Iraqi WMDs

[Ryan Ruck]

Saddam Regime Document: Saddam Met With His Nuclear Group In 2002 (Translation)

Pages 186 and 193 of document BIAP 2003 00090 carry one of the most important information revealed so far regarding Saddam Nuclear Program. In these two pages which document a summary of meetings held by members of The Military Office of the Iraqi Baath Party and dated May/12/2002 and June/9/2002 they have a section that discuss Saddam Hussein meeting with the Chairman of the Atomic Energy and an elite of researchers.

I first thought that this may be a reference to a meeting between Saddam and the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) so I called both of IAEA offices in New York and Vienna to check if Saddam had any meeting with the IAEA Chairman prior to May 2002, and they indicated to me that they do not recall any such meeting of IAEA chairman and Saddam prior to May 2002.

What is also important is that President Bush in a speech dated October 7 2002 mentioned that Saddam has held numerous meetings with his nuclear Scientists and I quote from President Bush “The evidence indicates that Iraq is reconstituting its nuclear weapons program. Saddam Hussein has held numerous meetings with Iraqi nuclear scientists, a group he calls his "nuclear mujahideen" -- his nuclear holy warriors” (see: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/10/20021007-8.html ).

So this document shows that it is true that in 2002 Saddam still has an active nuclear program if he still has a Chairman of the Atomic Energy Group and a group of Nuclear Scientists.

I will do a partial translation of page 186 and 194.

Beginning of the Partial translation of Page 186

In the Name of God the Merciful the Compassionate

The Baath Arabic Socialist Party

The Military Office

Subject: The report of the meeting of the cell members

Comradely Salute

At exactly the hour (13:00) on Sunday 12/5/2002 the committee of the cell of members held its scheduled meeting as follow:

5. The political side: The discussion of the comrade the Leader Saddam Hussein (God protect him) during the meeting of his Excellency with the Chairman of the Atomic Energy and an elite of researchers.

End of partial translation of Page 186.

Beginning of Partial translation of Page 194

In the Name of God the Merciful the Compassionate

The Baath Arabic Socialist Party

The Military Office

Subject: The report of the meeting of the cell members

Comradely Salute

At exactly the hour (13:00) on Sunday 9/6/2002 the committee of the cell of members held its scheduled meeting as follow:

5. The political side: The discussion of the comrade the Leader Saddam Hussein (God protect him) during the meeting of his Excellency meeting with the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Organization and a number of researchers.

[Ryan Ruck]

1997 Document: Orders To Remove All Information Related To WMD From Computers (Translation)

Pages 99 to129 of document CMPC-2003-00013038 dated in March 1997, many years after Saddam was supposed to fully comply with the UN resolutions to disarm his WMD and reveal everything to the UN inspectors, include many correspondences from the Iraqi intelligence service asking their employees not to store any information related to WMD and remove any information they have regarding WMD from their computers and records. This is yet another document that shows how Saddam Regime was doing all their efforts to hide their WMD programs or any information relate to it from the UN inspectors, a clear sign that this regime never really complied and they always wanted to keep their WMD programs and production.

Beginning of Translation of Page 107:

Subject: Pledge

I am the signatory below, I pledge not to store any information related to the Prohibited Weapons on any computer that we have installed and evacuate the related numbered magnetic discs to outside the location. And for this I sign

Signature

Name: Issam Shaker

Position: Director of Administration in the Fourth Directory

Directory: The Forth Directory

Date: 26/3/1997

End of translation of Page 107

In the document, there are many letters with the same text as in page 107 signed by other employees of the Iraqi intelligence service.

Beginning of the Translation of Page 115:

A visit was made to the Computer Center of the Third Directory Storage and search it and inform the person who is directly in charge of it to remove all the information related to the Prohibited Matters and what is related to the committees of inspection and industrialization and that he will be held responsible for this.

Signature

29/3/1997

End of translation of Page 115

In the document, there are many letters with the same text as in page 115 that inform different departments in the Iraqi intelligence service to remove all the information related to WMD.

[Ryan Ruck]

In Search of Saddam Hussein’s WMD: Introducing Iraqi General Georges Sada

Part 1 of a 5

Have you ever noticed that it’s always politicians, media types, and either washed up or disgruntled anonymous intelligence sources who claim that there never was any WMD in Iraq? On the other hand, nearly every single commander and deputy commander of CENTCOM says that Saddam did have WMD. So too do the inspectors with the closest knowledge of before and after inspections: Dr Butler, Dr Kay, Dr Duelfer, and most of the former UN inspectors (only Dr Blix and Scott Ritter differ in this opinion). Is this subject one where the word of a former governor of Vermont is better than that of highly decorated generals and weapons inspectors who have served their country all over the world for decades?

While Gov Dean’s hands were sticky with maple syrup, people like Dr. Kay and Dr. Duelfer were in 130 degree desert heat wearing plastic suits in toxic environments and being shot at. While Rep. Pelosi works to blame President Bush for things as controllable as the weather, people like General DeLong, General Franks, and so many others had their hands covered in the dirt and sands of the Middle East. Perhaps it’s wiser to believe the professionals who serve with honor and for whom lying is a disgrace rather than believing politicians for whom pandering to constituents and the party base isn’t lying. It’s just “spin.”

If one is to raise an eyebrow and for a moment believe the Generals, then the obvious question is, “What happened to Saddam’s WMD?” The former dictator declared he had them, and he declared they were destroyed, but he offered no evidence of their destruction; no wreckage, no contaminated sand, no documents, and not even witnesses. One must wonder how the most poisonous chemicals and biological agents ever made by man just disappear without leaving a trace, without anyone logging their destruction, and without anyone having done the destruction themselves. Moreover, if the WMD once did exist (as Saddam, the UN, the Clinton and Bush Administrations as well as the world at large acknowledge)….then where are they? There are basically three claims as to what happened to Saddam’s WMD: they were flown to Syria, they were driven to Syria, and they were shipped out on Russian ships.

One of Saddam’s generals, General Georges Sada, has come forward with claims that Saddam moved his “special weapons” out of Iraq, to Syria in late summer 2002. He allegedly did this under the guise of Iraqi humanitarian aid flights to Syria after a Syrian dam burst in July. The shipments were supposedly made on modified civilian planes flown by pilots Sada knows personally.

On June 17, 2002, the Times of London reported that Iraqi nuclear centrifuge parts were being smuggled out of Syria-originally stored at the port of Tartus, they had been moved to Damascus International Airport and moved to points unknown from there-effectively corroborating Sada’s story. The Time’s report even cites the dam break reported by Sada as the Iraqi cover story.

Wwe know from the Saddam tapes, from multiple mainstream media interviews with former Iraqi generals, from the newly released documents captured from Saddam’s Iraqi Intelligence Service HW, and from the ISG reports that Saddam stunned his general staff in the late summer of 2002 by announcing to them that he was letting the UN inspectors back in because there were no longer any “special weapons” in the country. The flights to Syria had ended.

Other clandestine shipments went by truck and storage payment was made to Syria through an arms smuggling front company run by Syrian Intelligence: SES International. That SES did exist, was Syrian Intel front company and was corrupt is not at all in dispute. SES Intl was one of those blatant Oil-For-Food cover companies used by Saddam to buy conventional weapons in exchange for UN oil vouchers. The Duelfer Report is ridden with information about SES International’s illegal sales-sales that Saddam was using to break his conventional arms containment. SES was cited by the Treasury Department as being a front for Syrian Intelligence, a sanction-breaking company, and was being used by Syria’s family to launder money. Assad’s family has also been caught by the UN using the collapsed bank of Al Madina as a similar front company involved in the assassination of Lebanon’s former Prime Minister.

Aside from the fact that his story is corroborated by media reports of the time, why believe General Sada? As a pilot himself and an investigator respected by even Saddam himself, Sada was the general in charge of interrogating and guarding downed Coalition pilots during Desert Storm. Retired USAF Col. David Eberly (the ranking Coalition POW pilot during Desert Storm) writes the introduction to Sada’s book and vouches for his credibility. Two British airmen vouched for his credibility in a book they co-wrote about their experience as POW’s at his hands. In fact, Sada dared to argue with Saddam’s insane son, Uday-who wanted the pilots executed, and Sada was jailed as a result.

Opponents to the war should respect his opinion as he was given multiple awards for his peaceful efforts to prevent a war by anti-war groups prior to the invasion. Ali Ibrahim, another of Saddam's former commanders, affirms Sada's story. (“Ali Ibrahim al-Tikriti was a southern regional commander for Saddam Hussein’s Fedayeen militia in the late 1980s and a personal friend of the dictator. Units under his command dealt with chemical and biological weapons”). So too do other former commanders of Saddam’s regime.

Perhaps most importantly, the details of his story – as well as all the stories in his book – are well-corroborated by mainstream media reports. Except for the contents of the planes and trucks that went to Syria his stories are backed up by fully accepted historical events and settings. Sada says he knows what was in them those trucks and planes, but the ISG, and mainstream media don’t. For whatever reason, they’ve chosen to report on the politics of the war rather than investigate the historical facts. It’s sad and should be unforgivable that they don’t have one of Sada’s pilots doing the cable news talk show circuit.

[Ryan Ruck]

In Search of Saddam Hussein’s WMD: The Russian Connection

Part 2 of a 5

In December 2002, Russia’s Middle East envoy, Yevgeny Primakov (former Russian Intelligence Chief), flew to Baghdad under the front of making one last chance for peace with the dictator. As soon as his plane landed, it was allegedly loaded with “sensitive materials” and flown directly to Belarus. People speculate as to whether or not it was WMD, WMD equipment, documents, people, or things the Russians didn’t want the US to get their hands on, but in any event…the plane was loaded with things the US wanted. There is no doubt that the Russians did send GPS jammers to confuse American satellite-guided bombs, night vision goggles, special anti-tank missiles, and Russian advisors.

American forces found the jammers, and that’s no secret since the Air Force was happy to boast that the jammers were ineffective (USAF just boosted the signal from their satellites so that it was “louder” than those from the jammers).

Syria and Russia both sent night-vision sights and goggles to Iraq, and they were recovered by American forces.

The anti-tank missiles did stop an Abrams tank and kill its crew. Others reportedly were ineffective, but evidence of their use is indisputable given the unique signature that their shaped charge left on the tanks that were hit.

