Iraqi WMDs

[American Patriot]

Iraqi Documents Rebuttal the Senate Intelligence Report on WMD.
Pentagon/FMSO website for Iraq Pre-war documents http://70.168.46.200/ ^ | September 18 2006 | jveritas



"It was clear that there is another branch committee from the Industrial Committee headed by Dr. Mahdi Shakr Ghali that currently evaluates the researches that cannot be declared (researches with relation to the previous Prohibited Programs) through presenting the Specialized Staff that ask to evaluate its researches, to conclusion related to these researches. This is an important subject and it is dangerous in case this information is leaked one way or another.” Mohamad Hussam Al Amin, Director of the Iraqi National Monitoring Directorate, September 16 1998, pages 63 and 64 from captured Iraqi document CMPC-2003-002284 .

The latest Senate Intelligence Committee (SIC) report released on September 8 2006 was as many expected very biased, inaccurate, and totally political and came up with very wrong conclusions regarding Saddam regime WMD and programs, as well as totally dismissive of Saddam relation with Al Qaeda. The SIC report regarding WMD was heavily dependent on the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) report which was released in September 2004. Unfortunately, the ISG also came to the wrong conclusions that Iraq did not have active WMD programs.


I will address the WMD portion of the SIC report based on the captured Iraqi documents that deal with this issue, and show how these documents do not agree with this report wrong conclusions about Iraq WMD.



The Chemical Weapons (CW) Programs:
There are two very important documents which clearly indicate that Iraq was working on activating the Chemical weapons programs. Document CMPC-2003-013956.pdf dated in the year 2000 and document ISGQ-2003-00044424.pdf dated January 2002 contain memos that talk about finalized research and the plans to locally produce Chemical Materials that can be used as Precursors for Chemical Weapons and that are prohibited by the Iraq to produce locally according to the UN sanctions.


Some of the Chemical Weapons Prohibited Precursors include DICYLOHEXYLDIACARBODIIMIDE which can be used as a Precursor to make VX NERVE GAS, SODIUM CYANIDE AND POTASSIUM CYANIDE can be used as a Precursor to make TABUN NERVE GAS. These materials were allowed to be imported under strict UN regulation because it can be used for other civilian industries and that Iraq should have declared exactly the imported quantities of these materials and where it is used and the balance in bi-yearly report to the UN. However Iraq was absolutely prohibited from manufacturing it locally because it will not be controlled by the UN and thus it can be used to produce Chemical Weapons. It is clear from the documents above that Saddam regime was researching and planning to produce these Chemical weapons Precursors in clear violation of UN rules, and with no other intention but to produce Chemical weapons despite that the Iraqi listed some of these precursors under a supposed “pharmaceutical project”.

The Senate Intelligence Committee report did not address these very important documents to show that Iraq was actively working on rebuilding its WMD programs, and planning to produce the precursors to make Chemical Weapons. In fact it would have been more useful for the Iraqis to produce and store the precursors rather than the final chemical weapon products because storing the CW in its final form can deteriorate after a period of time where as the precursors can last for much longer time, ready to be assembled into final CW when needed.


Two other important documents related to the Chemical Weapons programs are ISGQ-2004-00220151 and CMPC-2003-016083 . The first one dated in the year 2001 talks about the successful local production of 50 Chemical Decontamination vehicles to be used the Chemical Battalions of the Iraqi army with plans to build more and the second which is also dated 2001 talks about the local production of prohibited Nerve Gas detectors. Although some may say that these are defensive actions rather than offensive, the production of so many Chemical decontamination trailers and prohibited Nerve gas detectors are not meant to be used solely for defensive action in the Iraq of Saddam Hussein. These decontamination trailers are necessary to escort the Iraqis if they were moving chemical weapons from place to another because in case of a chemical accident these decontamination vehicles must be used. In fact during Colin Powell presentation to the UN on February 2003, he said that the 2002 satellite photos taken recently over Iraq showed presence of these Chemical decontamination trailers which indicate movement of Chemical weapons. Powell said “In May 2002, our satellites photographed the unusual activity in this picture. Here we see cargo vehicles are again at this transshipment point, and we can see that they are accompanied by a decontamination vehicle associated with biological or chemical weapons activity.” The Nerve Gas detectors were prohibited in Iraq by the UN since the Iraqis can use them in an offensive action in case they strike their enemies with Nerve Gas these detectors will be used to warn the Iraqi soldiers if the wind blows back and brings some this Nerve gas they used to attack their enemies.


Again the Senate Intelligence Committee did not mention anything about the production of these Chemical decontamination vehicles or Nerve Gas detectors. The report failed to comprehend and address the obsession of Saddam regime regarding the issue of Chemical Weapons. Saddam regime survived the Iraq-Iran war because it used CW against the Iranians.


Saddam regime was totally paranoid and in the mind of Saddam it would had been impossible for him to survive by counting on taking defensive measures if it came to a Chemical Warfare against Iran, or possibly Israel. Saddam regime strongly believed that having the ability to make Chemical weapons was very crucial for the survival of his regime in another future war against Iran because Saddam was always afraid that Iranians can attack anytime if they sense the weakness of his regime or if they realize that he did not possess Chemical Weapons anymore.


The Biological Weapons (BW):


The SIC report concluded that Iraq did not have Biological Weapons or programs related to biological weapons. The center piece of the report (BW) section was the “Mobile Laboratory Vehicles” that the previous intelligence reports indicated it was for Biological weapons production, but later on the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) examined two of the captured mobile labs and concluded it was made most probably for Hydrogen Production, the SIC report adopted the story of the ISG regarding these mobile labs.
Document CMPC-2004-006626 dated November 11 2002 talks about a plan to develop MOBILE LABORATORIES. The document is from a company called Ibn Rushd which is subsidiary of the Iraqi Military Industrialization Commission (MIC) and one of the companies suspected in developing Iraq Biological and Chemical Programs. The ISG report said the mobile labs they captured were manufactured by AL Kindi general company in 2002 not by Ibn Rushd company. The list of instruments required to build Ibn Rushd mobile labs does not indicate that it was used for Hydrogen production. Also if these mobile labs were used to make Hydrogen, it would have been mentioned in the document. The only document that mentions a “Hydrogen Production System” is ISGQ-2004-00220151 in pages 82 and 83 of this document. The document does not mention that this “Hydrogen Production System” was not described as a “Vehicle” or as a “Mobile Laboratory”. The document indicates that the production of this “Hydrogen Production System” was in the year 1997 and it was produced by a collaboration of few MIC companies, but the AL Kindi company was nowhere mentioned as part of this project. Also it is important to note that the original assessment of the military after the capture of the mobile vehicles that it can be used for Biological Weapons production, but it was the ISG who dismissed this original conclusion and adopted the Hydrogen production vehicles theory.


Both the ISG and SIC reports should have examined the Ibn Rushd mobile laboratories document which contradicts the story of the “Hydrogen Production vehicles”.


The Iraqi Nuclear Program.


For sure Iraq did not produce any Nuclear Weapons but the SIC based on the ISG report totally dismiss that Saddam was intending to build its nuclear program. The SIC report when handling the Iraq nuclear issue focuses on two issues that caused a lot of controversy and heated argument in the past three years and still cause it until now. On his state of the Union address President Bush mentioned that the US learned from British intelligence that Iraq was seeking Yellow Cake Uranium from Africa and he also said that Iraq was seeking high strength Aluminum tubes, both an indication of Saddam regime intent to rebuild its nuclear programs and activities.


Also in this case, the SIC also heavily based its report on the ISG finding regarding the Yellow Cake and the Aluminum tubes and concluded as the ISG that Saddam regime did not intend to re-activate its nuclear program.
On the high strength Aluminum tubes, the SIC and ISG reports concluded that these tubes that were captured by the US in 2001 were used as bodies for the 81 mm rockets and not to intended to be used in the centrifuge system for Uranium enrichment. The ISG reported that the very tight tolerances of these tubes were based on a decision made after a technical committee meeting in late 2000 to enhance the performance the 81 mm rockets. According to the ISG report Iraq used to import 81 mm Aluminum tubes before 1991 from Italy but with looser machining tolerances than the one they wanted to implement after the September 2000 technical meeting. However some of the documents contradict the ISG conclusion and analysis.


CMCP-2004-004404 shows a bid request from the Iraqi Military Industrial Commission (MIC) dated November 1999 to import 50,000 of these 81 mm Aluminum tubes with the same very tight tolerance that the ISG reported it was agreed upon after the September 2000 meeting i.e. 10 months after the bid request. Page 4 of the document shows the dimensions of the high strength Aluminum tubes with the very tight tolerances and page 10 of the documents shows that one of the bidding Iraqi firms complained that the “tolerances are to strict to meet” and it is “exceeding the stipulation of American standards”. Also the 1999 bid ask for 900 mm length tubes where as the length of the 81 mm rocket was 862 mm, so if the tubes were made for 81 mm rockets why the 1999 bid did not specify 862 mm length instead of 900 mm and save the agony and time consumption of machining the length down from 900 mm to 862 mm.


