Russia, China Solidify Disturbing Alliance

[Ryan Ruck]

An article I missed from 2006 written by Dr. Alexandr Nemets. I remember he used to write regularly for Newsmax and his excellent articles focused on the threats from Russia and China. His last regular article there was in 2003. I wonder whappened to him?

Russia, China Solidify Disturbing Alliance

The Chinese-Russian alliance has made much progress since I last reported on this and related matters in mid-2003.

Indeed, recent events have warranted an update as the two countries have intensified their activities. And the best summary of these changes is provided by the Chinese media.

The "International Survey" article published by Beijing-based Liaowang Weeklyat at the beginning of January 2006 offers great insight into current American-Russian relations: "The American-Russian struggle recently became really fierce. America wants to utilize Russia's temporary weakness for spreading and upgrading its own influence inside Eastern Europe and Central Asia.

"For these purposes, America uses such tools as 'democratic reconstructions' [and] plans to fulfill a 'peaceful transformation' of Russia, just as it happened already in Ukraine, Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan.

"In the second half of 2005, the American [idea] of a 'weak Russia' and Russia's own [idea] of a 'strong Russia' fiercely collided . . . Russia gave up its long-term policy of 'passive defense' and . . . expanded investments into defense and enhanced ties with key countries in Central Asia. As a result . . . America had to withdraw [in the second half of 2005] troops from Uzbekistan, and Russia and Uzbekistan signed an agreement . . ."

Russia and China are moving towards a "multi-polar world" in which China and Russia would be dominant players. According to Liaowang Weeklyat, "Based on the common interests and common ideas Chinese-Russian relations of a strategic cooperation partnership [during 2004-2005] additionally deepened and became extremely close.

"China and Russia are sparing no efforts for building the 'multi-polar world' and democratization of international relations and are mutually assisting in this endeavor.

"New mechanisms of providing Chinese-Russian security have been introduced already. Bilateral strategic and military-security cooperation steadily develop[ed] on the solid base of Chinese-Russian joint military maneuvers in August 2005. Chinese-Russian cooperation in the frame of Shanghai Cooperation Organization [dominated by China and Russia and including Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan] contributes greatly here."

China and Russia are also moving toward improved trade relations:

"Chinese-Russian trade is growing rapidly, particularly in the energy area. In 2006, Russia intends to deliver to China by railway 15 million tons of crude oil. Several oil and gas pipelines will connect the two countries.

"Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov emphasized at the end of 2005: 'Presently there are no serious political problems between China and Russia capable of influencing the two-side relations development.'

China is eyeing the American influence on Japan. The paper had this to say about the American-Japanese alliance: "America actively stimulates the introduction of [non-peaceful] changes into the Japanese Peaceful Constitution and the expansion of Japanese military spending for the purpose of 'taking additional responsibility for international security.'

"America considers Japan as a key link in U.S. global military force structure. Integration of U.S. Forces and Japanese Self Defense Forces (SDF) accelerates. U.S.-Japan joint development of Theater Missile Defense (TMD) System accelerates also . . . The eventual goal here is joint U.S.-Japan domination in the Asian-Pacific region. "American strategy is increasingly aimed at the containment of China. The 'China Military Potential Report' issued recently by the U.S. Defense Department emphasizes the 'China Threat Theory.' Forthcoming 'American Defense Quadrennial Estimation' also considers the restraining of China as a major goal of U.S. military strategy. "Japan cannot accept the rise of China. This results in long-term [straining of] Chinese-Japanese relations. Japanese leaders consider China's rise as a threat. Moreover, Japan cooperates with Taiwanese separatist forces, thus trying to 'contain China by Taiwan.' Shortly, Japan, with American assistance will try to hinder the historical process of China's peaceful rise."

This article raises serious issues. And the situation is ever-evolving: the Chinese-Russian alliance enjoyed additional development from January to May of 2006, and the Hu Jintao-Putin summit in Beijing on March 21-23 contributed greatly.

Opinions of Russian military experts in Krasnaya Zvezda Daily (the official paper of the Russian Army), issued during this summit and instantly after it, are of particular interest:

# China and Russia still have some problems in the trade-economic cooperation area, but such problems are absent in political and military cooperation, where the two countries have, in practice, coinciding approaches.

# During the recent summit in Beijing, China and Russia solidified a cooperative and unified approach towards Shanghai Cooperation Organization development, the situation in Afghanistan, the Middle East situation, the North Korean nuclear problem, and Central Asian development. Particularly, they will work out the united approach towards Iran's nuclear program. Both sides are against passing this problem to the UN Security Council.

# The summit also resulted in an upgrade of bilateral cooperation in military-technological and pure military cooperation. The large-scale joint military maneuvers "Peace Mission-2005" in August 2005 demonstrated that Chinese-Russian military cooperation far surpassed the weapon trade activity. Moreover, military cooperation now provides the cornerstone in bilateral relations.

China and Russia pursue very important goals. Mutual support in the struggle for these goals, confirmed by the Chinese-Russian summit in March 2006, predetermined an additional rise of bilateral cooperation in strategic, political, diplomatic, military, and economic areas. The following is a brief list of these goals broken down by country:

China

# Regarding Taiwan: The victory of a Guomindang (Nationalist Party) candidate at presidential elections in March 2008. Solidifying the Beijing-Taipei agreement about Taiwan reunification with Mainland China. Eventually, formalization of Greater China (Mainland China plus Taiwan plus Hong Kong). Russia supports China in this area.

# On Korea: China's goal is to protect Pyongyang from any serious action from the American-Japanese alliance. China hopes to increase its influence in South Korea. Russia supports China in Korea. Remarkably, from 2001-2005 Pyongyang's regime transformed into a member of the Chinese-Russian alliance.

# Plans for the South China Sea and Southeast Asia: China's goal is to have direct control over most parts of the South China Sea, and to establish domination in the mainland part of Southeast Asia. Russia, generally, supports China in this area. Particularly, Moscow is interested in the weapon markets of Southeast Asia.

# The Japan solution: China is striving for a concession of 200,000 square kilometers of a disputed piece of the East China Sea reportedly rich with hydrocarbon deposits and terminating the consolidation of a U.S.-Japanese alliance. Russia supports China by increasing diplomatic and even military pressure on Japan.

# Military cooperation with Russia: Using military-technological cooperation with Russia and Belarus for Chinese modernization and minimizing PLA lag behind U.S. Forces.

# Relying on Russia's resources: China will use Russian energy and natural resources for smooth development of Chinese economy.

# Science and technology: China will cooperate with Russia (outside of weapon R&D) for achieving breakthroughs in some key areas (including dual-use items), primarily, in space technology, nuclear technology, and new materials.

Russia

# Russia's revival: "Great Russia," to emerge; namely, reestablishing Moscow's domination over post-Soviet territory. Moscow will focus activity in Ukraine, Georgia, the entire Caucasus region, and Central Asia, aimed at "pushing America and NATO out of post-Soviet republics."

# Russia will ratchet up its struggle against NATO eastward expansion. China supports Russia in both directions.

As destructive as these individual goals may be, the two countries' common goals are even more problematic.

China continues to pursue unlimited access to Central Asian hydrocarbon resources and other natural resources, and to involve the entire Central Asia in SCO and eliminate any military presence of America or NATO in this key region. Russia's goals are the same regarding Central Asia.

China and Russia actively support the Iranian regime economically, politically and militarily. Moscow and Beijing particularly assist Tehran's military modernization and won't accept any Western sanctions against Iran, even if Tehran obtains nuclear weapons.

Russia and China also support Syrian and Palestinian autonomy. Russia and China are really interested in the defeat of America and its allies in Iraq.

[Ryan Ruck]

Another piece from Dr. Nemets he wrote in 2006.

Russia and China: The Mechanics of an Anti-American Alliance

By Dr. Alexandr Nemets

Conventional wisdom has it that China’s expanding military capabilities, and Beijing’s growing regional ambitions, will one day soon pose a challenge to the United States in Asia. Likewise, Russia under Vladimir Putin has shed any ambiguity about its post-Cold War direction, become increasingly assertive, powerful and anti-American.

Yet perhaps the greatest threat to U.S. interests and objectives in the years ahead will not come from Beijing or Moscow alone, but from the ominous alliance that is emerging between the two. It is a partnership that holds the power to reconfigure the balance of power in Europe, Asia and beyond—much to the detriment of the United States and American interests in those regions.

Genesis

Contemporary Sino-Russian relations can be traced back to September 1984, when the Soviet Union’s newly-appointed deputy premier, Ivan Arkhipov, visited Beijing to meet his Chinese counterpart, Li Peng. Though no agreements were reached at the time, both leaders committed unequivocally to a major upgrade of the bilateral relationship, thereby kicking off a multi-year revival of the thriving partnership that had existed between the two countries before 1960.

Additional overtures soon followed. Mikhail Gorbachev assumed power in the Soviet Union in March 1985, and the improvement of relations with China became one of his top foreign policy priorities. The results were dramatic; just three months later, in June 1985, during a visit by Li Peng to Moscow, the USSR and China signed a major pact on economic-technological cooperation—the first such agreement in a quarter-century. That deal paved the way for Soviet assistance in the modernization of China’s aging industrial sector, as well as a rapid expansion of Sino-Russian trade and extensive academic exchanges that led to a boom in science and technology collaboration.

Subsequently, in late May 1989, Gorbachev, as General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (and the newly elected president of the USSR), visited China and met Deng Xiaoping, Li Peng and other Chinese leaders. The visit was hailed worldwide as the final normalization of Chinese-Soviet ties after three decades of hostility. In practical terms, this visit created an environment for even greater cooperation. This expansion was not marred in the least by China’s brutal suppression of student protests in Tiananmen just weeks later. To the contrary, Soviet leaders recognized the new opportunities emerging from the resulting constriction of Chinese ties with the West.

By the time the Soviet Union began to crumble in 1991, contacts between Moscow and Beijing had become steady and robust, encompassing vibrant science and technology collaboration, ballooning bilateral trade and a thriving trade in high-tech Soviet arms (as Soviet defense firms, facing imminent prospects of cutbacks in military orders inside Russia, began to look to a new prospective customer: the PRC).1

The first half of 1991 saw growing chaos among the Soviet republics, and in Russia itself. But between Russia and China, the same period saw a rapid growth in strategic cooperation. Most notably, the Moscow visit of Jiang Zemin, General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, in May 1991 yielded a new border agreement that transferred to China hundreds of small islands in the Amur, Argun, and Ussuri rivers, and granting Chinese ships greater docking privileges at Russian ports.2

A Shifting Balance

Jiang’s visit showcased an important development. The balance of power between the USSR and China—previously squarely in Moscow’s favor—had begun to shift significantly toward the latter. The Soviet Union and China were now equal partners in their strategic relationship. Moreover, China was actually becoming stronger in some (primarily economic) areas, though it still lagged behind the USSR in military technology.

By the end of 1991, the Soviet Union had ceased to exist and Russia became an independent country. The fledgling Russian government initiated radical economic reform, which resulted in great economic and political chaos and hyperinflation. By contrast, in January 1992, China’s “paramount leader,” Deng Xiaoping, proclaimed a “new stage of economic reform,” which brought with it an annual rise of fourteen percent in China’s GDP.