Renowned reporter Joe Galloway reported that two Russian Generals, Gen. Vladimir Achalov, a former commander of airborne and rapid-reaction forces, and Gen. Igor Maltsev, a leading expert in air defense systems were in Baghdad up until 6 days before the war. During their “visit” they were photographed being given medals by Iraqi Defence Minister Sultan Hashim Akhmed. Other smiley photographs include the two Russian Generals standing with head of the General Staff of the Iraqi Army Izzat Ibragim between them. Upon their return to Russia, the generals were asked why they went on a “last-chance” diplomatic mission. They replied, “We didn't fly to Baghdad to drink coffee.” One wonders if all the elements of the story were proven true, could the claim of “special weapons” being moved out be less true than the other elements.

Immediately after the arrival of the Russians in Baghdad, retired USAF Lt Gen. James R Clapper Jr-then head of the National Imagery and Mapping Agency-monitored an increasing flow of traffic and communication from Iraq to Syria. Former head of the UN’s WMD inspection group, UNSCOM, Richard Butler, was asked to review the imagery. He agreed that Iraq appeared to be moving weapons out of Iraq, but did not think that “the Iraqis wanted to give them to Syria, but…just wanted to get them out of the territory, out of range of our inspections.” Syria was prepared to be the custodian of them. The entire idea was nearly identical to when Saddam sent his entire air force to Iran for safe-keeping during Desert Storm.

Israeli intelligence (flush with human intelligence sources in the region-particularly in Syria, and Lebanon) reported that the increased traffic was Saddam’s repositioning of WMD to Syria. On December 23, 2002, Ariel Sharon stated on Israeli channel 2 television, "Chemical and biological weapons which Saddam is endeavoring to conceal have been moved from Iraq to Syria.” About three weeks later, Israel's foreign minister repeated the accusation. The U.S., British, and Australian governments issued similar statements.

Opponents to the war like to point to the 1000+ pages of the Duelfer Report and summarize it as “NO WMD,” but there’s a lot more to Moby Dick than 5 letters. Not even an elementary school student would dare turn in a 5-letter book report on Melville’s epic. Similarly the ISG’s report contains a lot more than just “NO WMD.” It is a resounding verification that, yes, there was a great deal of ‘something’ secreted out of Saddam’s Iraq into Syria. While the ISG doesn’t claim that it was in fact WMD in those trucks, it specifically says that the investigations should remain open on the issue because the clandestine nature and the assembly areas for the convoys that left Iraq for Syria would be consistent with WMD, WMD equipment, documentation, and even personnel.

Given that there is so much evidence that Saddam’s illegal weapons, programs, documents, and equipment existed and were moved rather than did not exist and were destroyed, it seems that logic has turned. There’s simply more evidence it was moved than there is any evidence of WMD destruction. Yet, the debate from those who oppose prefers to ignore evidence and pretend that fictional evidence of destruction exists. That door to reality is creaking open for the opposition, and as such it’s no wonder that the anti-war movement is shattering, the Democratic Party is spinning, and opponents to the war are confused.

[Ryan Ruck]

In Search of Saddam Hussein’s WMD: Russian Intelligence, Belarus & Highway 11

Part 3 of a 5

The 1990-2003 War Against Saddam has millions of untold stories. Perhaps one of the most important happened at the onset of the invasion. On the evening of March 22 there are several reports that Russians were witness to an American airborne assault near the Syrian/Jordanian/Iraq border, on or near Highway 11, and in the vicinity of Akashat. Allegedly American airborne troops and/or Special Forces were trying to seize some of Saddam’s WMD on its way into Syria. They were detected by Iraqi forces, surrounded, and as many as 30 were killed or captured. Forces from Jordan were sent to provide air support and rescue for the survivors.

There are no reports of this incident in the mainstream media, but Russian intelligence reports that were remarkably published on the internet during the invasion were generally close to the mark in accuracy (albeit embellished with a distinct political slant), and the Department of Defense has affirmed that the reports do seem credible and accurate-particularly the ones that reference radio intercepts. This report of the border incident stems from such radio intercepts. It's also echoed in Yossef Bodansky's book, The Secret History of the Iraq War, and he cites several Russian eyewitnesses as well.

That the casualties are not listed in the DoD's casualty list is not unusual since the words "Ranger" and "Green Beret" are missing from that list entirely. It seems Special Forces casualties are not generally reported in the same manner as conventional forces. If true, the presence of American forces captured and taken into Syria perhaps might be one of the reasons why more pressure hasn't been exerted on the Assad Regime.

In any event, on March 24th President Bush called Russian President Vladamir Putin and there can be no doubt that the issue of Russian support for Saddam's regime was discussed. That the phone call (widely reported by the press at the time) came immediately in the wake of the border incident is interesting and poignant.

On March 29 and 30, Saddam contacted Belarus. The former Soviet Republic had been one of many that offered Saddam exile in the days just prior to the war. Instead of accepting the offer, Saddam had a Belarusian IL-76 transport plane flown to Baghdad, allegedly loaded with "sensitive cargo" and immediately flown back to Belarus. In December, Yevgeny Primakov's plane had been reloaded with "sensitive cargo" (i.e. cargo the Americans would want-like WMD, WMD equipment, documents, and people), and flown to Belarus. All flights in and out of Saddam International were monitored closely by the USAF, British Intelligence, and a list of other foreign intelligence services.

Many of the Russian-made weapons procured through Syria's front companies-like SES International-had come from Belarus. After the fall of Saddam's regime, it was found that many of the senior leaders who had fled went to Syria and Belarus (sometimes in that order). If one asks, "What happened to all that WMD?" Then a finger can be pointed towards the former Soviet Republic at the very least for enabling the former leaders of Saddam's regime to escape and orchestrate an insurgency, clearly for removal of "sensitive items" from Saddam's regime, and very likely for accepting Saddam's WMD, WMD equipment, documents, and people.

On April 5th, CENTCOM reported spotting a large column of Iraqi vehicles, and braced for a possible counterattack. Rather than race south to certain defeat and death, the column slipped into Syria. Russian intelligence reports reiterate this event as do Lebanese sources. Mainstream media reports only confirm the convoy's sighting, but they do not follow up the report, and they do not report on what happened to it. Allegedly the convoy included Russian-made mobile rocket launchers some with chemical weapons.

The exodus from Iraq to Syria by Saddam's allies and the highest ranking members of Saddam's regime didn't end on April 9th, but it was fully brought to the attention of the world when American Special Forces intercepted a Russian convoy headed into Syria. The Russians said that the convoy was on a diplomatic mission following a convoy that carried Primakov himself. To this day no one knows for sure. Some reports claim that Primakov's convoy carried Russian WMD people, documents, and equipment that could not be left to fall into the hands of the Coalition. That Russian convoys as well as convoys from Saddam’s regime were assembled and rushing out of Iraq/into Syria during those last few days has been well-reported by the mainstream media, and summarily ignored then forgotten.

The contents of the convoy that American commandos attacked remain classified, but former deputy undersecretary of defense for international technology and security, John A Shaw, reports that American intelligence has documents confirming that Saddam's Regime paid Russia to provide security forces for Iraq's Russian-made arms and paid Russia to conduct counterintelligence activities that would prevent the Coalition from discovering the illegal arms supply line from Russia through Syria. This is consistent with the other aid Russia is known to have provided Saddam’s regime in its last days.

"An Arabic-language report obtained by U.S. intelligence disclosed the extent of Russian armaments. The 26-page report was written by Abdul Tawab Mullah al Huwaysh, Saddam's minister of military industrialization, who was captured by U.S. forces May 2, 2003." Other intelligence officials confirm the possession of these documents and more. "The materials outlined in the documents included [illegal] missile components, MiG jet parts, tank parts and chemicals used to make chemical weapons, the official said."

Recently declassified documents from Saddam’s Iraqi Intelligence Services headquarters as well as the Iraqi Perspectives Project report released two weeks ago both serve as new sources detailing how Russian intelligence was working hand in hand with the IIS-even going so far as to provide the Iraqis with the American invasion plans for Operation Iraqi Freedom. Sec State Rice has even brought up the matter of Russian aid to Saddam’s dying regime as recently as last week.

One wonders how differently the war in Iraq would look if American commandos had been able to seize elusive WMD in those first few hours of the war, and what it would have been like if they could have presented it to the world? As more and more captured documents are being released every day, why not present the documents detailing the list of illegal Russian armaments provided to Saddam, or the other evidence of illegal Russian support as well?

That answer will come later.

[Ryan Ruck]

In Search of Saddam Hussein’s WMD: Saddam’s “Special Weapons”

Part 4 of a 5

Saddam's "Special Weapons" went by air to Syria, Belarus, and possibly Russia and Libya as well. They went by ground to Syria, and they went by sea to points unreported. The plan was called "Sarindar" ("Emergency Exit"), and it wasn't much different in general strategic terms from the American flight from South Vietnam. Just as U.S. embassy officials shredded and burned documents when Saigon fell, and again in Tehran, Kabul, and a dozen other fallen nations, the Russians and others did what they could to move, hide, and/or destroy their sensitive documents, equipment that they'd provided to Saddam's Regime, as well as (allegedly) his WMD and WMD equipment as well. "By air, by land, and by sea" That is the claim made by Gen. Sada, Deputy Undersecretary of Defense Shaw, Gen. Ibrahim, Ariel Sharon, Israeli intelligence, and many more.

Clandestine movements by air and land have been discussed. The story of "Sarindar" by sea follows. Allegedly two Russian ships left the Umm Qasr port in the months before the war and went to the Indian Ocean. On board were supposedly some of Saddam's WMD chemical precursors. According to the "Sarindar" plan, they were to be taken to a deep part of the ocean and dumped.

It is completely impossible to fathom that Russian ships could enter the Persian Gulf, dock in Iraq, load up and pass through the Persian Gulf again, then into the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean all within 100 miles of 1 to3 entire American aircraft carrier battlegroups as well as two Marine Amphibious Assault task forces. There is no way that those two ships were not monitored by dozens-perhaps even hundreds-of American and Coalition warships.

