"Intelligence Brief: The Struggle within Hamas"

On June 25, 2006, all Palestinian factions, with the sole exception of Islamic Jihad, signed the National Conciliation Document. This agreement reflects the "prisoners' initiative," a document signed in May 2006 by a few of the most important political prisoners jailed in Israel, such as Fatah Secretary General Marwan Barghouti and senior Hamas leader Sheikh Abdel-Khaliq al-Natsheh. In late May 2006, Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas placed pressure on Hamas to accept the prisoners' initiative by calling a referendum on the document. Hamas rejected such a solution, but a few weeks later agreed with Abbas on the main points of the document.

One of the main points of the agreement was the affirmation of a Palestinian state in the whole territory occupied by Israel after the Six Days War. This point represented a revolutionary concession by Hamas because it implies a two-state solution and an implicit recognition of Israel's existence. It was shortly after this agreement when the military wing of Hamas, Izzedine al-Qassam, attacked an Israeli base and captured an Israeli soldier.

The inner battle within Hamas raises the question whether the raid on the Israeli base could have been authorized not by the Hamas leadership in the Occupied Territories, but by Khaled Meshaal, who is based in Damascus and is one of the more radical Hamas members and the most important Palestinian leader outside of Palestine. The Hamas led-government was surprised by the Izzedine al-Qassam attack, which indicates the existence of a deep division within Hamas itself.

During the past few months, the gap between Hamas' military wing and its political leadership has increased sharply. The capture of the Israeli soldier was just the most recent example of the long-term struggle for power within the whole Palestinian political scene.

After Hamas' win in the January 2006 Palestinian elections, the movement faced new, different and harder challenges. With the election, Palestinian Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh and the rest of the Hamas leadership were thrust into an even more difficult position than in the past. The move toward a more pragmatic politics, of which the National Conciliation Document is a clear example, weakened Hamas' consensus within Palestinian society. Social consensus, which is a typical element of the "neo-traditionalist" Islamic movements of which Hamas belongs, was the key of the movement's electoral success.

Moreover, the recent inner crisis highlights a larger internal gap between Hamas' nationalist wing and its Islamic wing. On the one hand, for Hamas nationalists the cause of Palestinian nationalism is the main aim and Islam is a powerful instrument to reach it. On the other hand, the Islamic wing wants a new revolutionary order in the Middle East. Their struggle is not only for the Palestinians, but is a jihad against Zionism. They want to break the territories that make up historical Palestine free from the presence of Israel, and, according to this goal, the Palestinian people must become part of the global Islamic community. Thus, while the nationalists might be interested in a two-state solution, the Islamic wing does not accept such a solution.

Khaled Meshaal and other hard-line elements possibly believed that there were few benefits to Hamas' new government role, thus Meshaal might have wanted to use the current crises to increase his power in Hamas and to try to exploit the discontent against Hamas' leadership in the territories.

First of all, he may not want an agreement between Hamas and Fatah because he is afraid that such an agreement could weaken his hard-line faction's position. Therefore, he may have authorized the raid against the Israeli base to obtain a harsh military reaction from Israel. No agreement can happen with Israel in Gaza fighting against the Palestinians.

Secondly, the military campaign against Lebanon and Gaza can be used by hard-line elements as a propaganda instrument against Fatah and the moderate wing of Hamas.

An agreement between Hamas and Fatah that implicitly recognizes Israel's existence is also seen as a threat by Meshaal's main allies, Iran and Syria. They provide fundamental support to Hamas, and they do not want the Palestinians making peace with Israel because it could weaken their strategic position in the Middle Eastern context.

Indeed, their money is an important source of power within the movement, and Meshaal wants to demonstrate to Iran and Syria that he is the most faithful Palestinian ally, different from the moderate leadership of Hamas. Another important question regards the captured Israeli soldier and the Palestinian prisoners. Meshaal said that the soldier will not be freed without the release of Palestinian prisoners. This means that if Israel decides to release prisoners for an exchange with the captured soldier, Meshaal can take sole credit for the exchange and the political victory.

He also wants to underline the close ties between Hamas' hard-wing and Hezbollah in the struggle against Israel during the present crisis. Therefore, he may want to use the growing popularity of Hezbollah leader Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah within the Islamic world, even in the Palestinian territories, to strengthen his hard-line faction's power against the others Palestinian actors.

During the last few months, the fragmentation of the Palestinian political field increased. In the 1990s, the second half of the Palestinian struggle went through the "Tunisian phase," the old generation of leaders led by Yasser Arafat and the younger generation represented by the leaders of the first intifada. In the early 2000s, however, there has been a growing split between the secular-nationalist movement, such as Fatah, and the Islamic one, such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad. Yet, shortly after the political elections, the struggle for power has begun within Hamas.

The new role in the government has compelled the Hamas leadership toward a more pragmatic approach to other Palestinian factions and, above all, to Israel. Thus, Khaled Meshaal, who represents the main personalities of Hamas' hard-line, may have authorized the attack-and-capture raid against Israel because he wants to use the crisis to strengthen his power within Hamas.

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