DHS begins nuclear incident drills

[vector7]

NUWAIX '13 (CMHT Level of Play)
Nuclear incident drills to start Monday across Montana

May 3, 2013 | Comments


Malmstrom Staff Sgt. Isaiah Miller operates a lift in the missile tube of a static intercontinental ballistic missile used for maintenance training at Malmstrom Air Force Base in 2010. / TRIBUNE PHOTO/ RION SANDERS

Written by

Jenn Rowell

Tribune Staff Writer

If a nuclear incident happened in Montana, key officials don’t want to be meeting each other for the first time.

Military personnel at Malmstrom Air Force Base have regular exercises to test their response procedures and make sure everyone knows what to do and when.

But starting Monday, their training will go to a higher level.

A national exercise, known as NUWAIX 2013, which is executed by U.S. Northern Command and sponsored by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, will bring about 1,000 people to Montana throughout the exercise. The exercise isn’t expected to disrupt the community, but locals may notice additional vehicle traffic in and out of the base, increased helicopter activity and some personnel in hazmat suits or “tent cities” at some of the exercise sites. The majority of the exercise will be contained at Malmstrom and Fort Harrison in Helena.

Personnel from a variety of local and federal agencies, primarily the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Energy, Homeland Security and Federal Emergency Management Agency Region VIII, will augment Malmstrom and other Air Force participants.

The exercise will be scenario based, and participants will respond to a nuclear incident, which could be a DOE shipment in the state, an attack on a nuclear missile site, hostile action on base or the missile field or a range of scenarios.

“If that day were to happen, we want to kind of go on autopilot,” Col. Rob Stanley, 341st missile wing commander at Malmstrom, said.

The idea is to exercise procedures but also to build relationships among the key players so they aren’t meeting for the first time during an actual emergency, especially one involving nuclear weapons.

Federal, state and local agencies have emergency response plans, but anything involving a nuclear weapon initiates a higher response and having both military, government and civilian agencies understand the plan, lingo and how the others operate is critical.

“If it were to involve a nuke, we don’t have a lot of time,” Stanley said. “It helps prevent any delay in response actions.”

The last of these large scale exercises at Malmstrom was in 2004, and the last one on a nuclear base was held at Minot Air Force Base in North Dakota, Stanley said. Malmstrom personnel conducted an internal exercise about two weeks ago, he said.

Improved relationships with local and federal agencies has been a significant asset to emergency response planning, Stanley said. Information and resource sharing has become more standard in addition to better communication.


“The threat environment has changed over that time, we have to adjust,” he said.


Another big change in recent years is communication with the public, he said. A team from Global Strike Command in Louisiana will come to Montana to supplement Malmstrom public affairs so they can train on sharing information with the media and the public.
“Because if something happens, people need to know,” Stanley said.


About 1,000 people will come to Montana throughout the weeklong exercise. Many of them will be in Great Falls, but the exercise will be conducted at several states statewide.


That could result in about $140 per person per day, according to city data, meaning about $700,000 could be spent in Montana during the exercise.


Vince Kolar with Cascade County Disaster and Emergency Services said some local first responders will participate in the exercise.
“If the real thing happens, the locals are probably going to be the first ones on the scene. We’re usually pretty involved in local exercises,” Kolar said. “(The military) command structure is a little different than ours and once there’s a nuclear weapon involved, it’s a different show. It’s a little different situation for these responders than they’re used to.”


From the state level, the National Guard and state emergency responders will participate. Ed Tinsley, director of Montana DES, said in the three years he’s been on the job, there have been three presidential disasters declared in Montana.


“Our motto is that you don’t want to meet the person you’re going to be working with at the disaster. We know what to expect, how to talk their language, they know how to talk our language,” Tinsley, an Army veteran, said. “Nothing in the world like on the ground training.”

[Phil Fiord]

It is not a false flag in any way shape or form. We know about the exercise ahead of time. Just figured I would point that out.

[vector7]

Last edited by Rick Donaldson; Yesterday at 17:45. Reason: added second page

I was in a hurry this morning and didn't get a chance to post the second page, thanks Rick!

It is not a false flag in any way shape or form. We know about the exercise ahead of time. Just figured I would point that out.

Yeah, the Administration has a lot going on this week:

Syria heating up
Benghazi hearings
Never ending gun control, while the DHS is training for ‘Anti-Government’ Right-Wing Groups planning for Terror Attacks

[American Patriot]

No problem Vector. I do the same thing sometimes and don't get the whole article. I just saw that and figured I'd help out!