What is known for certain is that just before the war, mainstream media reported that two Russian warships and a tanker were positioned off the Persian Gulf allegedly to monitor the situation. More likely they were there to ensure that none of the Coalition naval forces threatened to board the Russian ships. In fact, from March 20 onward the Coalition stopped and seized all ships bound for Iraq (often under the disguise of being part of the Oil-For-Food program). Those that were in fact found to be carrying humanitarian supplies had their cargos delivered by the US military instead. Others were seized, and their contents never revealed. Russian ships were apparently permitted to dock, load up with clandestine materials, and pass right through the U.S. Navy.

Now, opponents of the war often like to parse words and rhetorically argue that the war was about WMD and not WMD precursor chemicals. Compare Saddam to the late Timothy McVeigh. Both committed mass murder, both belonged in prison. Had Timothy McVeigh worked in the prison autoshop and been caught with a gallon of gasoline in his locker as well as a few pounds of fertilizer, would that have been a threat? Absolutely! He used those chemicals to make the bomb that used to commit mass murder, and similarly Saddam used different combinations of different chemicals to commit mass murder.

The Duelfer Report, after action reports from US Forces, and even mainstream media have all shown photos and video of the thousands and thousands of empty artillery shells positioned at chlorine plants, pesticide plants, and "former" chemical weapons manufacturing plants. While empty artillery shells are not an imminent threat, they could be filled in hours and turned into WMD. Most of Saddam's program had been redesigned to make fresh, potent chemical and biological weapons in hours in some cases, and so the issue becomes his intent.

Did he intend to make fresh WMD with chemical precursors-like those allegedly dumped by Russian ships? The Duelfer Report says absolutely yes, and it makes that claim based on interviews with regime leaders as well as Saddam and his history of doing so. Having said all that, some chemicals-like chlorine and concentrated pesticides-are dual use and do have non-military uses, but other chemicals do not. The ISG shows pictures of a large can of rare New Zealand opossum pesticide that is as almost as toxic as anthrax (true, no New Zealand opossums have been seen in Iraq so either the pesticide worked, or it was to be used as a weapon as the ISG report claims). Another example: SCUD missile fuel is unique to SCUD missiles. Even Hans Blix' UNMOVIC couldn't explain why Saddam's regime making SCUD missile fuel. When the war started, this chemical was gone. Perhaps deep-sixed in the Indian Ocean? Or was it poured into the Euphrates River like the massive amounts of cyanide and other toxins that US Marines discovered and CNN reported?

Missing also are the binary chemical agents that Saddam could only have used to combine and make fresh nerve agent before loading into empty artillery shells and rockets. Where are the large, illegal missiles Saddam was found to have by post-war investigations (at least 22 of these illegal missiles were fired at Coalition forces. None had chemical warheads, but post-war investigations did find that the missiles had been widened to fit SCUD warheads of which there remain several missing chemical warheads, and some had been illegally modified to carry cluster munitions as seen in the Duelfer Report).

By air, by land, and by sea, Saddam paid the Russians and Syrians to get rid of his illegal WMD, WMD equipment, documents, and people. That Saddam once had horrific weapons is not in debate. Many were destroyed or decayed, and the Duelfer Report lists them in great detail, but it also lists many Remaining Unresolved Disarmament Issues. For someone to claim that all of Saddam's weapons were destroyed and not moved out of Iraq in the 15-month "rush-to-war", then that someone must be able to present greater evidence of the destruction of those remaining Unresolved Disarmament Issues-evidence greater than the mounting pile that suggests they were removed from Iraq.

When someone claims that Saddam destroyed all his anthrax and other chemical and biological agents, and the war was one big "Bush lie" about WMD, they need only be asked to provide some evidence of its destruction: contaminated sand, witnesses, documentation, photos, any evidence. Fact is, for thousands of liters, there is no evidence of destruction by Saddam, but there is evidence it was moved. These terrible weapons do not simply vanish, and given that a tablespoon of some can kill hundreds of thousands. It seems to many that they should be accounted for rather than dismissed as magically destroyed to fit a political agenda. Can we really believe that no one in Iraq witnessed their destruction, or do these Remaining Unresolved Disarmament Issues demand resolution; proof of destruction?

[Ryan Ruck]

In Search of Saddam Hussein’s WMD: The Documents Tell the Story

Part 5 of a 5

What exactly was moved out of Iraq? Two weeks before the war started, Hans Blix presented a report called, Unresolved Disarmament Issues. For those who don't trust or believe the Bush Administration's claims about WMD, this report is a much better description of the alleged threat that Saddam's Regime posed.

After the war, the Iraq Survey Group scoured the country looking to answer the Unresolved Disarmament Issues and to assess the threat of WMD posed by Saddam's regime. Combined, the before and after reports are a little under 1200 pages. The difference between the two-that is to say the Remaining Unresolved Disarmament Issues listed in the Duelfer Report-seems the most likely description of what was removed from Saddam's Iraq prior to the 2003 invasion. This list can be found in Volume III of the Duelfer Report starting on page 56.

Before examining this likely list of removed items, it's helpful to understand and discuss the benefits of the three different modes of transport used to remove "special weapons" and "sensitive materials" from Saddam's Regime.

The summer 2002 airlift was unique in that it provided a very good cover story (humanitarian aid for the dam break in Syria). This uniquely strong cover story would have been most beneficial in moving the most secret items-those most sensitive to UN inspection, but the weight and size restrictions of cargo that could be placed on planes is also a restriction. Weight and size restrictions would not have been a problem for the late 2002 airlift which used military transport planes capable of lifting even heavy tanks or large missiles.

The early 2003 truckloads were more vulnerable to American intelligence (as is clearly shown by the across-the-board detection of their movement by multiple sources-even the Iraq Survey Group and UNMOVIC), and so the most important and sensitive items would have been moved by a different method given the opportunity. However, movement by truck also allowed for rapid loading, unloading, and movement of items larger than those that would typically be moved by modified commercial aircraft.

There are unique benefits to the movement-by-ship method: first and foremost, large, heavy, and voluminous items could be moved, and secondly they were moved under the absolute guarantee of secrecy because no one was going to stop Russian ships with Russian warships in shooting range.

The post-invasion airlift from Saddam International was done on military transports (not civilian aircraft), and while they lacked a benign cover story, they did provide the opportunity to move items that would otherwise have to be moved by truck or ship due to size (though not weight) restrictions. The post-invasion truckloads and convoys of early April were even easier to detect and more likely to be intercepted (as was apparently attempted on at least one occasion), and so it would have been preferred to move cargo that was the least "smoking gun" in nature.

As was mentioned earlier, the Department of Defense reportedly has several documents detailing the contents of at least some of the shipments. General Sada and others have described the contents of the summer 2002 airlift to have been drums-some yellow-with labels on them suggesting that they were filled with chemical weapon pre-cursors, and this is consistent with the binary nerve agents that Saddam had developed where two chemicals would be combined to make a WMD just prior to its use (sometimes even combined in the warhead immediately prior to employment). These drums were supposedly loaded into ambulances upon arrival in Damascus, Syria and then driven north to be stored in the basement of a hospital in Beirut.

One of the few things that UNMOVIC did find before the invasion was that Iraq had modified some missiles to be wider so as to fit SCUD missile warheads (something that had been explicitly forbidden but carried out anyway sometime between 2000 and 2002). Iraq had also been caught by the UN illegally making castings that would make rocket engines for illegal missiles. Iraq was also caught making parts for SCUD missiles, and fuel that could only be used for SCUD missiles. While no SCUD missiles were found, it seems very likely that these large weapons might have actually been made and either moved by ship or military transport. At the very least, over 20 SCUD missiles were never accounted for between Desert Storm and Iraqi Freedom.

The Duelfer Report goes to great lengths to describe the equipment for biological WMD, and has incredible pictures showing illegal equipment that had been hidden by Saddam rather than turned over in cooperation to the UN. Some of this equipment was capable of turning liquid anthrax growth media into weaponized anthrax in days or even hours.

Estimates vary, but on average it seems that Saddam never accounted for roughly 15,000 liters of this deadly liquid. This would be incredibly easy to destroy without a trace if dumped over side of a Russian ship in the middle of the Indian Ocean, and if there was weaponized anthrax, it would have been small enough to fit in a few suitcases and flown out on a normal civilian airliner identical to those used in the summer 2002 airlift. The same is true for the 3,000 - 11,000 litres of botulinum toxin that was never accounted for to the UN, or the 5,600 litres of Clostridium perfringens that Dr Blix could not verify as having been destroyed.

The Duelfer Report's biological Unresolved Disarmament Issues focus on seed stocks rather than thousands of liters of liquid growth media. Seed stocks are test-tubes filled with biological agents that are preserved usually by freezing. Some were recovered by the ISG, but many more remain lost. That something as small as a fistful of pencils in a large can of ice cream could have been moved out during the 15-month "rush-to-war" seems very plausible, and most plausible in the summer 2002 airlift because of the size and importance of their nature.

These seed stocks, if still viable, could be used to make massive-almost unlimited amounts of biological weapons if the proper equipment was available, and the Duelfer Report lists dozens of reactors and similar equipment as still missing. Now, as the seed stocks are small, light, and incredibly easy to move secretly, the equipment needed to weaponize them is not. It's large, bulky, and heavy; the kind of thing that trucks would be perfect for moving-especially since (if intercepted) they're of little value.

"…much of the same equipment used in making weapons of mass destruction is potentially dual-use; the same fermenters used to make anthrax could be rinse out to make beer, and the same equipment used to make the nerve agents sarin and tabun could be used to make aspirin tablets."

-Australian Ambassador Richard Butler, former head of UNSCOM, The Greatest Threat, Iraq, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and the Growing Crisis of Global Security (2000 edition)

More sensitive to being captured, but still heavy and bulky, Dr Blix' pre-war report listed, "....up to 450 mustard filled aerial bombs unaccounted for since 1998 (The mustard filled shells account for a couple of tonnes of agent while the aerial bombs account for approximately 70 tonnes)" These could have been moved in aircraft during the summer 2002 airlift or the post-invasion 2003 airlift, or by ship, but not likely by truck given their value as "smoking gun evidence" and the vulnerability of trucks to capture.

Recently, some of the 35,000 boxes of captured documents taken from Saddam's Intelligence Service HQ have started to be released. Next month, the Sen. Select Committee on Intelligence is supposed to release its Phase II investigation into pre-war intelligence on Iraq. More and more information is making its way from the shadows to the public eye, and a pattern is emerging. When released, new open source intelligence seems to support the reports that WMD was removed from Iraq in the "rush-to-war" months, and this open source intelligence is confirming and strengthening the reports of Saddam's Ties to Al Queda. Combined, the case for war in Iraq is getting stronger, not weaker.

