Prepare Now for the Coming Middle East War

[American Patriot]

Diplomats: Iran may be trying to hide evidence of nuclear tests

March 8, 2012 |
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VIENNA, AUSTRIA -- Satellite images of an Iranian military facility show trucks and earth-moving vehicles at the site, indicating that crews were trying to clean it of radioactive traces possibly left by tests of a nuclear-weapon trigger, diplomats said Wednesday.


Two of the diplomats said the crews may be trying to erase evidence of tests of a small neutron device used to set off a nuclear explosion. A third diplomat could not confirm that but said any attempt to trigger a neutron initiator at the Parchin site could only be in the context of trying to develop nuclear arms.


The images, provided to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) -- the United Nations' nuclear watchdog -- by member countries, are recent and constantly updated, one of the diplomats said.


The diplomats are nuclear experts accredited to the IAEA, and all asked for anonymity to discuss sensitive information.


Iran is under growing international pressure over its nuclear program, which it insists is peaceful. Israel has warned that it may resort to a preemptive strike against Iran's nuclear facilities to prevent Iran from obtaining atomic weapons.


The IAEA has already identified the Parchin military site as the location of suspected nuclear weapons-related testing. In a November report, it said it appeared to be the site of experiments with conventional high explosives meant to initiate a nuclear chain reaction.


It did not mention a neutron initiator as part of those tests, but in a separate section, it cited an unnamed member nation as saying Iran may have experimented with a neutron initiator, without going into detail or naming a location for such work.


In contrast, the intelligence information the two diplomats shared linked the high-explosives work directly to setting off a neutron initiator at Parchin.

[American Patriot]

Iran may be hiding nukes

11:00 PM, Mar. 7, 2012 |


Written by

The Associated Press




VIENNA — Satellite images of an Iranian military facility appear to show trucks and earth-moving vehicles at the site, indicating an attempted cleanup of radioactive traces possibly left by tests of a nuclear-weapon trigger, diplomats told The Associated Press on Wednesday.


