The Pentagon's Latest China Report

[American Patriot]

The Pentagon's Latest China Report



by Arthur Waldron, Ph.D

Published on May 24th, 2006

LOOKING FORWARD
China’s Military Buildup Suggests She Seeks to Change the Status Quo:

China’s government has become wealthy through world trade. She has nearly a trillion dollars in foreign exchange reserves and 11% of her GNP is accounted for by exports to the United States alone.


But China’s military and strategic purpose is not to join the world that has made her rich as it is today, but rather to remake that world. That is the almost inescapable conclusion for anyone reading the just-released Pentagon report on Chinese military power.


China’s goal would seem to be to make herself the greatest military power in Asia, able to intimidate or defeat any of her neighbors in actually conflict, and to deter the United States or anyone else from intervening.


These conclusions are profoundly worrying to anyone who knows the history of war in Asia over the past century. They are also profoundly at odds with the conventional wisdom of several decades following U.S. establishment of relations with Beijing in 1979, which maintained that China had neither the desire nor the ability to become an important military force.


Many outside of China will dismiss the report, or argue that China is simply responding to actions by the United States or other countries.
Reality, however, is rendering more and more untenable both the long-standing position of complacency and the desire to see China’s actions as responsive, rather than self-directed.


China thinks of herself as number one. Her official historiography—at odds with what actually happened—describes a "Chinese world order" in which states from Mongolia and Japan to Southeast Asia were subordinates—"tributaries"—of the universal emperor of China.
Although in theory Beijing accepts the Westphalian concept of a horizontal community of equal, sovereign nations, in fact the old hierarchical sense has proven very difficult to shake.


China’s neighbors are already feeling the pressure to fall into place in this pyramid of which Beijing is capstone and the pressure will only increase.
The United States Will Prove Incapable of Maintaining Balance:
No Pentagon report would endorse the conclusion, but it is difficult to see the United States or the United States and her alliances in the region as currently constituted as determined and united enough reliably to deter China’s growing military might, or to adopt a coordinated diplomatic strategy to avoid danger.


Iraq has already made clear to the world how difficult a time Washington has with military operations—even in a country where the American role was to overthrow a despised autocrat and introduce democracy.
Iraq has also made clear the reluctance of many states that would expect the United States to assist them should they be in peril to help the United States with broader tasks.


In Asia, American credibility is particularly low. The Korean War was made possible by ambiguous American signals that led to deterrence failure. We abandoned South Vietnam in 1975 even though we had promised over and over that we would resist an actual invasion from the North. In 1979 we attempted to force Taiwan to join China by cutting all diplomatic relations—and doing so without consulting any of our allies. With South Korea we now have disagreements over how to deal with the threat from the North that, in theory, Seoul and Washington would resist together.
Furthermore, the United States now has major economic interests in China that clearly affect how our leaders—and in particular our former presidents, ex secretaries of state, etc. think. They are enriched by million dollar plus fees for speaking engagements in China.


Even though China minus the foreign investment and trade still looks an awful lot like the Soviet Union, few people have the fortitude to ask the difficult questions.


Possible Failure of Deterrence:
The decision by a country seeking to change the status quo by means of military force is often made easier when her potential adversaries are at sixes and sevens.


States such as Australia certainly do not want to live in a China-dominated Asia. She is not herself strong enough to deter China (unless she acquires nuclear weapons, which she could easily do) and must therefore depend on the United States doing the deterring. But even holding America’s coat is a stance she and other states find difficult, lest their economic relations with China be harmed.


The United States remains indispensable right now to stability and peace in Asia. But few Asian states are really willing to come out and say that, not to mention work closely with Washington. Nor is Washington’s resolve certain.


Under such circumstances, alliances tend to become weak or to dissolve.
This suggests that if current trends continue, China will find the general military balance in Asia seeming to shift in her favor—and be tempted to push harder, with threats and even military action, to effect the changes she seeks in Asia.


In other words, fear of the consequences of initiating conflict may fall to the point where they are no longer sufficient to restrain Chinese action. Deterrence could fail.


But Coalitions Can Form Quickly:
What state, however, has ever succeeded in a war in quest of hegemony? Athens failed when she effectively forced Sparta to fight in the fifth century B.C.E. France failed in all her attempts, under the Bourbons and then under Napoleon. Britain succeeded briefly after the Seven Years’ War, but only outside Europe. Germany failed twice in the last century; Japan once. Why?