Document ISGQ-2003-00000875 indicates that Iraq had local production of the 81 mm bodies in the year 2002 with looser machining tolerances than the ones in the 1999 bid and the September 2000 technical meeting. It is clear that the Iraqis thought in 2002 that the looser machining dimensions are OK to be used for the bodies of the 81 mm rockets and the question is why they requested much stricter machining tolerance in the 1999 bid to import these tubes. Even the ISG had difficult time explaining why in 2002 the Iraqi accepted looser tolerances to make the Aluminum tubes bodies for the 81 mm rockets.


Document ISGQ-2003-00001019 contains a secret and personal letter dated December 2000 addressed by the Director of Al Rashid company an MIC firm to the head of MIC telling him about the production of the bodies for the 81 mm rockets. This letter indicates that the Iraqi were producing the 81 mm rockets as early as the year 2000 so their attempt to import Aluminum tubes for 81 mm rockets does not make sense.


In regards to the Yellow Cake story the ISG uncovered one Iraqi document which showed that an Iraqi was approached by a person from Africa in 2001 who offered his service in providing Iraq with Uranium from the Africa but the Iraqis told the African man that because to the UN sanctions Iraq cannot accept his offer.


Document ISGQ-2003-00000813.pdf shows that the Iraqi were working on producing TANTALUM COATED GRAPHITE as part of research activities for the year 2002. The Graphite coated Tantalum to create a highly corrosion resistant surface for graphite. Tantalum coated Graphite was totally prohibited for use in Iraq according to the UN since it falls under the prohibited nuclear activities and since one of the few applications of this Tantalum coated Graphite is to be used with the highly

[Sean Osborne]

THIS IS A MUST READ IN ITS ENTIRETY BECAUSE IT IS THE UNRESTRAINED THRUTH OF THE MATTER REGARDING IRAQI WMD's. Period.



http://www.frontpagemag.com/Articles...e.asp?ID=23576

Symposium: Proving Saddam’s WMDs

By Jamie Glazov
FrontPageMagazine.com
Despite the antiwar Left's favorite mantra about how Bush lied regarding WMDs in Iraq, the evidence now proves there were WMDs after all.

According to recent announcement made by Senator Rick Santorum and Rep. Peter Hoekstra , approximately 500 weapons munitions, containing degraded mustard or sarin nerve agent, have been discovered in Iraq since 2003. Saddam, therefore, had the means to put WMDs into terrorists' hands.

So what is the primary significance of these revelations? And why are these developments not front page news in our media? Where are all of Bush's critics who called him a liar? Where are their apologies? And why isn't the administration using this information to legitimize itself?

To discuss these and other questions with us, Frontpage has assembled a distinguished panel. Our guests are:

Michael Ledeen, a resident scholar in the Freedom Chair at the American Enterprise Institute. An NRO contributing editor, he is most recently the author of The War Against the Terror Masters.



Andrew McCarthy, a former federal prosecutor and a senior fellow at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies. He prosecuted the Blind Sheik and his organization for seditious conspiracy in 1995.






Dave Gaubatz, a former U.S. Federal Agent (Arabic linguist/counter-terrorist specialist) who was deployed to Iraq at the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom. His mission was to search for WMDs. Four sites he identified were not searched by ISG (Iraq Survey Group) and he has waged a three year battle to get them searched. He is currently the Chief Investigator with the Dallas County Medical Examiner, Dallas, TX. He can be contacted at pdgaubatz@yahoo.com.






and

Thomas Joscelyn, an expert on the international terrorist network. Much of his research has focused on the role that nations such as Saddam's Iraq and the mullah's Iran have played in providing support, training and funding for terrorist entities such as al Qaeda, al Qaeda's affiliates, Hamas, Hezbollah and other terrorist groups. He has written extensively about these connections for the Weekly Standard and in several other publications. Currently, he is organizing a research project to review and translate the millions of documents captured from the fallen Iraqi regime and the Taliban.

FP: Michael Ledeen, Thomas Joscelyn, Andrew McCarthy and Dave Gaubatz, welcome to Frontpage Symposium.

Mr. Ledeen, let's begin with you. What do you make of the recent developments?

Ledeen: There are two separate issues, I think. The first is the continued reluctance of the Intelligence Community to share important information with the American public. Hoekstra pointed out that he did not learn about this document from the IC, and was very unhappy that the DNI (Negroponte) only declassified a few fragments. He implied that there was additional important information, and he promised to keep pushing for further declassification. Perhaps he will even hold hearings on the matter.

The second issue is the question of WMDs. Those who have followed the press releases carefully certainly knew that our soldiers and marines had found many weapons with sarin, and others designed to deliver sarin. The artillery shells described in the declassified fragments are old, but even the fragments state that they are dangerous, and Rumsfeld underlined this fact: our men and women are at risk from WMDs. I think the quibbling about their date of manufacture is beside the point, given the assessment of their danger.

I think we should all be pushing for further declassification, just as we did regarding the Saddam documents, which continue to trickle out at nowhere near the rate we had hoped. But even so, much of the information in those documents is extremely important, suggesting that claims of Iraq/terrorist collaboration was quite active, and also that the WMD program was at least in part hidden, not dismantled.

The truly amazing fact is that the White House is very obviously opposed to revisiting these questions. They say they want to look forward, not back into the past. But this wrongheaded view undermines a good deal of potential support for moving forward aggressively, because it deprives them of the ability to say that a good deal of what they said in the past was true. Once again, the White House fails to tell its own story effectively.

FP: Mr. Gaubatz?

Gaubatz: I agree they are dangerous, but it is just as dangerous to not inform the American troops that hundreds of more dangerous chemicals and/or biological weapons are within a couple of miles from the base in Nasiriyah, Iraq. Congressmen Hoekstra & Weldon have known about the old shells, and also the new 4 sites. Why would they not inform our troops to be aware of these sites?

Why, it comes down to politics. When the time is right for political gain you will see Hoekstra, Weldon, & Santorum come flying across the desert in a nice new Humvee. They will get out, have the sites excavated Dave Gaubatz identified 3 years ago, and wave an American flag and have Neil Cavuto (Fox) announce they have found it. Keep in mind Cavuto is a puppy Weldon bought. They will write a book and get re-elected (except for Santorum). The White House is not involved because they know Hoekstra and Weldon are involved in a strategy that does not benefit the American public; only themselves. I also must inform the readers that HQ AFOSI has 36 of my Intelligence reports and have offered them to the Congressmen. They still haven't obtained them it is much easier to whine that DOD want release classified information.

When we went to war with Iraq two of the goals were to remove Saddam Hussein and to capture him if possible. The second goal was to locate WMD. Mr. Ledeen makes an excellent point pertaining to classifying WMD being found in Iraq. Any WMD found should not be classified. The American people need to be aware of any updates in regards to these weapons. When Saddam Hussein was captured we did not classify this and release it several months later. The announcement was made immediately. The WMD issue is no different. If we locate one chemical shell or 500 chemical shells an announcement must be made.

Although the find of 500 WMD shells is important, very dangerous, and they prove Saddam lied about WMD, these are not the WMD that I and other Agents were searching for. Charles Dulefer admitted the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) only searched less than 10% of all suspected sites. The four sites myself and other Agents identified in 2003 were not pre-1991 weapons. I will not be satisfied until all sites are inspected. I do not want to see WMD fall into the hands of terrorist. I do not want our children or troops experience a WMD attack.

Joscelyn: I think Dr. Ledeen hits the nail on its head when he says, "we should all be pushing for further declassification, just as we did regarding the Saddam documents, which continue to trickle out at nowhere near the rate we had hoped." I think the main question that arises from the discovery of these 500 chemical weapons shells is this: What else don't we know about Saddam's Iraq?

Much of the Washington bureaucracy - including, oddly enough, many within the Bush administration - seem all too comfortable in letting the conventional wisdom stay where it is. But what few appreciate is just how shaky the conventional wisdom's foundation is. In the decade leading up to the war, the U.S. intelligence community had no significant intelligence assets within Iraq. There was a last minute crash course to recruit some regime members, but this led to uneven results at best. Simply put, we didn't know much about what was going on inside Saddam's Iraq.

Many have trumpeted the failure to find significant quantities of WMD as evidence that the Bush administration "lied." This is demonstrably false on its face as anyone could quickly locate similar claims being made by any number of foreign governments, members of the Clinton administration including the former president himself, as well as members of the U.S. intelligence community long before the current Bush administration even came into being.

