"Terrorism" in Russia

[Ryan Ruck]

A Reversal Over Beslan Only Fuels Speculation

A view of the gutted Beslan gym. Aza Gumesova, whose child died in the gym, said the fire was so hot that the metal crowns on her child's teeth melted.

VLADIKAVKAZ -- A senior prosecutor has acknowledged that commandos fired flamethrowers into the packed Beslan school gym, fueling speculation about what set off the blaze that engulfed the building and contributed to the deaths of scores of hostages.

Deputy Prosecutor General Nikolai Shepel, who reversed his earlier statements by making the admission last week, adamantly insisted, however, that the Shmel flamethrowers could not have sparked the inferno during a special forces operation to free the 1,200 hostages on Sept. 3. More than 330 people died in the Sept. 1-3 attack, about half of them children.

If prosecutors find that the commandos intentionally ignited the gym, as some Beslan residents and a regional lawmaker believe, it would mean that Russia violated an international convention banning the use of incendiary weapons that might injure or kill civilians, said Alexander Cherkasov, a senior member of the Memorial human rights group. Prosecutors also would then face the potentially unpleasant prospect of having to open an investigation into the military and security officials who organized the rescue operation, he said.

Although classified as a flamethrower, the Shmel in fact launches rocket-propelled projectiles, according to Jane's Information Group, an international center for defense information. The Shmel has three modifications: the RPO-A, whose shells explode; the RPO-Z, whose shells are incendiary; and the RPO-D, whose shells create smoke.


The commandos used the RPO-A type, Shepel told reporters on July 12. Its shells contain fuel-air explosives that on detonation form a ball of fire, creating a powerful blast effect.

Shepel said the fire lasts only a split second, while exposure of three to five seconds is required to inflict burns on a person or set fire to a building. "I am saying it once again: They don't have an incendiary effect," he said.

Military experts fired an RPO-A shell at dry, wooden building in a reconstruction of what happened in Beslan, he said. The force of the impact destroyed the building but the building did not catch fire, he said.

However, Alexander Pashin, an independent arms analyst, said that any type of explosive could create a fire.

Shepel initially said in November that it was the hostage-takers who had used flamethrowers, Novaya Gazeta reported Monday.

Prosecutors began investigating whether commandos had fired flamethrowers only after Beslan residents handed them used flamethrower barrels that they found around the school. Coding on the barrels was sufficient evidence to trace the barrels to their users.

Despite Shepel's denial last week, speculation persists that troops used the incendiary PRO-Z shells. Those shells contain napalm and leave traces of luminescent phosphorus on the site of detonation, Novaya Gazeta said.

Stanislav Kesayev, the head of a commission that is investigating the school seizure for the North Ossetia regional administration, said that preliminary results of a medical study found traces of phosphorus on the bodies.

Moreover, Beslan residents said the ruins of the gym glowed at night for weeks after the end of the hostage standoff, Novaya Gazeta said.

Beslan residents attending the ongoing trial of the only suspected surviving hostage-taker in the North Ossetian Supreme Court in Vladikavkaz said they had not noticed any glowing but were convinced that the commandos had caused the fire. Aza Gumesova, whose child died in the gym, said the fire was so hot that the metal crowns on her child's teeth melted.

A federal parliamentary commission headed by Federation Council Deputy Speaker Alexander Torshin is investigating what happened at Beslan. State Duma Speaker Boris Gryzlov said in early July that the commission would present its findings in September, but Torshin is still not ready to set a date. He said the commission needed to study the ongoing trial of the suspected hostage-taker, Nurpasha Kulayev. Torshin did not have any comment about Shepel's remarks, his spokeswoman, Valeria Shatunova, said Tuesday.

The blaze might have led to the collapse of the roof over the school's gym, burying many hostages, said Cherkasov, the Memorial activist. "It was difficult for the seriously injured people to get out. The ones who were trapped under the roof couldn't get out, and they continued to burn," he said. "If it hadn't been for the fire, many people could have gotten out and been saved."


The Shmel, classified as a flamethrower, fires rocket-propelled projectiles.

Even if RPO-A shells were used and did not ignite the fire, they could have caused the roof to collapse just as RPO-A shots destroyed a wooden house in the test by military experts, he said. Likewise, the roof could have collapsed due to explosions from bombs planted by the hostage-takers in the gym, he said.

Areas of the school where the terrorists holed up also suffered great destruction, suggesting that commandos might have aimed the flamethrowers only there, Cherkasov said.

But if the blame falls on the commandos, rights activists will demand that they act more discriminately in possible future hostage crises, Cherkasov said.

Pashin, the arms analyst, said the commandos were professionals who would have carefully chosen their weapons and refrained from firing indiscriminately if there had been a risk of civilian casualties.

Shepel also said the military experts' test "sweeps away all talk that the weapons that were used are banned ... by international agreements and conventions."

The 1980 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, of which Russia is a signatory, bans or restricts the use of certain weapons that are deemed particularly cruel. Protocol 3 of the convention bans the targeting of civilians with incendiary weapons and restricts the use of air-delivered incendiary weapons against military targets that are close to groups of civilians.

The convention lacks verification and enforcement mechanisms, and it does not spell out any formal process for resolving compliance concerns. Initially, the convention covered only international armed conflicts, but signatories extended it to apply to internal conflicts in 2001.

Just like the Nord Orst situation, dead men tell no tales!

[Sean Osborne]

I have been quietly watching the recent "terrorist" attacks in Russia's northern Caucasus region. My gaze has been relentless on this region since the twin downing of Tupolev commerical aircraft and the Beslan school massacre. The most recent action occured in Nalchik, capital of the north Caucasus Republic of Kabardino-Balkaria (a predominantly Muslim region, north of North Ossetia and Chechnya) .

Now a familiar name has emerged claiming responsibility for the action in Nalchik.

This name should be familiar to anyone who has followed the "Russia vs. Terrorists" saga since the attack on the Moscow Theater three years ago (2002). Also, anyone familiar with who it is who is refered to in Russia as "Mr. Hexogen" should also know this name.

Shamil Basayaev.

Identifying this attack or associating Shamil Basayaev's name with the events in Nalchik should raise a very literal red flag regarding who really planned, orchestrated and conducted this attack.

Note the similarities of this event to previous large-scale terrorist events in Russia. Yellow bold in the article below is mine for emphasis.

Here is a Washington Post report.

Putin's Spreading War





By Masha Lipman

Monday, October 17, 2005; Page A15

MOSCOW -- The attack on Nalchik, capital of the north Caucasus republic of Kabardino-Balkaria, was a carefully planned guerrilla operation carried out in broad daylight in a big city. The estimates of the fighters' numbers have varied from 50 to 600 (as of Sunday, official figures and news service accounts cited more than 130 people dead, including 94 attackers, and 15 arrested), but the important fact is that they were able to penetrate the city unnoticed and unhampered, thus demonstrating a clear advantage over numerically far superior federal forces in planning, intelligence and organization.