Given this pattern, it's no wonder that the Democratic Party's due date for draft 2008 part platforms was missed last November (remember when the party split 5 ways on Iraq and even Rep Pelosi had to publicly acknowledge the disarray?). That due date was pushed to January, then March, now April. How can the party leaders appease the base's unified position that the war was a Bush Lie about WMD, and troops should cut and run, while at the same time, the pattern of open source intelligence is showing that the WMD and Saddam's Ties to Al Queda claims were true?

The gap between the Democratic Party's leadership and its base widens with every piece of released intelligence that is consistent with the pattern which affirms the Bush Administration's policy and engagement of the Iraq War.

[Ryan Ruck]

2002 Document: Plan To Produce Mobile Laboratories (Translation)

Document CMPC-2004-006626 dated November 11 2002 talks about a plan to develop MOBILE LABORATORIES. The document is from a company called Ibn Rushd which is subsidiary of the Iraqi Military Industrialization Commission (MIC). As many of us know, the debate about the Iraqi Mobile Laboratories has been going on for the over three years. The Iraq Survey Group (ISG) indicated in their 2004 report (http://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/iraq_...ap6_annxC.html ) that the Iraqi Mobile Laboratories were used for agricultural purposes “Seed Purification Project” that concluded in 1997. In fact I found a document dated 1997 (Document CMPC-2004-005680 ) that talks about a Mobile Seed Laboratory. However the year 1997 indicated in the ISG report as the concluding phase of the “Seed Purification Project” and the Mobile Laboratories related to it can be an important date since this document about a plan to build Mobile Laboratories is dated November 2002. Also it is noteworthy to mention that Ibn Rushd the Iraqi MIC subsidiary was one of the companies suspected in developing Iraq Biological and Chemical Programs.
I will do a partial translation of document CMPC-2004-006626.
Beginning of the translation of page 1
In the name of God the Most Merciful the Most Compassionate
Presidency of the Republic
Military Industrialization Commission
Ibn Rushd General Company
Number 10025611018
Date 11/11/2002
To: Military Industrialization Commission/Department of Projects
Subject: Investment Plan for the year 2003
In regards from the letter singed with you on 12/10/2002 regarding our company investment plan to the year mentioned above, included is the technical report according to the letter showing its details below:
1. Develop and enlarge existing laboratories, 178,000,000 Dinars
2. Prepare MOBILE LABORATORIES , In Iraqi Dinar 128,413,00 + 273,445 Euros with 10 Dinar/Euro, 27,344,500, 155,757,500 Dinars.
Total 333,757,500 Dinars
Remark: The cost of the vehicles related to the Mobile Laboratories is not determined yet.
Please review and do what is necessary… with regards
Attachements:
1.Table fof quantity+ The plan related of developing the Laboratories
2.

Signature… Noor Al Din Abed Al Hadi The General Director 11/11/2002 End of translation of page 1 Partial translation of page 3 Table of electrical equipments and devices of the Mobile Laboratory Measurement device for the speed of vibration Measurement device for the speed of rotation Ultrasonic wave test device Different pressure measurement devices Mobile testing device for metals X-Ray testing device 20 Kilovolt electric generator End of partial translation of page 3

[Sean Osborne]

Weapons of Mass Destruction May Still be In Iraq

Sean Osborne
Associate Director, Senior Analyst, Military Affairs
Northeast Intelligence Network

http://www.homelandsecurityus.com/site/modules/news/


Well, at least retired Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI) agent Paul “Dave” Gaubatz, the Northeast Intelligence Network and other very interested parties hopes this is the case.

What we know and accept as truth is that OSI Agent Gaubatz and five other federal agents identified four of Saddam Hussein’s suspected WMD hideaways in the region around Al-Nasiriyah, in the province of Dhi Qar, Iraq between April and July of 2003. These sites are highly suspected of containing the biological and chemical weapons the Bush Administration went to great lengths to reveal to the world prior to the commencement of hostilities in Operation Iraqi Freedom on March 19, 2003. We also know as a matter of fact that despite repeated requests, begging and pleading for the past three years – none of these sites have been properly investigated since discovery – NOT ONE. Not by the Iraq Survey Group led by both David Kay and Charles Duelfer nor any team of US DoD investigators. This intolerable situation continues to this very moment despite detailed briefings, extended and repeated contact between Dave Gaubatz and Congressman Curt Weldon (R-PA) and Congressman Pete Hoekstra (R-MI), and members of their staff. What we do not know is whether these suspected Bio/Chem Warfare Material Storage Sites have been located and exploited by Islamic terrorists. You the reader must understand this clearly and completely, not only have these sites not be searched – they have been unguarded ever since their discovery a full three years ago. If the Bush Administration is embarrassed by these revelations – then so be it. What we have here is a matter of the utmost national security implications’. With these sites remaining unsecured by American or Coalition forces in Iraq every member of the coalition (our sons and daughters), every citizen of newly democratic Iraq and people around the world, including right here in the homeland USA are at risk.

[Page 2]

I can think of no better method of shining a spotlight on this urgent issue than to provide you with the text and a link to Dave Gaubatz media information page on his website. As you read this page I would humbly request you remain seated while consuming its contents. Then read it again, and again. I also beseech Congressman Tom Tancredo become involved in this effort immediately, and all members of the media who read these pages and follow the efforts of the Northeast Intelligence Network to contact Dave Gaubatz, get the word out in your columns and radio programs, inform the American people, and ultimately force our government and elected representatives to get off their butts, ignore petty partisan politics and get this task completed NOW.

http://www.davegaubatz.com/media.html

NOTE: I will address issues and include information only that has been discussed between myself, Congressman Pete Hoekstra
(House Intelligence Committee), Congressman Curt Weldon (Armed Services Committee), and their staff during non secure means
such as cell phones, unsecured phone lines, emails, and during private meetings with personnel the Congressmen understood did
not have clearances (Iraqis). Some of the conferences I and Congressman Weldon had were with other U.S. Agencies and private
corporations on non secure lines. It should be noted that no information was provided to any of the Democratic members of the
House Intelligence Committee or Armed Services Committee at the request of Congressman Weldon and Congressman Hoekstra.
To my knowledge (as told to me by Congressman Weldon) on 4 May 2006, none of the information had been provided to any person
affiliated with DOD. I have the utmost respect for both Congressmen, but feel the intelligence I provided them should have been
shared with all members of Congress and the White House. NOTE: I was the only civilian Federal Agent in the area, all others were
on active duty.

I will share the details behind the 3 year battle I have had to get suspected WMD sites searched by U.S. personnel. I was sent into
Iraq at the start (2003) of Operation Iraqi Freedom (U.S. Federal Agent, not military). I had specialized in counter-intelligence and was
an Arabic linguist. Prior to this I had served 20 years on active duty.

While in Iraq I had identified (with other Federal Agents) 4 sites that were highly suspected of containing biological and/or chemical
weapons. The sites were identified by very credible Iraqis who had knowledge and access to the areas. They risked their lives to
provide intelligence about the sites and to take U.S. personnel to the locations. The sites would require heavy equipment to exploit
the sites. The material was alleged to be buried deep and under water. To this date the sites have not been inspected. Several radio
programs and newspapers have written about the above previously; in this article I want to provide more details that will convince
the American public the WMD issues I have brought forward have been kept from the American public solely for political purposes.

I first spoke publicly about the WMD sites never being searched only after the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) and the White House
announced in late 2004 that the search for WMD was over. I went on the Gary McNamara Radio show (Dallas) in Jan 2005
addressing this issue. Since that time I have been on several radio shows to include the Tony Snow Show, John Batchelor, Darrell
Ankarlo (Dallas), and a variety of other radio shows. Fox News live with Eric Shawn, and on the CBN show with Erick Stakelbeck.
The NY Sun (Eli Lake) and FrontPage magazine (Jamie Glazov) have also written articles.

To me the entire issue is non political, it is a National Security issue, but during the three years I have found out that every “issue”
has political implications and the majority of most media corporations have a political agenda. I simply want the suspected WMD
sites in Iraq searched.

Many people have asked me why they were not searched in 2003, (read the NY Sun article by Eli Lake) and continue to ask me why
they are not being searched now. After reading my timeline of events on this issue below you will begin to understand.

TIMELINE OF EVENTS

Jan – Jul 2003: Deployed as U.S. Federal Agent first into Saudi Arabia (Arar Air Base) and then Nasiriyah, Iraq (Tallil Air base). Two
primary missions: Counter-terrorism and locate WMD. I was assigned as a civilian agent to the Air Force Office of Special
Investigations (OSI). If you research the OSI and interview other Federal Agencies you will find out OSI has the best trained counter-
intelligence and counter-terrorism agents among all Federal agencies. FBI agents and other Federal agents do not have the
clearances nor training OSI agents have.

Apr – July 2003: I and 5 other Federal agents identified 4 suspected WMD sites in southern Iraq. Made numerous attempts to ISG to
get the sites exploited. To date (5 May 2006) this has not happened.

July 2003 – Jan 2005: Stayed in contact with U.S. Government personnel and Iraqis who had reported the original WMD sites.

Jan 2005 – Mar 2006: Went public with information about the suspected WMD sites never being inspected.

Feb 2006: Invited to speak at the 2006 Intelligence Summit. WMD sites discussed extensively.

Feb 2006: Staff member of Congressmen Pete Hoekstra telephoned me several times for details about the WMD sites. Met with
staff member Jake Abel in Feb 2006. All details were provided pertaining to my knowledge of the WMD sites. Mr. Abel followed up
with more telephone calls and emails. All information was provided to Congressman Hoekstra.

16 Mar 2006: Met with Congressman Curt Weldon at his DC office. Met for approximately one hour. Russ Caso (Chief of Staff) and
an aide Michael Schuttloffel were present. All details were provided and I was informed by Congressman Weldon that he and his
staff would personally investigate the matter. I was requested to send all of the details to the private residence of Michael
Schuttloffel. This was done so the information I provided would not have to go through the Congressional mail channels. I sent the 15
plus pages of information as requested overnight FedEx to Mr. Schuttloffel.