These Bush “lied” claims obscure the fundamental issue: Because our intelligence capability was so poor prior to the war, we don't really know what happened to Saddam's WMD capability. Saddam never accounted for significant stockpiles of VX nerve gas and other nasty agents. And while there have been investigations into Saddam’s WMD capability, primarily the one done by the Iraqi Survey Group, there are a number of open questions. For example, the CIA reported for several years that Saddam had moved some of his WMD capabilities into Sudan. The Clinton administration even destroyed a factory where Iraqi scientists were suspected of working with al Qaeda to produce VX nerve gas. But, if you search the ISG’s report, you won’t find any of this mentioned, despite the fact that it is all a matter of the public record. This was one of the few instances in which the U.S. intelligence community put together multiple threads of intelligence, but it has never been revisited.

In addition, a careful reading of the ISG’s report reveals a number of intriguing details. One detail that escapes wide attention is that the regime had retained a dozen or more small-scale labs for chemical and biological weapons research under the auspices of the Iraqi Intelligence Service. And as the ISG report concedes, even if Saddam didn’t have a full-scale WMD capability, he still certainly maintained much of the infrastructure to regenerate that capability quickly once sanctions eroded.

One final point: while there have been investigations into Saddam’s WMD capability, there has been no rigorous investigation into his terrorist ties. An impartial, bipartisan investigation into that matter is much needed because while Saddam’s WMD capability may have been overstated in some ways, his ties to terrorism – including al Qaeda – were drastically understated.

McCarthy: As usual, I am fully in agreement with my friends Michael and Tom. While I admire the work Dave Gaubatz has done, I'm puzzled by the attacks on Sen. Santorum, Reps. Hoekstra and Weldon, and Fox's Neil Cavuto. There are broad swaths of government and media which are incorrigibly dedicated to suppressing and obstructing the thorough accounting of Saddam's terror ties and weapons that is so desperately needed. I don't see what is served by slamming the few officials who are actually trying to bring some sunshine to the equation. (Mr. Gaubatz's slam at Mr. Cavuto is so gratuitously nasty and irrelevant to what we are discussing, I can't even wrap my brain around it.)

The only thing we really know about Iraq (and much of the region) is that our intelligence there was grossly inadequate. The bizarre and sad thing about all of this is that we appear willing, as a nation, to have the history of matters of great consequence "definitively" written on the basis of this blatantly insufficient record. That is not history; it is fiction. Obviously, if there are matters of operational intelligence that need to be withheld due to bonafide military necessity, then that has to be done. But if, due to an insurgency with a strong jihadist component, we are still (over three years after Saddam's fall) considering to be "operational" intelligence about terror ties and weapons, there must be plenty there of interest. On the other hand, if we are withholding information because it would be embarrassing to the intelligence community or other officials because the positions they took prior to March 2003 are unsustainable, that similarly means what passes for the conventional wisdom is wrong and must be corrected.

The legacy of what we have done in Iraq is a matter of great significance, not only for those who have laid down their lives but for our future willingness (and effectiveness) in engaging other theaters and phases of what Michael has compellingly urged is a much wider war against the terror masters. It is vitally important that we have an accurate accounting.

FP: So what steps do each of you now think are crucial in order for there to be an accurate accounting?

Ledeen: I'm not sure I know the full range of research, and it probably won't be possible to do a lot of it until and unless the situation on the ground is much better than it is today. As I said before, it's important to encourage the administration to declassify the captured Iraqi documents, which are a real treasure trove of information. As Ed Morrissey has written at "Captain's Quarter" blog, recently released documents--released late on a Friday afternoon, by the way, which is a sure sign that Negroponte's office didn't want them to get top billing--show a far more active relationship between Saddam (in this case handled by no less than Saddam's son) and al Qaeda (Osama himself). And they also strongly suggest--and I'm understating the case--that there was a considerable store of chemical weapons and nuclear materials.

It's hard to justify the continued classification of these documents. I suspect that some in the administration are trying to protect the Russians, Germans, and French from embarrassment, because they were involved in the WMD programs in Iraq. But there is clearly a desire on the administration's part to avoid revisiting a subject that has caused them so much political pain. Too bad! It's very bad for the country to leave this question surrounded by a bodyguard of lies, which is the current situation.

Lots of very good military people who really want to know the facts tell me that so far as they can tell, the (considerable quantity of) WMDs thus far uncovered do not represent a serious military threat to our troops. They agree that these things could be wired into IEDs, but they doubt that such IEDs would be more lethal than those with explosives alone. On the other hand, they are quite prepared to believe that we have simply failed to find more up-to-date WMD artillery shells. If those exist---and knowledgeable people like Mr Gaubatz insist that they probably do--they would be very worrisome indeed.

So we also need to check out reports that chemical weapons have been hidden in Iraq. I have been told by highly professional foreign service officers that they were informed of such sites, but they were never able to get the CIA teams to go and look. I myself was contacted by a very well informed Iraqi who claimed knowledge of a site of enriched uranium, but CIA couldn't be bothered. It is worth investigating, but if the administration insists that "history" isn't important, then we are not going to get to the truth of this very important matter for a long time.


Gaubatz: In order for there to be an accurate accounting of WMD we must go into Iraq and start from the beginning. It wasn't safe in 2003 and it still isn't but who ever said war was safe? I respect every Iraq Survey Group member, but their marching orders were poor at best. Mr. Charles Duelfer seems satisfied less than 10% of all WMD sites were ever inspected. If we have a team of experts who will take all of the intelligence obtained initially in 2003 from "on the ground field intelligence officers" we will understand the current issues in the Middle East. What is happening now in Iraq, Iran, Syria, and with Hezbolla, is only a surprise to people who never listened in 2003.



Many of my fellow intelligence officers stated in our intelligence reports in 2003 that a civil war would evolve in Iraq, and terrorism against Americans would increase, not decrease. We also wrote about the Iranian, Russian, and Hezbolla influence in Iraq, and about the WMD. Our President was correct and I have always supported him. Many of the managers he counted on to do their jobs in 2003 (Republican and Democratic) failed him and the American people (specifically Charles Duelfer).



I would like to briefly explain to my friends and others why I came down hard on Congressmen Hoekstra, Curt Weldon, and Senator Santorum. I was in a closed door meeting with Congressman Weldon on 16 Mar 2006, and in teleconference with both Congressmen on 4 May 2006. I had respect for these gentlemen, but it was made very clear their search for the WMD was more for personal/political gain than for national security of America. Does this really surprise anyone that a politician would have personal agendas? I had been told verbatim by Congressmen Weldon that he did not trust the U.S. military and he subsequently provided the intelligence I had given him to private companies to verify. He was afraid DOD would take credit for finding the WMD and not himself. I wanted nothing to do with this and informed each. Although a conservative, I am no politician and will not allow politics to endanger my children or any child.



In regards to Mr. Neil Cavuto. He asked me to speak after the NY Times (Scott Shane) wrote an extensive article about my continued efforts to locate WMD in Iraq. The article was on 23 June 2006. Coincidence, no. After my detailed interviews with Scott Shane he was very much convinced WMD was/is in Iraq. Scott Shane also asked Congressmen Weldon and Hoekstra some tough questions about not inspecting the sites. They in turn asked Neil Cavuto to interview me and throw in the remark that I had left Federal Service on bad terms. They knew this was false & Cavuto did. I left Federal Service after 23.5 years. When I returned from Iraq my daughter (who was 5) asked me to never leave her again. I promised her I never would. I had been informed by people behind the scenes Weldon and Hoekstra had done this to now discredit me because I exposed and stopped their personal exploits of finding WMD. By doing so they were left with 500 "pre-1991" shells. This is when I lost respect for each of the gentlemen to include Cavuto. America will not be safe until "all" (not 10, 25, 50, or 75%) of WMD sites in Iraq are inspected.


Joscelyn: In conclusion, I think there are three principle points that we have all touched upon in one way or another:

(1) The documents and other evidence collected in Iraq are not just a matter of history or justifying the war to the American public. They are important for understanding the enemy and his capabilities.

(2) The documents that have already been released to the public reveal interesting details that were previously unknown. In part, this is because our intelligence inside Iraq and the Middle East as a whole was “grossly inadequate,” as Andy puts it.

(3) Finally, there is another dimension to the documents and other evidence collected in Iraq that many often miss. The intelligence community has been badly in need of reform for decades. In the wake of 9/11, there was an attempt to reform some corridors of the intelligence community as well as a complete restructuring of the intelligence community’s infrastructure, highlighted by the creation of the Department of Homeland Security. Many of the reforms deal with bureaucratic responsibilities and improving the flow of information among the various agencies. But there was, and remains, a need to reform the way our intelligence analysts and operatives approach their work. This aspect of intelligence reform has received far less attention. Here, too, the information collected in Iraq is valuable.

I’ll briefly comment on each of these three points.

