio Alvarez, CFO of Codelco; Douglas Albrecht, Chairman of Celulosa Argentina; Javier Garcia de Quevedo, CEO of Grupo Mexico; German Arce, Director of Public Credit of Colombia; Rodrigo Barbosa, CFO of Camargo Correa, Jaime Rivera, CEO of Bladex; Luis Alberto Moreno, President of the Inter-American Development Bank; Jean-Marc Etlin, EVP of Itau BBA; plus executives from Pacific Hydro, Grupo Diavaz, Banco de Credito del Peru, Grupo Vicini, Amedroz Capital Management and more.
Other Latin American investment opportunities will be well represented in areas including construction & infrastructure, metals & mining, agribusiness, energy, real estate, logistics, private equity, long-short funds, and more.
View agenda here. As you can see, LA-CIF is again shaping up to be a can't-miss event this year. It is your best chance to meet new potential investors from China and to hold 1-1 meetings scheduled ahead of the event. Curious about how the 1-1 meetings work? Call me at +1.305.428.6281.
Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao (L) shakes hands with Chilean President Sebastian Pinera during a welcoming banquet in Santiago, capital of Chile, on June 26, 2012. (Xinhua/Zhang Duo)
SANTIAGO, June 26 (Xinhua) -- China and Chile agreed Tuesday to upgrade their bilateral ties to a strategic partnership, and double trade in three years.
Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao and Chilean President Sebastian Pinera announced Tuesday the establishment of China-Chile strategic partnership and the completion of negotiations on investment-related supplementary deals to a bilateral free trade agreement.
During their talks, Wen urged speedy signing and ratification of these supplementary deals and called for the finalization of the China-Chile free trade area.
Wen called on the two nations to expand trade in goods, promote trade in services and mutual investment, and double bilateral trade in three years.
The Chinese leader also said the two countries should enhance cooperation in mining, expand farm product trade, and promote cooperation in farm product production and processing and agricultural technology.
China would like to be actively engaged in Chile's infrastructure construction and work with Chile to promote the development of transportation networks in Latin America, said Wen.
Meanwhile, Wen suggested that the two sides launch currency swaps and expand settlement in China's renminbi.
He also urged polar, oceanic, space and seismic cooperation and the promotion of people-to-people, cultural and youth exchanges and tourism so as to step up understanding and friendship between the two peoples.
China and Chile are at their key stages of development, and China attaches great importance to Chile's ever increasing international standing and competitiveness, said Wen.
He added that China is willing to closely work with Chile to promote China's relations with the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States and the Pacific Alliance.
President Pinera said that ever since the establishment of diplomatic relations, the two countries have seen fruitful cooperation, which has strongly promoted Chile's economic advancement.
Chile would like to work with China in promoting friendly and mutually beneficial cooperation in various sectors, and strengthen coordination in international and regional affairs with China, he said.
He also encouraged Chinese firms to increase their investment in his country.
Wen arrived in Chile on Monday after his official visit to Argentina. Chile is the last leg of Wen's four-nation South American tour, which has also taken him to Brazil and Uruguay.
China is increasingly looking to Latin America to expand its comprehensive strategic partnerships, most recently evidenced by President Xi Jinping's state visits to the region that resulted in at least 140 bilateral agreements.
Although Chinese-Latin American ties are primarily economic, political links are set to grow with expanded trade and investment partnerships.
China's challenge to US power in the region is likely to concern Washington, although Beijing's role will probably remain relatively modest while market volatility and perceptions of an unfair trade balance persist.
Latin American countries have welcomed China's overtures to strengthen its trading links with the continent. Sarah McDowall assesses the impact of these relationships and whether China is bidding to counter US foreign policy in the Asia Pacific region.
After a decade of consistent improvements, the China-Latin America relationship has become more mature, and multi-layered. Through a combination of investment, trade, and political exchange, China has become an important regional player and its involvement will intensify.