Vladimir Putin inherited the problem of Chechnya when he came to power. He pledged to make Russia safer, but during his tenure, terrorism and subversive activity have steadily expanded. His launching of the second atrocious war in Chechnya soon after he took office as prime minister in 1999 led to a vicious circle of guerrilla attacks, followed by retaliation by federal forces, which in turn brought out increasing numbers of young Chechen men seeking revenge. Later Putin opted for a Chechenization of the crisis and ended up with a pro-Moscow Chechen leader with a reputation as a butcher; his armed followers are reported to use abductions, hostage-taking and torture against their enemies. This man was granted the highest state award and was personally befriended by Putin, who received him in the Kremlin.

Terrorist attacks under Putin have included the Moscow theater siege in the fall of 2002, in which more than 800 people were taken hostage by Chechen terrorists; a botched rescue operation left 120 hostages dead (***The hostages were killed by Russian Spetznaz using a banned chemcial warfare agent and bullets to the head of the victims***). After that, terrorist attacks followed in a quickening succession that climaxed in the terrible tragedy at the Beslan schoolhouse in northern Ossetia in September 2004. The terrorism problem was no longer confined to Chechnya; it had spread all over the north Caucasus and was making plain the need for a major rethinking of policy.

But instead of rethinking things, Putin seized on the Beslan tragedy as an excuse to launch a political crackdown and to further curb democratic practices ( ***a convenient tool of The State, no? Especially when the commander, Basayaev, is known to be a longtime Russian GRU operative***). The information about the situation in the north Caucasus, as well as anti-terrorist operations, became even more tightly filtered by state-controlled TV networks. The investigation of Beslan, like that of the theater siege before it, has been much more about helping high-ranking officials avoid accountability than about a careful probe of the government's policy flaws.

When Putin took over as Russia's president, Kabardino-Balkaria was quiet. But Putin's use of brutal force in Chechnya has backfired, producing growing numbers of revenge-seekers. Further centralization of power has led to deeper problems of the kind inherent in a heavily bureaucratic system: poor performance, lack of accountability, failure to coordinate efforts because each official seeks first and foremost to avoid responsibility at any cost. A local leader with an independent source of authority is regarded with suspicion -- loyalty to the Kremlin is valued above all. This breeds incompetence and powerlessness among local officials.

Putin and those around him routinely attribute violent attacks in the north Caucasus republics to international terrorism. In fact, what is in common to all these predominantly Muslim regions is the abominable corruption of the local elites, awful social conditions and disenfranchised populations that become easy prey for radical underground groups.

In addition, each of those territories has its own problem. For instance, in Dagestan, where there is a complicated entanglement of dozens of ethnic groups, the balance among clans is cracking, leading to intense feuding. As a result, some 100 subversive attacks and shootouts have occurred there over the past 10 months. In Kabardino-Balkaria, one of the causes of trouble appears to be a fierce crackdown on Muslim believers; the closure of most mosques and brutal police treatment of those suspected of ties with Islamists have pushed young men to organize against the police.

So far the government's social policy has been largely limited to pouring more money into the troubled regions -- money that mostly ends up in the pockets of the corrupt.

Rather than masterminding a strategy to address these problems, Putin has allowed them to build; he blamed terrorism in the north Caucasus on evil outside forces seeking to weaken Russia because they regard it as a "threat that needs to be eliminated."

Back in the mid-1990s, when the first Chechen war began, there was talk of a nightmarish scenario in which the nations of the Caucasus would join the Chechen rebels in their secessionist cause. This threat was never realized and still does not seem imminent, but the specter of a Caucasus war is closer today than it was in the Russia that Putin inherited.

The Kremlin is hardly unaware of the gravity of the north Caucasus problem. One year ago Putin put one of his most efficient men in charge of this troubled region. But even if good decisions are made, a huge hurdle will remain: the irresponsibility and inefficiency of Putin's bureaucracy. Taking that on is a task Putin is not ready for.

Masha Lipman, editor of the Carnegie Moscow Center's Pro et Contra journal, writes a monthly column for The Post.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn...101600801.html

[Ryan Ruck]

Since this is a more appropriate thread. I went ahead and moved one of my posts from the "Russia's Involvement With Terrorism" thread over here. When merging threads, it lists the posts in chronological order thus making it appear that I started this thread when in fact, it was Sean.

It is definitely a good idea to have one thread for dealing with Russia's internal "terror problems" and a seperate one for dealing with Russia's sponsoring of terrorist groups around the world. Thanks Sean!

[Honza Malina]

The bottom line is that Shamil Basayev was Red Army special forces paratrooper, so there is NO WAY this is guy is anything but a fully committed communist.

When I served in CZ Air Force we had there separate unit of paratroopers, they were ALL hand-picked hard-line communists, sons of communist military officers and or communist officials etc.

Such people cannot possibly betray or not follow orders of the Party.

The same and even more-so applies to Russia and her Red Army.

While in services, we had a Red Army division there nearby our airport, where BTW we were training fighter pilots, including some from Libya and the communist regime of Angola.

I also remember seeing black African looking lieutenant [pilot rank] who while I was approaching him didn't know how to salute me back, didn't speak Czech and had no idea what to do as far being military officer.

You could tell he wasn't one or he didn't have the proper training [which is unlikely to happen when being trained by the communists].

I suspect, since the leadership of our division went to lengths not to reveal anything to us about such terrorist and military training of Libyans, Middle Easterners and communists from Angola [BTW Cuban - KGB/GRU operation], that this particular lieutenant had to be either a terrorist [of course dressed in our military uniform] or a fighter-pilot and or any other type communist agent recruited by the CZ military intelligence ZS, under standing orders of the Soviet GRU.

ANYTHING that happens in Russia as far as "Chechen Mafia" terrorism is being in reality run by the Russian military intelligence GRU, under orders of the Russian government, still to this day communists [and never different it was ever after the implementation of the communist Perestroika FRAUD] - and anything the Russians say about any terrorist attack in Russia must be regarded as their strategic deception as these communist criminals only tell the truth when they want to advance a bigger lie by it.

God have mercy on us for allowing ourself being in "strategic partnership" with these bastards.

God Bless.

Honza

[Ryan Ruck]

Tragedy In Beslan: The Russian FSB Was Ready To Sacrifice Children – Hostages

Russian military acting near Beslan school

A new horrifying evidence on the conducting of the operation in Beslan by the Russian FSB was revealed today at the North Ossetian court during the hearing of the case of the terrorist Nur-Pasha Kulaev, who survived.

The witnesses from the military units, which were placed around the school captured by the terrorists, said that unknown FSB officers conducted the siege giving orders not to care about the children inside, but to kill terrorists at any cost, Russian media reported. The orders were given to the tank squad to open fire to demolish the building. No one can say who was the FSB officer who gave the order and what was his rank. The soldiers claimed that the FSB operatives didn't show them any ID and were afraid to ask them for the documents. The high-ranking military officers tried to cover up the tracks, blurring their statements, which contradicted one with another. No unit received an order or instructions how to save the hostages. The FSB cared more for not to let any terrorist escape at any cost. The only units, which cared for the captured children release, were the local militia and home guards. But they were the ones blamed for the failure of the "special operation on releasing the hostages," for they tried to save children under the crossfire.