Yet, although the trends in the two countries were diametrically opposite, this state of affairs actually facilitated further cooperation. The new Russian leadership was desperately looking for economic partners to replace broken ties with Eastern Europe and the former Soviet republics, while China had become interested as never before in Russian raw materials and Russian markets for “thrifty” Chinese consumer goods. The mutual interests of the Russian defense industry and the PLA and Chinese defense industry were also on the rise.3

At the end of 1992, following a visit by new Russian president Boris Yeltsin to China, Sino-Russian relations reached a qualitatively new level with the signing of twenty important framework agreements—more than half dealing with cooperation between the People’s Liberation Army and the Russian armed forces, Chinese-Russian military-technological cooperation and related spheres. The deals paved the way for a subsequent, multi-billion-dollar, five-year agreement on military exchanges and defense technology cooperation, one which would provide a major boost to China’s military modernization during the mid-1990s. The writing was on the wall; Russia’s top leaders had chosen a geopolitical partner, and despite Moscow’s overtures toward Washington and European capitals, their choice was clearly Beijing.4

Expansion and Solidification

The ascendance of Yevgeny Primakov to the post of Foreign Minister in 1996 provided new momentum to the unfolding Sino-Russian strategic partnership. That year, overt Russian weapons and arms technology deliveries surpassed $1 billion. And arms trade was not the only sign of progress; in the wake of a November 1996 visit by Primakov to Beijing, Russia and the PRC also enhanced their political coordination on a number of fronts—most notably, opposition to American plans for the deployment of ballistic missile defenses.

This warmth facilitated a major change in military posture on the part of both countries. Based on accords signed with Beijing in April 1996, Moscow launched a major troop redeployment, moving forces away from the 2,500-mile border shared with China to the Moscow and Leningrad military regions, close to NATO borders. China, for its part, shifted its best troops—at least 200,000 soldiers and a substantial amount of heavy weaponry—from the Russian and Kazakh borders (the Shenyang, Beijing and Lanzhou major military regions) to the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea coast.

A new “Great Leap Forward” in Chinese-Russian ties was at hand, driven largely by Russian fears of Western encroachment. The geopolitical agenda of Alexei Arbatov, the influential chairman of the Russian Duma’s Military Commission, was published by the Russian press at the very beginning of 1997. In it, Arbatov made clear that, if NATO continued its eastward expansion, Russia would have to do the same.5 In short, Russia would form an alliance with China, as well as with Iran and India. This was, in effect, an ultimatum from Russia’s political elite to America and the West.

Arbatov’s manifesto was echoed in Beijing. At their April 1997 summit, presidents Boris Yeltsin and Jiang Zemin issued a joint statement on “Multi-polarization of the World and Establishment of a New International Order,” a document articulating the opposition of both countries to a world dominated by the United States and its allies. At the same time, Jiang was making new inroads in Central Asia. Over the span of several months in 1997, the Chinese president met with the presidents of Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. These meetings resulted in a dramatic reduction of Chinese, Russian and Kazakh troops based near the former Chinese-Soviet border.

Moscow and Beijing also drew closer on regional security matters. By mid-1997, China and Russia, along with several of the former Soviet republics, had formed something akin to a unified “defense perimeter”—one encompassing Russia, China, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan—and had begun redeploying troops along that new border. As a result of the arrangement, Russia received additional military forces with which to oppose the U.S. and Europe, while China solidified its military potential for a possible conflict over Taiwan.

Progress was palpable on another front as well. A Chinese-Russian summit in Beijing in November of 1997 by and large resolved a long-standing border dispute over three large islands in the Amur and Argun rivers. Even more importantly, Jiang and Yeltsin signed the Sino-Russian Border Demarcation Treaty, which affirmed the border pact signed by Jiang and Gorbachev in May 1991. The Chinese and Russian media stressed after the summit that the two nations henceforth had “no unresolved problems, no differences in foreign policy goals.” Russia and China were “pursuing the same ultimate goal: the creation of a multi-polar world, with the diminished influence of the U.S.”6

Economic realities were also working in the alliance’s favor. In August 1998, the Russian government officially announced that it was bankrupt. This economic failure undermined Russian belief in a market economy, and the last friendly ties to the West unraveled. Yeltsin began expanding the political power wielded by Primakov, a tried-and-true friend of China, and the latter wasted no time in looking east for assistance. In late August of that year, China broke the de facto “financial blockade” of Russia that had emerged, providing Moscow with $540 million in financial aid. The move was greatly appreciated in the Kremlin.

International events, meanwhile, seemed to confirm the prudence of partnership. In December 1998, the United States and England launched Operation Desert Fox in Iraq—a move that generated angry protests from both Moscow and Beijing, and provided new impetus to Chinese and Russian discussions about the establishment of a joint air-defense network. During the same period, Primakov also proposed the idea of a Russian-Chinese-Indian strategic triangle aimed against the West.7 The subsequent outbreak of hostilities in Kosovo in May 1999 only served to accelerate these trends.

In the midst of this burgeoning partnership, a new era dawned in Moscow with the elevation of Vladimir Putin to the post of Prime Minister in August 1999. But the corresponding transfer of power from Yeltsin’s corrupt “family” to the Putin regime—based primarily on FSB/KGB structures—did nothing to dampen the intensity of Sino-Russian cooperation. Indeed, between August 1999 and July 2001, strategic cooperation between Moscow and Beijing ballooned, as exemplified by a new accord on weapons and technology transfer worth at least $2 billion, and by the initiation of joint military maneuvers between the Russian armed forces and the People’s Liberation Army. During their first meeting in Dushanbe, Tajikistan on July 5-6, 2000, Putin promised Jiang Zemin that in the case of a conflict over Taiwan, “the Russian Pacific Fleet will block the path of U.S. naval vessels heading to Taiwan.”8

Increasingly, Moscow and Beijing were also making regional plans. The summer of 2001 saw the formal expansion of the “Shanghai Five” with the addition of Uzbekistan. The resulting grouping—encompassing China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan—has emerged as Eurasia’s premier post-Soviet security bloc, with both defensive and far-reaching offensive capabilities. Officially, the major function of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) was the struggle against “the ‘three forces’ of separatism, terrorism and extremism.”9 In reality, however, Moscow and Beijing have harnessed the SCO as a geopolitical instrument to restrain the Western penetration into the Caspian region and all of Central Asia.

New Horizons

Today, the Sino-Russian relationship continues to be animated by a number of factors. For China, these include maximizing influence over Taiwan and neutralizing U.S. influence there, as well as rolling back America’s presence on the Korean peninsula, in the South China Sea, and throughout Southeast Asia. Policymakers in Beijing, cognizant of their country’s growing energy needs, are also deeply interested in greater access to the hydrocarbon resources of Central Asia and the Middle East.

Russia, meanwhile, is intent on expanding influence in the “post-Soviet space,” as well as complicating Washington’s freedom of movement in its Near Abroad and in the Middle East. Officials in Moscow also fear that, unless confronted, America’s regional presence in the “post-Soviet space” could lead to a final disintegration of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the “peaceful transformation” of Russia through “democratic reconstructions” and “color revolutions.”10 These efforts have met with considerable success, with Moscow contributing to Washington’s forced strategic retreat from Uzbekistan (and quite possibly Kyrgyzstan in the near future). On the surface, American-Russian relations may still be quiet, but a fierce struggle is taking place underneath.

These objectives are complementary, and synergistic. It is therefore not surprising that bilateral ties between Moscow and Beijing are on the upswing. China and Russia are sparing no efforts to build a “multi-polar world” in which the power of the United States is diminished.

In the future, these efforts are likely to take several concrete forms. For China, the first priority will be to ensure an electoral victory for the opposition Kuomintang party in Taiwan in March 2008, a move that Chinese policymakers believe—with some justification—will pave the way for a formal agreement between Beijing and Taipei on Taiwan’s eventual reunification with Mainland China. The end goal is the ambitious concept of a “Greater China” encompassing the Mainland, a politically and economically integrated Taiwan, and Hong Kong. A secondary goal is the withdrawal of American troops from South Korea and the unification of the peninsula under a de facto Beijing protectorate. PRC policymakers are also keen to establish direct control over most of the South China Sea, thereby cementing China’s dominion in the region, as well as exerting greater pressure on regional rival Japan.

Russia, meanwhile, is intent upon establishing an “independent” (read anti-American) foreign policy in the greater Middle East—an objective that includes, in no small measure, the provision of assistance to the Iranian regime in its efforts at military modernization, as well as tacit support for Tehran’s nuclear ambitions. The latter makes good strategic sense for Moscow; since the Islamic Republic is a major nuclear client, Iran’s nuclearization would be a boon to Russia’s nuclear industry, providing a showcase for Russian nuclear expertise to other aspiring atomic states. Russia will also remain intent on reasserting hegemony in the “post-Soviet space,” and is likely to increase its efforts to influence—and destabilize—the fragile political systems of Ukraine, Georgia, and the Central Asian states. All of this sits well with China, which is interested in restoring Moscow’s dominion over the entire “post-Soviet space” and, consequently, nullifying American influence there.

And Moscow and Beijing are making progress. In March 2006, Presidents Hu Jintao and Vladimir Putin endorsed a new long-term action plan for strategic cooperation between their two countries. This program—which envisions new levels of economic, scientific, cultural and political cooperation between Moscow and Beijing in the years ahead—sets the stage for a further evolution of the Sino-Russian alliance. It is a partnership with which the United States will be grappling for a long time to come.

[vector7]

Monday, December 8, 2008

Security component of the organization has been expanding at breathtaking pace!

The SCO leaders have repeatedly denied any plans to transform their group into a defense alliance, but the security component of the organization has been expanding at breathtaking pace. Three years ago the SCO set up a modest Regional Anti-Terror Structure (RATS) for information exchange and joint training of national security services. Two years later cooperation between the Defense Ministries was institutionalized through the establishment of a Defense Ministers Council, and earlier this year Russia circulated a draft agreement to formalize closer military ties among the SCO states.

Beijing has now backed Moscow’s proposal to establish a partnership between the SCO and the Collective Security Treaty Organization, a defense pact of former Soviet states, even though earlier it was reluctant to have ties with a strictly military alliance and rejected Moscow’s initiative to make ‘Peace Mission-2007’ a joint exercise of the SCO and CSTO. “I think the SCO and the CSTO can and must cooperate,” Chinese Ambassador to Russia Liu Gushing said in the run-up to the Bishkek summit. CSTO Secretary-General Nikolai Board usher had earlier announced that the two organizations would shortly sign a protocol on cooperation and might hold joint military training in future.

A political declaration adopted in Bishkek bluntly stated that regional security was the responsibility of the SCO and no one else. “The heads of state think that stability and security in Central Asia can be ensured primarily through the efforts taken by the nations of the region on the basis of existing regional organizations,” the declaration said.

