How an Attack on Iran Would Unfold

[Jag]

Tuesday, October 03, 2006

http://www.iranvajahan.net/cgi-bin/n...&m=10&d=03&a=8


October 01, 2006
SF Chronicle
Matthew B. Stannard,


A B-2A Spirit thunders down the aging airstrip of Whiteman Air Force Base and takes off, curving east over the rolling forests of Missouri. It flies past the empty silos where Minuteman nuclear missiles slumbered through all the long years of the Cold War, past the nation's capital, across the Atlantic Ocean, to where the first of three giant KC-135R Stratotankers it will encounter in the long night waits with fresh fuel.

More than 19 hours later, the bomber slices above the Karkas mountains of central Iran and releases a 4,500-pound "bunker buster" over a complex of buildings guarded by aging missiles and obsolete guns. Explosions echo across the countryside.

[Podcast: James Finefrock and Abbas Milani about the repercussions of an air assault on Iran. ]

[Podcast: Phil Bronstein joins Mick LaSalle and Leba Hertz. ]

That, according to many experts, would be the opening gambit in a war against Iran -- should the United States decide to undertake that risky option.

"Iran has been a focus of war gaming for many years both inside and outside the Pentagon, and I have been around and participated in some of that. I have 'invaded' Iran probably 20 times; I have 'bombed' Iran 30 or 40 times," said Sam Gardiner, a retired Air Force colonel who has taught strategy and military operations at the National War College.

The Bush administration is constantly reiterating its desire for a diplomatic solution to the crisis over Iran's nuclear program. But the administration emphasizes that nothing is "off the table," including military action.

"The evidence is overwhelming that plans have not only been dusted off, but they are at the White House," Gardiner said. "The president believes that he has got to do this."

Other analysts are far more guarded.

"Only the president and a small number of his intelligence advisors can know at this point," said Michael Eisenstadt, director of the Military and Security Studies Program at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. "I think this could go both ways."

What would a military strike look like?

U.S. military options range from the subtle to the extreme.

Washington could sponsor Iranian dissidents, or employ U.S. Special Forces to conduct covert operations within Iran, sabotaging nuclear facilities or assassinating key scientists. In the view of many analysts, however, such operations, while important as part of any broader military approach, are insufficient to stop Iran's nuclear program.
At the other extreme, the United States could launch a full-scale invasion. That would be enormously demanding -- Iran is much larger and more mountainous than Iraq, and is likely to put up far more resistance.

"Nobody that I know of is talking about the use of ground forces," Gardiner said. "I think the one thing the administration has learned from (the Iraq war) is don't invade."

Between those options are several air-strike scenarios ranging from limited attacks on Iranian military assets or carefully selected research sites to sustained and broad strikes against political, military and scientific targets seeking not only to wipe out Iran's nuclear program but to topple its government.

Analysts consider the latter idea unlikely -- air power alone has not proven effective at toppling governments in the past and such a sustained assault would take months and come at enormous political and diplomatic cost. But some analysts say there is little point in limiting the strikes.

"There's no difference between bombing one site and bombing 1,000 sites, politically," said Andrew Teekell, a security analyst at Stratfor, a private intelligence consultant.

The most likely option, in the view of many experts, is a campaign of air strikes limited in time and breadth, but enough to significantly delay or destroy Iran's nuclear program.

Analysts disagree on the wisdom of such an attack. But there is broad agreement that the U.S. military has the ability to strike nearly at will against the outdated Iranian defense, even if it must do so alone, but there is also agreement that the effectiveness of a bombing campaign is uncertain, and that the possible consequences of such action could be wide-ranging, long lasting and unpleasant.

As such an attack unfolded, Stealth B-2A bombers from the continental United States would be joined by fighters, bombers and missiles from submarines, carriers and cruisers based in the Persian Gulf.

Iranian defenses are outdated -- its air force comprises a few hundred fighters, many of them poorly maintained, including Soviet-era MiG-29s and U.S.-made F-14s that predate the collapse of U.S.-Iran relations three decades ago -- and its arsenal of surface-to-air missiles and anti-aircraft weapons have little chance of overcoming modern U.S. countermeasures.