The families of the victims demand investigation to find out who where the FSB officers commanding the siege.

[Ryan Ruck]

Grenades 'Caused Beslan Tragedy'

A Russian investigator has said grenades fired by surrounding Russian forces could have triggered the Beslan school bloodbath in September 2004.

Yuri Savelyev's conclusions contradict the official view that bombs planted by the hostage-takers in the school gym went off just before the gun battle.

Mr Savelyev is a member of the Russian parliamentary commission investigating the siege, in which 331 people died.

Many of the victims were children, taken hostage by pro-Chechen militants.

Blast Evidence

In an interview with Moscow Echo radio on Monday, Mr Savelyev, a weapons and explosives expert, said that during the investigation, he "discovered that the consequences of those blasts could not at all be explained by the explosions of the home-made devices installed by the rebels".

"Most of the hostages were talking about explosions in a totally different part of the gym from that to which the official investigation referred.

"As a result, I came to the conclusion that these home-made explosive devices installed by the rebels did not explode at all. Those were explosive devices delivered from outside," he said, adding that it could have been "shots fired from grenade-launchers".

He said the explosions killed many of the hostages and dozens more died in the resulting fire.

Many relatives blame their children's deaths on the botched rescue operation, in which fire engulfed the school, in the Russian Caucasus republic of North Ossetia.

A North Ossetian parliamentary commission said the school had been seized because of "failings in the law enforcement bodies".

Row Rages On

The head of the commission, Stanislav Kesayev, said he had confidence in Mr Savelyev's conclusions.

"He had more resources than our commission. He relied on his own knowledge as a weapons specialist and mathematician," Mr Kesayev told the radio.

Mr Savelyev's conclusions were published on the website pravdabeslana.ru.

One of his colleagues on the Russian parliamentary commission, Arkady Baskayev, rejected his conclusions.

He said there was "nothing convincing in the trajectory of these special shells" which Mr Savelyev blamed for the explosions.

"This is Mr Savelyev's private opinion, which is not confirmed in any way," he said.

The earlier North Ossetian investigation concluded that grenade launchers, flamethrowers and tank fire had been used during the storming of the school by Russian security forces.

Russia's prosecutor general admitted such equipment had been used, but only after all the children had left the school.

For weeks after the siege Russian officials had denied the use of flamethrowers.

[Brian Baldwin]

Now do they have islamic terrorism or just people wanting to leave their overlord rule? If Islamic in nature only... Why are they so intent on Iran and areas surrounding?

[Ryan Ruck]

What they have are government agents carrying out acts of terror to cow their subjects and use it as an excuse to roll back the "freedoms" extended after the "fall" of the Soviet Union.

Just like removing the ability of the people to elect their regional governors to fight terror...

They have used Islamic terror as an excuse because they know we are suffering from that problem and are trying to gain sympathy from Western nations suffering from real terrorism.

[Ryan Ruck]

How FSB/GRU Supposedly "Rogue" Operations Carry Out Killings – Part 1

SPARE ORGANS

How secret services have created parallel structures for carrying out extrajudicial sentences.

How murders are carried out in the interests of the state. A secret instruction.

After the death of Alexander Litvinenko in London something seemed to change in Russia. Not everyone has formulated exactly what, but everyone has felt on order of their own "gut feelings" something, which makes the insides tense in anticipation of some unknown danger.

Although our state has nothing to do with this murder. So say the officials. But somehow we don't believe them. Perhaps, one of the reasons for this is we remember, how not that long ago the same officials told the whole world: the Russian embassy employees, who were arrested in Qatar have nothing to do with the murder of the former president of Chechnia, Zelimkhan Yandarbiev.



But then it turned out that the entire process of rigging his car with explosives by the diplomats was caught on tape.

Quite possible, the murder of Litvinenko was the proverbial last drop that made the cup of our knowledge run over and made us understand something about our country, which makes us feel akin to being naked in open space.

A rather important stroke was added to the large life experience of Russians, which overlays the historical experience as well (By now we all know who ordered to kill the Russian politician Trotsky, Bulgarian writer Markov, and Ukrainian nationalist Bandera).

The Werewolves of GRU

But what kind of life experience are we talking about? Everyone has their own. I wish to tell about my own, which I myself had encountered and on which my own doubts and fears are founded.



In 1995 I was writing an article about the "Larionov brothers gang", which was terrorizing Vladivostok in the early 90's. The gang had just been uncovered. The investigation was led by the General Prosecutor's office. It turned out that the gang was highly unusual. It was more reminiscent of a military unit with a well defined organizational structure, strict hierarchy and iron discipline. It included former VDV (airborne troops) military and political record servicemen, an accomplished airborne officer and even one of the best staff members of the local prosecutor's office. The members of the gang themselves did not refer to it as a "gang". They called it "The System" and modeled it after the GRU "Aquarium", described in a book by a defector and a former Soviet GRU officer Victor (Rezun) Suvorov. The System was equipped with modern means of communication and all kinds of eavesdropping and monitoring equipment - they were able to tap phones, to intercept conversations through the walls and windows; it even had its own encryption equipment to secure their own communications. They were very well armed and had access to dozens of safe houses. Using their well spread network of agents The System gathered information about key figures of the underworld, businessmen and staff of the government organization. The gang killed. Its victims consisted of the underworld criminal leaders and businessmen connected to the underworld. During those operations often happened what the law enforcement call "excessive force" - along with the intended targets random bystanders were killed. It was found out that the gang was handled by two colonels of the GRU: an active head of the human intelligence directorate of the Pacific Fleet, Col. Zubov and former head of the analytical department of the same intelligence unit, Col. Poluboyarinov. Poluboyarinov also recruited members of the gang and directed the operations.



The System acted brazenly and boldly. After each crime, some invisible force, it seemed, stalled the investigation, and moved out of danger the criminals, who were able to be discovered by police operatives. One of those, who's professional work put the very existence of the gang at risk, was Col. Sliantsev, the head of Vladivostok GUVD (police). It was then that the System decided to kill Sliantsev. The operation was given to a former member of the Soviet Navy Special Forces and was codenamed "Barracuda".

During one of our meetings Sliantsev had told me that while monitoring phone conversations of the gang members he was able do discover who was really behind The System. "Who is it?" - I was curious. "I can't tell you" - said the colonel - "You can't even begin to imagine the level of these people."

Today I'm certain - the colonel meant GRU.

So what kind of gang was it, formed out of exemplary military members, well equipped and working under the patronage of active officers from the Main Directorate of Intelligence (GRU) of the Russian Federation? The General Prosecutors Office could not answer that question. More likely, it didn't even try to answer it, because it wouldn't be allowed to.