Because once a state’s quest for hegemony becomes unmistakable, other states will band together to frustrate her.


Take Taiwan, for example, everybody’s favorite flashpoint. The island is Asia’s Belgium: that is to say, a small country whose strategic position is pivotal. (In Taiwan’s case, she sits athwart the critical sea lines of communication from the Straits of Malacca to Russia, Japan, Korea, China, and so forth; in Belgium’s case she possesses, in the Scheldt and ports on the Channel coast the indispensable logistical base for attack on England).
Other states cannot allow such a small but strategically pivotal state to join with a potential rival. Belgium cannot be part of France and she cannot be part of Germany. Taiwan cannot militarily be part of China (as she was with such important effect of Japan from 1895-1945) without threatening vital interests of all the other Asian states—whatever they may say.
Herein lies the problem. Belgium was at least formally recognized and her neutrality guaranteed by a number of other countries, including the United States. Yet even so Berlin miscalculated, imagining that her troops could pass through Belgium on their way to Paris without triggering larger conflict., President Woodrow Wilson so feared war with Germany that he declined to act in Belgium’s defense as we had promised to under the Hague Conventions. But Britain did act, contrary to German expectations—and to at least some of the signals London had sent as the summer crisis worsened in 1914.


Taiwan is not even recognized as a country by most states and she has no formal allies. So it is even easier to assume that, say, an attack on her would have no consequences. Yet the interests of her neighbors are as deeply involved in her security as were those of the European states in the formally-recognized security of Belgium in 1914,


Like Germany at the beginning of the last century, China is developing a formidable military force that makes no sense at all unless one assumes that a "grab for power" of some sort is its rationale. Of course Chinese military thought teaches that one wins by intimidation, but in practice conflict usually turns out to be, as Clausewitz puts it, the hard coin in which disputes are settled.


Here China faces insurmountable strategic difficulties, worse even than those that did Germany in twice.


China is surrounded by potential flashpoints: in Muslim central Asia and East Turkestan (Xinjiang—currently part of China), in Mongolia, in connection with both Koreas (which agree that China is occupying some Korean territory in Manchuria), in connection with Japan and Taiwan, in the South China Sea, and even far to the West—where China is attempting to pin India down by close alliances with Burma and Pakistan—with Russia, and so on.


The problem is that if China were to become involved in conflict in any of these areas, most or all of the other areas would join in resistance. The result would be a disaster for all concerned.


If, as seems increasingly likely, the United States fails to convince states in the region that she would go into a nuclear war to defend them, then we can expect further spread of nuclear weapons—to South Korea (where the United States has already intervened once to stop a program), to Japan, to Australia, possibly to Taiwan and elsewhere. Ironically, such nuclear deterrence would probably stabilize the situation and make China less rather than more likely to launch a war. The increasingly robust Indian nuclear capability must be a headache for any military planner. And who can say at what country North Korea really intends its nuclear weapons to be aimed?


American Interests:
The developments just described: a break down of deterrence, an attempt to win hegemony by war, the emergence of a counter-hegemonic coalition, and incalculable bloodshed and destruction—are clearly NOT in America’s interest.


Yet at present we do not seem to be genuinely focused on them as a possibility. We are preoccupied with Iraq and other "smaller" issues.
Even if we were to focus, however, it would not be possible for us to restore balance and deterrence in Asia alone.


We would need firm agreements with allies. We would need to align our economic policies with our security interests.


These tasks are difficult enough under any circumstances, but they are particularly difficult when the would-be allies are all economic and political competitors for the favor of the country that must be deterred.
The Japanese-American alliance is, however, is strongly supported in both countries. And should she feel the need, Japan could create a military far superior to China’s in a matter of a few years.


The American interest is to cease herself to be the sole guarantor of peace in the region—pledging to fight to defend a Japan that, owing to her American-drafted constitution, can have no offensive military, or sort of pledging to defend a Taiwan with whom she has no workable military relationship, or still basing troops in a Korea where they are increasingly unwelcome (unless, of course, they are needed to stop North Korea). That situation, a relic of the immediate post World War II era, makes no sense today.


Instead, she should foster military strength among other Asian states that share our democratic values, with the goal of creating a balancing coalition against China in Asia itself. At the same time we should stress our diplomatic ties with them at least as much as we do those with China—which is not currently the case.