Between 15 and 23 July, Chinese president Xi Jinping visited Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, and Venezuela, and attended the sixth BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) summit and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (Comunidad de Estados Latinoamericanos y Caribeños: CELAC) summit. It was his second tour of the region in just over a year, following a previous visit in May-June 2013, which concentrated on Central America and the Caribbean.
Xi's week-long tour underscored the region's rising importance in China's overall foreign policy agenda, revealing Beijing's desire to deepen ties with Latin America through investment, joint infrastructure projects, trade agreements, and increasing involvement in regional multilateral institutions.
Historically, China had shown scant inclination to engage with Latin America. However, during the past decade any such ambivalence has dissipated amid expanding Chinese commercial interests. Since 2000, trade with Latin America has surged from USD12 billion to reach USD261 billion in 2013.
Strengthening alliances
China's primary interest in Latin America is economic, as Beijing seeks to secure the raw materials necessary to meet rising demand in its energy and agricultural sectors. Another factor propelling China to intensify its activity is likely to be the desire to diversify its oil supply away from the Middle East. Since the early 2000s, economic interaction has moved beyond the energy sphere to infrastructure and transportation development.
While Xi was in Argentina, bilateral ties were upgraded to the level of 'comprehensive strategic partnership'. The Industrial and Commercial Bank of China pledged to fund the construction of two hydroelectric dams in Santa Cruz, Patagonia, and Beijing also agreed to finance a fourth nuclear power plant, Atucha III, adding to a site near Buenos Aires.
In addition to the announcement of a USD2.1-billion Chinese investment in the renovation of the Belgrano-Cargas freight railway, an USD11-billion currency swap agreement was reached with Argentina. Such initiatives add to the rising controversy in Argentina about an agreement to host a 200-hectare Chinese satellite-tracking station near Zapala, in the province of Neuquén, for which several annexes remain secret.
During Xi's time in Venezuela, 38 agreements were signed in industries ranging from petroleum and mining to finance, housing, technology, and innovation. In addition to this relationship also being elevated to a comprehensive strategic partnership, Beijing and Caracas renewed a joint development fund stipulating that China will contribute USD4 billion to be repaid by Venezuela through an additional 100,000 barrels per day in crude oil shipments. China also pledged to finance a copper and gold mining project in the south, and China's EximBank agreed to lend USD1 billion to state-owned oil and natural gas company PDVSA.
Among the 56 accords signed in Brazil, China agreed to purchase 60 E-190 commercial airliners from Brazilian aircraft manufacturer Embraer, on top of an agreement to expand bilateral defence co-operation. China said that it would open USD5-billion and USD2.5-billion credit lines to the Brazilian mining company Vale, while China and Brazil also pledged to co-operate with Peru to build a railway line linking the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.
China is also engaging in 'market-seeking' behaviour as it aims to secure and maintain access to the Latin American market for its own, mainly low-end, manufactured goods.
The CELAC meeting yielded plans to create a USD20-billion fund for infrastructure development and to increase investment stock in Latin America to USD250 billion over the coming 10 years, as well as an initial USD5-billion investment for the China-Latin America Cooperation Fund.
Meanwhile, progress on the political front has accompanied strengthening economic links, as shown by the establishment of strategic partnerships with several states. The promotion of Argentina and Venezuela to comprehensive strategic partnerships during this tour followed parallel upgrades with Brazil and Mexico in 2012 and 2013. Chile and Peru already enjoy partnerships at the 'strategic' level.
Rivalry with the US
It is unlikely to have escaped Washington's notice that Beijing appears to be spearheading alternatives to existing multilateral bodies without US participation. This is likely to have sparked concerns that China's intentions are not simply commercial but that they are aimed at countering US president Barack Obama's foreign policy pivot towards the Asia Pacific region.
Indeed, the China Youth Daily newspaper was unequivocal on 4 August in describing Xi's Latin America schedule as a 'counter-strike' against US domination of international bodies, such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). At the same time, Xi's decision to visit countries with either antagonistic or lukewarm ties to Washington has fanned media conjecture that Beijing is reacting to perceived US interference in its own Asian backyard.