Both colonels were labeled "werewolves". Zubov was fired from the Navy and Poluboyarinov was mysteriously killed. The Larionov brothers were eliminated as well. The younger Larionov, who was officially the leader of the gang died inside his cell when he realized he was betrayed and vowed to tell the mass media everything he knew about the gang ties to the GRU. Even his lawyer was killed as she prepared the text of the article.

About the same time in Vladivostok and Nakhodka there was another gang, the so called "Waps gang" - a bunch of hardened criminals were released from prisons on parole. They had been armed and told to wipe out the supposed "Chechen mafia", which actually did not exist in Nakhodka. The gang simply was used to redistribute property. But then it got out of control and started killing not only those, who were pointed out by their puppet masters, but everyone who they considered necessary for their own benefit as well.

A local FSB officer, who discovered that the gang was actually formed by the Main Directorate of Fighting Organized Crime (GUBOP) in MVD (Ministry of Internal Affairs) of Russia was killed supposedly by accident by police. It was found out, that the gang was acting not only on behalf of MVD but also with support from the local authorities. The investigator from the prosecutor's office, who was leading the "Waps gang" investigation, was most likely very afraid of those who stood behind the gang, as I understood from our meetings. It was probably why he was a heavy drinker at the time.

[Ryan Ruck]

How FSB/GRU Supposedly "Rogue" Operations Carry Out Killings – Part 2

The Wetwork Specialists



The journalist Dima Holodov was murdered in Vladivostok in 1994 - the same time frame, when the two gangs were uncovered, which had ties to GRU and MVD. An investigation of his murder during the first two month led to those very same two organizations. The suspects were a group of servicemen from the 45-th regimen of the VDV, which belonged to the GRU. During the investigation it was found out that the group supposedly did not report directly to the unit commander. Are such things possible in an ordinary military unit? Of course they are not. But the matter of the fact was, it wasn't just an ordinary unit. We shall discuss the specifics of unit No. 45 later. For now we will try to examine, who actually were these servicemen, supposedly serving in that unit under a "special status".

During the trial it became apparent that these GRU officers were used in special operations in Abkhazia, Transdnestria, Chechnya. What kinds of operations? Apparently, these servicemen carried out rather sensitive missions - physical elimination of targets, anyone whom they were told. For example, one of the servicemen took part in killing of a Georgian pilot, who supposedly bombed a vessel carrying civilians (during the Georgia-Abkhaz conflict - comm. JadeEmperor)

This fact alone deserves a special investigation - an active officer of the Russian Army, apparently acting under orders from his superiors goes abroad and kills a citizen of a foreign state. Any way you look at it, he had committed a crime. Same as those who ordered the killing. But during the investigation of Holodov murder no attention was paid to this additional episode. Another episode that was not developed any further - one of the suspect officers by admission had planted a magnetic mine under the car of then-assistant minister of finance of Russia, Vavilov. The mine went off, but due to sheer luck the assistant minister survived. This episode was covered in detail by the testimonies as a part of the Holodov investigation, but it was also looked over. But these allegations were also supported by the conversations between the suspects, which were recorded on tape. From these conversations it was obvious that Unit No 45 specialized in killings, which were well reimbursed.

The materials of the investigation give enough reason to believe that this group of servicemen was nothing else, than a gang of professional hitmen, which carried out specialized orders.

Regretfully, the General Prosecutors Office did not pursue all the complex questions, which emerged during the Holodov murder investigation. I believe it was not done for the same reason it did not investigate further the role of GRU and MVD in the Vladivostok and Nakhodka gangs - it would simply be not allowed to.



The Prosecutor's Office was sure - the connection of GRU officers to Holodov's murder has been proven. But, as do believe some of the staff who took part in investigation, the murder suspects could have been saved from prison by their powerful benefactors, whose orders they probably carried out.

I also mentioned that during the Holodov investigation, a link was discovered to GUBOP MVD (Ministry of Internal Affairs Organize Crime Fighting unit - comm. JadeEmperor). It is a very important fact and we will return to it, because it will help us understand the true scope of what goes on in Russia. The 45-th regimen servicemen, who were arrested, had in their possession cover documents, made by MVD. For instance, they were signed by the then-chief of GUBOP, Baturin. During the Holodov investigation, in which the Police Chief Committee (glavk) also took part, it was discovered that from there investigation details were leaked to the suspects. Indirectly it supported the theory that the group of Unit 45 servicemen worked hand-in-hand with the leadership of GUBOP, when carrying out their "special assignments". In connection to this, the sudden death of Baturin cannot be viewed as accidental. He may have been eliminated, as the most vulnerable link in the chain between two organizations, which conducted in an unlawful fashion.

[Ryan Ruck]

How FSB/GRU Supposedly "Rogue" Operations Carry Out Killings – Part 3

In the middle 90's a series of terrorist acts took place in Moscow. The most tragic one was a trolley bus exploding on Strastny Boulevard. Much was being said about a coordinated attack on Moscow (by the Chechens - comm. JadeEmperor). But all of a sudden it was uncovered that the bus was blown up not by the Chechen militants, but... by an ex-KGB colonel. He was found guilty by a trial. Also it was found out that the attempted bombing of a railroad bridge across the Yauza river also was not carried out by a militant, but by a former FSB officer. Most likely he would have succeeded had he not blown himself up while trying to plant the explosive device.



Apparently both former agents had direct links to the Maxim Lazovsky gang. At least 8 active FSB officers worked in close contact with the gang. This was established by the head of the 12-th department of MUR ((Moscow Police - comm. JadeEmperor), lieutenant colonel of militia, Vladimir Tzkhai. As soon as it became obvious that Petrovka ((Petrovka 38 is the official address of MUR headquarters and also its nickname, popularized in books, movies, etc - comm. JadeEmperor) Lazovsky and his closest associates were all eliminated. Suddenly Vladimir Tzkhai also passed away from cirrhosis of the liver. Not a single one of the lieutenant colonel's colleagues believed his death to be natural, his sober lifestyle was something of an example he set. His friends were sure: lt. col. Tzkhai had been poisoned. In connection to the bombings, to which the two FSB officers associated with the Lazovsky gang had been linked, other bombings, which occurred shortly before the 2-nd Chechen war, cannot be ignored. The explosions were blamed on the Chechens. But one of the key witnesses to this investigation told me while being recorded on tape that, contrary to the investigation's findings, he did not rent the basement in a building on Gurianov St. out to Gouchiaev, a Chechen militant. He rented it out to a totally different person. From a suspect sketch which was produced using his testimony, a former FSB colonel Mikhail Trepashkin had identified that other person to be a secret service agent. Furthermore, the senior leadership of the FSB could not produce a satisfactory explanation, what kind of drills had been conducted in Ryazan city which involved planting bags full of hexogen (an explosives) along with a timing device? ((an incident shortly following 1999 Moscow bombings in which bags of explosives along with the detonators were discovered in a building, but FSB later claimed it was a drill - comm. JadeEmperor) And what happened to the officers, who were planting those charges and whose conversations with their superiors were identified in logs from the city phone exchange? After the scandal, which was caused by this supposed "drill", the details of surrounding circumstances were classified.