Possible Outcomes:
The Pentagon report makes clear how much China could now interfere with any American attempt to intervene in an Asian conflict. This fact will make Washington reluctant to contemplate such intervention, which in turn will make her even less trusted in Asia than she is at present.


Nevertheless, should China actually attempt to convert her increasingly formidable military capability into the sort of political hegemony to which she seems to aspire, she is likely to trigger a catastrophic avalanche.
The policies of the United States and other countries at present are making such an attempt more, not less, likely, by demonstrating clear reluctance even to name obvious problems that China creates. The unwillingness to label the renminbi a manipulated currency, which it most certainly is, should be instructive.


So too is the extraordinary belief, that seems to animate much of Washington’s China policy, that if treated right, Beijing will help us to solve the nuclear problems in Iran and North Korea.


This is the sort of murky international environment in which trouble can arise.


China is of course changing, and it is likely that internal problems will become more severe in the years ahead. These could lead to the emergence of a regime that is more realistic about foreign policy. But of course nationalism and war have regularly been seen also as ways to keep political power.


China must also be aware that war would close the American markets to her exports, which would lead to grave economic problems internally.
But the current Chinese leadership lacks the wisdom of even a thug like Deng Xiaoping, who understood that under no circumstances should China become alienated from the United States. Having seen their country transformed since the death of Mao Zedong in 1976, and weathered the crisis of 1989, the current Chinese leadership is perhaps overconfident, lacking in the prudence born of setbacks and failures. Increasingly they act as if their country was already the great power she aspires to be, rather than a still-poor and chaotic third world state.


Whatever happens inside China, the hopeful sign is that the Pentagon report is rather straightforward and direct. Concern about China is increasing at least as rapidly as her military power. Which suggests that her unwise choice of pursuing the goal of hegemony with the steadiness and expenditures that the report documents may ironically call into being the required countervailing alliances and deterrence before Beijing is ready to move.

[American Patriot]

NRDC: Nuclear Notebook
http://www.thebulletin.org/article_n...ofn=mj06norris

Chinese nuclear forces, 2006


By Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen
May/June 2006 pp. 60-63 (vol. 62, no. 3) © 2006 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
ewly available information on the Chinese nuclear arsenal requires us to reassess our previous estimate of Beijing's stockpile (see "Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2003," November/December 2003 Bulletin). In 2005, the Defense Department published a detailed breakdown of the Chinese missile force, as part of its 2005 Annual Report on the Military Power of the People's Republic of China (otherwise known as Chinese Military Power 2005). Taken together with a vague 2004 Chinese Foreign Ministry declaration about the size of the Chinese nuclear arsenal and other information, we estimate that China deploys approximately 130 nuclear warheads for delivery by land-based missiles, sea-based missiles, and bombers. Additional warheads are thought to be in storage for a total stockpile of approximately 200 warheads.
China continues to modernize its nuclear forces, though its recent developments are less dramatic than many analyses have suggested. There continues to be a number of substantial unknowns about the composition of China's future forces, including if and how it will respond to the U.S. deployment of a ballistic missile defense system.


Land-based missiles. China deploys approximately 80 land-based, nuclear-capable ballistic missiles of four types: the Dong Feng (DF)-3, DF-4, DF-5, and DF-21, according to Chinese Military Power 2005. [1] Despite frequent claims to the contrary, none of the missiles carries multiple warheads.


China is gradually retiring the liquid-fueled DF-3 medium-range ballistic missile after more than 35 years in service; some 16 missiles remain operational for half as many launchers. The retirement of the missiles, some of which are probably targeted at Russia, India, and U.S. military bases in Japan, has been slowed presumably due to delays in deployment of a modified DF-21, the DF-21A.


China deploys about 22 two-stage, liquid-fueled DF-4 long-range missiles and a dozen launchers. The missiles are hidden in caves and are rolled out in preparation for launch. The targets for the DF-4 are likely to be in Russia, India, and Guam, where there are U.S. military installations. The Pentagon expects the missile to eventually be replaced by the new DF-31, but it may remain in service until the end of the decade.