The Russian and Chinese leaders both called in Bishkek for closer security cooperation within the SCO. President Vladimir Putting said the ‘Peace Mission-2007’ war games were part of “a joint system of rapid reaction to regional threats” that is being set up “to enhance the SCO potential in the sphere of security.” Intriguingly, for more detail visit www.huge-niche-keywords.com the scenario for ‘Peace Mission-2007’ — freeing a town captured by terrorists — was reportedly based on the 2005 armed revolt in Uzbekistan, when radical Islamists for several hours seized control of the provincial capital Andean. Mr. Putting called for holding war games on a regular basis in different countries of the SCO.

The security agenda of the SCO appears to be extending beyond the problems of Central Asia. Both Russia and China feel threatened by U.S. plans to build a global missile shield to gain ultimate strategic supremacy. The issue did not come up in public speeches in Bishkek, except for a blistering attack from Iran’s Mahout Amandine ad, which slammed the U.S. plan as “threatening not just one country, for more detail visit www.the20seotools.com but much of the Asian continent and SCO members.” However, the U.S. anti-missile plans were discussed at ministerial-level meetings in Bishkek ahead of the summit.

Russia’s Defense Minister Anatoly Surd upon said “the deployment of elements of the U.S. global missile shield in Europe destroys the strategic military balance,” while Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergey Lvov warned that the U.S. plan “is bound to impact on this region, bearing in mind the list of members and observers of the SCO.”

The SCO’s security concerns are also prompted by a looming U.S. defeat in Iraq and the resurgence of the Taliban in Afghanistan. “The situation in the region and neighboring countries remains unstable,” Gen. Blue-sky was quoted as telling SCO military chiefs in Chinese Uremia ahead of the Bishkek summit. “It would be premature to speak about its improvement. Moreover, the worst-case scenario cannot be ruled out. In particular, it is quite possible that the situation in Afghanistan may deteriorate even further

[vector7]

		Russia
		Russian defense minister to visit China on Dec. 9-11
		10:06 | 09/ 12/ 2008

MOSCOW, December 9 (RIA Novosti) - Russia's defense minister will discuss bilateral military-technical cooperation with China during a visit to Beijing on December 9-11, the Russian Defense Ministry said on Tuesday.

A spokesman for the ministry said Anatoly Serdyukov will attend a meeting of a joint intergovernmental commission on military-technical cooperation and security, and will meet with his Chinese counterpart Col. Gen. Liang Guanglie.

"The sides are planning to discuss bilateral military cooperation and a number of issues in the sphere of global and regional security," the spokesman said.

China, along with India, is a key buyer of Russian weaponry, including combat aircraft, air defense missile systems, and a variety of naval equipment.

Russia and China are members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), a regional security bloc which is widely seen as a counterweight to NATO's influence in Eurasia.

http://en.rian.ru/russia/20081209/118757756.html

[vector7]

China, Russia to hold anti-terrorist exercise in 2009www.chinaview.cn 2008-12-10 20:53:27 BEIJING, Dec. 10 (Xinhua) -- China and Russia will hold a joint anti-terror military exercise next year, the Chinese defense chief said on Wednesday.
"We should stage a successful China-Russia anti-terrorism joint military drill next year," Chinese Defense Minister Liang Guanglie told reporters, after a meeting with his Russian counterpart Anatoly Serdyukov.

This would be the third joint military exercise between the two militaries.
During their first-ever joint training in August 2005, a total of 10,000 people attended a week-long exercise first in Vladivostok, in Russia's Far East, then later moved to east China's Shandong Peninsula.

The "Peace Mission 2007" drill involved 6,500 people and 80 aircraft from China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).

"Our exercises in 2005 and 2007, under the SCO framework, were very successful," Serdyukov said, stressing bilateral military ties have been upgraded to a new level in recent years.

The Russian defense chief, who was on his first visit to China, said the cooperation within the SCO framework helped deepen mutual trust in the military field.

Hailing Serdyukov's visit as "a significant event" in military ties this year, Liang said China attached great importance to the visit.

"Both of us are satisfied with the growth of our military ties. More over, we have reached extensive consensus on stepping up our military cooperation," Liang said, without specifying the consensus.

The past few years saw steady progress of China-Russia military ties. Apart from joint exercises, the two held regular talks between their departments of General Staff. They also set up direct phone lines between their defense ministries last March.

With the 60th anniversary of China-Russia ties next year, Liang said, "The two agreed to make the best of this opportunity and work together to take our ties to a new high."

During their 90-minute talks, Liang also proposed the two countries keep their high-level military exchanges and carry out existing cooperative programs.

Liang said it was also important to strengthen personnel training and exchanges in specialized fields and expand areas of cooperation.

Chinese President Hu Jintao will meet with Serdyukov on Thursday.

http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/20...t_10485240.htm

[Ryan Ruck]

China, Russia Vow To Deepen Military Ties

China wants a closer military relationship with Russia because it is in the fundamental interests of both sides, a senior Chinese officer said in Beijing today.

In light of the complicated and volatile international situation, enhancing China- Russia military ties would also serve regional and world peace and stability, Guo Boxiong, vice chairman of the Central Military Commission, made the remarks when he met visiting Russian Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov.

As an important part of Sino-Russian relations and the strategic partnership of cooperation, Sino-Russian military relations have been constantly developed in recent years.

Anatoly Serdyukov backed Guo's evaluation on bilateral military and state-to-state relations. He said Russia was ready to intensify bilateral practical cooperation in every aspect.

As friendly neighbors, the two sides witness frequent state-to-state and military exchanges, and share similar views on important international and regional issues, which reflects the high level development of the Sino-Russian strategic partnership of cooperation, he added.

[Ryan Ruck]

Russia, China To Jointly Develop High-Tech Military Hardware

Russia and China are launching a new stage of military cooperation, with an emphasis on high technologies, director of Russia's Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation Mikhail Dmitriyev said, in comments on the 13th session of the Russian-Chinese intergovernmental commission for military cooperation, which took place in Beijing on Thursday.

The parties agreed to begin joint development of new high-tech military products, according to Dmitriyev.

[vector7]

Eurasia Daily Monitor, The Jamestown Foundation - December 16, 2008 — Volume 5, Issue 239

December 16, 2008

IN THIS ISSUE: * Russian Chief of General Staff calls for stronger security ties to China Russia’s “Strategic Partnership” with China Set to Grow in 2009 Roger N. McDermott On December 10 Chief of the General Staff Nikolay Makarov repeated Russia’s threat to deploy short-range Iskander (SS-26) missile systems as one of the promised countermeasures against planned U.S. positioning of several interceptors in Poland as part of the Ballistic Missile Shield (BMD). Makarov said: The Russian side, too, will make a number of decisions, including one on the deployment of new-generation missile systems, such as the Iskander system. In this case, everyone should realize that while [in the past] the issue of missile defense concerned [only] the Russian Federation and the United States of America, it is now a problem for all countries in Europe.” Moscow’s efforts to internationalize its concerns over the BMD not only apply to Europe; it is also looking to the leadership in Beijing for additional support. Russian Defense Minister Anatoliy Serdyukov recently discussed the United States’ BMD plans during talks with his Chinese counterpart Liang Guanglie. “We think that the USA’s global missile defense system could potentially upset the strategic balance of forces among the leading nuclear powers,” Serdyukov said, following talks in Beijing. Serdyukov also used this as a platform to attack what Moscow views as U.S. and EU opposition to Russian and Chinese attempts to outlaw the use of weapon systems in space (Zvezda TV, December 10; Interfax, December 10). After the bilateral Sino-Russian defense talks in Beijing, Liang announced that China and Russia would hold a joint antiterrorist military exercise next year. This will follow two previous successful antiterrorist exercises conducted in 2005 and 2007, both under the aegis of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Serdyukov indicated that next year’s exercise would also be a SCO military exercise, no doubt geared toward the needs of the defense planning staffs in Moscow and Beijing, rather than more direct involvement by their Central Asian counterparts. Serdyukov brought attention to the growth in bilateral defense cooperation, including such exercises; and it was agreed to develop this further. In light of the 60th anniversary of Chinese-Russian relations next year, Liang said that “The two agreed to make best of this opportunity and work together to take our ties to a new high” (Xinhua, December 10). Beyond the military exercises and promotion of the SCO’s counterterrorist credentials, it is likely that 2009 will see more frequent exploitation of the Sino-Russian strategic partnership in order to oppose Washington on a range of issues from BMD to promoting democracy. China says that it wants a closer military relationship with Russia, because it is in the fundamental interests of both countries. Following comments by other Chinese officials, Guo Boxiong, vice-chairman of the Central Military Commission, said that regional and global peace would benefit by enhanced Sino-Russian military cooperation. He said, without elaborating further, that this was particularly the case in light of a complicated and volatile international situation (Xinhua, December 11). Wang Gang, a member of the Political Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee and vice-chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) spoke of China’s deeper ties with Russia, pointing to several successful meetings between Presidents Medvedev and HU Jintao in 2008, as an indication of “growing momentum” in bilateral relations. “The two nations have boosted high-level exchanges, expanded political mutual trust, and forged close coordination on international issues,” Wang stated (Xinhua, December 11). Given the Sino-Russian cooperation at the UN earlier this year in blocking sanctions against Zimbabwe, however, what this “close coordination” might entail is open to question. China’s Xinhua news agency issued a year-end statement on December 11, which enumerated Russia’s countermeasures against the U.S. missile shield plans. It read almost like a report card on Russia’s unruly behavior in world diplomacy. It included Russia’s resumption of patrolling areas of the world’s oceans; its test firing of ICBMs; the first large-scale naval exercise in the Atlantic in 15 years in January; and two Tu-160 strategic bombers landing in Venezuela in September to carry out training flights. It also noted Medvedev’s week-long tour of Latin America in late November, which included stops in Brazil, Cuba, Peru, and Venezuela and coincided with a Russian naval convoy, consisting of a nuclear cruiser, an anti-submarine vessel, a tank vessel, and a tugboat, which was conducting joint maneuvers with Venezuela. which was conducting joint maneuvers with Venezuela. Moreover, Xinhua mentioned that Russia had made oil and arms agreements with Cuba, Libya, Syria, and Venezuela; conducted the war against Georgia; recognized the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia; and maintained its dogmatic opposition to further enlargement of NATO. Yet, in its new foreign policy concept, a more positive position was included in Russia’s relations with the United States. “It is necessary to switch Russian-US relations to a state of strategic partnership, to step over the barriers of past strategic principles,” the agency said, reminiscent of Vladimir Putin's earlier appeals. (Xinhua, December 11). Undoubtedly, Russia’s international diplomacy has become more assertive in 2008. It has also left Western diplomats nonplussed over Russia’s bargaining position, if it has one. http://georgiandaily.com/index.php?o...008&Itemid=132

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Communist Bloc Military Updates: Russian DM Serdyukov in Beijing, 3rd Sino-Soviet war game slated for 2009; Soviets feint Kaliningrad tank withdrawal



Yesterday Russian Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov met with his Chinese counterpart Liang Guanglie in Beijing, in another step forward to consolidate the "one clenched fist" of the Moscow-Beijing Axis. Today, reports state-run Xinhua, he met with Chinese President/Tyrant Hu Jintao (pictured above): "Russian President Dmitry Medvedev paid a successful visit to China in May after he took the position. Since then the Chinese and Russian presidents met with each other five times."