[Ryan Ruck]

How FSB/GRU Supposedly "Rogue" Operations Carry Out Killings – Part 4

Do the interests of the state require to kill?

There is yet another example. In Kaliningrad a gang was uncovered by RUBOP agents. Apparently behind the gang stood officers from a local FSB branch. One of the gang members whose job was kidnapping and extortion, was an intelligence agent himself. While being videotaped during his interrogation he confessed to having shot a businessman, well known in the city, using an automatic weapon. He also claimed that he was acting under orders from... the head of the "department of counterterrorism and protection of constitutional order" of the FSB of Kaliningrad province. The hit itself was carried out by an FSB officer.

Amazingly, this incident was not investigated any further neither by the FSB nor by the Prosecutor's Office. Furthermore, RUBOP agents who discovered the information about possible criminal activities of the FSB, all faced persecution.

What do all of these bizarre stories mean? It was said that during a trial the former KGB officer Vorobiev, who blew up the bus in Moscow, exclaimed: "This trial is a travesty on intelligence service!" How come in his mind the trial of a man who had committed a terrorist act is not a regular, expected outcome, but a "travesty"? Could it be because that he, while following someone's order, was somehow convinced: he was acting in the best interest of his country, but instead of being regarded as a dedicated professional, he was thrown in prison just like a common terrorist? If any of this is true, can we begin to understand what kind of detachment exists in a mind of an intelligence officer between what is lawful and what may be, as he thinks, a means to an end?

This mysterious colonel's expression gained special meaning when I was able to obtain a document, which I believe to be of great value to public knowledge. This appears to be a set of top secret instructions, 70 pages long, which explains much of what is happening in our country for the past 15 years.

Excerpts from this set of instructions I was able to publish in "Moscow Novosti" back in 2002, but in connection with the murders of my colleague Anna Politkovskaya, former FSB officer Alexander Litvinenko as well as the poisoning attempt on Egor Gaidar, it is necessary to review this document again and to reevaluate much of what it contains.



"The processes, which take place in the criminal environment" - says the preface of the document - "in the long term perspective affect national security. Organized crime and its direct result, criminal terrorism, threaten the foundations of the state power... Currently our society is opposed by a highly organized structure, founded on a powerful "shadow economy", being able to cover its activities using corrupt officials, who have at their disposal high class professionals in order to eliminate both the undesirable competitors as well as politicians.

It is highly necessary to establish an organizational structure which has the actual means to solve, using intelligence, operational and technical means, problems aimed at neutralizing and preventing all of the aforementioned negative occurrences.

The direct infiltration of the secret agents into the administrative, commercial, banking and entrepreneurial infrastructure, bodies of government and executive power, the creation of institutions and cover firms will allow to create, through contacts in these structures... a wide network of agents..."

The document also lists in great detail, where exactly should the agents be inserted: executive agencies, financial and banking systems, customs and revenue agencies, stock markets and courts.

"During the stage of actualizing the operations, it is possible to engage and neutralize the criminal gangs via operational-combat means" - says the instruction.

"A classified special unit is established. Along with the central unit, it is practical to establish regional operational-combat units."

An organizational form of this extra-legal structure "may be a private detective or security firm. The manager of the firm and the majority of its staff should consist of... ...persons who were fired and/or quit service in the MVD, FSB, SVR, GRU GSh RA, "

"In order to provide a cover for the intelligence gathering as well as operational-combat activities... a social organization should be established, for example "Association of Russian Spetsnaz Veterans", etc The premises belonging to the organization should be used as safe houses, where operational-combat units shall be concentrated, as well as providing support to agents operating under illegal status."

"Based on these structures it is possible to establish long term false-flag gangs, which will come in close contact with the Organized Crime Groups, as well as those groups which specialize in contract murder and terrorist acts..."

Pay close attention to the next part!



"In situations of extreme necessity... it is possible to use a special unit of an extra-legal intelligence operation - Spetsnaz... in order to neutralize of physically eliminate the leaders and active members of the terrorist and saboteur groups, who conduct war against the federal government.

The physical elimination may be carried out only against persons sentenced by the Russian judicial organs to the extreme penalty - the death penalty, or in order to avert grave consequences, in accordance with the laws of the Russian Federation..."

[Ryan Ruck]

How FSB/GRU Supposedly "Rogue" Operations Carry Out Killings – Part 5

The security agencies intimidate

The document that was quoted is naturally against the Constitution, the norms of criminal law and any ideas that we may share about a state where extrajudicial punishments are not possible. In any case, this is exactly what the leadership of our country has been saying. But it is quite obvious that inside our country there exists a dedicated system of security agencies aimed exactly at carrying out extrajudicial punishments.

But should the quote from an undated and unsigned document be trusted? The person who had leaked the document to me, indicated verbally that it had been signed by one of the then-directors of GUBOP, a "Hero of Russia" col. Seliverstov and that the classification markings as well as the signature was removed by the leaker when the document was being photocopied, so that, as he expressed "the journalists would not get into trouble".

I had contacted the colonel. The fact that this supposedly classified document wound up in the hands of the media, seemed to have put him in a state of shock. Seliverstov stated, that he never signed any such document, but added: "The person who gave you this had committed a crime against the state." He had sent another man in lieu of himself to our meeting, who introduced himself as a "representative of security agencies". This man tried to convince me that the document itself by definition is no more criminal than a kitchen knife - a murder weapon. "The question is, how is it to be used. A knife may be used to slice bread." - explained the stranger.



He insistently recommended not to publish the document, otherwise, he said I "may face the same problems as did Pas'ko and Nikitin" (both were former Russian Navy officers, accused of disclosing state secrets.)

The phone conversation with col. Seliverstov as well as the meeting with his representative had convinced me, that this secret instruction is indeed real. Furthermore, other unnamed experts whom I had consulted had told me, that any such document would have originated without a much broader directive at the highest levels of the government. This coincided with the statements made by the leaker, that there is a secret government directive, which had been flown down into this set of specific instructions. The man also said that its origins are in part owed to one of the 1st assistant prime ministers in the early 90-s, Yuri Skokov.

Of course, not a single person who had anything to do with the origins of this unlawful directive will ever admit this freely, much less publicly. But there are quite a few indicators that allow us to establish with a high degree of accuracy, that such a directive exists and is still active.

For instance, in the beginning of the 90-s one of the top officials in the MVD told me during a private conversation, that the old methods of countering organized crime are no longer effective and that new methods are needed. Specifically, it is necessary to legally give undercover agents, who infiltrate gangs, "a license to kill".

Shades of the general's thought seemed to have made their way into the secret directive, which I studied.

"The ways and methods of fighting crime... are lagging behind the current requirements. Criminal activities are poorly documented, in an absence of a solid technical base... it is necessary to use non-orthodox approaches while conducting investigative and operational activities."

It seems that the general was reflecting on something which was already etched in the lines of text of the government and interdepartmental directives.