The assertions from the diplomats, all nuclear experts accredited to the International Atomic Energy Agency, could add to the growing international pressure on Iran over its nuclear program, which Tehran insists is for peaceful purposes.
While the U.S. and the EU are backing a sanctions-heavy approach, Israel has warned that it may resort to a pre-emptive strike against Iran's nuclear facilities to prevent it from obtaining atomic weapons.
Two of the diplomats said the crews at the Parchin military site may be trying to erase evidence of tests of a small experimental neutron device used to set off a nuclear explosion. A third diplomat could not confirm that but said any attempt to trigger a so-called neutron initiator could only be in the context of trying to develop nuclear arms. The diplomats said they suspect attempts at sanitization because some of the vehicles at the scene appeared to be haulage trucks and other equipment suited to carting off potentially contaminated soil from the site.
The images, provided by member countries to the IAEA, the U.N's nuclear watchdog, are recent and constantly updated, one of the diplomats said. The diplomats all requested anonymity because they were not authorized to discuss the information on the record. The IAEA has already identified Parchin as the location of suspected nuclear weapons-related testing. In a November report, it said it appeared to be the site of experiments with conventional high explosives meant to initiate a nuclear chain reaction.
It did not mention a neutron initiator as part of those tests, but in a separate section cited an unnamed member nation as saying Iran may have experimented with a neutron initiator, without going into detail or naming a location for such work.
In contrast, the intelligence information shared with the AP by the two diplomats linked the high-explosives work directly to setting off a neutron initiator at Parchin.
In explaining such a device, the agency's November report said that "if placed in the center of a nuclear core of an implosion-type nuclear device and compressed, (it) could produce a burst of neutrons suitable for initiating a fission chain reaction."
If Iran did try to trigger a neutron initiator, it would harden international suspicions by adding a nuclear component to a suspected string of experiments linked to weapons development that generally have not included radioactive material.
Iran has previously attempted to clean up sites considered suspicious by world powers worried about Tehran's nuclear ambitions.
Iran razed the Lavizan Shian complex in northern Iran before allowing IAEA inspectors to visit the suspected repository of military procured equipment that could be used in a nuclear weapons program. Tehran said the site had been demolished to make way for a park, but inspectors who subsequently came to the site five years ago found traces of uranium enriched to or near the level used in making the core of nuclear warheads.
The Iranians also embarked on an extensive redo at the Kalay-e Electric Co., just west of Tehran, before agency inspectors were given access nine years ago. Although the site was re-painted and otherwise sanitized, samples taken from Kalay-e also showed traces of enriched uranium, though at levels substantially below warhead grade.
One official from an IAEA member country with good intelligence on Iran said the Parchin neutron initiator experiments were conducted between 2003 and 2010. Another said any such tests were closer to 2003, adding it was not clear whether they were successful.
The timing is important.
U.S. intelligence officials say they generally stand by a 2007 intelligence assessment that asserts Iran stopped comprehensive secret work on developing nuclear arms in 2003. But Britain, France, Germany, Israel and other U.S. allies think such activities have continued past that date, a view shared by the IAEA, which says in recent reports that some isolated and sporadic activities may be ongoing.
Iran vehemently denies allegations that it conducted any research and development into atomic weapons and says the totality of its nuclear activities are meant purely to generate power or for research.
Asked for comment, Ali Asghar Soltanieh, Iran's chief delegate to the IAEA, told the AP he would not discuss any nuclear issues until after he delivered his statement to the agency's 35-nation board meeting Thursday. IAEA officials also said they could not comment.
Attention most recently focused on Parchin several days ago, when senior IAEA officials first spoke of unexplained activities at the site without saying what they could be and said an inspection of buildings there was taking on added urgency.
One of six diplomats who spoke with the AP said his country continued to reserve judgment on what the movements at the site meant but two others who had seen recent spy satellite imagery said the trucks and other equipment at the site almost certainly showed attempts to clean it of radioactive contamination.
They declined to go into detail but said radioactive traces could also be left by material other than a neutron initiator, such as uranium metal which can be used as a substitute for testing purposes.
IAEA expert teams trying to probe the suspicions of secret weapons work by Iran tried — and failed — twice in recent weeks to get Iranian permission to visit Parchin. Tehran then said on Monday that such a visit would be granted.
But it said that a comprehensive agreement outlining conditions of such an inspection must first be agreed on — a move dismissed by a senior international official familiar with the issue as a delaying tactic. He, too, requested anonymity because his organization does not authorize him to speak publicly on confidential IAEA matters.
The diplomats and officials spoke ahead of a meeting of the IAEA board Thursday focusing on Iran's defiance of U.N. Security Council demands to end uranium enrichment — which can make both nuclear fuel and fissile warhead material — and dispel other suspicions that it may be seeking nuclear weapons.
That session was to take place Wednesday but had to be adjourned to give six world powers time to find common ground on how harshly to criticize Iran. They agreed on a text late Wednesday but only after marathon negotiations reflecting the difficulty of presenting a united front at upcoming talks with Iran.
Officials did not detail the text agreed upon, but the U.S., Britain, France and Germany wanted a joint statement that takes Iran to task for defying U.N. Security Council resolutions demanding it end uranium enrichment and cooperate with an IAEA probe of suspicions it secretly worked on nuclear arms.
A senior Western diplomat, however, told the AP that Russia and China, which have condemned Western sanctions on Iran as counterproductive, sought more moderate language. He spoke on condition of anonymity because his government does not authorize him to share confidential information with reporters.

[American Patriot]

AP Exclusive: Iran may be cleaning up nuke work

By GEORGE JAHN | Associated Press – 12 hrs ago

• Enlarge PhotoSatellite image received courtesy of the Institute for Science and International …
• Enlarge PhotoFILE - In this Saturday, Aug. 21, 2010, file photo, an Iranian security directs media …

See latest photos »



VIENNA (AP) — Satellite images of an Iranian military facility appear to show trucks and earth-moving vehicles at the site, indicating an attempted cleanup of radioactive traces possibly left by tests of a nuclear-weapon trigger, diplomats told The Associated Press on Wednesday.


The assertions from the diplomats, all nuclear experts accredited to the International Atomic Energy Agency, could add to the growing international pressure on Iran over its nuclear program, which Tehran insists is for peaceful purposes.


While the U.S. and the EU are backing a sanctions-heavy approach, Israel has warned that it may resort to a pre-emptive strike against Iran's nuclear facilities to prevent it from obtaining atomic weapons.


Two of the diplomats said the crews at the Parchin military site may be trying to erase evidence of tests of a small experimental neutron device used to set off a nuclear explosion. A third diplomat could not confirm that but said any attempt to trigger a so-called neutron initiator could only be in the context of trying to develop nuclear arms.


The diplomats said they suspect attempts at sanitization because some of the vehicles at the scene appeared to be haulage trucks and other equipment suited to carting off potentially contaminated soil from the site.


The images, provided by member countries to the IAEA, the U.N's nuclear watchdog, are recent and constantly updated, one of the diplomats said. The diplomats all requested anonymity because they were not authorized to discuss the information on the record.


The IAEA has already identified Parchin as the location of suspected nuclear weapons-related testing. In a November report, it said it appeared to be the site of experiments with conventional high explosives meant to initiate a nuclear chain reaction.


It did not mention a neutron initiator as part of those tests, but in a separate section cited an unnamed member nation as saying Iran may have experimented with a neutron initiator, without going into detail or naming a location for such work.