21 Mar – 30 Apr 2006: Received numerous phone calls from Congressman Weldon’s office. We discussed the sites in more detail
and the credibility of the Iraqis who provided the information about the sites. I received the calls via my cell phone. I was also
requested by Congressman Weldon to convert USM grids into longitude and latitude. I completed this process and provided all
information to Congressman Weldon. Congressman Weldon had my information confirmed pertaining to the locations.

Mid April 2006 – 4 May 2006: Sharon Behn of the Washington Times interviewed me several times via phone and emails pertaining to
the WMD sites and information pertaining to the Air Force Office of Special Investigations (OSI) “loosing” all reports submitted by
myself and other Agents assigned to Tallil Air Base Nasiriyah during the time period Apr –Dec 2003. OSI Agents had informed me all
electronic files pertaining to every report filed during this time could now not be found. The reports filed electronically by me and
other Agents would have also been sent to DOD, ISG, etc… I had requested when I first went public that to confirm the WMD sites had
never be inspected, would be to take my reports (and other agents assigned with me) and compare them to sites inspected by ISG.

2 and 3 May 2006: Congressman Weldon contacted me at my office and home several times on 2 and 3 May 2006. Emails were also
sent. We discussed the sites in more detail and he asked if I would accompany him and Congressman Hoekstra to the suspected
WMD sites in southern Iraq. I agreed, although I felt it was unsafe for two Congressmen to go to isolated areas in southern Iraq, even
if we had military personnel with us. Congressman Weldon advised me we would travel commercial aircraft, and only notify the U.S.
military when we arrived in Iraq. Congressman Weldon advised he would then have U.S. forces in Nasiryah go to the sites with us
with heavy equipment. Again, I felt uncomfortable due to safety concerns. I would have preferred to go with two or three other
agents and no other military convoys.

3 May 2006: I informed Congressman Weldon that an Iraqi who had provided the WMD intelligence on one site in 2003 would now
come forward. Congressman Weldon asked me (via email) if I would arrange a private meeting with him on 4 May 2006. I arranged
the meeting to be at Congressman Weldon’s DC office. The Chief of Staff (Russ Caso) for Congressman Weldon telephoned me and
we discussed via email the arrangements for 3 (three) Iraqis (non U.S. citizens) to meet with Congressman Weldon and
Congressman Hoekstra on 4 May 2006, at 10am.

Note: Sharon Behn, Washington Times spoke with the Iraqi (after receiving the approval of his U.S. attorney). Ms. Behn told me the
Iraqi informed her that what I had described about the WMD sites was correct and he wanted to assist America.

4 May 2006/1000 hours: Congressman Weldon contacted me at my office (Dallas County Medical Examiner) and asked me to
confirm I would lead the team (Congressman Weldon, Hoekstra, Iraqis) to the WMD sites. I agreed to do so. Congressman Weldon
then advised he wanted a conference meeting with himself, Congressman Hoekstra, their Chiefs of Staff, and 3 Iraqi citizens.
Congressman Weldon said all were present at his office and he wanted to discuss the details of the WMD sites and the trip to Iraq.
We had a conference call for about two hours. The 3 Iraqis confirmed my credibility in relation to the WMD sites, and one Iraqi
described the WMD site he was aware of in detail. Congressman Hoekstra asked me several questions relating to travel to the sites
and both Congressmen asked me to confirm I would go with them. I again agreed to lead the team to the sites. The 3 Iraqis were
asked by Congressman Weldon if they would also go. They said they would do anything to assist America. They advised them and
U.S. Federal Agents had all risked our lives in 2003 to go to the sites and follow up should have been conducted. They informed
Congressman Weldon and Hoekstra that no U.S. Government agency had ever debriefed them (aside from myself in 2003) during the
last 3 years and were upset the suspected sites had never been searched by the U.S. Congressman Weldon and Hoekstra were
upset the Iraqis had never been debriefed. Congressman Weldon and Hoekstra asked me to describe each site in detail again so the
3 Iraqis could provide details about the locations to them since they are from this area.

Congressman Weldon stated he did not want to inform any member of the DOD because he did not trust them. Congressman
Hoekstra told him he shouldn’t say that. The Congressmen told me they did not want to inform any member of the Democratic Party
because if we get to the sites and they have been exploited by insurgents/terrorists during the last 3 years, it would be very
embarrassing to them and President Bush. Congressmen Weldon stated if we go to Iraq and locate the WMD it would help with the
upcoming elections.

Note: Congressmen Curt Weldon and Congressmen Pete Hoekstra are very good people, but I had never wanted this to be a political
issue. I simply wanted the sites searched.

4 May 2006/approx. 1700 hours. I received a telephone call from one of the Iraqis. He told me he and the other two Iraqis wanted to
go with the Congressmen to Iraq, and would do anything to help America, but felt uncomfortable going for personal political reasons.
They wanted to speak with their U.S. attorneys this evening. I received another call on this date. The Iraqi told me they had each
spoken with their attorneys. The Iraqis and the attorneys agreed they should assist America by going to Iraq and helping locate the
sites, but did not want them going for purely political reasons as Congressman Weldon and Hoekstra requested. Their attorneys
advised since they are still awaiting U.S. citizenship they need to have sanctioned U.S. Government approval before going back to
Iraq. The Iraqis advised the Congressmen wanted them to go to Iraq using private funding and not U.S. Government travel. Note:
During our prior conference call I heard Congressman Weldon inform the Iraqis of this. The Iraqis also advised they had prior plans
to speak with the media about this, but were asked by Congressman Weldon’s Chief of Staff not to talk with the media. If the media
found out they would know it was more of a trip for political purposes than for official purposes. The Iraqis were also present when
Congressman Weldon said he did not want to notify anyone in the U.S. military.

4 May 2006/late evening: I received a call from a reporter (who has requested his/her name not be mentioned, and I will honor the
request). He said Congressman Hoekstra’s staff had called him on 3 May 2006 and were advising him of the WMD investigation and
me. The reporter also told me he just received an email (as we were speaking) from the press person of Congressman Hoekstra.
The press person told the NY Sun reporter that the Washington Times article that Sharon Behn was working on was going to be
squashed because the WMD issue could be politically embarrassing for the "Administration" (referring to President Bush and the
Republican Party). We also discussed the trip Congressmen Weldon, Hoekstra, the Iraqis, and myself were planning on taking to
Iraq to visit the sites. The reporter informed me on 23 May 2006 that Congressman Hoekstra's staff had told him there was no trip to
Iraq being planned. Note: Congressman Weldon, Congressman Hoekstra, the Iraiqs, and myself discussed the Iraq trip on 4 May
2006. The Congressmen's staff were also present, and in addition Congressman Weldon had called me previously to discuss the
trip. The trip was discussed in detail.

4 May 2006/late evening: I was informed by Sharon Behn of the Washington Times that she was not going to publish the article now
about the Congressmen’s trip to Iraq. I told her I had received a call from a reporter and had been told the article had been
“squashed”. Ms. Behn denied this and said it was because she needed more corroboration about the WMD sites and the trip. NOTE:
Ms. Behn had talked with the Iraqis and had other confirmation the Congressmen had been working with me for 2 months. The
article had been “squashed”.

5 May 2006/1000 hours: I received a phone call from Congressman Weldon’s Chief of Staff (Russ Caso). He advised the media had
found out about the trip to Iraq. I told him I was aware of this because a NY Sun reporter had telephoned me the night before and said
Congressman Hoekstra’s staff had talked with the Washington Times and had the article stopped. He said he was going to check
with Hoekstra’s staff. I told Russ Caso I did not feel it was a good idea for the Congressmen to go on a private venture to Iraq. He
asked why. I told him everyone would know we were going privately because two Congressmen, three Iraqis, and I would stand out
while traveling commercially together. I informed Russ Caso that the search of the WMD sites was a national security issue, and not
a media adventure as the Congressmen wanted. Russ Caso and I also discussed the scrutiny the Congressmen and the White
House would be under if the WMD sites had already been exploited by insurgents/terrorists. I informed Mr. Caso I just want the sites
inspected and do not want to be in the middle of a political battle. Mr. Caso said he would inform Congressman Weldon he should not
go to Iraq due to the media being aware. I informed Mr. Caso I felt this was best and the Congressmen should never have been going
to the sites in the first place. It was dangerous for all of us with them present. Mr. Caso asked if I would still lead a team to the
sites. I agreed I would.

Note: Congressman Weldon, Russ Caso, and I had discussed the following three scenarios if we went to the WMD sites:

#1: The sites would get searched by U.S. personnel and WMD would be there. This would be good for America and the upcoming
elections, and would make Congressman Weldon and Hoekstra stand out as having been the ones to locate the WMD.

#2: We would get to the sites and determine they had already been exploited by insurgents. This would make the Republican Party
look bad because they had failed to search the sites 3 years ago when I first reported them. If we discovered the sites had been
exploited we would downplay the search.

#3: We search the sites and there is no WMD. This would be politically embarrassing for Congressman Weldon and Hoekstra. If
this scenario occurred we would also downplay the search.

The above 3 scenario reasoning’s are why the media and the Democratic Party would not be advised of the WMD site intelligence I
had provided.

I have been told by the Congressmen the sites have never been searched to their knowledge, and I know the sites have never been
searched. The Congressmen have conducted their own corroboration of the intelligence information I provided them and this is why
they wanted to go to Iraq with me.

Note: Tony Snow (White House Press Secretary) has previously interviewed me about the WMD sites. Is/was there WMD in Iraq at
the start of the war? We will never know until we search all the locations identified to ISG during 2003.

We have 4 sites in Iraq that need to be searched. I want the American people to know the truth, whether it be scenario number 1, 2,
or 3 above. I am not concerned about being ridiculed if there is no WMD. I was sent to Iraq as a civilian, and at a cost of several
hundred thousand dollars (Arabic language school/one year, travel, etc). I was a professional doing my duty. Sites I and other
Agents identified should have been searched.

(signed)
Paul "Dave" Gaubatz



I will be providing updates to our readership as provided by Dave Gaubatz immediately upon receipt.

UPDATE: Among the data specifically provided to Congressmen Weldon and Hoekstra is the precise location of the WMD sites to within a resolution of approximately three (3) feet.

Two of these WMD sites are within the city limits of al-Nasiriyah, a third is 20 miles south of Nasiriyah in the vicinity of Suk Ash Shuyakh, Dhi Qar province of Iraq, and the fourth near the port of Umm Qasr in Basrah province neat the Kuwaiti border with Iraq.