[American Patriot]

Well..... check this out.

An Air Force Unit Controlling Our Nuclear Weapons Is Filled with 'Rot'

AP Photo/Minuteman Missile NHS, HO



Dashiell Bennett 8:23 AM ET
All-out nuclear war isn't something Americans worry about too much these days, which is good because the people in charge of fighting that war have apparently been doing a lousy job lately. According to the Associated Press, an internal inspection at the Minot Air Force Base found the unit that oversees nuclear missile launches to be so woefully unprepared that an unprecedented 17 officers had to be stripped of their duties.


The group—which is responsible for launching nuclear-armed Minutemen missiles at a moment's notice—was lambasted last month, after coming as close to failing the inspection as you can get without actually failing. (The group received a "D" grade on its most important function, launch proficiency.) Members of the group were accused of safety violations, questioning orders, and showing general disrespect to superior officers. In the most serious incident, one officer was even accused of intentionally violating a rule that could have compromised the launch codes that enable the missiles to be fired from their underground silos.


The deputy commander of the unit said the inspection uncovered "such rot" that the unit needs to be rebuilt" from the ground up." The 17 officers have been "benched" for 60 days, but have not lost their jobs or rank.


The Air Force's nuclear weapons crews have been under fire in the past, thanks in part to a post-Cold War "malaise" that experts say has demoralized these formerly essential units. After all, sitting in an underground bunker in the middle of North Dakota on 24-hour apocalypse watch is not what many people hoped to be doing when they signed up for the Air Force. (That doesn't even begin to address other issues that have plagued the service, like its growing sexual assault problem.) Let's hope they get their issues sorted out—and that they're still never called upon to do that duty anyway.

[American Patriot]

Minot's Launch Control Fail: Reason #532 Why Nuclear Deterrence Is a Fragile Foundation for Peace

By Russ Wellen, May 8, 2013


To concerns about human error in nuclear launch control add moodiness.

Robert Burns of the Associated Press reports that the Air Force removed authority to control – and launch – nuclear missiles from 17 officers of the 91st Missile Wing in Minot, North Dakota after they were given a poor review for a series of mistakes.

The tip-off to trouble was a March inspection, which earned the equivalent of a "D'' grade when tested on its mastery of Minuteman III missile launch operations. … In addition to the 17, possible disciplinary action is pending against one other officer at Minot who investigators found had purposefully broken a missile safety rule in an unspecified act that could have compromised the secret codes that enable the launching of missiles. [Emphasis added.]

Human error when on nuclear launch duty is serious enough. But willfulness only further increases the degree of difficulty of managing nuclear risk.
You could tell it was bad. The deputy commander of the 91st Missile Wing, Burns reports, wrote in an email:

"We are breaking you down, and we will build from the ground up. … It takes real leaders to lead through a crisis and we are, in fact, in a crisis right now."

He told his subordinates, "You must continue to turn over the rocks and find the rot."
The deputy commander's name, by the way, is General Jack D. Ripper, I mean, Lt. Col. Jay Folds. But what exactly turns these officers into slackers? Burns asked Bruce Blair, the co-founder of Global Zero and one-time launch control officer.

"The nuclear air force is suffering from a deep malaise caused by the declining relevance of their mission since the Cold War's end over 20 years ago. … Minuteman launch crews have long been marginalized and demoralized by the fact that the Air Force's culture and fast-track careers revolve around flying planes, not sitting in underground bunkers baby-sitting nuclear-armed missiles."

In other words, they're sulking. But how can the Air Force maintain a nuclear command without officers who aren't immune from making mistakes or obsessing over their stalled careers? By replacing them with robots! Hey, "smart," autonomous drones are starting to seem inevitable. Why not adapt them to nuclear launch control?
Of course, that would be Reason Number 533 Why Nuclear Deterrence Is a Fragile Foundation for Peace.

[American Patriot]

Air Force Strips 17 Officers of Nuclear Missile Control
May 8th, 2013


WASHINGTON (AP) — The Air Force has stripped an unprecedented 17 officers of their authority to control — and, if necessary, to launch — nuclear missiles.

The action follows a string of unpublicized failings, including a remarkably dim review of their unit’s launch skills.