In contrast, the intelligence information shared with the AP by the two diplomats linked the high-explosives work directly to setting off a neutron initiator at Parchin.
In explaining such a device, the agency's November report said that "if placed in the center of a nuclear core of an implosion-type nuclear device and compressed, (it) could produce a burst of neutrons suitable for initiating a fission chain reaction."


If Iran did try to trigger a neutron initiator, it would harden international suspicions by adding a nuclear component to a suspected string of experiments linked to weapons development that generally have not included radioactive material.
Iran has previously attempted to clean up sites considered suspicious by world powers worried about Tehran's nuclear ambitions.


Iran razed the Lavizan Shian complex in northern Iran before allowing IAEA inspectors to visit the suspected repository of military procured equipment that could be used in a nuclear weapons program. Tehran said the site had been demolished to make way for a park, but inspectors who subsequently came to the site five years ago found traces of uranium enriched to or near the level used in making the core of nuclear warheads.


The Iranians also embarked on an extensive redo at the Kalay-e Electric Co., just west of Tehran, before agency inspectors were given access nine years ago. Although the site was re-painted and otherwise sanitized, samples taken from Kalay-e also showed traces of enriched uranium, though at levels substantially below warhead grade.


One official from an IAEA member country with good intelligence on Iran said the Parchin neutron initiator experiments were conducted between 2003 and 2010. Another said any such tests were closer to 2003, adding it was not clear whether they were successful.


The timing is important.


U.S. intelligence officials say they generally stand by a 2007 intelligence assessment that asserts Iran stopped comprehensive secret work on developing nuclear arms in 2003. But Britain, France, Germany, Israel and other U.S. allies think such activities have continued past that date, a view shared by the IAEA, which says in recent reports that some isolated and sporadic activities may be ongoing.


Iran vehemently denies allegations that it conducted any research and development into atomic weapons and says the totality of its nuclear activities are meant purely to generate power or for research.
Asked for comment, Ali Asghar Soltanieh, Iran's chief delegate to the IAEA, told the AP he would not discuss any nuclear issues until after he delivered his statement to the agency's 35-nation board meeting Thursday. IAEA officials also said they could not comment.


Attention most recently focused on Parchin several days ago, when senior IAEA officials first spoke of unexplained activities at the site without saying what they could be and said an inspection of buildings there was taking on added urgency.


One of six diplomats who spoke with the AP said his country continued to reserve judgment on what the movements at the site meant but two others who had seen recent spy satellite imagery said the trucks and other equipment at the site almost certainly showed attempts to clean it of radioactive contamination.
They declined to go into detail but said radioactive traces could also be left by material other than a neutron initiator, such as uranium metal which can be used as a substitute for testing purposes.


IAEA expert teams trying to probe the suspicions of secret weapons work by Iran tried — and failed — twice in recent weeks to get Iranian permission to visit Parchin. Tehran then said on Monday that such a visit would be granted.


But it said that a comprehensive agreement outlining conditions of such an inspection must first be agreed on — a move dismissed by a senior international official familiar with the issue as a delaying tactic. He, too, requested anonymity because his organization does not authorize him to speak publicly on confidential IAEA matters.


The diplomats and officials spoke ahead of a meeting of the IAEA board Thursday focusing on Iran's defiance of U.N. Security Council demands to end uranium enrichment — which can make both nuclear fuel and fissile warhead material — and dispel other suspicions that it may be seeking nuclear weapons.


That session was to take place Wednesday but had to be adjourned to give six world powers time to find common ground on how harshly to criticize Iran. They agreed on a text late Wednesday but only after marathon negotiations reflecting the difficulty of presenting a united front at upcoming talks with Iran.


Officials did not detail the text agreed upon, but the U.S., Britain, France and Germany wanted a joint statement that takes Iran to task for defying U.N. Security Council resolutions demanding it end uranium enrichment and cooperate with an IAEA probe of suspicions it secretly worked on nuclear arms.


A senior Western diplomat, however, told the AP that Russia and China, which have condemned Western sanctions on Iran as counterproductive, sought more moderate language. He spoke on condition of anonymity because his government does not authorize him to share confidential information with reporters.
___
George Jahn can be reached at http://twitter.com/georgejahn

[American Patriot]

Iran Whitewashing Nuclear Test Site

Iran is trying to cover its tracks at a nuclear testing site by removing traces of nuclear research, sources told Associated Press.
By Tzvi Ben Gedalyahu First Publish: 11/21/2011, 3:17 PM