The only true intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) in China's arsenal is the liquid-fueled DF-5, which is capable of targeting the entire continental United States. The exact number of DF-5s is unclear, but Chinese Military Power 2005 states that 20 missiles are deployed in 20 launchers, a number that has remained steady over the past six years or so. The missiles are deployed in silos at two locations, and their nuclear warheads are stored separately nearby.


A program to upgrade the DF-5 to the DF-5A and increase its range and payload has been ongoing since the 1980s. The Pentagon has long predicted that the program would be completed by now, but it grinds on at a snail's pace. If China decides to deploy multiple warheads on a portion of its ICBM force as a countermeasure to U.S. ballistic missile defenses, then the DF-5A may remain in operation for some time, using up to three of the lighter-weight warheads designed for the DF-31.


Some of the road-mobile DF-21s and DF-21As are conventionally armed, and the Pentagon says that only about 21 total missiles are deployed with approximately 36 launchers.


For about 15 years, the intelligence community and Pentagon have consistently reported that China is "modernizing" its missile force. While this is true, the process has been very slow--a point rarely emphasized. Also overlooked is how future Chinese forces might compare with U.S. forces, what that means, and why it matters.


The "modernization" talk began two decades ago with reports of a new three-stage, solid-fueled, mobile ICBM, the DF-31. The missile was said to have a range of 7,200-8,000 kilometers (4,500-5,000 miles) and a circular error probable (how close a weapon comes to its target) of 300-600 meters. Its range suggests that once it is deployed its likely targets will be Russia, India, and U.S. bases and facilities in the Pacific Ocean, essentially replacing the coverage of the DF-4. Analysts and media reports have suggested that the DF-31 will carry multiple warheads, but official U.S. estimates have consistently credited it with only one. The Pentagon's estimate of when the DF-31 will be operational has repeatedly slipped, and the missile is still not fielded.


China is also developing a longer-range version of the DF-31 known as the DF-31A. The road-mobile DF-31A is expected to have a slightly shorter range, 12,000 kilometers (7,500 miles), and a smaller payload than the silo-based DF-5A. The Pentagon predicts the missile will be deployed by the end of the decade, but it has yet to undergo a full-scale flight-test, so this projection seems overly optimistic. When it is deployed, it will most likely be with a single warhead, decoys, and penetration aids aimed at confusing defensive systems.


For 20 years China has had the technical capability to develop multiple reentry vehicles (MRVs) or multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) but has chosen not to do so. The CIA estimated in 2001 that it would take only a few years for China to deploy a simple MRV or MIRV on silo-based DF-5s, using a DF-31-type reentry vehicle, though it cautioned, "Chinese pursuit of a multiple [reentry vehicle] capability for its mobile ICBMs and [submarine-launched ballistic missiles] would encounter significant technical hurdles and would be costly." [2]


Sea-based missiles. China has encountered enormous difficulties with its nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) program. China's "fleet" consists of a single Xia-class sub built at Huldao (or Huludao) Naval Base and Shipyard and launched in April 1981. That there is only one submarine strongly suggests that the program was a colossal failure; no country would decide to build just one ballistic missile sub, considering the amount of resources necessary to accomplish this task. There was another Xia-class sub, but its fate is unknown--it may have been canceled or lost in a 1985 accident.


The Xia operates with the North Sea Fleet at Qingdao and is based at Jianggezhuang, approximately 20 kilometers (12 miles) to the northeast. A satellite image published in February 2005 reveals the Xia and two Han-class nuclear-powered attack submarines (one in dry dock) at the base. Also visible is the entrance to a large underground submarine cave, which was rumored to exist for many years but was never before seen in photographs. The cave is probably used to store missiles and warheads for the submarine. [3]


The Xia is configured to carry 12 single-warhead Julang (JL)-1 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), which have an estimated range of approximately 1,700 kilometers (1,060 miles). After a four-year overhaul between 1995 and 1998, the Xia has been slow to resume operations. [4] In 2003, the Pentagon predicted that China would deploy the JL-1 that year and that the sub's service life would be extended past 2010. [5] But according to more recent data obtained from U.S. Naval Intelligence, the Xia never conducted a single deterrent patrol before its overhaul, nor has it conducted any since.