In an internal email obtained by The Associated Press and confirmed by the Air Force, the air group’s deputy commander says the group is suffering what he calls “rot” within its ranks.


The tip-off to trouble was a March inspection of the 91st Missile Wing at Minot Air Force Base, N.D. The group earned the equivalent of a “D” grade when tested on its mastery of Minuteman III missile launch operations.


The Air Force says the lapses never put the security of the nuclear force at risk.

[American Patriot]

Maybe all of this is why DHS is doing nuke drills?

[American Patriot]

AP Exclusive: Air Force sidelines 17 ICBM officers

By ROBERT BURNS, AP National Security Writer | May 8, 2013 | Updated: May 8, 2013 7:24am

• 

Photo By Minuteman Missile NHS
1 of 2


FILE - This 2002 file photo provided by the National Park Service shows the launch key mechanism at the deactivated Delta Nine Launch Facility near Wall, S.D. The Air Force stripped an unprecedented 17 officers of their authority to control _ and if necessary launch _ nuclear missiles after a string of unpublicized and unacceptable failings, including a potential compromise of missile launch codes. The group’s deputy commander said it is suffering “rot” within its ranks. The tip-off to trouble was a March 2013 inspection of the 91st Missile Wing at Minot Air Force Base, N.D., which earned the equivalent of a “D” grade when tested on its mastery of Minuteman III missile launch operations. Photo: Minuteman Missile NHS

• 
• 

WASHINGTON (AP) — The Air Force stripped an unprecedented 17 officers of their authority to control — and, if necessary, launch — nuclear missiles after a string of unpublicized failings, including a remarkably dim review of their unit's launch skills. The group's deputy commander said it is suffering "rot" within its ranks.


"We are, in fact, in a crisis right now," the commander, Lt. Col. Jay Folds, wrote in an internal email obtained by The Associated Press and confirmed by the Air Force.


The tip-off to trouble was a March inspection of the 91st Missile Wing at Minot Air Force Base, N.D., which earned the equivalent of a "D'' grade when tested on its mastery of Minuteman III missile launch operations. In other areas, the officers tested much better, but the group's overall fitness was deemed so tenuous that senior officers at Minot decided, after probing further, that an immediate crackdown was called for.


The Air Force publicly called the inspection a "success."


But in April it quietly removed 17 officers at Minot from the highly sensitive duty of standing 24-hour watch over the Air Force's most powerful nuclear missiles, the intercontinental ballistic missiles that can strike targets across the globe. Inside each underground launch control capsule, two officers stand "alert" at all times, ready to launch an ICBM upon presidential order.


"You will be a bench warmer for at least 60 days," Folds wrote.


The 17 cases mark the Air Force's most extensive sidelining ever of launch crew members, according to Lt. Col. Angie Blair, a spokeswoman for Air Force Global Strike Command, which oversees the missile units as well as nuclear-capable bombers. The wing has 150 officers assigned to missile launch control duty.


The trouble at Minot is the latest in a series of setbacks for the Air Force's nuclear mission, highlighted by a 2008 Pentagon advisory group report that found a "dramatic and unacceptable decline" in the Air Force's commitment to the mission, which has its origins in a Cold War standoff with the former Soviet Union.


In 2008, then-Defense Secretary Robert Gates sacked the top civilian and military leaders of the Air Force after a series of blunders, including a bomber's mistaken flight across the country armed with nuclear-tipped missiles. Since then the Air Force has taken numerous steps designed to improve its nuclear performance.


The email obtained by the AP describes a culture of indifference, with at least one intentional violation of missile safety rules and an apparent unwillingness among some to challenge or report those who violate rules.


In response to AP inquiries, the Air Force said the lapses never put the security of the nuclear force at risk. It said the officers who lost their certification to operate ICBMs are now getting more training with the expectation that they will return to normal duty within about two months. The missiles remain on their normal war footing, officials said.


Although sidelining 17 launch officers at once is unprecedented, the Air Force said stripping officers of their authority to control nuclear missiles happens to "a small number" of officers every year for a variety of reasons.


In addition to the 17, possible disciplinary action is pending against one other officer at Minot who investigators found had purposefully broken a missile safety rule in an unspecified act that could have compromised the secret codes that enable the launching of missiles, which stand on high alert in underground silos in the nation's midsection. Officials said there was no compromise of missile safety or security.


