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The new Russian doctrine, recently presented in an article by Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov, unveils an assertive plan unprecedented since cold war times. Defining as Russia’s “sphere of strategic interests’ virtually whole post-Soviet space, and terming democratization and European aspirations in the post-Soviet states a direct threat to Russia’s interests the article constitutes an openly stated high-level official position acknowledging that Russia still finds difficulty parting with the Cold War logic as a guiding philosophy for its security and military strategy.
BACKGROUND: Much has been said lately about Russia’s use of hydrocarbons as a remedy designed to alter the behavior of those neighboring states that have opted for membership in NATO and the EU. Now it appears that Russia fancies the idea to “correct†the democratic and Euro-Atlantic aspirations of its neighbors by the means of traditional military force.
Observers who find such a possibility too hard to believe should reflect on “The New Russian Doctrineâ€, an article by Russia’s defence minister, Mr. Sergei Ivanov, published January 11 in the Wall Street Journal. What is most important about the new doctrine – in addition to its unprecedented level of openness in describing the nation's reliance on nuclear force as means for ‘achieving certain defense aims’ – is that it represents a break with Russia’s declared foreign policy to act as a partner, not a rival of the West and in particular the United States.
Equally alarming is the fact that such new trends in Russian policy may lead to dangerous implications for independent states within the enumerated geographic area, which happens to be parts of the former Soviet Union, as the Doctrine broadens the scope of Russia’s accepted maneuvering to consider virtually any event a threat and validate forceful interference in their internal affairs. Russia clearly states its top concern the internal situation or “uncertainty†in some members of the CIS, or as the article puts it, a “process that has a potential to pose a direct threat to Russia’s security or to change the geopolitical reality in a region of Russia’s strategic interestsâ€. Just how far the above region extends wherein the changing of the geopolitical reality may pose a security threat to Russia is left to free interpretation.
However, in stark contrast to Russia’s accusation of its neighbors having an “uncertainty factor†that creates a threat to its security, the core problems such as instability, political or military conflicts and criminal enclaves that many post-Soviet states face, are mostly manipulated by Moscow. In Georgia, Russia has for years supported the separatist regimes of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Along with Russia’s covert participation in escalating these conflicts in the 1990s, the Russian leadership has put in place a strategy, under the guise of peacekeeping and mediation, that has all hallmarks of de facto annexation of these territories. Granting Russian citizenship to local residents, the illegal operation of Russian banks and cell phone companies, appropriation of real estate including properties of Georgian refugees, arming and training secessionist forces, and even appointing Russian senior military and intelligence officers with experience from Chechnya to leadership posts, in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Both the Abkhaz defence minister Sultan Soslaniev and the chief of staff Anatoly Zaytsev are Russian citizens and military generals. Likewise, South Ossetia’s prime minister Yuri Morozov and chief of soviet-fashioned KGB Anatoly Yarovoy are high-ranking Russian military officials. The recent threat issued by Russian colonel Barankevich, who is also defense minister of the self-proclaimed South Ossetian Republic, to shoot down any aircraft that might fly over “South Ossetian territory†was intensified by the discovery of the Russian anti-aircraft missile system "Igla" and its launcher in what is supposed to be a demilitarized zone.
It is not hard to guess who provides South Ossetian and Abkhaz secessionist regimes with modern military equipment in violation of every document signed by the sides as well as by the chief mediator. Russia does so in blatant disregard of Georgia’s repeated protests, and in breach of compliance with the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe which sets a regional ceiling for Russian heavy weaponry.
Just as inadequate as the biased brokerage is the shortsightedness toward dangerous concentration of ammunition and armored vehicles in the conflict regions, particularly given Russia’s policies aimed at preventing terrorists from gaining access to arms. Alarmed at this situation, the Georgian government gave Russia yet another chance to fulfill its peacekeeping obligations and set deadlines for improving the performance of its peacekeepers in the conflict zones, or else terminating their activities within the first half of this year.
IMPLICATIONS: What is dubbed by the new Russian doctrine as a “political process that has a potential to change the geopolitical reality in a region of Russia’s strategic interest†is none other than the new wave of democratization spreading the ideals of freedom and democracy, and a desire to integrate with Euro-Atlantic structures in the former Soviet states in the aftermath of the Rose and Orange revolutions.
Apparently, stable and prosperous democracies on its borders is not interpreted as serving Russia’s interests. To keep the “geopolitical realities†inherited from the times of the Soviet Empire intact, among other things, Moscow consistently exploits energy warfare and uses blackmail by exploiting dependence on Russian supplies. The Russian government’s recent actions to manipulate the natural gas ‘market prices’ and cut off its supplies to Georgia and Ukraine were a litmus test of Russia’s true intent to act as a traditional imperialist power and not a reliable business partner to the West. Similarly, recent explosions on the main pipeline supplying Georgia with Russian gas at a time of brutal cold came after Moscow threatened disloyal neighbors with the use of economic pressures.
Russia’s desire to have a stranglehold of Central Asian energy shipments through the state-owned energy conglomerates must also be seen as part of a policy aiming to use its energy resources as a weapon to exert pressure on its neighbors. It is reasonable to infer that Russia’s stated policy to be a reliable partner for the West is at variance with Russia’s efforts to reanimate its imperial vocation in what Russia forcefully reclaims as its geopolitical territory. Many can question whether this brinkmanship can be accepted as a basis for partnership, particularly given that Russia assumed the presidency of the G8 club of world’s leading industrial democracies.
CONCLUSIONS: Russia’s backsliding to military pressure, as stated in the New Doctrine, sends a clear, if somewhat unsettling, message to the international community – democratization and European aspirations in the post-Soviet states pose a direct threat to Russia’s interests and should be halted, if necessary by force. This approach means, among other things, the false promise of Russia's declarations to join family of European democracies, which has too often been used as an excuse for avoiding real analysis about Moscow’s intentions.
Coupled with Russia’s aspirations to have a stranglehold on Central Asian energy shipments, the dangerous ideas set forth in its New Doctrine may have far-reaching consequences not only for Georgia and other post-Soviet states, but also for Europe as a whole. For if Russia can routinely and safely interfere in the internal affairs of the small states along its frontiers, its imperialist proclivities may grow and encourage it to target others further afield.