China's growing political and economic links in the region will inevitably affect Washington's complex geopolitical interests. China appears to be emerging as an alternative to the traditionally dominant US, whose power in the Americas has been weakening due to neglect. One potential cause for US concern will be the construction by 2016 of the Chinese satellite station in Argentina.
Furthermore, China may be keen to safeguard its regional trade interests by protecting sea lanes connecting the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. For instance, the Hong Kong-based Nicaragua Canal Development Investment Company (HKND Group), which is based in Hong Kong, signed a deal with Nicaragua in June 2013 to build a new shipping route to rival the Panama Canal, although the group claims to have no backing from China.
Although IHS Jane's assesses that some countries with leftist administrations such as Cuba and Venezuela have courted China for ideological as well as economic reasons, most governments in the region view engagement with China as an opportunity to enhance economic growth and to move away from dependence on the US.
A survey conducted by the US-based Pew Research Centre in July 2013 found that China was viewed more positively than the United States by interviewees from Latin American commodities exporters, such as Venezuela (71%), Brazil (65%), and Chile (62%). Many Latin American countries also view China as an important market for agricultural produce, oil, and mineral resources, as well as an increasingly crucial source of loans and investment capital.
However, any US fears of a direct challenge by China to its regional dominance in Latin America are perhaps premature. Xi is likely to have held several terse conversations during his tour. Frustrated with Cuba's slow pace of economic reform, and anxious about Venezuela's ability to repay its loans, Beijing probably harbours ongoing concerns regarding the dependability of its regional allies. For example, in 2010, China restricted imports of Argentine soybean oil, citing quality issues, although it is likely that this was in retaliation for Argentina imposing import taxes on Chinese goods.
Conversely, concerns among Latin American countries that China is undermining the economic competitiveness of domestic manufacturing firms by deluging the market with cheap imports have led countries such as Brazil and Mexico to impose barriers against Chinese firms.
Outlook
The most important component of China's ties with Latin America is likely to remain economic over the next several years. However, as China's influence grows, it will become increasingly difficult for Beijing to separate economic objectives from its geopolitical implications.
Xi's July state visits underscored a new wave of Chinese multilateral diplomacy. IHS Jane's judges that Beijing will be hoping that regional initiatives will serve as vehicles to further its national interest by easing concerns about rising Chinese power and bolstering its legitimacy by forging consensus on a range of issues. Building on existing initiatives such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), multilateralism has become a critical aspect of China's strategy in international affairs.
Nevertheless, China's economic relationship with Latin America is far from the point at which it could be considered a viable alternative to the US, and its trajectory in that direction is likely to face many challenges.
Changes in the Latin American countries' political landscapes - such as leadership changes - and protectionist measures for domestic manufacturing will probably modify China's strategic policy debate in the decades to come.
Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro said on Sunday he will visit China and several unspecified OPEC countries during a week-long tour meant to improve the South American nation's finances, which have been weakened by tumbling crude prices.
"I'm leaving today for an international tour ... a very important tour to take on new projects, given the circumstances of falling income that our country faces," Maduro said during a televised broadcast.
His first stop will be China, which has become Venezuela's principal financier through oil-for-loan agreements in which Venezuela receives cash up front in exchange for future deliveries of crude and fuel.
"Also, I'm going to visit other OPEC countries to continue high-level efforts (to create) a strategy for a recovery of oil prices, a strengthening of OPEC," Maduro said. He provided no other details.
Venezuela's economy contracted during the first three quarters of 2014, and its international reserves have deteriorated sharply amid tumbling oil prices.
The decline has spurred concerns that Venezuela may default on its foreign bonds, which in turn has pushed its bond yields to the highest of any emerging market nation.
Maduro denies the country will default. But he says Venezuela's government needs financing in 2015 and says borrowing on international markets is prohibitively expensive.