Folds is deputy commander of the 91st Operations Group, whose three squadrons are responsible for manning the wing's 15 Minuteman III launch control centers.
Advising his troops on April 12 that they had "fallen," Folds wrote that drastic corrective action was required because "we didn't wake up" after an underwhelming inspection in March that he said amounted to a failure, even though the unit's overall performance technically was rated "satisfactory." That is two notches below the highest rating.


"And now we're discovering such rot in the crew force that your behavior while on alert is accepting of" weapons safety rule violations, possible code compromises and other failings, "all in the name of not inconveniencing yourselves," Folds wrote.


Folds also complained about unwarranted questioning of orders from superior officers by launch crews and failure to address superiors with the proper respect.
"We are breaking you down, and we will build from the ground up," Folds added. He later wrote, "It takes real leaders to lead through a crisis and we are, in fact, in a crisis right now."


He told his subordinates, "You must continue to turn over the rocks and find the rot."


When the AP inquired about the Folds email, the Air Force arranged a telephone interview with one of Folds' superiors, Col. Robert Vercher, commander of the 91st Missile Wing. The wing is one of three that operate the nation's fleet of 450 Minuteman III missiles; the two others are at Malmstrom Air Force Base, Mont., and F.E. Warren Air Force Base, Wyo.


"We are frustrated anytime we're performing less than we expect of ourselves," Vercher said, adding that he and other senior officers are implementing an aggressive and innovative plan to restore a record of high performance among launch control officers.


"There was a problem," Vercher said. "And we will fix it."


Vercher said Folds was expressing frustration.


"That is a very passionate leader embarrassed by a performance below our expectation," Vercher said, adding that Folds was disappointed by the inspection, which was by the inspector general of the Air Force Global Strike Command.


Vercher said Folds was telling his officers, in effect, "Quite frankly, you guys should all be embarrassed that in an area that's important, you passed but you were rated as very close to not passing, and that's not acceptable."


The inspection area to which Vercher referred was proficiency at operating the missile launch simulator and responses to written questions about procedures. Their performance was rated "marginal," which Vercher said is the equivalent of a "D'' grade. The inspector's office told the AP that "marginal" is a passing rating, "but attention is needed from leadership to address issues before they become unsatisfactory."


"Nobody is comfortable with that," Vercher said.


The launch simulator is used in testing for inspection because, for obvious reasons, they can't perform an actual missile launch.


Exposure of shortcomings within Vercher's unit recalls an earlier series of stunning mistakes by other elements of the nuclear force, including the August 2007 incident in which an Air Force B-52 bomber flew from Minot to Barksdale Air Force Base, La., without the crew realizing it was armed with six nuclear-tipped cruise missiles. One outcome of the incident was the creation of Global Strike Command in January 2009 as a way of improving management of the nuclear enterprise.


Bruce Blair, who served as an Air Force ICBM launch control officer in the 1970s and is now a research scholar at Princeton University, said the Folds email points to a broader problem within the nuclear weapons force.


"The nuclear air force is suffering from a deep malaise caused by the declining relevance of their mission since the Cold War's end over 20 years ago," Blair said in an interview. "Minuteman launch crews have long been marginalized and demoralized by the fact that the Air Force's culture and fast-track careers revolve around flying planes, not sitting in underground bunkers baby-sitting nuclear-armed missiles."


Blair is co-founder of Global Zero, an international group that advocates the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons.

[vector7]

So they took our ICBM team down, did they replace them or leave their posts vacant?

[Ryan Ruck]

Rick,
Those posts dovetail with this thread that details how the Air Force is losing its nuclear edge - Air Force's Nuclear Focus Has Dimmed Studies Find.

[American Patriot]

Good question... I am not sure.

My thinking is though, you take guys off a position, there's other shifts, thus shift leaders, thus people who CAN be promoted into positions.

Chances are very good there are trained people out there that CAN take over quickly.

So I wouldn't think that "no one is guarding the buttons" at this point.

[Ryan Ruck]

I was reading the take on this on ARFCOM. There is a large number of former military on the site including a number of missileers. Here's the take of one member who I consider a go-to on nuclear related topics:

Is it sad that the first thing I thought of when I read the headline (not the article) this morning was "Betcha it was Minot"? IG visits there have become nothing more than regularly scheduled beatings.

Sorry, folks, not a lot of info I can share that's not in the article. This is, in fact, a big deal, last time this kind of bloodshed occurred in missileer memory was back in 1988 at (you guessed it) Minot, they fired everyone above and including the rank of Major.