Determined to build a sea-based leg to its nuclear arsenal, China is working on a new SSBN program called Project 094. The new sub class is expected to carry 16 three-stage JL-2 SLBMs, a variant of the DF-31 missile, with a range of 7,200-8,000 kilometers. The navy test-launched the JL-2 in 2004 from a converted Golf-class sub. As with the other two versions of the DF-31, there is speculation that the JL-2 may be equipped with multiple warheads, but U.S. intelligence credits the missile with only a single warhead. The Pentagon optimistically predicts the deployment of the JL-2 in 2008-2010, but a later date is more realistic.


Aircraft. China has a small stockpile of nuclear bombs for delivery by aircraft. Between 1965 and 1976, Chinese Hong (H)-5, H-6, and Qian (Q)-5 aircraft dropped 11 nuclear test bombs at the Lop Nur test site. The bombs detonated with yields between 8 and 4,000 kilotons in four distinct ranges: 8 kilotons, 15-35 kilotons, 250 kilotons, and 3,000-4,000 kilotons. The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) estimated in April 1984 that "a small number of the nuclear-capable aircraft probably have nuclear bombs, even though we are unable to identify airfield storage sites." [6] Nine years later, the National Security Council (NSC) reaffirmed that China has a "small stockpile of nuclear bombs." Although the Chinese Air Force "has no units whose primary purpose it is to deliver" the weapons, "some units may be tasked for nuclear delivery as a contingency mission," the NSC concluded. [7]


Given its history as the primary nuclear delivery platform during China's period of atmospheric testing, the H-6 is a strong candidate for having a nuclear mission. Approximately 100-120 H-6s remain in operation, and a small number of them may have nuclear missions. Although increasingly obsolete as a modern strike-bomber, the H-6 is younger than the U.S. B-52 bomber and may gain new life as a delivery platform for China's emerging cruise missile capability. The naval air force has operated the H-6 as a platform for the C-601/Kraken anti-ship cruise missile for more than 10 years, and many H-6s may be modified to carry the new Ying Ji-63 land-attack cruise missiles. [8] Chinese Military Power 2005 confirms the development of first-and second-generation land-attack cruise missiles and adds that, once developed, there "are no technological bars to placing on these systems a nuclear payload."


It is not known if the Q-5 attack aircraft continues to have a nuclear capability more than 30 years after it dropped nuclear test bombs. China has more modern attack aircraft, such as the Russian-designed Su-30, with greater range and payload that would make better nuclear candidates, although there is no publicly available evidence that identifies a nuclear role for Chinese fighter-bombers.


Short-range nuclear weapons. Based on previous U.S. intelligence reports, we formerly counted about 100 nonstrategic warheads in our estimates of Chinese nuclear forces, but no recent credible evidence suggests that they are presently part of Chinese operational forces. In November 1984, the DIA concluded that although there "is no evidence that it has yet produced or deployed such weapons . . . there are indications that China may develop tactical nuclear delivery systems." [9]


In 1987, the DIA included the DF-15 in an overview of foreign tactical nuclear weapons systems. [10] Six years later, the NSC reported that China was working on "warheads for . . . tactical missiles." [11]
Deployments of DF-11 and DF-15 missiles form the core of China's short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) buildup opposite Taiwan; as many as 650-730 missiles are currently deployed. These SRBMs, which China is deploying at a rate of about 100 per year, are thought to be conventionally armed. The Pentagon sees China's growing conventional missile force as an effort to achieve "a strategic capability without the political and practical constraints associated with nuclear-armed missiles." [12]
China has traditionally claimed a "no first-use" policy regarding its nuclear weapons, though the Pentagon suggested in 2003 that this may be about to change. "Some strategists are considering the conditions under which Beijing would employ theater nuclear weapons against U.S. forces in the region," according to Chinese Military Power 2003. The 2005 report did not include this analysis but rather highlighted China's increased interest in non-nuclear short-range systems.


Warheads. China has kept the total number of warheads in its stockpile ambiguous. If we are to believe a reference included in a 2004 Chinese Foreign Ministry fact sheet on nuclear weapons, the arsenal is smaller than previously thought. The document's crucial sentence reads, "Among the nuclear-weapon states, China . . . possesses the smallest nuclear arsenal." [13]


Since Britain has declared that it has fewer than 200 operationally available warheads (see "British Nuclear Forces, 2005," November/December 2005 Bulletin), and the United States, Russia, and France have more, the Chinese statement could be interpreted to mean that China's nuclear arsenal is smaller than Britain's. Not surprisingly, the devil is in the details. The Chinese statement uses the word "arsenal." Is this a reference to the entire stockpile or just operationally deployed warheads? To add to the confusion, Britain has not disclosed the precise size of its stockpile either but only declared that "less than 200 warheads" are "operationally available." This strongly suggests that there may be additional British warheads in storage. [14]