As for the first, many of the documents illuminate various aspects of the insurgency that we face in Iraq today. There are documents detailing Saddam’s support for jihadists coming into Iraq to confront American forces prior to the war (including an order to “utilize” Arab suicide bombers), Saddam’s orders for his paramilitary forces (including the fanatically loyal Fedayeen Saddam) and other elite conventional military forces to create small resistance cells, and offers to support Iraq’s jihad against America from terrorist groups such as Hamas. There are a lot of additional examples that can be found in the documents as well.

All of this information is valuable for understanding how the enemies we face on the ground today in Iraq came together. This is not mere “history.” We are in a hot war against an enemy that our intelligence community never really understood.

As for the second, part of the reason that the Pentagon’s war planners and other analysts did not adequately plan for this insurgency was that they underestimated Saddam’s relationship with various terrorist groups, including al Qaeda. As I have mentioned previously, one of the documents details a series of contacts between Iraqi intelligence and al Qaeda in the mid 1990’s. Osama bin Laden even requested Iraq’s support in conducting “joint operations against the foreign forces in the land of Hijaz [Saudi Arabia].” The document indicates that Saddam’s operatives “were left to develop the relationship and the cooperation between the two sides to see what other doors of cooperation and agreement open up.” [I would note that one of the “doors of cooperation” that opened up years later was jointly working against American forces in Iraq. There is a wealth of evidence that al Qaeda in Iraq’s Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and his goons were working with Saddam’s regime prior to the war in order to set up cells for “resisting” American troops.]

This document provides new details on the meetings that were taking place between Iraqi operatives and al Qaeda in the mid-1990’s. The intelligence community and especially some within the CIA knew that there were meetings taking place, but they didn’t have any agents inside the meetings so they simply dismissed the threat.

This brings me to the final point: how the documents can help reform the way our analysts and operatives think about terrorism and other intelligence problems. Robert Baer was one of the CIA’s men in Khartoum in the mid-1990’s when Iraqi intelligence was meeting with bin Laden. In Sleeping With The Devil, Baer explains, “Iraqi intelligence had met with bin Laden on several occasions. Although we couldn’t be positive, we assumed the emissaries were only taking bin Laden’s measure, making sure he wasn’t about to turn on them.”

That’s one heck of an assumption. But now we have a document authored by Iraqi Intelligence that summarizes what they were thinking in their meetings with bin Laden, the same ones Baer discusses. There is no mention of being worried about bin Laden turning on them. This was just an ad hoc rationalization that Baer and his cohorts invented. So, I would argue, this is one example of how the documents can help our intelligence folks understand that they should be more careful about the assumptions they make.

In sum, whether it is the discovery of 500 chemical weapons shells or an analysis of the documents created by Iraqi intelligence, the evidence collected in Iraq can begin to fill in the blanks. This isn’t a matter of “selling the war,” as some critics will argue. It is a matter of getting it right, helping the men and women on the ground in Iraq with a better information about their enemies, and understanding why our intelligence services have failed so frequently.



McCarthy: The longer this conversation goes on, the more it becomes clear that the information which has been withheld is vital for prospective as well as retrospective purposes. That worries me as much as it intrigues me.

Prospective usefulness is a major justification typically relied on by government to withhold information, the unassailable truism being that we don't want to enhance the enemy's ability to inflict harm by educating him as to our knowledge and capabilities. People who work in government are only human. If they stand to be embarrassed in some way by revelation, they will be apt to find reasons not to disclose -- and to make use of any ostensibly valid justifications available ... even if they are just a fig leaf for less worthy motivations.

Powerfully suggested by our conversation, for example, is something perspicacious observers have suspected for some time: viz., that Iraq does not present a textbook post-war mop-up insurgency (like Germany circa 1945-46) but is, instead, the war Saddam and his cohorts planned to fight all along. That is, knowing they could not go toe-to-toe with the American military, they have engaged in a sort of rope-a-dope strategy: giving up the body (in this case Baghdad, where the regime seemed to collapse so quickly in Spring 2003), and opting for a long, drawn-out conflict which would combine (a) the effectiveness of modern terrorism (viz., diffuse cells and weapons seeded among civilian populations which are very difficult to retaliate against), and (b) the Achilles heel of modern western democracy (viz., international law and the media which, respectively and over time, empower terrorists and play on our innate aversion as civilized people to the inevitable gore and collateral damage of warfare).

Now, if this actually was a planned enemy strategy, it would obviously be very valuable for the country to know that. There may be many conflicts to come in which we see this model again (especially given how patently effective it has been in terms of public opinion). If what is happening in Iraq is understood as a function of enemy planning rather than spontaneous mismanagement of a conflict, not only might there be more public support for the war effort but, at least equally important, there would be a surge of support for rethinking: (a) military strategy, (b) our international law obligations (e.g., do the Geneva Conventions make sense in their totality for 21st Century conflicts?), and (c) the way the press reports wars (e.g., would at least some reporting be different if the media understood beyond cavil that they were being used quite intentionally as part of the enemy arsenal?) (And, yes, I understand that some would be delighted to be used this way.)

But, declassification of information revealing that this was the enemy's strategy (if, in fact, it was) could plainly be very embarrassing. Not only would our intelligence have missed it a priori; it would have continued to miss it even as it was happening -- and the "Mission Accomplished" business, which the administration understandably does not want to be reminded about, would be more politically damaging than it has been to this point (for it would underscore that we declared victory before the enemy, for all practical purposes, had even started to fight).

Michael's right: Too bad. Tom is right: This has too much consequence for national security going forward to be suppressed. And Mr. Gaubatz is right in what I take to be his major point: This situation screams out for effective congressional oversight because without that kind of pressure the executive branch will always be inclined to withhold intelligence. On that last, Mr. Gaubatz and I simply disagree on the minor point: I think Senator Santorm and Congressmen Hoekstra and Weldon have done extraordinarily valuable work here, and if it happens to be the case that they benefitted politically from some of it, that doesn't deflate the value. (In point of fact, I think a lot of what they have done has been at great political cost to themselves -- the war is very unpopular in the media, which promotes the screwy conventional wisdom that there were no WMD and no "operational relationship" between Saddam and al Qaeda.) But I agree that effective oversight is crucial.


FP: Dave Gaubatz, a final word?


Gaubatz: On July 27, 2006, Senator Rick Santorum was interviewed by Sean Hannity. Senator Santorum announced there have been suspected WMD sites in Iraq that were never inspected since 2003. He went on to say WMD has now been confirmed at some of these sites. Sean Hannity put Senator Santorum on the hot seat. He asked him why have the WMD not been retrieved if it has been confirmed.

Senator Santorum stumbled and could only say the Administration has confirmed WMD is at a location, but could not explain to Hannity why it hasn’t been retrieved.

Now for the complete story: I have battled politicians for 3 plus years to have 4 suspected WMD sites searched. I have always said the U.S. need only take my grid coordinates and review satellite images before the war at these sites. The images would reveal WMD being buried at the sites. Finally on 14/15 June 2006 I was able to present the intelligence to the DIA (outstanding organization). We also reviewed some satellite images of the areas.

Hannity had asked Santorum why the U.S. just doesn’t retrieve the WMD. The answer is what I have said for years. The satellite images have confirmed WMD was buried at the locations I identified. In order to retrieve the WMD the U.S. must drain sections of the Euphrates River, dig many feet under the riverbed, and then open the concrete bunkers. Not an easy task and very time consuming.


This is why it has not yet been retrieved. It will be and Senator Santorum, Congressman Curt Weldon, and Congressman Pete Hoekstra know this.


Congressman Michael Burgess (Tx) called me on Thursday, July 27, from his DC office. He recently returned from Iraq as did Congressman Pete Hoekstra. Congressman Burgess asked to meet with me in his Dallas office.

Eventually all of this will be acknowledged by Senator Santorum, Congressman Hoekstra, and Congressman Weldon. We have disagreed on the methods, but I respect these gentlemen and know they will inform the public with the truth.

The big question is why it has taken me 3 plus years to get this done which has put our troops and America in danger? Possibly politics?

FP: Well, one day we will have a symposium to dig deeper into this question. And hopefully you will join us.

[Ryan Ruck]

Terror WMD Feared In Police Poisoning

Hundreds of Iraqi officers, some bleeding from ears, others believed dead, ill after breaking Ramadan fast

Hundreds of Iraqi policemen fell sick from poisoning last night at their base in the southern part of the country after the evening meal breaking their daily Ramadan fast, raising fears of a new type of terrorist attack – perhaps even involving chemical, biological or nerve agents.

Some of the policemen reportedly began bleeding from the ears and nose immediately after the meal, said Jassim al-Atwan, an inspector for the Environment Ministry, who was serving as a liaison in the investigation between the Health Ministry and the base, located in the town of Numaniyah.