There is yet another sign that the document I quoted is not a piece of fiction. That is is a part of real life. Many infamous crimes almost seem to have been scripted exactly to the document. If we look closely at the activities of the groups that I mentioned and compare them to the set of instructions, both seem to coincide. Does it mean that the Larionov brothers gang in Vladivostok, Waps gang in Nakhodka and Lazovsky gang in Moscow - are all false-flag gangs created by the security agencies? And unit No. 45 - a "decoy military unit with full support infrastructure"? If this is actually the case, it becomes apparent why a small group of servicemen did not report to the unit's commander, but directly to the chief of intelligence of VDV.

The instruction also tells how to create a cover public organization, such as "Association of Russian Spetsnaz Veterans". If we look around, there are already tenths of such organizations.

But lets have a look at the document again.

"It is highly necessary to establish an organizational structure which has the actual means to solve, using intelligence, operational and technical means, problems aimed at neutralizing and preventing all of the aforementioned negative occurrences."

Was such a structure ever created? I believe so. Probably its the at one time top secret unit of the FSB, created in the early 90's - the so-called URPO. The acronym stands for "Upravlenie Razrabotki Prestupnykh Organizatsij" ("Directorate of Infiltration of the Criminal Organizations"). The unit was headed by Gen. Evgenii Hohol'kov. It consisted of 150 undercover agents, whose job was to infiltrate organized crime structures. Based on private conversations with Gen. Hohol'kov I now believe that URPO was created to serve the exact purpose outlined in the secret directive.

The public found out about URPO in 1996, when five of its staff members conducted a press conference and told that their unit carries out extrajudicial punishments. For instance, they claimed that the management of the unit was developing plans to eliminate Boris Berezovsky.

The officials of the government had snubbed and ridiculed at the conference. At that time I believed they were right. Today I am much more critical of their line of argument. It is hard to imagine that five senior FSB officers at once would lose their minds and start making wild accusations in public, fully understanding that they shall face the dire consequences. (Currently one of the officers who had participated in the press conference had been killed (he was Alexander Litvinenko - comm. JadeEmperor), another is serving a prison term and the rest have "repented" and even helped to "expose" their comrades, who had refused to "repent".)

After that very press conference, when the true purpose of URPO was uncovered, the unit was soon disbanded and the former FSB director Kovalev had resigned.

How to make "vigilantes"

When he was already in London, one of the officers from that famous press conference, Alexander Litvinenko had related to me the following account. At one point he had been invited to the office of one of the organization assistant directors, the topic of discussion was his transfer to a subdivision which carried out "wetwork".

- The assistant director had asked me, - said Litvinenko - how in my opinion should a physical elimination of a certain person be carried out. I had told him that it is possible to use a convicted criminal, serving a prison sentence. After he had carried out his task, he will go back to prison and will be easy to hide from any investigation. The assistant director agreed, but then told me his own version. He said it is possible to use a close relative of another assassination victim. Some people are ready to make revenge and we can exploit those feelings: we can promise to find and punish the killer, if the person agrees to take out those who we point out.

And also Litvinenko had reflected on events of 10 years ago, in connection to the Larionov brothers gang, which I had mentioned previously. When I was looking into this case, for a long time I could not find an explanation for the murder of GRU col. Valentin Poluboyarinov. His car was stopped on the way to the airport and he along with his son were strangled. This is what Litvinenko had to say:

- The assistant director had told me that treason in their system is punished mercilessly. And he had mentioned col. Poluboyarinov as an example. "The colonel wanted to betray us and he paid for it."

Does it mean that col. Poluboyarinov intended to fly to Moscow and expose the criminal activities of the GRU?

Why, for what purpose were intelligence stations created inside the country? False-flag gangs and military units, false-flag social organizations, why did their agents infiltrate all matter of public and private organizations?

The secret directive indicates: all in the name of national security. The same argument is used to justify extrajudicial punishment.

Did they really want to fight crime, control corruption? Maybe. Did they succeed? The answer is obvious.

From the first steps taken by the extrajudicial units, innocent people were killed along with organized crime figures. Furthermore, not a single one of the organized crime targets had been officially sentenced to death by a court, as the document mandates. None of them had presented such a threat to public order, that involved "grave consequences", a major destruction or loss of life on a large scale. But those were exactly the arguments used in that document to justify extralegal punishments.

Obviously, when they designed the document supposedly to uphold the law and order in the Russian Federation, they had been lying. The document merely had untied their hands.

[Ryan Ruck]

How FSB/GRU Supposedly "Rogue" Operations Carry Out Killings – Part 6

Who decides when to kill?

The technical aspects of extrajudicial retribution had been worked out well in Chechnya. There were thousands of Russian citizens who disappeared without a trace there - sounds like whole new ways to uphold the law and order have been discovered. An ex-army officer, who had served in Chechnya had told me how people "disappear", in such a way that neither their relatives nor the law enforcement agencies can find them. The captives are being interrogated under torture, then taken to a remote location, piled into 3-5 men pile and then blown up using a powerful explosive charge. No identifiable part of the bodies remains. They are being effectively vaporized.

The secret directive which I had quoted does not say who and on what level reaches a decision to allow the physical elimination of a certain individual. According to our Constitution, only a court may determine if a person is guilty and the measure of punishment, but who does during these extrajudicial operations? A chief of some unit? Department? Service? Or someone even higher, depending on the status of the suspected criminal? And what kind of arguments are necessary to reach a death sentence?

A new way of fighting crime, which seemed so easy and simple, and what is more important, effective, has plunged the country into an even greater degree of lawlessness. Furthermore, it brought crime not into merely organizational, but a political level. Inside our country there was a series of high level murders, the circumstances of which either directly or indirectly point to the fact that they were carried out by specialists, who received specialized training at one point. The targets were either public persons, or persons whose means and influence were not widely advertised, but whose power was sufficient enough to affect certain circles of politics and business, either that or they had direct knowledge about the corruption of high level government officials. In many of those crimes the various "Spetsnaz veterans associations" are implicated not only by the methods used, but by the behavior of law enforcement agencies during the subsequent investigations.

Tsepov was killed in Russia exactly the way Litvinenko was in London.

We should remember the mysterious death (poison placed in the phone receiver - comm. Jade Emperor) of a well known banker Ivan Kivilidi. I had a conversation with the head of the Institute of the Evolution of Morphology and Ecology of Animals, Efim Brodsky who had identified the poisonous substance, which was planted in the receiver of his telephone.



- It was a nerve agent, similar to sarin. - said the scientist. A rather exclusive substance. The exact type could be identified only by a specialist who had worked with in in a laboratory. It is possible to even tell who it might have been, because the labs that are cleared for that type of work are few and their staff are few and documented.

Why weren't they identified then? Why weren't they being looked for?

Two years ago there was yet another strange murder. We do mean Roman Tsepov, the head of a private security enterprise in St. Petersburg.



Tsepov was a very wealthy man and had nearly unlimited resources due to close friendship with people at the very top of the government. His power was feared.