Eight and a half crews off the schedule will HURT. BAD. That's about 60% of a squadron's worth of alert-pullers (out of three). So the other crewdawgs who survived are left holding the scheduling bag until these clowns get their head out of their fourth point of contact and back in the game. Thanks, guys, "buddy" is only half the term.

The part that really pisses me off the most is not the busts (though that does), but the way the story broke. Missileers (much like submariners) have traditionally been "quiet professionals." We take care of our own, and we don't make a big deal about what's going on in the missile world, because the average US citizen (and the countries watching us) should NOT have to worry about our nuclear deterrent force. I'm pissed that some whiney little butt-hurt Lt ran to the AP and gave them the email, not because of any sense of coverup, but because the effect on national security (both domestic confidence in our ability to do our job, and the daily international calculus of adversaries and allies on the strengths and weaknesses of our deterrent capability) is just too high to be playing these kinds of personal, "I have sand in my magina" kinds of games.

And a post from another nuke guy with interesting insight on SAC:

Do you know the Col? Unless you know the situation, you shouldn't assume that is what is going on.

I don’t know him and I don’t have to. If Lt Col Folds is part of the leadership of that unit he’s as much the problem as anyone. I was on missile crew for just shy of 6 years counting my time in GLCM and Peacekeeper. What people didn’t realize back then and certainly don’t know now is that SAC was in essence its own military service. Everyone ran around in AF uniform but in reality they were SAC. SAC was a mother fucker, no doubt about it, but they had a reason to be.

I never enjoyed crew duty that much, but I took it seriously. My crew practiced on alert and off; I had 14 evals and never busted one. In SAC the standard was 100%, end of discussion. Crews tested monthly on EWO, codes and weapon system and the minimum passing score was 90% but the expected score was 100%. If you missed a question 2 months in a row they put you on remedial (retard level) training until you were motivated to get 100%. If you busted an eval you were a leper following the world class ass reaming you got from the DO (O-6). I saw people pass out in the middle of bust briefs while being screamed at. The AF needs to man the fuck up and bring SAC back and instill the values (to err is human, to forgive is not SAC policy) and performance levels it had before.

Most guys in SAC were like me, they did their time and did it well, then they got the hell out and retrained into something else. That’s why you saw so many officers with pocket rockets in other career fields. I’m retired now and sometimes it comes up that I used to be a missileer. Invariably people ask if I would have actually key-turned if I had gotten the order. I tell them the truth, that I would have nuked those commie cocksuckers into radioactive ash, then I’d have nuked them some more if I still had any missile left.

[American Patriot]

I can vouch for the remarks of the second guy for sure. I knew many Missileers and SAC folks. And he got it absolutely correct. "To Err is human, to forgive is not SAC policy". lol

I was in AFCC, AFCS, TAC and MAC in my tenure. TAC came closest to being like SAC - but, we weren't the big dogs.

When I was in AFCC/AFCS I was a Combat Crew member, Team Chief for several systems and personnel - but we did communications not missiles.

Badges I wore included "Combat Crew" and Master Electronics Tech (I forget the name of that second badge, but that's what it was).

The former SAC guys I worked with were all good guys. One missile guy I worked with, I will never forget. He never lost his SAC mentality and though he did well in the unit (WHCA) he was not well liked by anyone because he was a total, unrepentant prick. He could have gotten along better if he'd have been a little nicer to people. I had to chew him out standing in a vault in a foreign embassy once (and he out ranked me, he almost lost his job for that incident).

[American Patriot]

Top U.S. Nuclear Brass Reserves Judgment on Errant ICBM Launch Officers



May 9, 2013

By Elaine M. Grossman
Global Security Newswire



A Minuteman 3 ICBM lifts off in a 2010 test from Vandenberg Air Force Base, Calif. Seventeen officers who control the missile's launch operations were temporarily pulled off duty for marginal performance (AP Photo/U.S. Air Force).



WASHINGTON -- The nation’s highest-ranking nuclear arms commander on Thursday sought to reassure lawmakers alarmed at the revelation that 17 ICBM launch-control officers at a North Dakota base have been temporarily pulled off alert duty after performing poorly on an inspection.


“This has my personal attention,” Gen. Robert Kehler, who heads U.S. Strategic Command, testified at a morning House hearing. The Air Force four-star officer said he has asked his organization’s inspector general to review the Minot Air Force Base unit’s performance and the chain of command’s response to the lapses.