"Hundreds of soldiers were poisoned after taking food and water in the iftar," Wasit Gov. Hamad al-Latif told AP, referring to the meal that breaks the sunrise-to-sunset fast during the Islamic holy month. "Investigations are under way to determine the cause."

Authorities have arrested the head of the mess hall, and a military spokesman said today it was likely the poisoning was intentional, according to the AP.

Last night, al-Atwan said 11 policemen had died, but Brig. Qassim al-Moussawi, a senior spokesman for the Iraqi military, denied the report, saying only four victims were hospitalized.

Samples of the food and water were being tested "to determine the substance in them" and will be sent to Baghdad for further tests, al-Latif said.

The suddenness and severity of the mass poisoning immediately raised fears of a new kind of terrorist attack for the nation of Iraq where weapons of mass destruction have not been used since Saddam Hussein was in power.

Iraqi forces under Saddam Hussein had an extremely potent mustard gas called "khardal" in Arabic. It was originally manufactured in Russia. Symptoms include bleeding from the eyes, ears and nose two minutes after exposure.

The policemen stricken were mostly Shiite officers. In the past, Sunni terrorists have targeted police and military forces with bombings and shootings.

Al-Atwan told AP those who ate the most died.

Some of the soldiers collapsed as soon as they stood up from the meal, others fell "one after the other" as they headed out to the yard in the base to line up in formation, al-Atwan said.

Iraqi police officers are on the front line of the bloody conflict tearing the country apart. About 4,000 Iraqi police have been killed and more than 8,000 wounded in the past two years, the U.S. commander in charge of police training said Friday.

Officials in Numaniyah, about 75 miles southeast of Baghdad, described disorder on the military base there as angry recruits stoned the car of their commander who had publicly reproached them for their religious observances.

According to the Los Angeles Times, several members of the Wasit provincial council and the mayor of Numaniyah, who all asked not to be named out of fear for their safety, said they had received complaints from soldiers about abuse by Col. Amer Flaih Hasoon Dulaimi, commander of the 1,800-member National Police brigade.

After the colonel public being publicly reproached for celebrating the birth of an imam, the recruits staged a protest at the base entrance, and threw stones at Dulaimi's car as it passed, the security official said.

However, the official said he thought the soldiers were poisoned by meat served after its expiration date.

[Ryan Ruck]

Hmm… This guy is being prosecuted for selling aluminum tubes used for producing weapons grade nuclear material to North Korea. Amazing how some leftists still think those aluminum tubes we found in Iraq were for missiles…

Trial of Nuke Tube Businessman Begins

The trial of a German businessman accused of entering into a deal to provide aluminum tubes to North Korea has begun in Stuttgart. He faces charges of breaking weapons embargoes and assisting Pyongyang’s nuclear program.

The trial of a 57-year-old German business man accused of attempting to ship aluminum tubes to North Korea began on Wednesday in the southwestern German city of Stuttgart. The man, identified as Hans-Werner Truppel, the head of German company Optronic, is charged with trying to ship 214 tubes that prosecutors say were destined for the Stalinist country’s nuclear weapons program.

The tubes were intercepted on a French freighter at the Egyptian port of Damietta en route to North Korea in April after French authorities received intelligence from the German secret service.

Truppel is charged with breaching German arms export regulations along with two employees of a Hamburg-based shipping firm who sought to conceal the shipment by declaring that the tubes were for the Chinese aeronautics industry.

Entrapment claims dismissed by court

Lawyers for the prosecution have dismissed these claims as implausible and a pretext to get around the laws banning arms exports. On the defense side, Truppel’s lawyers wanted the trial stopped, accusing the German authorities of entrapment. They argued that the Hamburg company was given initial approval for the shipment only to run into trouble with the authorities later. The court immediately dismissed the claim as unfounded.

The case has already taken another dramatic turn after a report appeared in the German news magazine Der Spiegel claiming that a high-ranking North Korean diplomat, Yun Ho Jin, made contact with Optronic in the 1980’s. Jin was Pyongyang’s representative at the Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) at the time.

Accused faces 15-years in jail

Experts from the IAEA, the German Foreign Ministry and the German Federal Intelligence Service are expected to testify at the trial. A verdict is expected on Dec. 17. If found guilty, Truppel could face up to 15 years in prison for the sale of the tubes.

German-made aluminum tubes are in high demand around the world. They are especially popular with countries pursuing nuclear weapons programs due to the fact the tubes are an integral component in high-precision equipment used in the enriching of uranium – a basic ingredient of nuclear bombs. It is believed that the apprehended tubes were heading for a facility where they were to be used in the building of gas ultra-centrifuges used in the process of enrichment.

Tubes could have greatly boosted nuke production

Nuclear weapons experts say the gas ultra-centrifuges to be built with the tubes could have produced about 10 kilograms of enriched uranium within two years. North Korea said recently it had already produced enough weapons-grade plutonium for six atomic bombs by reprocessing spent nuclear fuel rods.

[Ryan Ruck]

Did Saddam's WMD Go to Syria? Part I

Have you ever noticed that it's always politicians, media types, and either washed up or disgruntled, anonymous intelligence sources who claim there never was any WMD in Iraq? On the other hand, every single commander and deputy commander of CENTCOM says that Saddam did have WMD. So too do the inspectors with the closest knowledge of before and after inspections: Dr Butler, Dr Kay, Dr Duelfer, and most of the former UN inspectors. Is this subject one where the word of a former governor of Vermont is better than that of highly decorated generals and weapons inspectors who have served their country all over the world for decades? While Gov. Dean's hands were sticky with maple syrup, people like General Zinni, General DeLong, General Franks, and so many others had their hands covered in the sands of the Middle East. While Rep. Pelosi works to blame President Bush for things as random and controllable as the weather, people like Dr. Kay and Dr. Duelfer were in 130 degree desert heat wearing plastic suits in toxic environments and being shot at. Perhaps it's wiser to believe the professionals who serve with honor and for whom lying is a disgrace rather than a politician for whom pandering to constituents and the party base isn't lying. It's "spin."

If one is to raise an eyebrow and for a moment believe the Generals, then the obvious question is, "What happened to Saddam's WMD?" The former dictator declared them, and declared them destroyed but offered no evidence of their destruction; no wreckage, no contaminated sand, no documents, and not even witnesses. One must wonder how the most poisonous chemicals and biological agents ever made by man just disappear without leaving a trace, without anyone logging their destruction, and without anyone having done the destruction themselves. Moreover, if the WMD once did exist (as Saddam, the UN, and the Clinton and Bush Administrations as well as the world all acknowledge)….then where are they?

There are basically three claims as to what happened to Saddam's WMD: they were flown to Syria, they were driven to Syria, and they were shipped out on Russian ships.

One of Saddam's generals, General Georges Sada, has come forward with claims that Saddam moved his "special weapons" out of Iraq, to Syria in late summer 2002. He allegedly did this under the guise of humanitarian aid flights to Syria after there was a dam burst in July, and the shipments were made on modified civilian planes, by pilots Sada knows personally. On June 17, 2002, the Times of London reported that Iraqi nuclear centrifuge parts were being smuggled out of Syria-originally stored at the port of Tartus, they had been moved to Damascus International Airport and moved to points unknown from there-effectively corroborating Sada's story. The Time's report even cites the Dam break as a cover story, and that cover story is part of Georges Sada's claims as well. In late summer 2002, we know from the Saddam tapes, from multiple mainstream media interviews with former Iraqi generals, and from the ISG reports that Saddam stunned his general staff by announcing to them that he was letting the UN inspectors back in because there were no longer any "special weapons" in the country.

Other shipments went by truck and storage payment was made to Syria through an arms smuggling front company run by Syrian Intelligence: SES International. That it did exist, was A Syrian Intel front company and was corrupt is not at all in dispute. SES Intl was one of those blatant Oil-For-Food cover companies used by Saddam to buy conventional weapons in exchange for UN oil vouchers. The Duelfer Report is ridden with information about SES International's illegal sales-sales that Saddam was using to break his conventional arms containment. SES was cited by the Treasury Department as being a front for Syrian Intelligence, a sanction-breaking company, and was being used by Syria's family to launder money. Assad's family has also been caught by the UN using the collapsed bank of Al Madina as a similar front company involved in the assassination of Lebanon's former Prime Minister.

Why believe General Sada? As a pilot himself and an investigator respected by Saddam himself, Sada was the general in charge of interrogating and guarding downed Coalition pilots during Desert Storm. Retired USAF Col. David Eberly (the ranking Coalition POW pilot) writes the introduction to Sada's book and vouches for his credibility. Two British airmen vouched for his credibility in a book they co-wrote about their experience as POW's at his hands. In fact, Sada dared to argue with Saddam's insane son, Uday-who wanted the pilots executed, and Sada was jailed as a result. Opponents to the war should respect his opinion as he was given multiple awards for his peaceful efforts to prevent a war by anti-war groups prior to the invasion. Ali Ibrahim, another of Saddam's former commanders, affirms Sada's story. ("Ali Ibrahim al-Tikriti was a southern regional commander for Saddam Hussein's Fedayeen militia in the late 1980s and a personal friend of the dictator. Units under his command dealt with chemical and biological weapons"). Perhaps most importantly, the details of his story-as well as all the stories in his book-are well-corroborated by mainstream media reports. Few details are not-except the contents of the planes and trucks that went to Syria. Sada says he knows what was in them, but the ISG, and mainstream media don't. It's sad they don't have one of Sada's pilots doing the cable news talk show circuit.