In one of the reports, created by one of the government agencies in the early 90-s, which had come into my possession, Tsepov was identified as being behind extortion rackets on all the major commercial venues in St. Petersburg, including casinos, and was personally delivering the proceeds to a high-level FSB official in Moscow.

When I had asked a St. Petersburg colleague, an acquaintance of Tsepov, if the latter was a "money bag to a high-level government official", he had said that "Tsepov was the lock on a money bag".

His personal doctor, the head of a department of hospital No. 32 Petr Perumov, had told me in a great level of detail about the sickness that killed him.

- Tsepov had all the signs of a poisoning, vomiting, diarrhea - but he had neither chills nor high fever. I invited other specialists from different clinics, but we couldn't understand what was wrong with him. I believe he may have died due to being injected with a lethal dose of Colchicine, a drug sometimes used to treat leukemia.

I later found out from another source in the Prosecutor's Office that experts had determined that Tsepov had died from radiation poisoning. The level of radiation inside his body exceeded the allowable limits 1 million times!

Who would dare to kill such a powerful man, so close to the Kremlin?

In contrast to how quickly, professionally and aggressively Litvinenko's murder is being investigated by the Scotland Yard in London, Tsepov's murder in Russia is a dead end investigation. Very little is known about it, just like the murder of Ivan Kivilidi.

I would like to stress, the last part is characteristic of this type of murder, as soon as the leads point to either FSB, GRU or MVD, they are dropped.

The same way the lead was dropped during an investigation of a death of the chief editor of "Novaya Gazeta" and a deputy of Duma, Yuri Schekochikin, who's strange death was the result of a condition rather similar to that of Litvinenko. Back on 2003 the murder investigation was not even launched. And our demand in 2006, which was directed to the General Prosecutor's Office, to reopen the investigation based on newly discovered evidence, has so far not had a reply.

We do not yet know for a fact, who had killed Litvinenko or who had ordered the killing. But it is rather hard to dismiss the possibility, based on everything else that goes on in Russia today, that government security agencies had something to do with it. Especially since just a few months prior to Litvinenko's murder according to Putin's demand the Duma has allowed the agencies to legally carry out extrajudicial retributions abroad.

The Summary

The above stated facts give a reason to believe that our own security agencies, bypassing the Constitution, or more likely - their "affiliated" shadow branches and "foundations" have some kind of special extrajudicial powers. Through both their legal and extralegal units, they have become the main pivot arm of control over the entire country. They now possess power, which poses danger to the society itself, to every citizen and even to the President himself.

As a citizen of the Russian Federation, I demand from the General Prosecutor's Office the Security Council of the Russian Federation and of the President of the Russian Federation:

1. Conduct a full investigation of the supposed secret directive, which authorizes the law enforcement agencies to act via unorthodox means.

2. Determine, if follow up MVD directives, resulting from the above, also exist.

3. Determine, if there are secret extra-legal units created in accordance with the above directives, and what role do they play today?

Igor Korolkov, the chief reviewer of "Novaya Gazeta"

P.S. When this issue was being printed, we did indeed receive a reply from the General Prosecutor's office regarding the death of Yuri Schekochikin - "to launch a criminal investigation into the death of Yuri Schekochikin - denied".

[Ryan Ruck]

Why 'GQ' Doesn't Want Russians To Read Its Story

September 4, 2009

For war journalist Scott Anderson, the most confounding part of his recent assignment for GQ magazine to explore the root of terrorist acts in Russia a decade ago wasn't the suggestion of treachery and subterfuge he found.

It was the reception his story ultimately received in the United States.

"It was quite mysterious to me," Anderson says. "All of a sudden, it became clear that they were going to run the article but they were going to try to bury it under a rock as much as they possibly could."

Anderson, 50, is an accomplished reporter and novelist who has written previously for Harper's Magazine, The New York Times Magazine, and Vanity Fair.

His investigative piece, published in the September American edition of GQ, challenges the official line on a series of bombings that killed hundreds of people in 1999 in Russia. It profiles a former KGB agent who spoke in great detail and on the record, at no small risk to himself. But instead of trumpeting his reporting, GQ's corporate owners went to extraordinary lengths to try to ensure no Russians will ever see it.

A Management Memo

Conde Nast owns Vanity Fair and GQ as well as other publications, including Russian versions of GQ, Glamour, Tatler and Vogue. On July 23, Jerry S. Birenz, one of the company's top lawyers, sent an e-mail memo to more than a dozen corporate executives and GQ editors.

"Conde Nast management has decided that the September issue of U.S. GQ magazine containing Scott Anderson's article 'Vladimir Putin's Dark Rise to Power' should not be distributed in Russia," Birenz wrote.

He ordered that the article could not be posted to the magazine's Web site. No copies of the American edition of the magazine could be sent to Russia or shown in any country to Russian government officials, journalists or advertisers. Additionally, the piece could not be published in other Conde Nast magazines abroad, nor publicized in any way.

It wasn't just that there was no reference to Anderson's piece on the cover of this month's GQ, which featured a picture of Michael Jackson, a reference to tennis star Andy Roddick's wife and a ranking of obnoxious colleges and top drinking cities. At this writing, I cannot find any reference to Anderson's piece on the Internet.

The idea that information can be sequestered at a time when people can communicate instantly across oceans and continents may seem quaint. But in this instance, Conde Nast sought, against technology, logic and the thrust of its own article, to show deference in the presence of power.

Lawyers, executives and editors at Conde Nast and GQ did not respond to repeated requests for comment this week, and a spokesman ultimately declined on their behalf. But NPR has spoken to several people knowledgeable about the handling of Anderson's piece. No issues have been raised to date about the article's accuracy.

A Taboo Topic

To understand why Conde Nast might have reacted the way it did, it's worth remembering the subject of the report — and the context in which it is now being written. Back in September 1999, Chechen terrorists were blamed for the attacks. The new prime minister, Vladimir Putin, emerged from the shadows and consolidated power. A crackdown ensued and a second war was launched against Chechnya. Putin took over from President Boris Yeltsin soon after the new year.

Chechen separatists have been known to commit deadly terrorist acts. Hundreds of Russians were killed after the takeover of a school in Beslan, Russia, while more than 100 other people died at a Moscow theater after a siege by Russian forces seeking to liberate it from Chechen gunmen.

But in today's Russia, says Nina Ognianova, the program director for Europe and Central Asia at the Committee to Protect Journalists, the origin of the 1999 bombings is a taboo topic. And she says Russian authorities often turn up the heat on reporters who stray into unwelcome terrain.

"You can be sued for defamation — but you don't even have to be sued. You can be audited," Ognianova says. "Politicized audits are a big hurdle for publications that dare to publish sensitive topics."

Those audits can focus on just about anything — including fire codes — that could paralyze a publication for months and send advertisers fleeing. That's a consequential result for media companies that see foreign publications as increasingly important sources of revenue.