“I think the unit is moving aggressively,” in terms of decertifying last month those with insufficient performance in a mix of written tests and launch-control simulations, Kehler told members of the House Armed Services Strategic Forces Subcommittee. “I believe they’re working on getting [insight as] to root cause.”


He said he had not seen any details thus far that would “cause me to lose confidence in that [unit’s ability] to perform the mission safely and effectively.”


The affected organization is the Air Force 91st Operations Group, which oversees three squadrons responsible for the Minot wing’s 15 Minuteman 3 ICBM launch-control centers. Roughly 1,500 military personnel operate in the missile wing.


The Associated Press reported on Wednesday that the officers -- described as relatively junior first lieutenants and captains -- had shown disregard for security procedures and orders from superior officers. Following remedial training, the personnel are expected to return to their jobs in 60 days.


The Air Force had publicly characterized the March inspection as a “success” and said the unit’s missiles have remained safe and ready for use. However, AP obtained an internal e-mail from the deputy commander of the operations group voicing outrage at shoddy -- and just barely passable -- performance.


“We're discovering such rot in the crew force that your behavior while on alert is accepting of" violations in weapons safety directives, possible compromises in launch codes and other shortcomings, "all in the name of not inconveniencing yourselves," AP cited Lt. Col. Jay Folds as writing.


Senator Richard Durbin (D-Ill.), who chairs the Senate Appropriations Defense Subcommittee, on Wednesday said the apparent problems "could not be more troubling." The House subcommittee chairman, Representative Mike Rogers (R-Ala.), said on Thursday he would not comment publicly on the matter until the Air Force and Defense Department have issued investigative findings.


In a brief interview after the House hearing, Kehler said he was unaware of “what the specifics were of the individual performance here that caused the unit to aggressively take this approach” in dealing with the 17 officers.


While the general lays out military requirements for ICBMs to be ready for use, if ever necessary, it is up to a different organization -- the Air Force Global Strike Command -- to manage day-to-day issues of this kind.


However, as the first top Strategic Command leader with experience as an ICBM commander, Kehler noted that temporary decertification is a tool sometimes used to ensure that proper procedures and good judgment are maintained in the custody of these dangerous weapons. Their launch would require a presidential order.


“From what I know about the inspection, I think that the steps they are taking appear to be prudent,” he told Global Security Newswire. “From my experience, you gain judgment through a lot of ways. Certainly the more training you get contributes to your judgment bag. Experience -- in that job in particular -- contributes much to your judgment.”


He said the 17 benched officers -- described as an unprecedented high in Air Force history -- would have to pass new inspections before returning to their launch-control positions.


During inspections, Air Force missile-launch units are rated at one of five levels, according to former officers: outstanding, excellent, satisfactory, marginal or unsatisfactory. Scores are issued on a bell-shaped curve, meaning it is unusual -- but not unheard of -- for personnel to be rated either outstanding or unsatisfactory.


Though few details have been released about the specific nature of the transgressions, the description of marginal-but-passing performance by so many launch officers at once could raise doubts about whether the test parameters are inappropriate or too demanding, according to some military sources.


“In all likelihood, the crews made a mistake in terms of not following their checklists or weapon system technical orders,” said one former ICBM squadron commander, who requested anonymity in discussing a delicate security issue. “So the question needs to be asked: Were the technical orders correct, properly written, and current?”


In testimony, Kehler said the concerns about performance and the significant reaction at the unit’s upper echelons reflect high standards for nuclear operations safeguards and oversight.


The Air Force moved in recent years to strengthen nuclear training and operations following an accidental 2006 shipment of warhead fuses to Taiwan and a mistaken bomber transport of six atomic-armed cruise missiles across several U.S. states the following year.


One result was the creation of Global Strike Command in 2008 to oversee bomber and ICBM units.


Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel this week received a staff briefing on the Minot lapses and requested further information, spokesman George Little told reporters.


Air Force Secretary Michael Donley on Wednesday called it the duty of commanders to "ride herd" on young officers charged with "this awesome responsibility" of controlling weapons capable of such vast destructive power, AP reported.


The former ICBM commander took issue with this terminology, though, saying the Air Force must be careful to exert prudent direction.


“You need to lead crew members, not ‘ride herd’ on them,” this source said. “If the squadron commander sets the standard of performance, the crew members will follow good leadership.”