[Ryan Ruck]

Did Saddam's WMD Go to Syria? Part II

In December 2002, Russia's Middle East envoy, Yevgeny Primakov (former Russian Intelligence Chief), flew to Baghdad under the front of making one last chance for peace with the dictator. As soon as his plane landed, it was allegedly loaded with "sensitive materials" and flown directly to Belarus. People speculate as to whether or not it was WMD, WMD equipment, documents, people, or things the Russians didn't want the US to get their hands on, but in any event…the plane was loaded with things the US wanted. He also allegedly brought Russian GPS jammers to confuse American satellite-guided bombs, night vision goggles, special anti-tank missiles, and Russian advisors.

American forces found the jammers, and that's no secret since the Air Force was happy to boast that the jammers were ineffective (USAF just boosted the signal from their satellites so that it was "louder" than those from the jammers).

Syria and Russia both sent night-vision sights and goggles to Iraq, and they were recovered by American forces.

The anti-tank missiles did stop an Abrams tank and kill its crew. Others reportedly were ineffective, but evidence of their use is indisputable given the unique signature that their shaped charge left on the tanks that were hit.

Two Russian Generals, Gen. Vladimir Achalov, a former commander of airborne and rapid-reaction forces, and Gen. Igor Maltsev, a leading expert in air defense systems were reported in Baghdad up until 6 days before the war. During their "visit" they were photographed being given medals by Iraqi Defence Minister Sultan Hashim Akhmed. Other smiley photographs include the two Russian Generals standing with head of the General Staff of the Iraqi Army Izzat Ibragim between them. Upon their return to Russia, the generals were asked why they went on a "last-chance" diplomatic mission. They replied, "We didn't fly to Baghdad to drink coffee." One wonders if all the elements of the story were proven true, could the claim of "special weapons" being moved out be less true than the other elements?

Immediately after the arrival of the Russians in Baghdad, retired USAF Lt Gen. James R Clapper Jr-then head of the National Imagery and Mapping Agency-monitored an increasing flow of traffic and communication from Iraq to Syria. Former head of the UN's WMD inspection group, UNSCOM, Richard Butler, was asked to review the imagery. He agreed that Iraq appeared to be moving weapons out of Iraq, but did not think that "the Iraqis wanted to give them to Syria, but…just wanted to get them out of the territory, out of range of our inspections." Syria was prepared to be the custodian of them." The entire idea was nearly identical to when Saddam sent his entire air force to Iran for safe-keeping during Desert Storm.

Israeli intelligence (flush with human intelligence sources in the region-particularly in Syria, and Lebanon) reported that the increased traffic was Saddam's repositioning of WMD to Syria. On December 23, 2002, Ariel Sharon stated on Israeli channel 2 television, "Chemical and biological weapons which Saddam is endeavoring to conceal have been moved from Iraq to Syria." About three weeks later, Israel's foreign minister repeated the accusation. The U.S., British, and Australian governments issued similar statements.

Opponents to the war like to point to the 1000+ pages of the Duelfer Report and summarize it as "NO WMD," but there's a lot more to Moby Dick than 5 letters. Not even an elementary school student would dare turn in a 5-letter book report on Melville's epic. Similarly the ISG's report contains a lot more than just "NO WMD." It is a resounding verification that, yes, there was a great deal of 'something' secreted out of Saddam's Iraq into Syria. While the ISG doesn't claim that it was in fact WMD in those trucks, it does leave that door open because of the clandestine nature and the assembly areas for the convoys that left Iraq for Syria would be consistent with WMD, WMD equipment, documentation, and even personnel.

Given that there is so much evidence that Saddam's illegal weapons, programs, documents, and equipment existed and were moved rather than did not exist and were destroyed, it seems that logic has turned. There's simply more evidence it was moved than there is any evidence of WMD destruction. Yet, the debate from those who oppose prefers to ignore evidence and pretend that fictional evidence of destruction exists. That door to reality is creaking open for the opposition, and as such it's no wonder that the anti-war movement is shattering, the Democratic Party is spinning, and opponents to the war are confused.

[Ryan Ruck]

Did Saddam's WMD Go to Syria? Part III

The 1990-2003 War Against Saddam has millions of untold stories. Perhaps one of the most important happened at the onset of the invasion. On the evening of March 22 there are several reports that Russians were witness to an American airborne assault near the Syrian / Jordanian / Iraq border, on or near Highway 11, and in the vicinity of Akashat. Allegedly American airborne troops and/or Special Forces were trying to seize WMD. They were detected by Iraqi forces, surrounded, and as many as 30 were killed or captured. Forces from Jordan were sent to provide air support and rescue for the survivors.

There are no reports of this incident in the mainstream media, but Russian intelligence reports that were published on the internet during the invasion were generally close to the mark in accuracy (albeit embellished with a distinct political slant), and the Department of Defense has said affirmed that the reports do seem credible and accurate-particularly the ones that reference radio intercepts. This report of the border incident stems from such radio intercepts. It's also echoed in Yossef Bodansky's book, The Secret History of the Iraq War, but he cites several Russian eyewitnesses as well.

That the casualties are not listed in the DoD's casualty list is not unusual since the words "Ranger" and "Green Beret" are missing from that list entirely. It seems Special Forces casualties are not generally reported in the same manner as conventional forces. If true, the presence of American forces captured and taken into Syria perhaps might be one of the reasons why more pressure hasn't been exerted on the Assad Regime. In any event, on March 24th President Bush called Russian President Vladamir Putin and there can be no doubt that the issue of Russian support for Saddam's regime was discussed. That the phone call (widely reported by the press at the time) came immediately in the wake of the border incident is interesting and poignant.

On March 29 and 30, Saddam contacted Belarus. The former Soviet Republic had been one of many that offered Saddam exile in the days just prior to the war. Instead of accepting the offer, Saddam had a Belarusian IL-76 transport plane flown to Baghdad, allegedly loaded with "sensitive cargo" and immediately flown back to Belarus. In December, Yevgeny Primakov's plane had been reloaded with "sensitive cargo" (i.e. cargo the Americans would want-like WMD, WMD equipment, documents, and people), and flown to Belarus. All flights in and out of Saddam International were monitored closely by the USAF, British Intelligence, and a list of other foreign intelligence services.

Many of the Russian-made weapons procured through Syria's front companies-like SES International-had come from Belarus. After the fall of Saddam's regime, it was found that many of the senior leaders who had fled went to Syria and Belarus (sometimes in that order). If one asks, "What happened to all that WMD?" Then a finger can be pointed towards the former Soviet Republic at the very least for enabling the former leaders of Saddam's regime to escape and orchestrate an insurgency, clearly for removal of "sensitive items" from Saddam's regime, and very likely for accepting Saddam's WMD, WMD equipment, documents, and people.

On April 5th, CENTCOM reported spotting a large column of Iraqi vehicles, and braced for a possible counterattack. Rather than race south to certain defeat and death, the column slipped into Syria. Russian intelligence reports reiterate this event as do Lebanese sources. Mainstream media reports only confirm the convoy's sighting. Allegedly the convoy included Russian-made mobile rocket launchers some with chemical weapons.

The exodus from Iraq to Syria by Saddam's allies and the highest ranking members of Saddam's regime didn't end on April 9th, but it was fully brought to the attention of the world when American Special Forces intercepted a Russian convoy headed into Syria. The Russians said that the convoy was on a diplomatic mission following a convoy that carried Primakov himself. To this day no one knows for sure. Some reports claim that Primakov's convoy carried Russian WMD people, documents, and equipment that could not be left to fall into the hands of the Coalition. The contents of the convoy that American commandos attacked remain classified, but former deputy undersecretary of defense for international technology and security, John A Shaw, reports that American intelligence has documents confirming that Saddam's Regime paid Russia to provide security forces for Iraq's Russian-made arms and paid Russia to conduct counterintelligence activities that would prevent the Coalition from discovering the illegal arms supply line from Russia through Syria. "An Arabic-language report obtained by U.S. intelligence disclosed the extent of Russian armaments. The 26-page report was written by Abdul Tawab Mullah al Huwaysh, Saddam's minister of military industrialization, who was captured by U.S. forces May 2, 2003." Other intelligence officials confirm the possession of these documents and more. "The materials outlined in the documents included missile components, MiG jet parts, tank parts and chemicals used to make chemical weapons, the official said."