As we expected, the two communist superpowers announced that they will hold their third combined war game next year. The first Sino-Soviet exercise "Peace Mission 2005" took place that year, followed by "Peace Mission 2007" last year. It can be surmised that the Soviet strategists and their comrades in Beijing will tag next year's war game "Peace Mission 2009" or some other euphemism. Both communist capitals camouflage their war preparations against the Western Alliance as "anti-terrorist" drills, a ruse that has worked well in distracting the shopping mall regimes from inquiring too closely about their looming confrontation with the Communist Bloc.

"During their first-ever joint training in August 2005, a total of 10,000 people attended a week-long exercise first in Vladivostok, in Russia's Far East, then later moved to east China's Shandong Peninsula," related Xinhua yesterday, adding: "The Peace Mission 2007 drill involved 6,500 people and 80 aircraft from China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)." Following the first meeting with the Chinese leadership, Serdyukov intoned: "Our exercises in 2005 and 2007, under the SCO framework, were very successful. Bilateral military ties have been upgraded to a new level in recent years." Liang ventured: "Both of us are satisfied with the growth of our military ties. Moreover, we have reached extensive consensus on stepping up our military cooperation."



Tanks, but No Tanks: Soviet Deception in Kaliningrad Oblast

Meanwhile, the Soviet strategists appear to be executing a feint in Kaliningrad, by announcing the withdrawal of nearly 900 tanks from the exclave, which is bordered by the Baltic Sea, Lithuania, and Poland. The tanks formerly belonged to the Soviet 11th Army, which was disbanded in 1997.

Yesterday, reports Novosti, General Nikolai Makarov, Chief of the Russian General Staff, explained: "We had 880 tanks in the Kaliningrad Region, and we are pulling virtually all of them out." However, there's a catch. The good general added: "The withdrawal could take several years as the tanks are to be transported by sea after Lithuania denied us permission to allow the hardware to be moved by rail through its territory." Waving the Kremlin's good intentions, General Makarov was quick to add: "Our unilateral move clearly demonstrates that Russia has no plans to attack other countries and is not pursuing an expansionist policy." Sure, Nick, whatever you say. The kicker follows: "However, we have always opposed NATO's eastward expansion because it poses serious threats to Russia."

Last December, Novosti continues, Russia unilaterally imposed a moratorium on its compliance with the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE), theoretically permitting the Kremlin to move its 6,500 active main battle tanks about as it pleases. Moscow has indicated that it will once again observe the CFE if NATO approves the adapted version of the treaty, signed in 1999 and so far ratified only by Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. Only hours after Barack Hussein Obama won the presidential election last month, Russian "President" Dmitry Medvedev threatened to (re?) deploy Iskander-M tactical missiles in Kaliningrad if Washinton went ahead with its missile shield deployments in Poland and the Czech Republic.

Interestingly, in September Kremlin-run Interfax painted a somewhat different story, reporting that that month the Russian Ground Forces transported 40 T-72 tanks by rail from Kaliningrad to Russia proper via Lithuania. This occured with the full approval of the Lithuanian defense ministry, contrary to General Makarov's complaint. "The Russian military transit through Lithuania was conducted in line with Lithuanian laws and coordinated plans. Permission was granted for the transit of the tanks," ministerial spokesperson Ruta Apeikyte informed Interfax. "The more armaments are taken away from the Kaliningrad region the better. This withdrawal increases security and stability of the Baltic region and Europe as a whole," Apeikyte assured.

In what could be another cover story, Russia Today insists that Kaliningrad's nearly 900 tanks are destined to be sold to Africa or Latin America, where Russia admittedly has plenty of clients for military hardware.

Reading between the lines, we can surmise that the tanks may be used as part of neo-Soviet Russia's re-invasion of Europe since they are already well situated for striking south into Poland and north into the Baltic republics.

posted by Perilous Times at 12:30 PM 2 comments links to this post

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The Great Dragon Awakens: China Challenges American Hegemony by José Miguel Alonso Trabanco Global Research, January 6, 2009