[Sean Osborne]

More from retired OSI Special Agent Dave Gaubatz

FOR CONGRESSMAN CURT WELDON

FROM: SPECIAL AGENT PAUL “DAVE” GAUBATZ (RETIRED)
CIVILIAN FEDERAL AGENT, AIR FORCE OFFICE OF SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS (AFOSI)

SUBJECT: WMD SITES IN IRAQ THAT WERE NEVER EXPLOITED BY IRAQ SURVEY GROUP (ISG) PERSONNEL

1. Per our meeting on 16 Mar 2006, (1000 hours), I am forwarding the following information for your
review.
• An overview of my background
• WMD sites that myself and other Federal Agents identified in southern Iraq that were never
exploited by ISG
• Russian intelligence information/activity in Iraq at the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom
• Iranian intelligence information/activity in Iraq at the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom
• Al-Qaeda activity…””””” ””
• Hezbollah activity…..””””†â€â€
• Individuals who can verify WMD, Russian activity, Iranian activity, Al-Qaeda activity, and Hezbollah
activity in Iraq
• Overall assessment

Based on my intelligence gathering the following was substantiated:

1. WMD (chemical/biological) was and still is in Iraq.

2. Suspected WMD sites (4) in Iraq have never been exploited/searched by U.S. personnel.

3. Russians were involved in the transfer of WMD out of Iraq and assisted the Iraqi’s in hiding/moving WMD materials during United Nations Inspections.

4. Iranian Intelligence activities were ongoing in Iraq before and during the war, and Iranians were flooding the southern region of Iraq. Their goal was to thwart the goals of the U.S., and to help establish Shiite political and religious domination in Iraq.

5. Hezbollah was active in Iraq at the start of the war and conducted terrorist operations against U.S. units/personnel.

6. Al-Qaeda had been active in Iraq for many years before the war.

The intelligence activity obtained by myself and other U.S. Agents I worked with and the details of our missions/operations were submitted to the AFOSI Regional Headquarters in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. They in
turn disseminated through all levels of DOD, DOJ, CIA, ISG, etc… during the period April through July 2003.


Paul Dave Gaubatz

[Malsua]

Sean,

That's interesting. I think the downside of the polical calculations is overstated by Weldon, et. al. After all, the left firmly believes "NO WMD" so inspecting a site is just that. Inspecting a site. If nothing is found, big deal.

Timing is everything. If it does have WMD, September will be when they are found. The excuse for waiting? "We were made aware of these sites in May but due to logistics, they couldn't be exploited for at least 60 days to get proper equipment in place putting us in the middle of July. July and August are too hot for this kind of work, due to equipment failure and personnel issues".

September is 60 days out from an election that won't be pretty for many "R"s, and it would be a great boost politically. That's how our Politburo, ur..I mean ruling elites...ur..I mean congress thinks. It's all politics. After all, who cares about national security, getting re-elected is more important. One need merely look at how the Senate is pandering to special interest on the immigration issue. One interesting note on that, of the 64 Senators that voted for the amnesty bill in the Senate, only 6 are up for re-election in 2006.

-Mal

[Sean Osborne]

Sean,

That's interesting. I think the downside of the polical calculations is overstated by Weldon, et. al. After all, the left firmly believes "NO WMD" so inspecting a site is just that. Inspecting a site. If nothing is found, big deal.

Mal,

The thing is this... Air Force OSI are the best trained field intelligence men in the world - bar none. If a team of six (five plus Dave Gaubatz) find four different WMD sites in southeastern Iraq in April to July 2003 and they're convinced there is WMD hidden inside at the time of discovery - then there's a very high probably WMD agents are hidden inside.

When these sites are investigated - and they will be investigated soon - and it's determined that all or some of the WMD is missing - then that will be a very bad thing for all concerned, particularly US and Coalition soldiers in Iraq and Kuwait, because it will mean that the Islamic terrorist's exploited the site contents in the 3 year interim, and they are now in-theater WMD-armed nutcases. No further guesswork or hypothesizing required - the assessment at that point will be cold hard fact. Most soldiers turned in or no longer carry even rudimentary WMD protection at this time.

On the other hand, upon investigation, we find beaucoup Iraqi WMD in these four sites then the BIG LIE will have been finally put to rest concerning "No WMD" and the Left and all those who bought their feces can go suck and pound sand.

The investigation will occur sometime very soon. Acclimated soldiers can be there tomorrow. Remember, we were digging up MiG's in the Iraqi desert in June, July and August of 2003 - the time of year is not an issue, especially not one of this import.

The only remaining issue is to Git R Done ... Now!

[Ryan Ruck]

Sorry about that formatting SNAFU guys. Must have been some bad HTML in there some where.

Looks like my reformat fixed it.

[Sean Osborne]

Sorry about that formatting SNAFU guys. Must have been some bad HTML in there some where.

Looks like my reformat fixed it.

You da man!

[Sean Osborne]

Documents Reveal Saddam's Hidden Agenda
By Erick Stakelbeck Washington Terror Analyst

29 March 2006



–
CBN.com ... FULL ARTICLE AT LINK BELOW ... WASHINGTON - Earlier this month, the Bush administration began releasing some of the two million classified documents captured by

One shows that in 1999, Saddam's son Uday called for a wave of suicide attacks against Western targets.
Another document states that in 1995, a representative of Saddam's regime met with Osama bin Laden in Sudan with Saddam's full approval.
During the meeting, bin Laden suggested that Iraq and al-Qaeda should carry out "joint operations against foreign forces" in Saudi Arabialace. Eight months after this meeting, terrorists killed five u.s. military advisors in Riyadhlace. The terrorists claimed they had been trained by bin Laden.

Steven Hayes is a senior writer for The Weekly Standard. “You hear a lot now in the mainstream press and primarily Democratic politicians like Carl Levin and others, that there was no relationship between Iraq and al-Qaeda,” Hayes said, “…The Iraqis who are responsible for conducting the relationship--and their own documents--tell quite a different story.”

His book, The Connection, details Saddam's links to al-Qaeda. Hayes says Saddam's documents show that Iraq funded Abu Sayyaf--an al-Qaeda-linked terrorist group based in the Philippines. But that is not all.

Hayes said, “One of the documents describes the things that Iraqis--Iraqi intelligence officials, Iraqi regime officials--should do to stoke an insurgency. And they said things like kill Sunni clerics and blame the Shiites, kill Shiite clerics and blame the Sunnis. Use mosques to store arms.”

Could the newly released documents also shed light on lace w:st="on">Iraqlace>'s elusive wmds? Jack Shaw--a former top Pentagon official--said recently that Russia helped move Iraq's wmds into Syria and Lebanon prior to the U.S. invasion. Others believe that wmds are still in Iraqlace today.

David Gaubatz is a former U.S. federal agent who recently met with officials on Capitol Hill.

“I'm 100 percent confident that WMD was and still is in Iraq,” affirmed Gaubatz. “The only thing I think, with the documents -- [they’re] going to verify what I'm saying.”

In 2003, Gaubatz was assigned to Iraq for four months. His main task was to find weapons of mass destruction. He told us of sites he personally visited in the city of Nassariya in southern Iraq, where he believes Saddam's regime hid WMD.

"One is very close, Gaubatz remarked, “…within a couple of kilometers of the "Saddam Hospital"--that's what they called it at the time…They were sealing them up into the pipes. The primary stockpiles were [in] areas where you had the waterways. What they'd have to do, initially, was to drain the water in the areas. And then they would build the bunkers underneath. And then, put the water back over the bunkers, and no one from the outside could ever tell."

A number of reliable Iraqi sources led him to the sites. Gaubatz says that "ex-security officials in the area who were at the sites--police officers, military personnel, and just regular people in the city--they knew what was going on…And the people who were giving us that info, they were putting their life on the line, many times."

Gaubatz says that he passed this information along to his superiors, but no one ever came to check it out.

“They sent me there to find this stuff,” Gaubatz declared. “I located it--with not just one source, but with various credible sources---and then we're sitting back saying, ‘Well, when are you gonna come? When are you gonna come and exploit the site, and search the site?’“

Hoekstra says that he ran up against similar roadblocks in his push to have Saddam's documents released. Before changing course earlier this month, John Negroponte--the director of National Intelligence--had refused to release them. But why?
According to Hoekstra, “What we have here is, we've got a relationship or a recognition that some of the documents may embarrass some of our allies, because it will highlight the relationships that some of these governments or some of the people from these countries had with Iraq or had with Saddam Hussein.”
Just last week, the Pentagon released a report saying that two of the documents show that Russia passed along confidential details about the U.S. war plan to Saddam--and that Russia’s ambassador to Iraq gave Saddam information on U.S. troop movements. Russial denies these charges.

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice says she will discuss the documents with Russian officials. But with more and more of them becoming available, it may not be her last awkward conversation with a so-called ally.

http://www.davegaubatz.com/files/CBN_News_30_Apr_06.doc

[Sean Osborne]

Well lookie here... LTC Joe Myers just sent me an Email informing me that my article about Dave Gaubatz Iraqi WMD data was picked up by AmericanThinker.com

http://www.americanthinker.com/comme...mments_id=5300

So, I returned the favor on the NEIN mainpage by linking his related article.

Here it is:

Why We Can’t Deter Iran (because we aren’t)
June 6th, 2006



The Iranian nuclear program crisis is currently presenting the greatest challenge to the national security strategy of the Bush Administration. Strategists, diplomats and policy makers are all hard at work trying to craft a course of action and an international coalition that will dissuade and/or prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons.
Once Iran has the warheads, though, they will be able to range most of Europe and in short order the United States. This development will likely be a tipping point for others like Brazil to pursue its own nuclear deterrent capability. Their cryptic language and secretiveness with their own nuclear technology has already raised attention.

The President has been very clear with dissuasive language. In an O’Reilly Factor interview the exchange went like this:

“O’REILLY: Iran said yesterday: Hey, we’re going to develop this nuclear stuff, we don’t care what you think. You ready to use military force against Iran if they continue to defy the world on nuclear?
BUSH: My hope is that we can solve this diplomatically.
O’REILLY: But if you can’t?
BUSH: Well, let me try to solve it diplomatically, first. All options are on the table, of course, in any situation. But diplomacy is the first option.
O’REILLY: Is it conceivable that you would allow them [Iran] to develop a nuclear weapon?
BUSH: No, we’ve made it clear, our position is that they won’t have a nuclear weapon.”