One wonders how differently the war in Iraq would look if American commandos had been able to seize elusive WMD and present it to the world? As more and more captured documents are being released every day, why not present these documents as well? That answer will come later.

[Sean Osborne]

Just recieved this report via email. Fairly significant considering the source.



http://www.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2007/6/28/205509.shtml?s=br

Saddam Tried to Build Nuclear ICBM


UNITED NATIONS -- In a wide-ranging comprendium on Saddam Hussein's secret weapons programs, the U.N. Monitoring, Observation, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) reveals that in late 1989, Saddam's military launched a modified Scud missile that could have carried a nuclear warhead.

In a document released on Thursday, UNMOVIC states:

"In its only test flight on Dec. 5, 1989, the Al Abid space launch vehicle flew for about 45 seconds before encountering (an unidentified) problem. This space launch vehicle consisting of five Scud engines for its first stage had the potential to deliver a payload, including nuclear, to an intercontinental range."

The issue of Iraqi nuclear missiles had been periodically raised by Russian authorities when it became known that the Al Abid missile had the potential of reaching Moscow.

The missile was also believed capable of reaching as far west as Paris.
Iraq's deputy prime minister, Tariq Aziz, repeatedly waved off Western concerns about the missile program.

Now, it has become clear that such concerns were justified.

The 1,160-page report to be examined by the U.N. Security Council on Friday is likely to be the last by the U.N. inspectors. The U.S. and the UK intend to introduce a resolution to disband the inspection unit.
Down from more than 300 personnel, the remaining 34 UNMOVIC staffers had spent most of their time these days analyzing docuements they had impounded before Saddam was overthrown in 2003.

[American Patriot]

Top Secret: Bush Told the Truth About WMD
FrontPageMagazine.com ^ | 9/7/2007 | Deborah Weiss

The secret’s out: on August 24th, 2007, UN weapons inspectors found 6 to 8 vials of chemical weapons sitting in an office at the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) headquarters in NYC. They found the vials when archiving files due to the fact that UNMOVIC is closing down its mission. They placed the vials in a sealed package and put them in a safe located in a secured room. Subsequently, on August 29, 2007, UNMOVIC employees discovered the inventory list which listed the content of the vials.

The vials contained the chemical phosgene, which according to the Center for Disease Control causes blurred vision, a burning sensation in the eyes and throat, difficulty breathing, coughing, nausea, vomiting, heart failure, fluid in the lungs, and death. It is a clear liquid, and when stored at room temperature, it converts to a poisoness gas. It was used as a choking agent in World War I and was responsible for multitudes of fatalities. In 1987 it was used by Iran during the Iran-Iraq War.

The FBI and NYC Police were called in to remove the vials, during which time UNMOVIC staff and other tenants on the same floor were asked to temporarily evacuate. Additionally, the UN building was sectioned off from the public and photographers. But not to worry. Jerry Haver, NYC’s former Emergency Services Directory explained, “[I]f it is properly sealed, it should not pose much of a threat unless it is dropped.” How comforting.

The vials were originally obtained by UNMOVIC in 1996, but apparently sat in the office unnoticed for the past decade. Normally, such vials should have been sent directly to the lab for testing and not to the UNMOVIC headquarters, but I suppose anyone could make such a mistake. Or….at least we know the UN can.

The UN is steeped in scandal, corruption, immorality, incompetence, and unaccountability. This is demonstrated by the Oil for Food scandal, the farce of the UN Human Rights Commission, the UN’s refusal to acknowledge the genocide in Darfur, the failures of its peacekeeping missions around the globe, including those in Rwanda and in Lebanon (1975). Historical as well current events are replete with numerous other examples as well. The UN often fails to promote peace as it is mandated to, and indeed, often hinders the peace process. Yet, the UN enjoys the benefits of international legitimacy, diplomatic immunity, and a twenty billion dollar per year budget (approximately 25% of which is funded by the US, making our nation the UN’s single largest contributor). But, I digress.

So, who is UNMOVIC? It is the agency which was created to replace the United Nations Special Commission Inspectors (UNSCOM). UNSCOM, established by Security Council Resolution 687 in 1991, was the original group sent to inspect Iraq for WMD. However, in 1998 the UNSCOM inspections collapsed when Iraq blocked the inspectors’ access. Subsequently, in 1999 the UN Security Council adopted Security Council Resolution 1284 which created UNMOVIC to continue with the mandate of disarming Iraq of its WMDs, and to monitor and verify Iraq’s compliance. In reality, UNMOVIC did not enter Iraq until 2002 after the passage of UN Resolution 1441, which threatened “serious consequences” if Iraq failed to comply with it obligations. And, unlike UNSCOM, UNMOVIC’s commission was made up at least partially of UN employees.

The vials found at UNMOVIC headquarters came from Al Muthanna, Iraq’s prime facility for chemical weapons research, production and storage. In 1984, with the intent to develop greater self reliance in the production of chemical munitions, Iraq began to create facilities that would be dual use, i.e. they would be used for a legitimate programs as well as WMD programs. Iraq’s state construction company, Al Fao General Establishment, was involved in the construction of all Iraq’s sites and facilities involving chemical weapons, biological weapons, and other WMDs. This included Al Muthanna. Not surprisingly, Iraq insinuated that Al Muthanna was designed merely for research on pesticides, and originally named the facility the “State Establishment for Pesticide Production.” However, according to UNMOVIC’s documents, this facility was authorized to produce casings for radiological bombs. It also worked closely with Iraq’s nuclear program and obtained its information from the same technical research center as the Al Hakam biological weapons facility.

Also according to its own documents, UNMOVIC found, identified and commenced the destruction of approximately 50 litres of mustard, as well as other chemicals. But, presumably that didn’t count as WMD because it was nothing new from UNSCOM’s findings and the destruction of these chemicals was merely a continuation of the pre-existing process. However, UNMOVIC admitted that it was “not possible” to verify the destruction of all WMD’s or Iraq’s declarations regarding the quantities of biological weapons and chemical weapons, because Iraq did not retain complete production, storage and deployment records. Iraq claimed that these records were unilaterally destroyed.

Most important, UNMOVIC’s compendium summary entitled, “observations and lessons learned” prefaces its conclusions by stating that the life of the UNMOVIC inspections (November 2002 through March 2003), a mere five months, was much shorter than anticipated. It explains that had UNMOVIC been provided with the time necessary, it might have been able to set forth a more detailed and thorough report and pursue questions raised to conclusion. It explicitly warns that the strict time constraints under which it was operating, “limit the confidence in the inspection results obtained.”

Former Prime Minister Tony Blair, in one of his speeches arguing in favor of invading Iraq, he explained the dilemma something to this effect:

Let’s say one day you go to a man’s home and enter his bedroom. In the top drawer of his night table you find a gun, which he admits he owns. Now let’s say a month later you go to that same man’s house and go to his bedroom. You look in the dresser drawer and the gun isn’t there. You ask him “where’s the gun?” If he says, “what gun? I don’t know anything about a gun,” you can’t just say “Ok” and take his word for it. He had the gun before, so one of two things happened. Either he still has the gun and hid it somewhere, or he disposed of the gun, in which case he should be able to explain how he disposed of it. But in no case, can you conclude that the gun never existed in the first place.

Yet, that is exactly what Saddam Hussein did, and somehow the left still found him credible. Bush must be the one who lied!

This is the question: since at some point Saddam Hussein admitted that he had stockpiles of WMD, how could he have subsequently made them vanish into thin air without a trace, without documentation, without evidence of destruction, without residual contamination, and without witnesses?

We now know beyond a shadow of a doubt that some of the chemical agents landed in UNMOVIC’s office. It strains credulity to think that eight vials encompassed the entire sum of Saddam’s chemical stockpile. However, it does not at all strain credulity to realize that the mainstream press is hardly mentioning this discovery, despite the fact that it has been known for a week. Does this new-found evidence lend credence to the Administration’s decision to invade Iraq? Is it possible that President Bush told the truth about Iraq’s WMD’s? Shhh….it’s a secret

[Ryan Ruck]

Mystery Deepens Over WMD Documents

How the classified military documents from Iraq, which named the coordinates of where the Army suspected weapons of mass destruction to be hidden, ended up in an Arabic translator's apartment on Hoyt Street in Brooklyn, is clear.

Not likely to be known anytime soon is what, if anything, the army contractor did with the documents.

The U.S. attorney's office in Brooklyn, which is prosecuting the case, appears to have little direct evidence that Noureddine Malki passed information on to the insurgency, either during his time in Iraq in 2003 and 2004, or upon his return to America in 2005. But it has raised the possibility that he may have done so. The government has said Malki regularly called phone numbers connected to insurgents and took bribes of at least $11,500 from Sunni tribal leaders.