Nowadays, most International Relations analysts acknowledge China’s potential to achieve superpower status over the course of the next decades due to its impressive economic growth, which was triggered by Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms program (inspired by theorists like Friedrich List). Chinese power has also increased considerably in military, geopolitical, trade and financial affairs. Some experts have even contemplated the possibility of China becoming the world’s greatest power, overtaking the US. For instance, Goldman Sachs has predicted that China’s GDP will surpass America’s sometime circa 2050. However, one must always bear in mind that if Beijing indeed succeeds in becoming the ‘first among equals’, it would not be the first time such event takes place. The ‘Middle Kingdom’ was already a mighty empire thousands of years before the US was even founded. Thus, China (both as a State and as a civilization) has flourished for centuries and has outlived the Roman, Persian, Arabian, Turkish, Mongol, and British empires, which is by no means an easy accomplishment. Needless to say, Washington feels its position might be seriously threatened in the long run. The Project for a New American Century stipulates that the US must prevent any power(s) or coalition thereof (read China and Russia) from effectively challenging American power. Therefore, America’s top policy makers are well aware that China is certainly a serious contender and, for that reason, have been implementing a strategy specifically designed to check Chinese mounting power. Below we will dissect and explore American efforts meant to curb China as well as Chinese countermoves. The US plans toward China comprises the following components: Number one: An updated version of classical containment which was an American strategy conceived by US geoestrategist George Kennan during the early years of the Cold War to limit the Soviet Union’s power projection capabilities. This was clearly reflected in the creation of NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization), an alliance whose purpose was to keep "the Americans in, the Russians out, and the Germans down". In order to achieve Great Power status, one must ensure regional security in one’s neighboring areas. This can be done by attracting potential allies, establishing a patronage over weak States and by excluding hostile powers from one’s own immediate periphery. The US Monroe Doctrine, formulated at a time when America was an emerging power, is an enlightening example because it expresses American determination to enthrone Washington’s exclusive primacy in the American hemisphere. In the present day, there is not a formal structure akin to an Asian version of NATO. Nevertheless, the US has been continuously seeking to establish military bases close to Chinese borders. Washington has established a meaningful military presence in Mindanao (the Philippines), Okinawa (Japan), the Korean Peninsula, Kyrgyzstan and Afghanistan (which is in fact NATO-occupied). Moreover, some of China’s neighbors are staunch allies of the West: Japan, Australia, Taiwan and the Philippines. All of them have forged an important degree of military cooperation with Washington and have also purchased a great deal of American-made arms. So far, Washington has not tried to encircle China’s borders as aggressively and in the case of Russia (expansion of NATO, missile defense facilities in Eastern Europe and so on). This is not because America is somehow friendlier towards China but because Beijing’s military capabilities are not as threatening as those of Moscow, whose military power and huge nuclear arsenal possess the ability to challenge the US in the case of war, to say the least. Moreover, the American ‘cordon sanitaire’ around China is far from being complete. Beijing has developed a strong partnership with Moscow through the SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organization) which also encompasses Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan Kyrgyzstan. The SCO, curiously referred to as the ‘Shanghai Pact’ by former Chinese President Jiang Zemin, is not yet a full-fledged military alliance but it definitely has the potential to reach that point provided Sino-Russian strategic cooperation continues to thrive in the coming years. It is interesting to highlight that the US membership application was rejected by SCO members. It would be a severe mistake to underestimate the SCO. If its level of strategic coordination deepens, the SCO’s combined power would turn to be outright frightening for NATO. SCO member States (not including observers): Control a vast portion of the Eurasian landmass. Contain huge population centers. Command large armies equipped with state-of-the-art weaponry (ICBMs, fighter jets, satellites, strategic bombers and fleets of tanks). Possess massive reserves of natural resources (oil, gas, uranium, metals and fresh water). Own important industrial plants. Have accumulated some of the largest amounts of foreign currency reserves. Can convince other countries to join their organization as full members like India, Pakistan, Mongolia, Iran, Turkmenistan, Belarus, a post-Yuschchenko Ukraine, Armenia, Syria, etc. Not long ago, US forces were expelled by fellow SCO member Uzbekistan from the Karshi-Khanabd air base (a.k.a. K2), located in its territory. Tashkent strengthened its links with both Beijing and Moscow after a presumably US-masterminded ‘Color Revolution’ backfired and ultimately failed to produce regime change in that Central Asian republic. China has also tried to court other neighboring States through an intensification of trade flows. For example, South Korea, although it still hosts a large number of American troops, has implemented a foreign policy carefully crafted not to irritate China. Seoul knows that Beijing, through its leverage and influence on Pyongyang, holds one of the most important keys to an eventual Korean reunification and that China is a force that can contribute to (geo)political stability and offer interesting business opportunities in East Asia. The ‘Middle Kingdom’ has successfully attracted Myanmar as an ally. Myanmar (a.k.a. Burma) borders the Southern part of the Peoples’ Republic of China and it contains important raw materials like natural gas, marble, gems, precious stones and exotic woods. Myanmar’s government has sided with Asia’s rising powers such as China, India and, to a lesser degree, Russia through closer trade, diplomatic and military relations. Beijing has plans to establish intelligence facilities in Myanmar’s territory and, taking into account a growing Chinese military presence there, it is clear that China intends to intensify its alliance with Myanmar. In 2007, the world witnessed the ‘Saffron Revolution’ (please note the term, where have we heard something similar before?), a series of protests led by Buddhist monks and political elements prone to adopt pro-Western positions. This unrest was most likely orchestrated by American intelligence personnel, eager to overthrow Myanmar’s current government and replace it with pro-Western rulers. Myanmar’s governmental forces, despite Western isolation and attempts to impose sanctions and backed by full Chinese and Russian support, ultimately prevailed. This methodology is not new at all and it seems to be almost a carbon copy of other ‘Color Revolutions’ instigated in the post-Soviet space. However, the latest attempts to apply this recipe have failed in Belarus, Uzbekistan and Myanmar. It can also be added that some of the first governments which took over thanks to ‘Color Revolutions’ are already facing a considerable deal of trouble. For instance, Georgia was defeated by Russia when its government decided to invade South Ossetia; furthermore, Mikheil Saakashvili’s impudence was further punished by Moscow’s diplomatic recognition of both Abkhazia and South Osettia. Plus, Ukraine (along with Georgia) was denied NATO Membership Action Plans because of old Europe’s fear of irresponsibly antagonizing Moscow. Serbia has just signed a deal to increase energy cooperation with Russia’s Gazprom. Number two: The implicit threat of using American sea power to enforce a naval blockade against China to interrupt both its shipment of goods overseas as well as the flow of critical raw materials. Chinese economic growth fuels an ever-increasing demand of energy and raw materials. However, domestic supplies are not enough to meet those needs. For example the People’s Republic of China is currently the second largest importer of oil. Therefore, the aforementioned means that China’s manufacturers must resort to foreign sources to provide the necessary resources for their production activities. Many of these foreign providers are located in areas far away from China’s borders, namely the Middle East and Africa. That implies that a considerable part of Chinese critical supplies have to be seaborne. Moreover, the Middle Kingdom’s major industrial production centers are to be found in zones close to China’s Pacific seaboard. Thus, the overwhelming majority of Chinese export products have to be transported by ship as well. As far as the Chinese flow of imports and exports is concerned, it is significant to highlight the importance of the Malacca Strait, a tight waterway positioned between Peninsular Malaysia and the Indonesian island called Sumatra. Such shipping lane is indeed a chokepoint because, if the United Stated decided to enforce a naval blockade around it, the flow of Chinese imports and exports would suffer a lethal blow. The US, much like its British predecessor, is the world’s leading sea power and that, combined with all of the above, represents a serious strategic vulnerability to China who obviously does not want to depend on American goodwill to conduct its commercial exchange overseas. The ‘Middle Kingdom’ is aware of this military gap between American forces and its own. Beijing also acknowledges that developing a competitive sea power is a task which demands a colossal sum of resources in terms of time, manpower, materials, R & D and money. Therefore, China knows that it will not have the ability to directly challenge American naval primacy in one generation or two. Yet, that does not mean that there are not powerful asymmetric equalizers that can be used to counter the US apparently unrivaled sea power. Beijing’s military doctrine is quite flexible and methodologically creative. If the ‘Middle Kingdom’ perceives an imminent military threat from America, it can make use of its foreign currency reserves (currently the largest in the world), which are denominated in US dollars, as a strategic weapon. If China decides to get rid of its dollars reserves, the consequences will be devastating for the US, perhaps triggering its economic, social, military and political collapse. Some analysts dismiss this scenario as far-fetched; they argue that China would hesitate to unleash financial hell upon the US because Chinese exporters would also suffer considerably from the dollar’s fall. Nevertheless, they seem to forget that, historically, States are indeed willing to sacrifice some of their meaningful economic interests when their very survival is at stake. One just needs to remember that Germany and Britain were important trading partners right before World War One broke out… Furthermore, China has been studying American over-reliance on real-time information feed collected through spy satellites in order to wage war. Thus, the ‘Middle Kingdom’ has discovered that US ground, sea and air forces would be left almost blind if deprived of data provided by its satellite network. Not surprisingly, Beijing’s military-industrial complex has been busy designing and testing a variety of anti-satellite weapons. In 2006 a Chinese land-based laser illuminated an American satellite. A year later, China destroyed one of its own weather satellites by using a modified version of ballistic missile technology. The Chinese government has actively engaged in diplomatic talks in order to foster land-based oil and gas pipeline projects in order to secure its energy security and to diminish its dependence on seaborne supplies of oil. Beijing has succeeded in establishing an oil pipeline which provides China with both Russian and Kazakh petroleum. Likewise, the ‘Middle Kingdom’ plans to build pipelines connecting oil and/or gas producing-countries (like Iran, Myanmar and the Russian Far East) with Chinese territory. It is worth mentioning that there have been many rumors in strategic circles concerning Chinese plans to open a military base in Iran and to set a naval outpost in Gwadar, Pakistan. It is way too early to confirm authoritatively weather these projects will indeed materialize. At least, one can confidently assert that the motivation is clear, i.e. to enhance Chinese power projection capabilities beyond its borders and to protect its uninterrupted energy supply. Number three: Divide and rule, i.e. American efforts to dismantle Chinese territorial integrity and dissolve China’s internal political uniformity. The US and the West know that China is a lot harder to balkanize than Serbia; nevertheless, they have used their intelligence agencies in order to create a persistent irritant that can distract Beijing and force it to divert its resources. The People’s Republic of China, like most other nation-States on Earth, is not a country which is ethnically or geographically homogenous. The ‘Middle Kingdom’ is home to different ethnicities, cultures and religions. China’s largest ethnic group is the Han people. They comprise the majority of the country’s population. Both China’s Eastern seaboard (the area where the wealthiest cities are located) and its (more agricultural) heartland are inhabited by Han Chinese. However, there are regions of the Chinese territory whose main population are not Han Chinese. The most important cases are the Xinjiang-Uyghur Autonomous Region and the Tibet Autonomous Region. Xinjiang-Uyghur, located in the Northwestern part of China, is strategically important because it borders Russia, Mongolia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Pakistan and Afghanistan. Thus, this piece of land represents China’s territorial contact with Central Asia. It is essential to indicate that this autonomous region contains large deposits of minerals and oil. Xinjiang-Uyhgur is populated by people who profess the Islamic religion and who belong to the Turkic ethnicity, which is why this zone is also called ‘Eastern Turkestan’. Western intelligence agencies have predictably provided covert support for both Islamic and separatist forces inside Xinjiang-Uyghur. In fact, these forces have already demonstrated both their political willingness as well as their operational capability to carry outterrorist attacks. On the other hand, Tibet is an issue Washington and Brussels have exploited in order to fracture Chinese internal unity. It is vital to take into consideration that even open source intelligence material confirm that the Dalai Lama himself was working undercover along the CIA in order to undermine Chinese control over Tibet during the early decades of the Cold War. One can only wonder if such collaboration continues today. Natural resources play an important part as well: Tibet might have some the world’s largest reserves of uranium. Moreover, this autonomous region is rich in gold, copper, drinking water and could even possess valuable deposits of both oil and gas. In March 2008 a series of riots broke out all over Tibet and especially in its capital Lhasa. Beijing accused the ‘Dalai Lama gang’ of inciting unrest which was eventually restrained by Chinese law enforcement. The Dalai Lama’s Western supporters took political advantage of this situation and launched a PR attack against China’s government. Some Western leaders even threatened to boycott the Beijing Olympics. The somewhat naïve ‘Free Tibet’ crowds even held protests in some Western capitals. During these events, it is critical to take into account that Moscow expressed a strong diplomatic and political support for Beijing. The Han Chinese themselves are not immune to foreign geoestrategists prone to balkanize their rivals. For example, the Falun Gong movement (described by some as a ‘cult’) has been outlawed by the Chinese government. In strategic circles, it has been argued that Beijing regards Falun Gong as a CIA front whose task is to provoke instability and induce turmoil in the Chinese mainland. Moreover, China’s rural population who live in the country’s heartland can also become an attractive target to someone willing to spread political discontent because they have not yet caught up with the wealth and prosperity experienced by the coastal industrial cities. Conclusion It seems that China is continuously advancing toward a greater role in the international system’s distribution of power. The ‘Middle Kingdom’ is increasingly assertive in defending its interests. The West (North America plus Europe) along with its followers (Japan, Australia, et al.) are willing to counter China’s rise. Nevertheless, Beijing is more determined than ever to recover its great power position and has forged strategic alliances (with Moscow and the Central Asian Republics) as well as partnerships in East Asia, the Middle East and elsewhere. Additionally, China and its allies have been perfecting a strategy to challenge Western plans to contain Eurasia’s rising powers. We can therefore anticipate that such rivalry will intensify as the stakes become higher and higher.

Global Research Articles by José Miguel Alonso Trabanco

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Friday, 1 May 2009

UNITY BETWEEN THE RUSSIAN BEAR AND THE CHINESE DRAGON

Russia, China on comradely terms

By M K Bhadrakumar
Asia Times Online

Westernism is giving way to Orientalism in Moscow's
outlook, if the past week's happenings are any guide. As
Russia's ties with the West deteriorate, an upswing in its
strategic partnership with China becomes almost inevitable.

The resumption of Russia-NATO (North Atlantic Treaty
Organization) dialogue has gone awry. And the nascent hopes
regarding a "reset of the button" of the Russian-American
relationship are belied. With Moscow under multiple
pressures from the West, two top Chinese officials have
arrived in the Russian capital to offer support -Defense
Minister Liang Guanglie and Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi.

Moscow angrily reacted to NATO's expulsion of two Russian
diplomats on Wednesday. In exceptionally strong language,
it called the NATO move a "crude provocation" and an
"outrageous action". The Foreign Ministry alleged that
certain "completely unscrupulous ... forces" in the West
were "hectically" creating pretexts for obstructing
Russia's dialogue with Europe.

The two diplomats to NATO headquarters in Brussels are the
Russian mission's senior adviser and political desk chief
Viktor Kochukov and mission attache and executive secretary
Vasily Chizhov. They were accused of espionage
"incompatible with the diplomatic status".

The Russian mission to NATO went a step further to allege
an attempt to "disrupt a reset in relations between Russia
and the US". In immediate terms, the scheduled Russia-NATO
foreign minister-level meeting on May 19 in Brussels
appears problematic. Hardliners have prevailed.

Unsurprisingly, Moscow has also ratcheted up its
condemnation of NATO's 27-day military exercise in Georgia,
due to start this coming Tuesday. President Dmitry Medvedev
called the exercises "an open provocation" and warned that
there could be "negative consequences for those who made
the decision to hold them". He accused the alliance of
encouraging Georgia's "re-militarization". Russia seems to
estimate a larger plot to corner it in the Caucasus.

In a pre-emptive move, Moscow on Thursday signed five-year
border defense agreements with Georgia's breakaway regions
of Abkhazia and South Ossetia whereby the two regions will
delegate their border security (including the maritime
frontiers) to Russian forces.

Rivalries over control of Caspian oil provide the backdrop
to these rapid developments involving Georgia. Conceivably,
the hardliners would exploit the spiraling tensions to
brand "revanchist" Russia at the summit meeting of the
European Union (EU) in Prague this coming Thursday, which
is expected to take a view on the two rival pipeline
projects that aim to transport Caspian and Central Asian
gas to Europe - South Stream, sponsored by Russia, and
Nabucco, supported by the US.

At the Prague summit, Europe's dependence on Russia for its
energy supplies will come under scrutiny. There is mounting
frustration among the proponents of Nabucco that Moscow is
steadily advancing South Stream. Yet, leading European
countries like Germany, France and Italy are at ease with
Russia. US attempts to stall South Stream have been of no
avail.

Last Tuesday, Russia's Gazprom and the Bulgarian gas
utility Bulgargaz initialed a cooperation agreement on a
feasibility study for South Stream. But the Bulgarian side
cannot formalize the South Stream agreement before the EU
summit meeting of May 7. Washington hopes that the
parliamentary elections in Bulgaria due in early July may
postpone the agreement. It will be a close call.

All these factors are at work in the current tensions
between NATO and Russia. But that isn't all. NATO, with
active US support, is once again making a determined effort
to pitch its tent in Central Asia. The latest Western
attempt to establish a NATO regional centre on terrorism in
Tajikistan comes on top of the US's agreement with
Tajikistan regarding a basing facility for NATO operations
in Afghanistan. The US has secured similar facilities in
Uzbekistan and negotiations are underway with Turkmenistan.

However, no matter the criticality of the Afghan situation,
the US is insisting that NATO should sidestep offers of
help from the Collective Security Treaty Organization
(CSTO) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). In
effect, the US's containment strategy of the George W Bush
era still remains intact at the operational level in
Central Asia, no matter President Barack Obama's promise to
revamp US regional policy.