According to Anthony Cordesman, an analyst with the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Iran has clustered land-based air defense systems -- U.S.-made Improved Hawks dating from the 1970s and Soviet-era SA-2s -- around some obvious targets, such as the uranium enrichment facility at Natanz, south of Tehran, and the heavy-water reactor at Arak, southwest of Tehran.

The Russian-designed reactor being built at Bushehr, along the Persian Gulf coast, is also defended, and would be a risky target because of the several hundred Russian workers there who might be killed. Another hurdle is uncertainty over Iran's nuclear research program -- where it is, how large, and how well it is protected.

Even the known components of Iran's program are widely dispersed, and recent satellite images suggest the Iranians have constructed underground chambers, protecting their equipment with as much as 45 feet of reinforced concrete and dirt.

Those challenges, say military experts, can be surmounted with multiple bombing sorties. But that exposes U.S. pilots and Iranian civilians to greater risk.

It's unclear how many targets U.S. bombs would need to hit, and how often. The International Atomic Energy Agency identified 18 nuclear sites in Iran, but Gardiner and other analysts say new construction has increased the number of necessary "hit points," by Gardiner's count, to about 400 for the nuclear program alone.

"Could very well be 2,000, 2,500, 3,000 after you begin to add in all the other things like air bases, missile storage sites," he said. "The nonnuclear part is expanding." Cordesman estimates the number of sorties by bombers and cruise missiles would range from several hundred over a week's period for strikes focused on nuclear and missile sites to as many as 2,500 over a period of months for wider strikes including those targeting Iran's retaliatory military capability.

Whatever does survive a U.S. attack -- and most analysts suspect some portion of Iran's nuclear program would -- is likely to become the kernel of a new program, said analysts who cited Israel's 1981 destruction of the Osirak reactor, where Iraq responded by vastly increasing investment in its nuclear program, from 400 scientists with a budget of $400 million, to 7,000 scientists with a budget of $10 billion.

There are several ways Iran could retaliate after an attack. Iran could immediately expand the acts it is already accused of doing: using its proxies in the Middle East -- Hezbollah in Lebanon and Shiite militias in Iraq, for example -- to foment violence and instability.

"I don't know how much of a pep talk those groups would need from the Iranians to attack U.S. assets," Teekell said. "They could raise all kinds of hell in Iraq."

Israeli and U.S. forces in several nearby nations are within range of Iran's Shahab-3 missiles, too. Iran already has threatened to attack Israel's nuclear reactor if its own is attacked.

Some analysts foresee post-attack Iran sponsoring acts of terrorism against U.S. interests around the world, and perhaps within the United States itself. But others say Iran would see such acts as too provocative.

That risk might ultimately depend on how hard the United States hits Iran.

"The problem is if you go too high up on the escalation scale ... it starts to look like regime change, and then you've got an enemy who thinks his back is against the wall," Eisenstadt said. "Do we want to put them there? I'm not sure we do."

Perhaps Iran's most effective weapon would be withholding the oil it sells to the rest of the world -- although that has its own risks. Halting sales would be economically self-destructive.

And while Iran might be able to halt the flow of oil from Iraq by sabotaging its pipelines, and the flow from other Gulf nations by blockading the Strait of Hormuz, those steps might do Tehran more harm than good because they would invite renewed U.S. attacks and could tip world sympathy away from Tehran.

"I'm not sure the Iranians want to screw with shipping in the gulf ... that's a two-edged sword for them," Eisenstadt said. But "it may be with 50 billion in cash reserves, they feel willing to live with that for awhile."

A full blockade is probably outside the ability of Iran's Kilo-class diesel submarines and aging navy and air force to pull off. But threatening traffic in the straits is well within Iran's means, many analysts say, and could serve its economic interests as well.

Iran could harass vessel traffic by laying mines from commercial vessels that would not be easily traced to Tehran -- either by using proximity mines that some reports suggest may already be lurking on the bed of the strait, or by using speedy C-14 catamarans armed with machine guns, anti-ship missiles or suicide bombers to assault oil tankers.

Exactly how much harm such harassing attacks could do is uncertain. But given the jittery nature of world oil markets and insurance companies, even the threat of such attacks could send oil prices to record highs, severely harming the U.S. economy.

Should the oil flow be completely cut off -- two-fifths of the world's oil, from various gulf countries, passes through the strait -- the United States could use military force to keep the Strait of Hormuz secure, but that action could quickly escalate.