The Pentagon stated in 1996 that China's "inventory of nuclear weapon systems . . . now includes over a hundred warheads deployed operationally in medium-range ballistic missiles, intermediate-range ballistic missiles, and intercontinental ballistic missiles." [15]



The next year it added, "China has over 100 nuclear warheads deployed on ballistic missiles" and that "additional warheads are in storage" with "a stockpile of fissile material sufficient to increase or improve its weapon inventory." [16]



In July 1999, the DIA estimated the size of the Chinese nuclear weapons inventory to be roughly 155 warheads. [17]


We know that there are roughly 40 fewer warheads today due to the withdrawal of the DF-3s and the conversion of some DF-21s to non-nuclear missions.
The Pentagon and the intelligence community have not commented on this reduction but instead have emphasized that they expect China's nuclear arsenal to increase significantly over the next decade. The CIA predicted in December 2001 that "the total number of Chinese strategic warheads will rise several-fold" by 2015. [18] In 2002 (and again in 2003 and 2004), the Pentagon predicted that the number of Chinese ICBMs capable of hitting the United States "could increase to about 30 by 2005 and may reach up to 60 by 2010." [19] The first part of this prediction is already moot, as the number remains at 20 and deployment of the DF-31A is years away.
Past U.S. predictions about China's nuclear arsenal have repeatedly proven to be highly unreliable. Rather than continue to grow, China's stockpile appears to have leveled out at approximately 200 warheads in the mid-1980s and remained at about that level ever since.
The CIA's latest prediction of a "several-fold" increase in warheads deployed "primarily" against the United States is hardly a firm estimate since it depends upon several unanswerable questions: How many DF-31As will China deploy? Will China finally develop and deploy MRVs on its DF-5A missiles? How will it respond to deployment of the U.S. antiballistic missile system? China might not even know the answer to these questions.
Even if an increase occurs, the total Chinese stockpile would rise only moderately because warheads on older liquid-fueled missiles will have to be phased out.

1. Defense Department, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report on the Military Power of the People's Republic of China 2005, July 20, 2005, p. 45.
2. CIA, National Intelligence Council, "Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat Through 2015," December 2001, p. 8.
3. Thomas B. Cochran et al., "Chinese Nuclear Forces," Imaging Notes, Winter 2006, p. 25.
4. Defense Department, Annual Report on the Military Power of the People's Republic of China, n.d. [2002], p. 22.
5. Defense Department, Annual Report on the Military Power of the People's Republic of China 2003, July 28, 2003, pp. 27, 31.
6. DIA, "Nuclear Weapons Systems in China," DEB-49-84, April 24, 1984, pp. 3-4. Partially declassified and released under Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).
7. NSC, "Report to Congress on Status of China, India, and Pakistan Nuclear and Ballistic Missile Programs," n.d. [July 28, 1993], p. 2. Obtained under FOIA by the Federation of American Scientists (FAS).
8. Defense Department, Annual Report on the Military Power of the People's Republic of China 2003, July 28, 2003, p. 24; "China's New Cruise Nears Service," Flight International, August 22, 2000, p. 26, as cited in Richard D. Fisher Jr., "PLAAF Equipment Trends," Jamestown Foundation, October 30, 2001.
9. DIA, "Handbook of the Chinese People's Liberation Army," November 1984, pp. 36, 71. Released under FOIA.
10. DIA, "A Guide to Foreign Tactical Nuclear Weapon Systems Under the Control of Ground Force Commanders," DST-1040A-541-87, September 4, 1987, p. 79, as cited in Robert S. Norris, Nuclear Weapons Databook Volume V: British, French, and Chinese Nuclear Weapons (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), p. 386, footnote 1. Report was partially declassified and released under FOIA.
11. NSC, "Report to Congress on Status of China, India, and Pakistan Nuclear and Ballistic Missile Programs," n.d. [July 28, 1993], p. 1.
12. Defense Department, Office of the Secretary of Defense, The Military Power of the People's Republic of China 2004, p. 23.
13. Foreign Ministry of the People's Republic of China, fact sheet, "China: Nuclear Disarmament and Reduction of [sic]," April 27, 2004, p. 1.
14. Some believe the Chinese arsenal may be even smaller. See: Jeffrey Lewis, "The Ambiguous Arsenal," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May/June 2005, pp. 52-59.
15. Defense Department, Office of the Secretary of Defense, "Proliferation: Threat and Response," April 1996, p. 12.
16. Defense Department, Office of the Secretary of Defense, "Proliferation: Threat and Response," November 1997, p. 16.
17. DIA, "A Primer on the Future Threat: The Decades Ahead: 1999-2020," July 1999, p. 38. This 1999 DIA report is dubious because it lists ICBMs, SLBMs, and SRBMs but no MRBMs. Nor does it include nuclear bombs. Instead, the SRBM category probably includes everything other than ICBMs and SLBMs.
18. CIA, National Intelligence Council, "Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat Through 2015," December 2001, p. 3.
19. Defense Department, Office of the Secretary of Defense, The Military Power of the People's Republic of China 2004, p. 37.