Journalists in Russia do fear retribution. Ognianova will be in Moscow on Sept. 15 to release a CPJ report about 17 journalists who have been killed since 2000. There have been convictions in only one case. One of the most prominent killings involved an American citizen of Russian descent who was editor of Forbes' Russian-language magazine. And other critics have been silenced as well — most notably Alexander Litvinenko, another former KGB agent who claimed the Russian security services were tied to the terror attacks of 1999. Litvinenko died in England after being poisoned with radioactive polonium.

Professional Obligations

But Conde Nast's Birenz did not raise security issues in his memo. And Anderson says he was not told of any safety matters by the company, just concerns of lawyers.

"If you're worried about repercussions and you bow to them, you're basically surrendering to the other side," Anderson says.

Jane Kirtley, an attorney who is a professor of media ethics and law at the University of Minnesota's journalism school, says Conde Nast's position makes no sense as a matter of pragmatism or principle.

"On one level, the smart thing is to stay in business and to stay in Russia, of course," Kirtley says. "But these stories will get out, they will get read in Russia. They're being somewhat naive to believe that by limiting this to their American edition that somehow they're preventing this from being read."

More important, she argues, is Conde Nast's failure to live up to its professional obligations. "It goes with the territory of a news organization to speak for those who can't speak — and to bear the consequences," she says.

'It's Really Kind Of Sad'

Anderson had never hidden his subject from editors at GQ when they approached him to write something about Russia. His ensuing six-page story centered on Mikhail Trepashkin — a former KGB agent who had investigated the bombings. Trepashkin spoke at length about the inconsistencies in the case — and about possible links between the bombings and to the security agency that Putin once headed. Trepashkin himself has ties to a controversial Russian billionaire and recently spent several years in jail before being released. But Amnesty International said he had been treated unjustly and said the charges against him appeared to be politically motivated.

"Here's a guy who spent four years in prison on a trumped-up, really rather silly charge (that) was a direct result of the investigative effort he's made on these bombings," Anderson says. "Now he's out — he's certainly kind of walking around with a bullseye on his back — and yet is still willing to tell the story."

"I think it's really kind of sad," Anderson says. "Here now is finally an outlet for this story to be told, and you do everything possible to throw a tarp over it."

GQ editors were also told not to promote the story, but in an act of quiet defiance, the magazine sought publicity for Anderson's article from a few news outlets, including NPR's All Things Considered.

Anderson was also asked to refuse to syndicate the article to any publications that appear in Russia once the rights revert back to him. He says he acknowledged the request, but told GQ he would refuse to honor it.

[Ryan Ruck]

Foiled Plot To Assassinate Putin Reportedly Raising Eyebrows

February 27, 2012

As news of an alleged plot to assassinate Prime Minister Vladimir Putin dominated Russian websites on Monday, the timing of the foiled plot is reportedly raising some eyebrows.

Russia's state television, The Channel One, reported Monday that the suspects, who have been linked to a Chechen rebel leader, were preparing to kill Putin in Moscow immediately after next Sunday's presidential vote, in which he is all but certain to reclaim the presidency.

Many Russians, however, have reacted with skepticism and suspicion, suggesting on social media sites that the failed plot was fabricated and timed just six days prior to the election to garner sympathy for Putin, RFERL.org reports.

"A good PR move for the country's main thief. Now all the grandmothers will react, they love victims," writes one poster on the Russian blogging platform LiveJournal.

"Strange that the attack wasn't plotted in London, jointly by [North Caucasus insurgent commander Doku] Umarov, the resuscitated [Al-Qaeda head Usama] bin Laden, and Martians," quips another. "The ratings must be really low."

Reports of the alleged plot could be aimed at deflecting attention from the growing street protests against Putin in recent weeks, analysts told the website.

"Although nothing can be ruled out nowadays, it's perfectly clear that this thwarted plot comes at a crucial time in Putin's election campaign," defense analyst Aleksandr Golts said. "Before this news was announced, many analysts said his campaign must receive new impetus in order to show how important Putin is for the country and how much Russia's enemies hate him."

Meanwhile, the Channel One said the suspects had been arrested in Ukraine's Black Sea port city of Odessa following an accidental explosion that occurred on Jan. 4 while they were trying to manufacture explosives at a rented apartment.

Putin's spokesman Dmitry Peskov confirmed the report to the ITAR-Tass news agency, but refused to make any further comment.

The station said the source for its information was Russia's Federal Security Service, the main KGB successor agency dealing with domestic security. It was impossible to independently verify the claim made in the program.

Russian and Ukrainian special services wouldn't comment on the report.

[Ryan Ruck]

Putin Assassination Plot Foiled, Russian Spy Service Says, Though Timing Of Revelation Questioned

February 27, 2012

Russia's security services say they've foiled a plot by Chechen separatists to assassinate Russian leader Vladimir Putin, according to Russian media reports on Monday. The alleged hit job revelation comes a week ahead of Russian presidential elections that Putin is expected to easily win.

Two suspects, reportedly acting under the leadership of Chechen warlord Doku Umar, "were arrested in Ukraine's Black Sea port city of Odessa after an accidental explosion Jan. 4 while they were trying to manufacture explosives at a rented apartment," the Associated Press reported Monday, citing Russian state television channel One. They were reportedly "preparing to kill Putin in Moscow immediately after Sunday's election."

Russia watchers in Washington said while the timing of the public revelations of the hit plot may be "managed" by the Kremlin, they did not believe it likely that the charges were entirely trumped up to benefit Putin's presidential elections prospects.

"It may be as simple as what takes place in every country in the world: By and large, governments try to manage the timing of information getting out to the public to their advantage," Matthew Rojansky, deputy director of the Russia and Eurasia program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, told Yahoo News in an interview Monday. "The very benign interpretation is maybe they were waiting for the pieces to fall into place."

The alleged would-be assassins were originally arrested by Ukraine's security forces in the city of Odessa following an investigation into an explosion in an Odessa apartment last month. Russian security services then conducted their own investigation, reports said.

Ukraine's security services are unlikely to have ginned up the alleged assassination case in order to boost Putin's presidential aspirations, Rojansky said. "The idea that [Ukrainian President Viktor] Yanukovich would do an electoral favor for Putin...it's a stretch, I think," he said, adding that Yanukovich's relationship with the Russian leader has cooled over the past year over Putin's perceived overstepping into Ukrainian affairs.

Putin, a former KGB colonel, served as Russian president from 2000-2008. Barred by Russian law from serving a successive third term, he then moved over to be Russian prime minister from 2008-2012. His decision last fall to stand in Russia's presidential elections this March generated rare protests in Russia. And protests started again this past weekend in anticipation of the election. But almost all analysis suggests Putin will easily defeat the other candidates to win a six-year term as Russia's next president.

On Monday, Putin took to the pages of "Russia Today" to sketch out his foreign policy vision, in which he argued against military strikes on Iran's nuclear facilities and against international intervention in Syria's domestic strife.

"Putin's position is surprisingly consistent," Rojansky said. It's based on his premise that "the world is a more stable place with Russia as a great power."

[American Patriot]

It's a load of bullshit. lol

I didn't post it here because that's precisely what it is.

[Ryan Ruck]

Very true...