"Either we're going to lose oil flow through the straits, or we're going to send ground forces into southern Iran," said Richard Andres, a professor at the Air Force School of Advanced Air and Space Studies. "All of a sudden, what you've got is ground forces occupying southern Iran, which is the worst thing in the world."

The U.S. could try to invade Tehran and install a new government, much as it did in Iraq. But Iran is several times larger than Iraq, has a more-complicated terrain and a population analysts say is more likely to unite and fight against an invading force.

The grim features of each option facing the United States if it chooses to fight leave many analysts arguing that there is no military solution to the Iran crisis.

"Unless the U.S. does find evidence of an imminent Iranian threat -- which at this point might well require Iran to find some outside source of nuclear weapons or weapons-grade material -- the U.S. may well simply choose to wait," Cordesman wrote. "Patience is not always a virtue, but it has never been labeled a mortal sin."

Others argue that our disavowing the threat of force now might have a counterintuitive effect: It might actually weaken Iran's bargaining position.
"The threat of war plays right into the hands of Iranian hard-liners and encourages the ultranationalism that helps drive nuclear ambitions. There are plenty of other carrots and sticks to offer," said Stephen Zunes, a professor of politics and international studies at the University of San Francisco. "If the only thing in your toolbox is a hammer, pretty soon everything starts looking like a nail."

Nevertheless, some analysts who oppose an attack say diplomacy works best when both sticks and carrots are in plain sight.

"You have to wed diplomacy with the threat of force -- with the credible use of force -- to get the Iranians to negotiate," said Richard Russell, professor of national security affairs at National Defense University. "Absent that credible threat of force, I think what you have is just Iranian charades."

To read the rest go to the link provided....
Jag

[Sean Osborne]

... a complex of buildings guarded by aging missiles and obsolete guns.


Matthew B. Stannard, SF Chronicle

Apart from Mr. Stannard and the liberal editors of the San Francisco Chronicle... is there anyone on this forum who believes this is the calibre of modern air defense weaponry Russia has been supplying Iran to defend its most strategic assets with in exchange for large numbers of Iranian petrodollars?

Anyone?

[American Patriot]

Nope. I dont think so. Then again, I believe that indeed they don't have all brand new weapons. I'm sure that there are plenty of new items in the inventory too... but when it comes to the conventional army...'


Well, I guess we will see won't we

[Sean Osborne]

Well, I guess we will see won't we

Only after Syria is completely removed from the equation.

And even then there will be no land invasion or ground combat in Iran.

[falcon]

Originally Posted by Sean Osborne
Only after Syria is completely removed from the equation.

Sean, you hit the nail on the head once Syria is removed then the Iran problem can be resolved. That being said we must be very careful not to let Syria get to many new weapons systems, that they can use against us. Then once Syria is removed from the picture go after Iran, with an air attack one the world has never seen.

In the meantime we need to turn up the VOA load and clean, plus supporting the regime change in Iran. The US has never been good at regime changes it's about time they learn the tricks, for whatever it takes.

[American Patriot]

Let's add a little piece of the pie here...

As the storm of war approaches (With Moscow's blessing, steadfast preparation for battle)
Jerusalem Post ^ | October 5, 2006 | CAROLINE GLICK



With Moscow's blessing, the Palestinians, Hizbullah, Syria and Iran are steadfastly preparing for battle.


The clouds of the coming war are converging upon Israel. But our political and military leaders refuse to look up at the darkening sky.


The Russian bear has awakened after 15 years of hibernation. Under the leadership of former KGB commander President Vladimir Putin, Russia is reasserting its traditional hostility towards Israel.


On Tuesday, Russian military engineers landed in Beirut. Their arrival signaled the first time that Russian forces have openly deployed in the Middle East. In the past Soviet forces in Syria and Egypt operated under the official cover of "military advisers." Today those "advisers" are "engineers." The Russian forces, which will officially number some 550 troops, are tasked with rebuilding a number of bridges that the IDF destroyed during the recent war. They will operate outside the command of UNIFIL.


Mosnews news service reported on Wednesday that the engineers will be protected by commando platoons from Russia's 42nd motorized rifle division permanently deployed in Chechnya. According to the report, these commando platoons are part of the Vostok and Zapad Battalions, both of which are commanded by Muslim officers who report directly to the main intelligence department of the Russian Army's General Staff in Moscow. The Vostok Battalion is commanded by Maj. Sulim Yamadayev, who Mosnews refers to as a "former rebel commander."