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Nuclear Notebook is prepared by Robert S. Norris of the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) and Hans M. Kristensen of the Federation of American Scientists. Inquiries should be directed to NRDC, 1200 New York Avenue, N.W., Suite 400, Washington, D.C., 20005; 202-289-6868.
May/June 2006 pp. 60-63 (vol. 62, no. 3) © 2006 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists

[American Patriot]

Pentagon Finds China Fortifying Its Long-Range Military Arsenal

By Ann Scott Tyson
Washington Post Staff Writer
Wednesday, May 24, 2006; Page A17
China's military buildup is increasingly aimed at projecting power far beyond its shores into the western Pacific to be able to interdict U.S. aircraft carriers and other nations' military forces, according to a Pentagon report released yesterday that outlines continued concerns over China's rising strategic influence in Asia.
Chinese military planners are focusing to a greater degree than in the past on targeting ships and submarines at long ranges using anti-ship cruise missiles, partly in reaction to Taiwan Strait crises in 1995 and 1996 that saw the U.S. military intervene with carrier battle groups, the report said.

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The People's Liberation Army "is engaged in a sustained effort to interdict, at long ranges, aircraft carrier and expeditionary strike groups that might deploy to the western Pacific," the report said. Long-term trends in China's development of nuclear and conventional weapons "have the potential to pose credible threats to modern militaries operating in the region," it said.
The annual report to Congress on China's military power also highlighted Beijing's purchases of Russian weapons, its positioning of as many as 790 Chinese short-range ballistic missiles opposite Taiwan and its nuclear weapons modernization. It warned that advances in nuclear missiles are spurring a debate among some high-ranking Chinese strategists over whether Beijing should change its "no first use" doctrine that bars using nuclear weapons except in response to a nuclear attack.
The 50-page report states that China's military buildup remains primarily focused on Taiwan, and notes that its current ability to sustain military power over long distances is limited. But the report also outlines Chinese military ambitions that go well beyond Taiwan, and reiterates the Pentagon's latest formulation on China's military threat, stating that "China has the greatest potential to compete militarily with the United States."
China's defense budget is expanding apace with the new investments, the report said. Beijing officially projects a growth in defense spending of 14.5 percent this year to about $35 billion. But the report, citing the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, puts the actual funding at twice or triple that amount -- or as much as $105 billion -- when all military-related spending is tallied.
The report details how the Chinese military is investing in cruise missiles, precision weapons and guidance systems that could target ships, submarines, aircraft and airbases as far away as the "second island chain" including the Mariana Islands and Guam. As part of this strategy, China is buying Russian aircraft, such as the IL-76 transport and IL-78 tanker aircraft, and has shown interest in the Su-33 maritime strike aircraft. China is in the early stages of "developing power projection for other contingencies other than Taiwan," said Peter W. Rodman, assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs.
On Taiwan, the report said China had deployed about 100 more short-range ballistic missiles to garrisons opposite the island, increasing the total from 650 to 730 last year to between 710 and 790 now. "The balance between Beijing and Taiwan is heading in the wrong direction," Rodman said, adding that "maybe our job is to be the equalizer if a contingency arises."
The internal debate over China's nuclear policy of no first use is unfolding as the nation upgrades its nuclear arsenal to include more mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles such as the DF-31A and the JL-2 submarine-launched ballistic missile, according to the report. Both missiles are expected to become operable as early as 2007 and be capable of striking the United States, it said.
China's stated doctrine, reaffirmed last fall during a visit to Beijing by Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld, is not to use nuclear weapons first. But senior U.S. defense officials said improvements in the quality and quantity of China's nuclear missiles had generated discussion among Chinese military and academic strategists over how and when to use them. "We take them at their word that they adhere to that doctrine," Rodman said. However, he said, "as their capabilities change they may be thinking about options that they didn't have before."
The report cites public comments by Chinese military officials and strategists stating that under certain extreme circumstances -- such as an all-out attack against the country by conventional forces -- that China should use nuclear weapons.
Any move to abandon the no-first-use doctrine would be "very destabilizing" in the region, a U.S. defense official said.
To address such concerns, the United States and China will soon start talks over nuclear strategy with the first U.S. visit by the head of China's nuclear arsenal, Jing Zhiyuan, the commander of the Second Artillery Corps, officials said. Jing will be hosted by his American counterpart, Gen. James E. Cartwright, chief of U.S. Strategic Command at Offutt Air Force Base in Nebraska. No date has been finalized for the visit, Rodman said.
The strategic talks illustrate the Bush administration's two-pronged approach to China's military buildup set down in the 2006 National Security Strategy: to engage with Chinese military leaders to influence their choices while hedging against potential threats.
Experts on China's military differed on the significance of the debate over nuclear policy. "The real issue is not 'no first use.' The real issue is: Under what conditions China will use nuclear weapons . . . how bad do things have to get for the threshold to be crossed?" said Evan S. Medeiros, an expert at Rand Corp. He noted that some Chinese military commentators have stated that a precision strike by conventional weapons on China's nuclear facilities could be tantamount to a small-scale nuclear attack and lead China to consider using nuclear weapons.
Other experts played down the importance of the nuclear debate in China. "They are primarily interested in increasing conventional options in regional contingencies and vis-a-vis Taiwan," said Kurt Campbell, a China expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