Chinese newspaper the People's Daily recently featured a
commentary broadly estimating that while Obama's diplomacy
was characterized by "soft power", that was merely
tactical, since "the US will not give up its dominant role
in world affairs ... Wrapping a big stick in a layer of
soft sponge or putting a carrot at the front and a big
stick at the back, the US has never given up its powerful
military force ... Diplomatic policy is also a kind of
political game. One of its fundamental principles is to
obtain the largest benefit at the least cost. The
adjustment of Obama's diplomatic policy notably predicates
a reduction of cost, without any change in their goal to
obtain the most benefits."

The commentary likely had Central Asia in mind. Both Russia
and China will take note that US regional policy cuts into
their core interests. Russia's state television, Rossiya,
showed a documentary last week accusing the US of using its
air base in Manas, Kyrgyzstan, for running intelligence
operations. Rossiya showed clippings of a windowless
two-storey building in the Manas base, which it said was
the hub of a major US radio-intelligence unit. (Manas is
close to China's missile sites in Xinjiang.) There are
signs that Moscow and Beijing will invest the SCO as a key
instrument to counter the US moves to expand NATO into the
Central Asian region. The SCO conducted war games in
Tajikistan recently, simulating an attack by al-Qaeda from
Afghanistan, in which terrorists seized a chemical factory
and took its workers hostage.

Medvedev has called for a stronger role for SCO in
stabilizing Afghanistan. Arguably, by prevailing on Bishkek
to evict the US from Manas, Moscow signaled that it was
reviewing the rules of the game in Central Asia. A cat and
mouse game is going on. Washington kept up an appearance
for weeks as if it was reconciled with the closure of
Manas, while Moscow (and Beijing) put on an air of
indifference. But now it transpires the Pentagon is seeking
a reversal of the decision by the Kyrgyz government. "We
are still engaged with the Kyrgyz ... They have given us
notification and they want to end the presence of the US
basing abilities in Kyrgyzstan, but the story is not over
there yet," a US official was quoted as saying.

On Wednesday, Pentagon spokesman Geoff Morrell said, "I
think there's actually progress in dealing with the Kyrgyz
on Manas ... And I think we see reason for hope there, that
that can be worked out ... We hope we're getting closer."
On the other hand, Bishkek keeps affirming that its
decision is irrevocable. Kyrgyz Prime Minister Igor
Chudinov insisted, "Not a single government official has
been authorized to hold such negotiations. No one. I have
no information about such negotiations."

At any rate, Russia plans to increase the number of
military aircraft at the Kant air base in Kyrgyzstan. "It
is in line with the situation in Central Asia and
Afghanistan," CSTO secretary general Nikolai Bordyuzha
said. There is also a concerted attempt on the part of
Moscow to rally the CSTO. Moscow will host a CSTO summit
meeting on June 14, which is expected to formalize the
creation of the alliance's new rapid reaction forces. To be
sure, Moscow is reasserting its role as the guarantor of
security for Central Asia.

But Moscow also regards the SCO as a forum within which it
has the unique opportunity to coordinate with China. While
receiving the SCO defense ministers who gathered in Moscow
this week, Medvedev said, "Overall, the region in which the
SCO operates is a complex one, and so we have to take into
account the reality that surrounds us, and the need for our
countries to jointly coordinate efforts on a wide range of
issues, including security and the defense capability of
our countries on a collective basis."

The defense ministers' meeting in Moscow on Wednesday saw a
strong affirmation by China on enhanced SCO cooperation to
confront regional challenges. In an oblique reference to
the US, Liang called for the eschewal of "antagonism,
clique politics and unilateralism" and underlined that the
SCO has a role to play in the entire Eurasian region.
Russia and China separately agreed on an intensified
program of bilateral military cooperation that includes as
many as 25 joint maneuvers in 2009 in a demonstration of
the strengthening of strategic ties.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov also expressed
similar sentiments earlier in the week after his talks with
his visiting Chinese counterpart. Lavrov said Moscow and
Beijing favored the "comprehensive strengthening of the SCO
as a key factor of the promotion of stability and security
in the Central Asian region". Lavrov summed up that two
chief principles lie at the core of the "dynamically
evolving" Russian-Chinese strategic cooperation. One, the
two countries share a common perspective on the
contemporary world processes.

Two, the two countries will "always support each other on
concrete issues" that directly affect their national
interests. Carefully choosing his words, Lavrov added that
Russia and China agreed during consultations in Moscow that
"such comradely mutual assistance" is only going to be
strengthened.

Ambassador M K Bhadrakumar was a career diplomat in the
Indian Foreign Service. His assignments included the Soviet
Union, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Germany, Afghanistan,
Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Kuwait and Turkey.

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Action by NATO in Europe, China and Russia brings closer

F. William Engdahl

To the extent as it is clear that the U.S. foreign policy under President Obama in all major areas of nothing more than a continuation of the Bush policy, the two great powers in Eurasia - namely Russia and China - cautious steps to deepen their economic and military cooperation.

Gradually, the "Shanghai Cooperation Organization" (SCO) as a counterbalance to NATO as a defensive alliance.

This development could have been avoided if NATO after the collapse of the Soviet Union to an expansive approach would have been set.

At the end of April arrived, the Chinese Defense Minister Liang Guanglie in Moscow, where he attend a meeting of defense ministers of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization took part.

To the extent that NATO is the increased pressure in Eurasia, puts this issue more and more into focus.

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) was founded in 2001 as a regional economic and trade organization. Now that Washington, the war in Afghanistan and the Middle East expands, it takes more and more the role of a 'counter-NATO "a. Besides Russia and China are the central Asian states of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan are members of the SCO.

Iran, Pakistan and India have observer status, but for different reasons - not least because the SCO Bylaws, an agreement on mutual defense in case of an attack on one of the Member States provide - not yet, as members had been accredited.

If Iran in the SCO as would the SCO in an attack Israel or the United States against the Iranian Atomanalagen committed in a conflict involved, very soon become a third world war could lead.

Apart from winning the mutual cooperation in Eurasia, especially between the two major powers Russia and China, rapidly strategic depth.

Pipelines and military geopolitics

In a few weeks, the Russian state pipeline operator Transneft to build the East Siberia-Pacific Ocean pipeline (ESPO) to finalize the Chinese border. Russia and China in February 2009 an agreement on the construction of a section of ESPO to China and long-term oil supplies from Russia to China.

The pipeline has a number of years the subject of Russian-Chinese negotiations, their completion underscores the deepening cooperation between the two countries. This cooperation will be in Washington, of course, anything but welcome.



Russia is an important arms supplier to China and deepen the military cooperation within the SCO.

At the same time Russia and China to deepen their military cooperation. The volume of Russian-Chinese cooperation in the field of military technology since 2001 totals, according to Anatoly Isaikin, the chief of the Russian arms monopoly Rosoboronexport company for at 16 billion U.S. dollars.

In addition to other weapons systems and equipment to China, Russia's Su-27 and Su-30 fighter jets sold and submarines of the Kilo-class and air defense systems.

Russia's first defense business this year has been signed with China, it provides for the delivery of over 100 jet engines for the Chinese J-10 fighter before. While there are still tensions between the two countries because the Chinese have tried to be "imitators" versions of superior Russian military technology to develop, but the military talks will nonetheless continue to deepen, and from simple necessity.

The Chinese government has confirmed that it continues to transport aircraft for military use, and aircraft engines from Russia wants to buy, you also had to air defense systems and naval equipment interested.

SCO as a counterweight to NATO in Afghanistan

At the end of March was held in Moscow in a historic meeting of the SCO, at which about the situation in Afghanistan was discussed.

Remarkably were leading representatives of U.S. and NATO and UN Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon as observers. Of particular importance was the discussion about the alarming influx of heroin from Afghanistan to Russia and other SCO countries, as well as in Iran since the American occupation of the country in late 2001. For 2008, the UN reported a record opium harvest in Afghanistan. Moscow and other states, the U.S. and NATO accused, as occupying powers not seriously against opium production approach, in contrast to the former government of the Taliban, the opium production almost completely prevented had.

In Russia, the heroin from Afghanistan into a huge social problem. The Russians regard the Afghan drug trade as far the biggest threat to the security of Russia and Central Asia. Russia's anti-drugs chief, Viktor Ivanov, the drugs of the U.S. coalition in Afghanistan as a "fiasco" means and pointed out that the opium production in Afghanistan since the start of the deployment of U.S. and NATO troops in the country has increased by leaps and bounds.

German sources, the direct experience in Afghanistan that have assured me that the task of the German troops in Afghanistan almost only consists of the transport routes for opium secure.

Reportedly killed in Russia every year 30,000 people participated in drugs from Afghanistan, which are twice as many people as the former Soviet Union during the ten-year military occupation of Afghanistan has lost.

In a new action plan of SCO is a common approach of the SCO and Afghanistan in combating drug trafficking and organized crime required, including better training of drug control authorities, a strengthened fight against money laundering and the tightening of border controls.



The statistics of the UN drug shows a sudden rise in Afghan opium production since the beginning of U.S. occupation in late 2001. The bulk of this opium goes to Russia.

Indeed, this action plan is a kind of roadmap for Afghanistan in the bosom of the SCO to lead - a step that India has already welcomed.

For Washington, however, would be the accession of Afghanistan to SCO a horror scenario, because it would obviously why the United States with its numerous air bases and other military facilities in Afghanistan continues to remain.

These bases have nothing to do with the preservation of peace and security in Afghanistan itself, but rather is purely for the potential protection of U.S. and NATO forces in their efforts against Russia, China and the SCO countries.

In order to facilitate cooperation between Afghanistan and the SCO to torpedo, Obama has the establishment of a NATO-controlled by the "contact group" with Afghanistan proposed in order to obviously try to get the growing influence of the SCO back.

The growing attention given to Russia and the SCO in the situation in Afghanistan are dedicated, is both a sign that we increasingly understand the threat of a NATO-controlled Afghanistan for the security of Russia is both a sign of the growing cohesion within the SCO in creating a counterweight to NATO in Eurasia.

The geopolitical battle for dominance in Eurasia is the center of foreign policy strategy of the U.S. Defense Department.

Monday, 11.05.2009

Category: geostrategy, Economics & Finance, Politics

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[Ryan Ruck]

Russia, China On Comradely Terms

Westernism is giving way to Orientalism in Moscow's outlook, if the past week's happenings are any guide. As Russia's ties with the West deteriorate, an upswing in its strategic partnership with China
becomes almost inevitable.

The resumption of Russia-NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) dialogue has gone awry. And the nascent hopes regarding a "reset of the button" of the Russian-American relationship are belied. With Moscow under multiple pressures from the West, two top Chinese officials have arrived in the Russian capital to offer support - Defense Minister Liang Guanglie and Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi.

Moscow angrily reacted to NATO's expulsion of two Russian diplomats on Wednesday. In exceptionally strong language, it called the NATO move a "crude provocation" and an "outrageous action". The Foreign Ministry alleged that certain "completely unscrupulous ... forces" in the West were "hectically" creating pretexts for obstructing Russia's dialogue with Europe.