With the deployment of former Chechen rebels as Russian military commandos in Lebanon, the report this week exposing Russia's intelligence support for Hizbullah during the recent war takes on disturbing strategic significance. According to Jane's Defense Weekly, the Russian listening post on the Syrian side of the Golan Heights provided Hizbullah with a continuous supply of intelligence throughout the conflict.


Much still remains to be reported about the impressive intelligence capabilities that Hizbullah demonstrated this summer. But from what has already been made public, we know that Hizbullah's high degree of competence in electronic intelligence caused significant damage to IDF operations. Now we learn that Moscow stood behind at least one layer of Hizbullah's intelligence prowess.


Moscow's assistance to Hizbullah was not limited to intelligence sharing. The majority of IDF casualties in the fighting were caused by Russian-made Kornet anti-tank missiles that made their way to Hizbullah fighters through Syria. Indeed, as we learn more about Russia's role, it appears that Russia's support for Hizbullah may well have been as significant as Syria's support for the terror organization. And now we have Chechens in Lebanon.


Russian backing of Hizbullah, like its support for Syria and Iran, has been matched by its extreme, Cold War-esque hostility towards Israel. On Tuesday, Channel 2 reported that for the past few months Putin has been obsessively demanding that the government transfer proprietary rights and control to the Russian government over the Russian Compound, which has served as a police station since the British Mandate, and other Russian historical buildings in central Jerusalem.


Putin's demand, which has no legal foundation or diplomatic precedent, exposes startling disrespect for Israeli sovereignty. According to Channel 2, Russian diplomats have been raising this obnoxious demand at the start of every meeting they have had with Israeli officials for the past several months. This most recently reported slap in the face joins a long list of diplomatic crises that Russia has fomented in the past few months.


In just one example, last month the Russians cancelled the Russia-Israel trade fair in Tel Aviv on the eve of its opening. Russian businessmen who had already arrived in Israel and were unable to get flights home the day of the announcement were ordered by the Russian embassy to remain in their hotel rooms until they returned to the airport for the first available flight to Russia.


Then there is Russia's unstinting support for Iran's nuclear weapons program. During the latest of his frequent visits to Teheran Tuesday, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov announced, yet again, that Russia opposes all international sanctions against Iran. Indeed, since Iran's nuclear program was exposed three years ago, Russia has acted as Iran's defender against every US attempt to galvanize the international community to take action to prevent Iran from achieving nuclear weapons capabilities.


In 1967 Russia played a central role in fanning the flames of war in Syria. In the months that preceded the Six Day War, Moscow fed Damascus a steady diet of false intelligence indicating that Israel was planning to invade. In the summer of 1973, the Soviets also encouraged Syria to join Egypt in invading Israel.


Whether or not Russia is interested in fomenting the next war, its intentions are less relevant than how Russia's extreme positions are interpreted by the Arabs. Judging by Syrian President Bashar Assad's recent bellicose speeches, it appears that Damascus believes that Russia will support Syria if it goes to war against Israel. In his latest address regarding Syria's willingness to go to war if Israel doesn't fork over the Golan Heights forthwith in "peace negotiations," Assad made clear his belief that whatever its level of intensity, a Syrian war against Israel could well advance his interests.


Russian influence is also evident in Assad's "peace" rhetoric. His protestations of willingness to conduct negotiations with Israel are taken directly from the Soviet playbook. As the reactions the speech elicited from leaders of the pro-Syrian camp in the Israeli Left like Maj.-Gen. (ret.) Uri Saguy, Education Minister Yuli Tamir, Haaretz columnist Yoel Marcus, and MK Azmi Bishara made clear, all that is needed to manipulate Israeli public opinion regarding Syrian intentions is a hollow and disingenuous Syrian announcement: If we abide by all of Damascus's demands (something Damascus will never allow us to do), then Syria will give us "peace," and if we don't, then the responsibility for the war that will ensue will be our own.