The government, prosecutors wrote in one court filing, could "establish that the defendant had an opportunity to provide stolen classified information to anti-coalition forces."

Yesterday, at a hearing in U.S. District Court in Brooklyn, an Army officer with the 82nd Airborne Division described some of the reports that Malki had obtained. "The information is so critical that you do not want the information to get into the hands of anyone without the need to know," Lieutenant Colonel Michele Bredenkamp said, referring to a mission analysis report for the 82nd Airborne, to which Malki was attached. The document, among other things, described convoy routes and named known terrorists the Army was targeting. Between 60 and 70 individuals had authorization to view the document, which could be accessed through a secure computer, Colonel Bredenkamp testified.

"Would this be the type of thing for a soldier to take for a keepsake?" a prosecutor, John Buretta, asked.

"That's absurd," Colonel Bredenkamp said.

Malki has pleaded guilty to charges of unauthorized possession of national defense information. He is likely to be sentenced this spring. Prosecutors are seeking a 10-year sentence. Malki's lawyer, Mildred Whalen, is calling for him to be released on time served.

In court papers, Ms. Whalen has claimed that documents Malki "had in his possession were obtained or kept unknowingly."

In a short phone interview from prison last year, Malki told The New York Sun: "I never had bad intentions whatsoever."

"I loved this country more than them," he added, though it was not entirely clear to whom he referred. "I served this country in Iraq and they didn't."

Malki, a native of Morocco, immigrated to Brooklyn in 1989, his sister, Sonia Malki, said in an interview. While two of his siblings earlier moved to France, Malki decided to set out for America, after living in Paris for three months in 1989.

"This is not a terrorism case," Ms. Malki said. "This could happen to any immigrant."

Malki did not initially land on his feet in this county. He was homeless for a time. At one point he drove for a car service. A passenger robbed him, hitting his head so hard that he fell into a coma, Ms. Malki recalled.

Ms. Malki, who lives in France, said her brother went to Iraq as a translator out of gratitude to America, which gave him citizenship in 2000.

"In the end he has done a good job for this country," she said.

[American Patriot]

JPost.com » Israel » Article

Apr 7, 2008 21:57 'Report on Sept. 6 strike to show Saddam transferred WMDs to Syria'

By JPOST.COM STAFF


An upcoming joint US-Israel report on the September 6 IAF strike on a Syrian facility will claim that former Iraqi president Saddam Hussein transferred weapons of mass destruction to the country, Channel 2 stated Monday.


Furthermore, according to a report leaked to the TV channel, Syria has arrested 10 intelligence officials following the assassination of Hizbullah terror chief Imad Mughniyeh.

[Ryan Ruck]

We'll see how this pans out...

Anyone remember where that Russian convoy out of Iraq was headed at the start of the war? Could it have been... Syria!

[American Patriot]

To: Sunnyflorida
THE LEADING MODERATOR OF FR JUST KILLED NEWS FROM JPOST SAYING THAT AN UPCOMING REPORT WAS ABOUT TO BE PUBLISHED STATING THAT SADDAM WMDS HAD BEEN MOVED TO SYRIA.
AS FREEREPUBLIC DOESN’T WANT TO SPREAD THE STORY (?!), PLEASE GO TO LITTLE GREEN FOOTBALLS WHERE THE STORY HAS BEEN SHOWN :
http://littlegreenfootballs.com/webl..._to_Syria&only


31 posted on Friday, April 11, 2008 11:36:47 AM by drzz

[Ryan Ruck]

I wonder what the logic is in that???

It's not like The Jerusalem Post is equivalent to the National Enquirer.

[American Patriot]

I don't know, but drzz has been spamming the site with that sort of posting, so I think it is more of an anomaly than anything.

[vector7]

The WikiLeaks vindication of George W. Bush

Larry Elder traces new evidence that yes, there was yellowcake in Iraq

Posted: December 09, 2010

1:00 am Eastern

By Larry Elder

The WikiLeaks de facto declassification of privileged material makes it case closed: Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction – and intended to restart his program once the heat was off.

President George W. Bush, in the 2003 State of the Union address, uttered the infamous "16 words": "The British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa."

Former Ambassador Joe Wilson sprang into action and, in an op-ed piece, in effect wrote, "No, the Cheney administration sent me to investigate the allegation – and I found it without merit."

Put aside that Wilson's CIA-employed wife, not the evil Vice President Dick Cheney – as Wilson implied – sent him on the African errand. Put aside that the British still stand by the intelligence on which Bush made the claim. And put aside that the anti-Bush Washington Post, in an editorial, concluded that Wilson had lied about not finding evidence to support the Iraq-in-Africa-for-uranium claim, since he told the CIA the opposite when he reported back from Africa.

Bush claimed that Iraq sought uranium, specifically "yellowcake." What is yellowcake, and why would its presence or attempted acquisition corroborate the nearly unanimous assumption that Saddam possessed WMD?

The Associated Press called yellowcake "the seed material for higher-grade nuclear enrichment" and said that it "also can be enriched for use in reactors and, at higher levels, nuclear weapons using sophisticated equipment."

"Bush and Iraq: Follow the Yellowcake Road" headlined a euphoric Time magazine July 2003 piece – written when the Bush administration began backtracking from the Iraq-sought-uranium-from-Africa claim. Time said no yellowcake equals no WMD equals bogus basis for war.

The article led with this ripper: "Is a fib really a fib if the teller is unaware that he is uttering an untruth? That question appears to be the basis of the White House defense, having now admitted a falsehood in President Bush's claim, in his State of the Union address, that Iraq had tried to buy uranium in Africa."

Time hoisted (the now discredited) Joe Wilson on its shoulders as The Man Who Told the Truth to Power: "Just last weekend, the man sent by the CIA to check out the Niger story broke cover and revealed that he had thoroughly debunked the allegation many months before President Bush repeated it." Never mind that the bipartisan Senate Intelligence Committee concluded that Wilson's report "lent more credibility to the original Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) reports on the uranium deal" sought by Iraq in Niger.

Let's recap.

Bush, in building the case for war against Iraq, lied to the nation. He falsely claimed that Iraq was attempting to purchase yellowcake from Africa. Time magazine specifically referred to the yellowcake "lie" in accusing Bush of fabricating the case for war. Therefore, were Iraq to have had yellowcake – an assertion called a "lie" – it would have confirmed the presence of WMD, giving credence to Bush's declaration of Iraq as a "grave and gathering threat."

But ... there ... was ... yellowcake. This brings us back to WikiLeaks.

Wired magazine's contributing editor, Noah Shachtman – a nonresident fellow at the liberal Brookings Institution – researched the 400,000 WikiLeaked documents released in October. Here's what he found: "By late 2003, even the Bush White House's staunchest defenders were starting to give up on the idea that there were weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. But WikiLeaks' newly released Iraq war documents reveal that for years afterward, U.S. troops continued to find chemical weapons labs, encounter insurgent specialists in toxins and uncover weapons of mass destruction (emphasis added). ... Chemical weapons, especially, did not vanish from the Iraqi battlefield. Remnants of Saddam's toxic arsenal, largely destroyed after the Gulf War, remained. Jihadists, insurgents and foreign (possibly Iranian) agitators turned to these stockpiles during the Iraq conflict – and may have brewed up their own deadly agents."

In 2008, our military shipped out of Iraq – on 37 flights in 3,500 barrels – what even the Associated Press called "the last major remnant of Saddam Hussein's nuclear program": 550 metric tons of the supposedly nonexistent yellowcake. The New York Sun editorialized: "The uranium issue is not a trivial one, because Iraq, sitting on vast oil reserves, has no peaceful need for nuclear power. ... To leave this nuclear material sitting around the Middle East in the hands of Saddam ... would have been too big a risk."

Now the mainscream media no longer deem yellowcake – the WMD Bush supposedly lied about – a WMD. It was, well, old. It was degraded. It was not what we think of when we think of WMD. Really? Square that with what former Democratic National Chairman Howard Dean said in April 2004: "There were no weapons of mass destruction." MSNBC's Rachel Maddow goes even further, insisting, against the overwhelming evidence to the contrary, that "Saddam Hussein was not pursuing weapons of mass destruction"!

Bush, hammered by the insidious "Bush Lied, People Died" mantra, endured one of the most vicious smears against any president in history. He is owed an apology.

When Hollywood makes "The Vindication of George W. Bush," maybe Sean Penn can play the lead.

[Backstop]

Yep.

Glad you posted that, as I was getting ready to.

[Phil Fiord]

I used to listen to Larry Elder several years ago in the afternoons when we was on KABC radio 790 in Los Angeles. On his website he had a ton of factual information that dispelled common myths and misconceptions. My fav of which was about taxes and the portions of taxes paid by earnings. The top 1% paying the lions share of all taxes.