The two diplomats to NATO headquarters in Brussels are the Russian mission's senior adviser and political desk chief Viktor Kochukov and mission attache and executive secretary Vasily Chizhov. They were accused of espionage "incompatible with the diplomatic status".

The Russian mission to NATO went a step further to allege an attempt to "disrupt a reset in relations between Russia and the US". In immediate terms, the scheduled Russia-NATO foreign minister-level meeting on May 19 in Brussels appears problematic. Hardliners have prevailed.

Unsurprisingly, Moscow has also ratcheted up its condemnation of NATO's 27-day military exercise in Georgia, due to start this coming Tuesday. President Dmitry Medvedev called the exercises "an open provocation" and warned that there could be "negative consequences for those who made the decision to hold them". He accused the alliance of encouraging Georgia's "re-militarization". Russia seems to estimate a larger plot to corner it in the Caucasus.

In a pre-emptive move, Moscow on Thursday signed five-year border defense agreements with Georgia's breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia whereby the two regions will delegate their border security (including the maritime frontiers) to Russian forces.

Rivalries over control of Caspian oil provide the backdrop to these rapid developments involving Georgia. Conceivably, the hardliners would exploit the spiraling tensions to brand "revanchist" Russia at the summit meeting of the European Union (EU) in Prague this coming Thursday, which is expected to take a view on the two rival pipeline projects that aim to transport Caspian and Central Asian gas to Europe - South Stream, sponsored by Russia, and Nabucco, supported by the US.

At the Prague summit, Europe's dependence on Russia for its energy supplies will come under scrutiny. There is mounting frustration among the proponents of Nabucco that Moscow is steadily advancing South Stream. Yet, leading European countries like Germany, France and Italy are at ease with Russia. US attempts to stall South Stream have been of no avail.

Last Tuesday, Russia's Gazprom and the Bulgarian gas utility Bulgargaz initialed a cooperation agreement on a feasibility study for South Stream. But the Bulgarian side cannot formalize the South Stream agreement before the EU summit meeting of May 7. Washington hopes that the parliamentary elections in Bulgaria due in early July may postpone the agreement. It will be a close call.

All these factors are at work in the current tensions between NATO and Russia. But that isn't all. NATO, with active US support, is once again making a determined effort to pitch its tent in Central Asia. The latest Western attempt to establish a NATO regional centre on terrorism in Tajikistan comes on top of the US's agreement with Tajikistan regarding a basing facility for NATO operations in Afghanistan. The US has secured similar facilities in Uzbekistan and negotiations are underway with Turkmenistan.

However, no matter the criticality of the Afghan situation, the US is insisting that NATO should sidestep offers of help from the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). In effect, the US's containment strategy of the George W Bush era still remains intact at the operational level in Central Asia, no matter President Barack Obama's promise to revamp US regional policy.

Chinese newspaper the People's Daily recently featured a commentary broadly estimating that while Obama's diplomacy was characterized by "soft power", that was merely tactical, since "the US will not give up its dominant role in world affairs ... Wrapping a big stick in a layer of soft sponge or putting a carrot at the front and a big stick at the back, the US has never given up its powerful military force ... Diplomatic policy is also a kind of political game. One of its fundamental principles is to obtain the largest benefit at the least cost. The adjustment of Obama's diplomatic policy notably predicates a reduction of cost, without any change in their goal to obtain the most benefits."

The commentary likely had Central Asia in mind. Both Russia and China will take note that US regional policy cuts into their core interests. Russia's state television, Rossiya, showed a documentary last week accusing the US of using its air base in Manas, Kyrgyzstan, for running intelligence operations. Rossiya showed clippings of a windowless two-storey building in the Manas base, which it said was the hub of a major US radio-intelligence unit. (Manas is close to China's missile sites in Xinjiang.) There are signs that Moscow and Beijing will invest the SCO as a key instrument to counter the US moves to expand NATO into the Central Asian region. The SCO conducted war games in Tajikistan recently, simulating an attack by al-Qaeda from Afghanistan, in which terrorists seized a chemical factory and took its workers hostage.

Medvedev has called for a stronger role for SCO in stabilizing Afghanistan. Arguably, by prevailing on Bishkek to evict the US from Manas, Moscow signaled that it was reviewing the rules of the game in Central Asia. A cat and mouse game is going on. Washington kept up an appearance for weeks as if it was reconciled with the closure of Manas, while Moscow (and Beijing) put on an air of indifference. But now it transpires the Pentagon is seeking a reversal of the decision by the Kyrgyz government. "We are still engaged with the Kyrgyz ... They have given us notification and they want to end the presence of the US basing abilities in Kyrgyzstan, but the story is not over there yet," a US official was quoted as saying.

On Wednesday, Pentagon spokesman Geoff Morrell said, "I think there's actually progress in dealing with the Kyrgyz on Manas ... And I think we see reason for hope there, that that can be worked out ... We hope we're getting closer." On the other hand, Bishkek keeps affirming that its decision is irrevocable. Kyrgyz Prime Minister Igor Chudinov insisted, "Not a single government official has been authorized to hold such negotiations. No one. I have no information about such negotiations."

At any rate, Russia plans to increase the number of military aircraft at the Kant air base in Kyrgyzstan. "It is in line with the situation in Central Asia and Afghanistan," CSTO secretary general Nikolai Bordyuzha said. There is also a concerted attempt on the part of Moscow to rally the CSTO. Moscow will host a CSTO summit meeting on June 14, which is expected to formalize the creation of the alliance's new rapid reaction forces. To be sure, Moscow is reasserting its role as the guarantor of security for Central Asia.

But Moscow also regards the SCO as a forum within which it has the unique opportunity to coordinate with China. While receiving the SCO defense ministers who gathered in Moscow this week, Medvedev said, "Overall, the region in which the SCO operates is a complex one, and so we have to take into account the reality that surrounds us, and the need for our countries to jointly coordinate efforts on a wide range of issues, including security and the defense capability of our countries on a collective basis."

The defense ministers' meeting in Moscow on Wednesday saw a strong affirmation by China on enhanced SCO cooperation to confront regional challenges. In an oblique reference to the US, Liang called for the eschewal of "antagonism, clique politics and unilateralism" and underlined that the SCO has a role to play in the entire Eurasian region. Russia and China separately agreed on an intensified program of bilateral military cooperation that includes as many as 25 joint maneuvers in 2009 in a demonstration of the strengthening of strategic ties.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov also expressed similar sentiments earlier in the week after his talks with his visiting Chinese counterpart. Lavrov said Moscow and Beijing favored the "comprehensive strengthening of the SCO as a key factor of the promotion of stability and security in the Central Asian region". Lavrov summed up that two chief principles lie at the core of the "dynamically evolving" Russian-Chinese strategic cooperation. One, the two countries share a common perspective on the contemporary world processes.

Two, the two countries will "always support each other on concrete issues" that directly affect their national interests. Carefully choosing his words, Lavrov added that Russia and China agreed during consultations in Moscow that "such comradely mutual assistance" is only going to be strengthened.

[Ryan Ruck]

China Lauds Ties With Russia

A top Chinese official says Sino-Russian relations have maintained growth and have reached "an unprecedented level."

In extensive coverage of the Moscow visit of Wu Bangguo, chairman of the Standing Committee of China's National People's Congress, the official Xinhua news agency quoted the top legislator as saying upon his arrival Wednesday, "China-Russia relations have maintained a strong momentum of growth and reached an unprecedented level."

China and Russia this year will observe the 60th anniversary of setting up diplomatic ties. Wu's visit comes ahead of the scheduled trip of Chinese President Hu Jintao to Russia next month, the report said.

In the past year, top leaders of the two countries have been in close contact trying to build a closer relationship against the background of fast changes in global situation, Xinhua reported.

President Hu and Russian President Dmitri Medvedev have met five times since last May. Bilateral trade reached a record high of more than $50 billion in 2008.

The two countries should exchange views on maintaining stability of their own financial market and pushing forward reform of the international financial and currency systems, Wu said.

Medvedev, after meeting Wu, was quoted as saying strengthening their cooperation would also be conducive "to resumption of world economy and establishment of a new, just and rational international political and economy system," Xinhua reported.

Wu also was scheduled to visit Austria and Italy.

[vector7]

We are geopolitically getting isolated for the great fall.

China, Russia say ties must flourish in economic crisis


By Alissa de Carbonnel – 1 day ago

MOSCOW (AFP) — The leaders of China and Russia on Wednesday vowed to beat the economic crisis by bolstering strong ties, as they put a brave face on a slowdown that has seen bilateral trade plummet.

The warm smiles and optimistic statements were aimed at emphasising the strength of Moscow-Beijing relations and how they have recovered from the Cold War when the main Communist powers eyed each other with suspicion.

"In the midst of the global financial crisis, we are actively developing a practical cooperation in every sphere," Chinese President Hu Jintao said at the start of a state visit to Moscow.

"China will always look at its relations with Russia as a priority of its foreign policy," he told strongman Prime Minister Vladimir Putin.

Russian President Dmitry Medvedev after his meetings with Hu also underscored the importance of coordinated regional measures to combat the global crisis.

"Of course, today our attention is centred on those measures necessary to prevent or minimise the negative influences of the global financial crisis, which of course have an effect on our bilateral ties," Medvedev said.

"The main goal is not only to preserve the relations existing between our states,but to give them a new impulse," he added.

Medvedev hailed Hu's visit as "friendly and constructive," adding these were qualities "that characterise relations between our two countries."

The Chinese president ended his talks with the Russian for "Thank You".

Both countries have taken great strides to put old rivalries behind them, ending just last year a decades-long dispute over their 4,300-kilometre (2,700-mile) border.

Medvedev and Hu signed a packet of accords for future cooperation including in the sphere of natural gas and coal.

Yet bilateral trade has now taken a major hit from the economic crisis, falling 42 percent to 7.3 billion dollars for the first quarter of 2009 compared with the same period last year, Russia's trade envoy to Beijing said.

Medvedev and Putin did not mention these figures, instead citing bilateral trade with China worth over 55 billion dollars in 2008.

China and Russia also agreed to boost the use of their domestic currencies in trade, Medvedev added, as Moscow seeks to lessen the global dominance of the US dollar.

"Another very important task -- which today has become very timely -- is the question of using national currencies in mutual payments," he said. "We agreed to take additional measures in this direction."

But even as the two leaders hailed their growing energy relations, Russian energy monopoly Gazprom said Wednesday that a planned gas pipeline to China had been delayed until after 2011.

"Talks are ongoing, we haven't yet agreed on the price. Already, we are no longer talking about 2011," as a deadline for the Altai pipeline linking the two countries where their borders meet in Western Siberia, Gazprom CEO Alexei Miller said.

The two countries, which normalised ties in 1989, also signed a deal only last year to build an oil pipeline, which will run from Siberian fields via Russia's Far East to energy-hungry China, after talks on the project began in the 1990s.

"We have started a complex cooperation in the oil sphere and reached an important breakthrough in the energy sphere," Hu said.