WHAT IS Israel doing to meet these gathering threats?
First we have our elected leaders. They contend with the growing threats by denying them, giving in to them and attempting to change the subject. The Olmert-Livni-Peretz government had no public reaction to the Russian-Chechen deployment in Lebanon. As far as the Israeli government is concerned, this issue, like the fact that Hizbullah has returned to its pre-war positions and that UNIFIL forces are doing nothing to prevent its rapid rearmament, should be of no interest to the pubic.


According to Channel 2, Prime Minister Ehud Olmert is now leaning towards capitulating to Russia's demands and transferring proprietorship over the Russian Compound to the Russian government during his upcoming visit to Moscow.


As to Syria, rather than crafting a Syria policy, the government argues about the desirability of giving Syria the Golan Heights now or later. Above and beyond all else, as Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni and Defense Minister Amir Peretz proclaim, from the government's perspective, the best way to deal with the growing military threats is to ignore them and destroy Israeli communities in Judea and Samaria.


Our political leaders are not the only ones involved here. It is the IDF's duty to sound the alarm bells and contend with these threats. But the IDF is doing no such thing. Chief of General Staff Lt.-Gen. Dan Halutz claims that he is devoting all of his time to rebuilding the IDF after what he refers to as its "mediocre" performance in Lebanon. Practically speaking, however, Halutz is not contending with the threats. In an interview with Yediot Aharonot on Sunday, Halutz discounted the Syrian developments and maintained his position that we won the war in Lebanon and are feared by Hizbullah.


Far from contending with the IDF's "mediocrity," Halutz is prolonging it. The IDF's "mediocre" land campaign in Lebanon was led by Deputy COS Maj.-Gen. Moshe Kaplinsky, Operations Directorate Chief Maj.-Gen. Gadi Eisenkot and Brig.-Gen. Tal Russo who oversaw the IDF's special operations. Rather than contend with these officers' demonstrated mediocrity, Halutz has promoted them. Eisenkot was appointed the new commander of Northern Command, and Russo will be promoted to major general and replace Eisenkot as head of Operations. Furthermore, Maj. Gen. Iddo Nehushtan who commands the Planning Directorate supports opening negotiations with Syria. Halutz promoted Nehushtan to his position after he led the IDF's failed media campaign during the conflict.


Halutz has repeatedly stated that he will resign if he feels that his authority is no longer accepted by the army. Yet, the primary officers who have felt the brunt of his authority - Armored Brigade 7 commander Col. Amnon Eshel and Maj.-Gen. Yiftach Ron-Tal - are the most prominent officers who have forthrightly attempted to point out the reality of the IDF's defeat.


It is clear why Halutz behaves this way. If he were to sound the alarm bells about the rising dangers in the North, he would have to admit that he failed in his command of the war. Similarly, if he were to bring new blood into the ground forces' chain of command, he would be effectively admitting that Kaplinsky, Eisenkot, Russo, and he as their commander, led the war irresponsibly. Indeed, the only way that Halutz can keep his job is by not contending with the dangerous military realities that have arisen as a result of the IDF's defeat in the war against Hizbullah this summer.


It is this policy of denial that motivated Halutz to fire Maj.-Gen. Ron-Tal from the service on Wednesday night for Ron-Tal's statement of the obvious: The year the IDF devoted to training its forces to expel the 9,500 Israeli civilians from Gaza and northern Samaria last summer came at the expense of training for war against Israel's enemies. It was also this policy of denial that motivated Halutz to bar Eshel from promotion for two years after Eshel pointed out how incompetently Division 91 Commander Brig.-Gen. Gal Hirsh commanded his forces in Lebanon.


Halutz accused Ron-Tal, who has been on paid leave pending his retirement for the past seven months, of bringing politics into the IDF for his statement that the IDF's single-minded devotion to the government's controversial political program harmed its war-fighting capabilities, and for his call for Halutz and Olmert to resign. Yet, during his tenure as chief of staff, Halutz has been slavish in his public devotion to the government's political preference for using the IDF to fight the Israeli residents of Judea, Samaria and Gaza over preparing for war against Israel's enemies.


ANY OBJECTIVE observer of the developments in our region understands that the storm of war is rapidly approaching us. With Moscow's blessing, the Palestinians, Hizbullah, Syria and Iran are steadfastly preparing for battle.


There is no doubt that Israel can weather the coming storm. But to do this, we must have political and military leaders who are willing to recognize its inexorable approach.