The National Security Strategy (NSS) of the United States is likewise very clear. Twice it states that “the gravest danger to the Nation [and freedom] lies at the crossroads of radicalism and [nuclear] technology.” Certainly Iran is a state sponsor of terror, a country that is directly liked to acts of terror and war against the United States and clearly meets that ‘gravest’ threat formulation.
Diplomacy is our first option. Hopefully the UN will not once again demonstrate its irresoluteness, as it did with its Iraq resolutions to halt Iran’s nuclear weapons program. Military options, as President Bush stated above, remain on the table, and the US has greatly improved its Global Strike capabilities via US Strategic Command. Others have suggested a strong united international coalition against Iran might work to energize domestic Iranian opposition to forestall this eventuality, but that strong unity is not yet materializing.
Of course one key reason the unity is not materializing is China, part of the ‘coalition,’ a country that not only is not an honest broker but is the largest unacknowledged center of gravity for nuclear proliferation in the world. Whether facilitating North Korea and Pakistan’s nuclear cooperation, selling nuclear capable missiles to Saudi Arabia or actively supporting Iran’s nuclear programs—China has its own geostrategic motivations. That is to contain the US through global proxies.
Russia on the other hand must be recklessly corrupt: challenged by its own Islamist threats while dallying with exporting nuclear technology to pan-Islamist Iran for profit is rational only in the shortest term. Consequently, as of now, the diplomatic process has moved away from the Security Council with many countries painlessly acknowledging Iran’s “right to peaceful nuclear power” which of course is not the issue. Russian and China have been firm that force is not an option to resolve the crisis under any scenario. Ultimately, when all is said and done, do not expect them to be of help here.
So absent military action and the West’s acquiescence to a nuclear armed Iran, can Iran be deterred from proliferating nuclear weapons and associated technology? Can we be assured they won’t pass one to a proxy?
The answer is no, at least as current US strategies are crafted. While the Department of Defense has produced a coherent and robust set of documents based on the capstone document of the 2002 NSS there is one thread, one concept, one policy statement in the national strategy that is missing that much of these documents should provide clarity to.
What is missing is a clear statement from the United States of its counter-proliferation deterrence policy.

To date, all of the Bush strategy statements really fail to warn others, whether they are friend or foe, from proliferating WMD technologies to second or third parties that may result in a catastrophic event on U.S. soil. A nuclear detonation in a major U.S. city would have incalculable, far-ranging global consequences beyond the mere physical destruction here at home; we got a taste of it with Hurricane Katrina. The Bush Administration acknowledges we are vulnerable to WMD threats by stating

“we know from experience, that we cannot always be successful in preventing and containing the proliferation of WMD to hostile states and terrorists.”

True—and we will be even less successful without an articulated counter-proliferation deterrence policy.
While a preemptive policy is good under circumstances of a recognized threat, it cannot help after an event. What is needed is a new and updated statement of U.S nuclear deterrence that is consonant with a world of increasing WMD proliferation and rising transnational actors. This policy must first warn, and then address what the U.S. response might entail in the event that a catastrophic WMD attack occurs on U.S. soil as a result of an asymmetric, terrorist strike.
Effective deterrence and an effective statement of deterrence require not only clearly implying consequences if deterrence fails, but who the policy is attempting to deter. Proliferating countries, networks and the terrorist organizations must be put on notice and at clear risk.
Proliferation of WMD is not happening in a vacuum, magically or in isolation to proliferating states. It is happening because states like China, Pakistan and North Korea facilitate it, and because of rogue scientific networks, citizens and entities — corporate or otherwise —like AQ Khan have facilitated it.
All of the recent strategic documents, whether the National Defense Strategy, National Military Strategy or the National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism articulate DoD approaches, joint concepts and preparations across these “three pillars”: non-proliferation, counter-proliferation and consequence management. Yet these documents principally focus on what the Armed Forces must do as part of an interagency team to be prepared to act within those three -areas. But that cannot be the only answer.
A counter-proliferation deterrence policy puts focus as well on what other countries must do and what terrorist organizations might fear.
Classical U.S. nuclear deterrence strategy holds that use of WMD against the United States will invite an unacceptable and punishing response through the full range of our capabilities, up to and including our own use of nuclear weapons. Nothing in the Bush strategy fundamentally changes U.S. classical deterrence strategy regarding an attack with WMD from another country. Use WMD against America and you risk overwhelming and unacceptable levels of responsive damage.
Few would argue that U.S. cannot deter states from directly attacking the United States. What we don’t know and what remains unanswered is the question of whether the U.S. can deter states from proliferating WMD weapons or technologies to third party groups or entities like al-Qaida or Hezbollah—terrorists who theoretically cannot be deterred or contained and which could employ these weapons clandestinely on behalf of unattributed states.

A counter-proliferation deterrence policy statement roughly formulated should say in effect:

“If you are a state sponsor of terror, with or without a WMD research base, or are an avowed enemy of the U.S. and you have a public policy that espouses the hope and bent for the destruction of the U.S.; if you are a state that clandestinely proliferates (buys or sells) WMD technologies outside international agreements and inspection regimes, then you are subject to being immediately held strategically culpable should there be a catastrophic WMD event inside the U.S..”

To be sure,

“U.S. policy considers states, private, corporate or rogue entities that provide or have provided WMD technological assistance to state sponsors of terror or terrorist groups to equally be considered to have provided a fungible contribution to the catastrophic event and likewise held strategically culpable.”

The term “strategically culpable” is designed to be “strategically ambiguous.”
It is not an emphatic statement of how the U.S. will respond under a set of circumstances against a set of suspected countries, networks or individuals. It might mean, however, that rogue scientific networks or individual proliferators, military, civilian, or diplomatic around the world with representatives in their corporate offices could receive a cruise missile strike or single bullet as fast as any military industrial, WMD research or key economic target is destroyed. States may suffer a range of physical punishment, sanctions, loss of status, or changed or clarified U.S. policy positions to third parties. There must be a conspicuous cost to illicit proliferation. A range of pre-determined actions may be initiated. Targets might include both counter-force and counter-value targets; even cultural symbols.
The price of acquiescence to a nuclear armed Iran and North Korea is to place hostile states, partners, allies or putative allies on notice to aggressively monitor the activities of their governmental or private firms, citizens and agents. The chain of proliferators must police their own, because the benefits, costs and risks of their WMD programs will have just changed.
The US will likely never fully know how proliferators and threats collaborate—but they do. They know their relationships and actions. So this is not an intelligence driven policy—but one that turns the table. It is a policy that leverages the unknown about America’s response against their clandestine activities.
In any event, a tough counterproliferation strategy requires a Presidential decision to actively target individual rogue proliferators as vital threats to the security of the United States to be eliminated. A nuclear armed Iran also must mean Hezbollah is defeated, disrupted, deported, and in major cases dead.The bottom-line statement of policy of the U.S. government should be: “It is unacceptable for there to be a catastrophic WMD event inside the U.S. under any circumstance or relationship.”
Our response will not be Congressional commissions, far flung FBI forensic investigations, or mournful speeches. A mushroom cloud in the US will be a “triggering event.” As long as everyone understands that at the table, let Iran and North Korea have their nuclear weapons.

LTC Joseph C. Myers is the Senior Army Advisor to the Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB. A graduate of the US Military Academy he holds an MA from Tulane University. LTC Myers was a 2003 Senior Army Fellow at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies.



LTC Joseph C. Myers

http://www.americanthinker.com/artic...rticle_id=5555

[Ryan Ruck]

Memo Reportedly Shows Location Of WMD

Text from Saddam regime describes burial to hide from inspectors

A captured document from the Saddam regime but left untranslated by the Pentagon describes the hiding of chemical-weapons materials and the location of their burial in Iraq.

Joseph Shahda, who has translated a number of key texts from among the thousands made available on the Internet by the Defense Department, posted his work on the conservative forum FreeRepublic.com.

The memo, dated Sept. 15, 2002, is from the General Relations group of one of Saddam's military-intelligence organizations.

The document, signed by Moohsen Abdel Karim Mahmood, says a team from the Military Industrialization Commission "did bury a large container" that "contains a chemical material in the village" of Al Subbayhat, part of the district of Karma in Fallujah.

The area is described as a quarry region used by the South Korean manufacturer Samsung and "close to the homes of some citizens."

The container, the memo says, was buried using a "fleet of concrete mixers."

The text notes that before "the departure of the international inspectors in 1998, a United Nations helicopter flew over the region for two hours."

It also states:

* "A large number of the region residents know about this container from the large number of machines used to hide it then."

* "It was noticed a non ordinary smell in the region."

* "No official visited the burial site through out the years which give the impression that it is not currently known by the Military Industrialization Commission."

* "Positions for the air defense were digged [sic] in the region that surrounds the quarry place without them knowing anything about the container. Also next to it are important headquarters like (Saddam factories-The warehouses of the Commerce ministry- Headquarters of Mujaheeden Khlaq)."

The weblog Powerline points out the Military Industrial Commission ran the Iraqi weapons of mass destruction program before the 1991 Gulf War and continued its existence afterwards in a more covert fashion.

In November, the producer of a documentary on Saddam Hussein said there is no question the ousted Iraqi dictator possessed weapons of mass destruction.

Brad L. Maaske, who interviewed dozens of Iraqis in producing his film "Weapon of Mass Destruction: The Murderous Reign of Saddam Hussein," pointed out it does not take much to create a WMD.

"There didn't have to be massive stockpiles of chemicals," he explains. "A few 55-gallon drums of a nerve gas could kill a million people if properly dispersed, so it's not that difficult for him to get rid of what he had."

[Ryan Ruck]

Sean,
You know your piece was written about in The American Thinker?

WMDs still in Iraq?

Sean Osborne, Associate Director and Senior Analyst at the Northeast Intelligence Network relays a stunning report on the frustrations of retired Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI) agent Paul “Dave” Gaubatz. According to Gaubatz he has had a three year battle in trying to get the Iraqi Survey Group (ISG) or any other appropriate agency to investigate four sites in Iraq suspected of having biological and chemical weapons.