Diplomatic ties between the two permanent members of the UN Security Council have been founded on a common stance on issues from the Iranian and North Korean nuclear programmes to the Middle East, Sudan and non-proliferation.

And while the two countries compete for influence over energy resources in Central Asia, they have built up cooperation in regional clubs that aim to balance against US hegemony.

Hu travelled to Russia's Ural-mountain city of Yekaterinburg this week for a summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, which groups Russia and China with four Central Asian states and aims to be a counterweight to NATO.

Copyright © 2009 AFP. All rights reserved. More »

[Ryan Ruck]

Russia Secures Trade Surplus With China

February 14, 2010

Russia has repeatedly pledged to expand its trade with China, as the Kremlin appeared to view these commercial ties as an important indicator of what was officially described as the bilateral strategic partnership. Although bilateral trade was adversely affected by the global economic downturn, Moscow also achieved a sizable surplus in its trade with China in 2009. Last year, bilateral trade between Russia and China declined: reaching $38.8 billion, or some 32 percent down year-on-year, according to Russian and Chinese statistics.

Chinese exports to Russia, which totaled $17.5 billion or 47 percent down year-on-year, according to Russia’s trade representative in Beijing Sergei Tsyplakov. Russian exports to China amounted to $21.3 billion or 11 percent down year-on-year, he explained. Russia also recorded a healthy $3.8 billion surplus in its trade with China, Tsyplakov noted (Interfax, January 18).

Tsyplakov said that from September 2009, Russian exports to China began increasing. Notably, in the fourth quarter of 2009 Russian exports were 21.1 percent up year-on-year and the figure was 53.6 percent up year-on-year last December, he said. Increased Russian exports to China, including crude oil, metals and metal ore, came to indicate signs of recovery in bilateral trade, Tsyplakov argued.

High growth rates in Sino-Russian commerce were seen by Moscow as an important indicator of the state of bilateral partnership. In 2006, bilateral trade amounted to $33.4 billion or some 15 percent up on the previous year. Russia’s trade turnover with China exceeded $29 billion in 2005, up by 37.1 percent year-on-year.

In January 2006, the then Russian President Vladimir Putin announced plans to raise bilateral trade to between $60 to 80 billion annually by 2010. Initially, both countries appeared to rapidly progress towards achieving that goal. In 2007, Russia’s trade with China reached $48.16 billion or 44.3 percent up year-on-year.

In 2008, the level of bilateral trade reached $56.8 billion or 18 percent up year-on-year. As a result, China emerged as Russia’s third largest foreign trade partner, while Russia became China’s eighth largest trade partner. However, in the second half of 2008 trade between Russia and China apparently began to slow down against the background of the global economic downturn. Not surprisingly, last year bilateral commerce fell below $40 billion or well below the level of 2007.

Russian officials conceded that bilateral trade is unlikely to recover this year. In 2010, Russia’s trade with China is not expected to exceed $46 billion, Tsyplakov said. The pre-crisis trade turnover of $56 billion may be reached in 2011 or 2012, he argued. Russia achieved a sizable surplus in its trade with China mainly caused by falling machinery exports from the country due to weak demand in Russia. In contrast, Russian energy exports to China were rising.

From January to October 2009, oil deliveries to China totaled 13 million tons, according to Tsyplakov. Consequently, Russia became China’s fourth largest oil supplier. In 2009, Russian oil supplies amounted to 7.8 percent of China’s total oil imports, up from 6.5 percent in 2008. In March 2009, Russia resumed its electricity exports to China following a prolonged hiatus. This occurred in the context of the long-standing saga of Russian power supplies to China.

Moscow and Beijing have long discussed electricity trade. In the mid-1990’s, they discussed a joint project to build a 2,600-kilometer power transmission line from the Irkutsk region in Siberia to China at a cost of $1.5 billion. However, both sides never agreed on pricing and later abandoned the project. In November 2006, Moscow and Beijing reached a deal to raise annual exports of electricity from Russia to China to 3.6-4.3 billion kwh/year in 2008 to 2010, and 18 billion kwh in 2010 to 2015, and eventually up to 60 billion kwh. However, three years ago Moscow’s plan to boost its electricity exports was dealt a major blow. From February 1, 2007, China refused to import Russian electricity, thus leaving Russian hydropower plants without a market to sell their surplus electricity.

However, both sides managed to resolve their differences, and in 2009 Russian suppliers exported about 900 million kwh to China. Russian energy companies now reportedly aim to export 60 billion kwh by 2020.

Russian and Chinese trade statistics typically do not include armament sales figures. However, Russian arms supplies to China were apparently also in decline. The Russian state-run arms export company Rosoboronexport, the country’s predominant weapons exporter, conceded that its arms exports to China were falling. On January 28, the Rosoboronexport Head Anatoly Isaikin said that China’s share in Russian arms exports fell by 18 percent. China has been cutting its arms imports and instead focusing on military technology transfers and the development of domestic arms production, he said (Interfax, RIA Novosti, January 28). In the early 2000’s, Russia earned up to 40 percent of its arms exports revenue from sales to China.

Therefore, trade in industrial commodities between Russia and China apparently declined due to the adverse effects of the global economic downturn. Meanwhile, Russia has continued to increase its energy supplies to China.

[vector7]

China seeks Russia alliance to counter US dominance

Tue, 23 Mar 2010 22:39:07 GMT

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Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin (L) meeting with Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping

Looking to form a counterbalance to the power of the US, Beijing called on Moscow, as one of the emerging market economies, to enter into an alliance with China seeking to increase their leverage in global affairs.

Speaking after talks with Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping hailed the strength of bilateral ties with Russia as a success and went on to express the Beijing government's support for Russia's growing power on the global stage.

"We are in favor of Russia playing an important role in international and regional affairs," Xi said, stressing that "we will surely support you."

"In our opinion, China and Russia should in the future facilitate the establishment of a multi-polar world and democratization of international relations," the Chinese official added.

The visit by the Russian official comes as Moscow and Beijing seek to put the rivalries of the Cold War behind them and rise as counterweights to the global dominance of the US.

Officials from both countries describe their trade and political ties as better than ever before.

In response to the Chinese official's remarks, Putin referred to China as Russia's "strategic partner in the full sense of this word."

The Russian prime minister went on to offer Moscow's support for China's stance on Taiwan, saying, "We have always supported China on the most sensitive issues, including the Taiwan problem."

Beijing considers Taiwan, which became the base for the self-styled Republic of China headed by Chiang Kai-shek when the Chinese Communist forces defeated the Chinese Nationalist Party in 1949, as an indivisible part of its territory and seeks reunification with the island.

[vector7]

China-Russia: Force to reckon with for Western powers?

Russia and China have agreed to help each other increase their clout in global affairs.
At meetings in Moscow, Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping and Russia's leaders hailed the strength of ties between the two, and said economic and political relations had never been better.

[vector7]

Putin voices support for China’s Taiwan policy


MOSCOW: Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin affirmed Russia’s support for China’s position on Taiwan at a meeting in Moscow on Tuesday with Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping.

“We have always supported China on the most sensitive issues, including the Taiwan problem,” Putin told Xi at the start of talks.

China considers Taiwan, where the mainland’s nationalists fled in 1949 after losing the civil war, to be a territory awaiting reunification, by force if necessary.

Russia and most of the world also view Taiwan as an integral part of China, but Taiwan trades with and receives support from numerous countries, notably the United States. In January, Washington angered Beijing by approving a 6.4-billion-dollar arms sale to Taiwan.

Xi in turn praised Russia-Chinese relations as being “at an unprecedentedly high level.” “It is very important to maintain the good state of Russian-Chinese ties in the future,” he said. Xi, who met Putin for the first time Tuesday, is widely seen as the most likely candidate to take over the Chinese presidency in 2012-13.

Putin last visited China in October 2009, when he held talks with Chinese President Hu Jintao. afp

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China's heir-apparent pitches Russian alliance

Tue Mar 23, 2010 12:28pm EDT

* Chinese heir-apparent meets Russian leader Putin
Stocks
* China's Xi says to help Russia punch its true weight
* Russia says talks focus on trade, investment, energy

By Darya Korsunskaya

MOSCOW, March 23 (Reuters) - The man widely seen as China's next leader told Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin on Tuesday the world's two most powerful emerging market economies should help each other increase their weight in global affairs.

China and Russia say their trade and political relations are better than ever, though senior Russian officials are privately concerned about an increasingly assertive China along Moscow's vast and largely empty southeastern border.

Vice President Xi Jinping, seen as the frontrunner to succeed President Hu Jintao in 2013, told Putin Beijing wanted the power of key developing nations to be recognised.

"We consider that in the process of the deep transformation of the world order, the interests of China, Russia and other developing countries must be taken fully into account," Xi said.

"Russia and China must become strategic props for each other in the future on all questions which have a strategic interest for Russia," he told Putin at the start of talks in Moscow.

Analysts said the visit to Russia -- which will include a meeting on Wednesday with President Dmitry Medvedev -- was aimed to acquaint Russia's leaders with a potential successor to Hu.

"Xi Jinping is considered to be one of the candidates to replace Hu Jintao so it is a very important visit, to get acquainted with him and to understand the aims of the man who could be the next ruler of China," said Fyodor Lukyanov, editor of the magazine Russia in Global Affairs.

Russia has called for the group of emerging market powers known as BRIC -- which also includes Brazil, India and China -- to be given more say in world affairs, though China's economy is bigger than the other three put together.

FUELLING THE DRAGON

China, the world's fastest growing major economy, has in recent years sought to secure long-term oil and gas supplies from Russia, the world's biggest energy producer, which has been battered by the economic crisis.

China's economy grew by about 8.5 percent to $4.76 trillion last year while Russia's economy shrank 7.5 percent to $1.25 trillion after a 10-year economic boom, according to the International Monetary Fund.

Russia is a keen buyer of Chinese manufactured goods, though Moscow is worried that its former Soviet role as a supplier of technology and arms to Beijing has largely vanished as China's own industries overtake Russia's.

Russia also sees China as an important partner in efforts to limit the influence of the United States on issues ranging from Iran's nuclear programme to reducing reliance on the dollar.

"We have always supported China on the most sensitive questions, including on the problem of Taiwan," Putin said. Xi said Russia and China should work to prevent the dominance of a single power, shorthand for U.S. influence.

Xi's talks in Moscow will include discussions about trade, investment, energy and the development of the sparsely populated regions of Russia's Far East, Russian officials said.

But behind the warm phrases of support for closer ties, many Russian policy makers are increasingly anxious about China's rise as a world economic and political power.

"The growing economic imbalance -- China has already overtaken Russia on all parameters -- cannot but provoke concern, even if China tries to demonstrate its benevolence," said Lukyanov.

China was Russia's second most important trade partner last year after the European Union, though bilateral trade tumbled 29 percent to $39.5 billion from $55.9 billion in 2008, according to Russian customs statistics.

Bilateral trade fell as the economic crisis undermined demand for metals, oil and gas, Russia's main exports, but this is expected to recover this year.

(Writing by Guy Faulconbridge, editing by Paul Taylor)