[American Patriot]

U.S. concerned about Chinese military buildup across from Taiwan (Updated: 12:55 a.m.)

2006/8/4
By Foster Klug, WASHINGTON, AP


A U.S. official said Thursday that American policy has created greater stability between China and rival Taiwan. But, he said, the United States remains worried about China's fast-paced military buildup across from Taiwan, the self-governed island Beijing claims as its own.

Thomas Christensen, deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asian affairs, told a congressional advisory panel that as China's economy grows, "it will try to build a more modern military force.


"We understand that. But we're concerned about the pace and lack of transparency in China's military modernization. And we're particularly concerned about the fast-paced buildup across from Taiwan."


Christensen said that China's goal to unify with Taiwan "is a different thing than preventing conflict in the cross-Strait relationship."


"The question is whether there will be events that could lead to military conflict in the Taiwan Strait," he said.


Christensen told the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission that he believed Chinese officials are "more confident that stability can be maintained in the near term then perhaps they were a couple of years earlier."


China has close to 800 short-range ballistic missiles aimed at Taiwan, with numbers increasing at about 100 missiles a year, U.S. officials say.
China has pledged to keep the island from independence by force if necessary. Washington has no formal diplomatic ties with Taiwan but maintains extensive unofficial relations and has pledged to see that Taiwan has the means to defend itself.


Christensen said the United States continues to support Taiwan's membership in international organizations that don't require statehood. He also would not rule out a possible U.S.-Taiwan free trade agreement, something Taipei has long pushed for.


While the time is not right for such an agreement now, he said, "I don't think any determination has been made by any part of the U.S. government that says that a free trade agreement with Taiwan is something we're not going to pursue."


He emphasized, however, U.S. opposition to any unilateral change by either side in the China Taiwan impasse. U.S. officials fear such action could be destabilizing.


U.S. Sen. James Inhofe warned the panel that China's growing attempts to secure oil and other energy interests, especially in Africa, could threaten U.S. interests.


China has invested heavily in Africa to feed its growing economy. But, U.S. critics say, it has failed to condition its investments with calls for political reform.


"The threat here is not the simple fact that China is growing, but it is doing so by using some unhealthy practices that threaten the world community and will undercut any long-term progress they hope make," Inhofe said.