Gaubatz, a 20 year active duty veteran, was also a specially trained US Federal counter-intelligence agent and Arabic linguist. In April of 2003 he was sent to Iraq and while there,

…had identified (with other Federal Agents) 4 sites that were highly suspected of containing biological and/or chemical weapons. The sites were identified by very credible Iraqis who had knowledge and access to the areas. They risked their lives to provide intelligence about the sites and to take U.S. personnel to the locations. The sites would require heavy equipment to exploit the sites. The material was alleged to be buried deep and under water. To this date the sites have not been inspected.

I first spoke publicly about the WMD sites never being searched only after the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) and the White House announced in late 2004 that the search for WMD was over.

Over two years ago, I wrote this article for AT about the flawed search procedures used by the ISG, and about the ISG’s habit of contradicting or downplaying chemical weapons caches found by trained Coalition forces. Now, Agent Gaubitz has reinforced my suspicions of an agency seemingly unable, or more than likely, unwilling to find evidence of Saddam’s WMD stockpile.

According to Gaubitz’ timeline, he deployed as a civilian agent to the Air Force Office of Special Investigations (OSI) first into Saudi Arabia and then Nasiriyah, Iraq (Tallil Air base) from January to July 2003. He had two primary missions: Counter-terrorism and locating WMD. In April through July 2003, he and five other federal agents identified four suspected WMD sites in southern Iraq. He made numerous attempts to ISG to get the sites exploited.

To date (5 May 2006) this has not happened. Since that time, he stayed in contact with U.S. Government personnel and Iraqis who had reported the original WMD sites.

In recent months, he contacted Representative Pete Hoekstra and has held meetings with Congressman Curt Weldon. At this point he notes the process became very “political” in that Weldon

…did not want to inform any member of the DOD because he did not trust them. Congressman Hoekstra told him he shouldn’t say that. The Congressmen told me they did not want to inform any member of the Democratic Party because if we get to the sites and they have been exploited by insurgents/terrorists during the last 3 years, it would be very embarrassing to them and President Bush. Congressmen Weldon stated if we go to Iraq and locate the WMD it would help with the upcoming elections.

Gaubitz also maintains that Sharon Behn of the Washington Times interviewed him several times via phone and emails about the WMD sites and obtaining background information about the Air Force Office of Special Investigations (OSI) “losing” all of the reports submitted by Gaubitz and the other Agents assigned to Tallil Air Base Nasiriyah, Iraq. Later, he was informed by Behn that she was not going to publish the article despite (in Gaubitz’ view) the facts having been corroborated. His belief is that the article had been “squashed.”

I have no further insight into Gaubitz’ meetings with the Congressmen, or his interviews with Sharon Behn. I can say his frustrations with the ISG are remarkably similar to my experiences with them in the summer of 2003. Amazingly, the case is still not closed on Saddam’s WMD. Only now, it’s possible that terrorists may have possession of WMD at the sites that we willingly chose not to exploit and secure.

Hat Tip: Dr. Mohamed Ibn Guadi

[Sean Osborne]

Sean,
You know your piece was written about in The American Thinker?

Yup. My bud Lt. Col. Joe Myers told me about it in an email. It happened that the day it went online was the same day LTC Myers most recent went online at AmericanThinker.com.

Related closely to this, I am working in concert with AFOSI special agent Paul "Dave" Gaubatz in keeping folks informed of the most recent developments on this issue.

Here's the latest which is also on the NEIN mainpage as an update.

"For our Troops, America, and our Children I ask everyone to read my article"

U.S. Federal Agent (Retired) Dave Gaubatz & other U.S. Federal Agents identified four
suspected WMD sites in southern Iraq at the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003. To
this date the sites have never been inspected. Charles Duelfer did a substandard job in
managing the Iraq Survey Group during the initial phases of the war when he took
command of the unit. Congressman Pete Hoekstra and Congressman Curt Weldon were
provided detailed intelligence about each of the four sites several months ago.

In late 2004, President Bush and the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) officially informed the
American public the "hunt for WMD was over".

In Jan 2005, I began speaking publicly about the four suspected WMD sites that had never
been searched. I was a guest speaker on several radio and television from Jan 2005 - Mar
2006.

In Feb 2006,I met with a member of Congressman Hoekstra's staff and provided
intelligence on the suspected sites.

On 16 Mar 2006, I had a meeting with Congressman Weldon and his Chief of Staff (Russ
Caso) in Wshington DC. Congressman Weldon did not want anyone in DOD or the NRO to
be notifed, because in his words he did not trust them and they would attempt to take
credit for locating WMD in Iraq. Congressman Weldon advised he would go through private
corporations to confirm the grid coordinates of the sites.

Toward the end of Mar 2006, I was contacted by a private imaging company (arranged by
Congressman Weldon) and we discussed the site locations.

Several telephone conferences and emails between Congressman Wedlon, Hoekstra, and
their staff were exchanged during the period Mar - May 5, 2006, pertaining to the WMD
sites. I had been requested by Congressman Weldon (who had telephoned me at home and
work) to arrange a meeting with 3 Iraqi citizens who were aware of one of the WMD sites
in Basra, Iraq.

On 4 May 2006, Congressman Weldon, Congressman Hoekstra, members of their staff, the
three Iraqi citizens, and myself discussed the suspected sites in detail. Congressman
Weldon asked me several times during the meeting if I would go with them (to include the 3
Iraqis) to the four sites near Basrah and Nasiriyah, Iraq. During the meeting it was
discussed that no member of their respective committees would be informed, specifically no
member of the Democratic party. Congressman Weldon whom I had respected very much
then advised no member of the "Military" was to be informed because they could not be
trusted with this intelligence information. Congressman Hoekstra did not like this
statement, nor did I. I now did not feel comfortable going with Congressman Weldon
because this was going to be a 'political personal venture" more so than for national
security concerns. It would also not be safe for two Congressmen to go to isolated
locations in southern Iraq.

On 4 May 2006 (evening) I contacted a journalist from the Washington Times who was
going to do an article on the WMD issue and informed her of the trip scheduled to Iraq with
the Congressmen, the Iraqis and myself. She called Congressman Hoekstra's staff to
inquire about the trip. The journalist later called me to inform me she would not be running
the WMD article. I was called by another journalist on the night of 4 May 2006, and
informed the Washington Times had been told to "squash" their article. They complied for
political reasons.

I then established this website and have informed both Congressmen I will keep updating it
until the suspected WMD sites in Iraq are inspected. The Chief of Staff (Russ Caso) for
Congressman Weldon contacted me on 5 May 2006 and tried to pressure me by saying "I
would upset the wrong people" if I maintained the website. I informed Caso the site would
remain until the sites are inspected.

On 14 and 15 June 2006, I met with two DIA Agents and two CIA Agents at the FBI office
in Dallas, Tx. The Agents were very professional and we discussed the sites. I was informed
my intelligence reports as well as "all" classified intelligence reports submitted from Iraq
during the first part of 2003 could not be located. Our intelligence reports were submitted
from Iraq through a main server at Prince Sultan Air Base (PSAB), near Riyadh, Saudi
Arabia. Once we had launched operations into Iraq in Mar 2003, the Saudi Government
(our friends) advised all U.S. Operations at PSAB must be closed. This caused major
disruptions with logistics and electronic communications. I advised the DIA and CIA Agents
I would assist them in putting together the intelligence I had originally reported in 2003.

On 16 June 2006, I asked Congressman Weldon if he could arrange a "Congressional
Hearing" so the American public will know the truth behind the WMD issue, to determine
who "dropped the ball" in regards to intelligence dissemination, and to allow the American
public to decide if the suspected WMD sites should now be inspected.

On 16 June 2006, I was informed of an interview Congressman Weldon had conducted on
13 June 2003. Congressman Weldon had stated, "the jury is still out" in regards to WMD in
Iraq. He further stated he had been made aware of four WMD sites in Iraq that have never
been searched by U.S. personnel. He said he had also been briefed by "Iraqis familiar with
these sites". Weldon also stated if no WMD is located at these four sites he believes Russia
was involved in moving the WMD to Syria. (Congressman Weldon is referring to the four
sites I identified and the meeting I arranged for him involving Iraqi citizens). To read the
interview go to www.delcotimes.com. Search this site for "Weldon WMD". It is located in an
article by William Bender, titled "Liberal bloggers riled over Weldon's WMD comments". In
this article Charles Duelfer again makes a statement, "I tend to doubt that there would be
locations which haven't yet been scavenged or in other ways examined". Duelfer further
said, " the four sites targeted by Weldon are worth evaluating if it can be done safely".

The remarks made by Duelfer reflect what Agents like myself faced when we reported
suspected sites at the beginning of the war. Does Mr. Duelfer not feel if the sites were
already 'scavenged" that it would be in the interest of America to find out what was
scavenged, who scavenged them, where the scavengers took them, and what the
scavengers intentions with the WMD are? Mr. Duelfer should have understood inspecting
WMD sites in Iraq would be dangerous in wartime. Based on these two statements alone
verify Mr. Duelfer was not qualified to be in charge of the Iraq Survey Group (ISG).

I only want to protect America and more specifically I do not want our children to ever
again experience a terrorist attack like September 11th or worse. I will do my part to
prevent an attack even if I have to experience ridicule from people who believe WMD was
never in Iraq. I have always said we can't say WMD was not or is not still in Iraq if we
haven't looked at suspected sites that Federal Agents identified.

I will update this website so you will be able to click on links to all of my communications
and non classified supporting evidence to and from Congressmen Weldon and Congressman
Hoekstra. You will be able to determine what the truth is.

If Saddam Hussein had WMD, and because the four sites were not searched and now Osama
Bin Laden and his followers may now have it, we must all be concerned that we may
experience another major terrorist attack. If WMD is still or even if there is a very small
chance (as Duelfer stated) we need to search the sites for our children's safety. Below is a
photo of me with an Iraqi child at the Children's Hospital in Nasiriyah, Iraq.
U.S. Military personnel in Iraq are fighting for a cause. The safety of all children throughout
the world.

Please email me for any specific questions and I will insure each one will be answered. To
obtain more information about my 3 year battle you can "google" my name and there are
numerous newspaper, magazine, and television reports on the issue.

Thank you,

Dave Gaubatz

[Malsua]

500 Shells found. Sarin/Mustard.

Does that qualify as a stockpile?

-Mal