Bushehr nuclear power plant
Arutz Sheva: archive

Iran is trying to cover its tracks at a nuclear testing site by removing traces of nuclear research, sources told the Associated Press.
The source from an unnamed country said intelligence officials noticed through satellite pictures that there had been an unusual amount of activity at the site, with the movement of a large number of vehicles.
“Freight trucks, special haulage vehicles and cranes were seen entering and leaving... Some equipment and dangerous materials were removed from the site," the source told AP.
The activity was confirmed by sources in two other countries, whose officials did not reach the same conclusion that Tehran is trying to hide nuclear weapons research. All three countries noting the unusual activity are members of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which declined to comment on the latest allegations.
The site at the large Parchin complex is suspected of being home to a large metal structure referred to earlier this month in an IAEA report as being used for explosive tests. The same site is used for research, development, and production of ammunition, missiles, and high explosives
The IAEA concluded in its report on November 8 that the steel chamber referred to in the new disclosure was designed for manufacturing an atomic bomb.
Iran’s postponements of IAEA attempts to visit the site have given the Islamic Republic time to try to sanitize the complex and cover its tracks, as it has allegedly done at previous nuclear facilities. One example was a nuclear site that was turned into a park before IAEA officials were able to visit for an inspection.

[American Patriot]

Images may indicate nuke testing in Iran

Published: March 7, 2012 9:56 PM
By GEORGE JAHN. The Associated Press
VIENNA -- Satellite images of an Iranian military facility appear to show trucks and earth-moving vehicles at the site, indicating an attempted cleanup of radioactive traces possibly left by tests of a nuclear-weapon trigger, diplomats told The Associated Press yesterday.
The assertions from the diplomats, all nuclear experts accredited to the International Atomic Energy Agency, could add to the growing international pressure on Iran over its nuclear program, which Tehran insists is for peaceful purposes.
While the United States and the European Union are backing a sanctions-heavy approach, Israel has warned that it may resort to a pre-emptive strike against Iran's nuclear facilities to prevent it from obtaining atomic weapons.
Two diplomats said the crews at the Parchin military site may be trying to erase evidence of tests of a small experimental neutron device used to set off a nuclear explosion. A third diplomat said any attempt to trigger a so-called neutron initiator could only be in the context of trying to develop arms.
The diplomats said they suspect attempts at sanitation because some of the vehicles at the scene appeared to be haulage trucks and other equipment suited to carting off potentially contaminated soil from the site.
The images, provided by member countries to the IAEA, the UN's nuclear watchdog, are recent and constantly updated, one of the diplomats said. The diplomats all asked for anonymity in discussing sensitive information.
The IAEA has identified Parchin as the site of suspected nuclear weapons-related testing. In a November report, it said it appeared to be the site of experiments with conventional high explosives meant to initiate a nuclear chain reaction.
The intelligence information shared with the AP by the two diplomats linked the high-explosives work directly to setting off a neutron initiator at Parchin.

[American Patriot]

U.N. accuses Iran of hiding nuclear plans

'Iran is not telling us everything,' atomic agency chief says

Author: By the CNN Wire Staff
Published On: Mar 07 2012 01:44:12 PM EST Updated On: Mar 08 2012 05:08:10 AM EST

VIENNA, Austria (CNN) - Iran is not open about its nuclear program, but it should be, the head of the U.N. nuclear watchdog agency said Wednesday.


"Iran is not telling us everything. That is my impression. We are asking Iran to engage with us proactively, and Iran has a case to answer," said Yukiya Amano, the director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency.


Amano told CNN Senior International Correspondent Matthew Chance that Iran has declared a number of nuclear facilities to the IAEA, which has them under its safeguards.
"For these facilities and activities, I can tell that they are in peaceful purpose," Amano said. "But there are also, there may be other facilities which are not declared, and we have the indication or information that Iran has engaged in activities relevant to the development of nuclear explosive devices."
Also Wednesday, a Western diplomat here said that the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, plus Germany -- the so-called P5-plus-1 -- have agreed on a joint statement on Iran, which will be delivered Thursday to the IAEA.
"The statement underlines our concerns about Iran's nuclear activities, including its uranium enrichment activities at Natanz and Fordow," the diplomat said. "It calls on the director general of the IAEA to report back on Iran's progress in fulfilling its obligations."
Diplomats at the IAEA say the statement is notable because it represents a unified message from a group that has often had difficulty speaking with one voice.
"The hope is it helps isolate Iran and indicates that Russia and China are in the West's camp in calling on Iran to comply," the diplomat said.
The United States, France, Britain, China, Russia and Germany agreed Tuesday to resume negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program. Iran signaled a willingness to let international inspectors visit a key military base that international inspectors suspect could be involved in a nuclear weapons program.
The P5-plus-1 said in a letter from the European Union's foreign policy chief, Catherine Ashton, that they would resume stalled talks. She was responding to an overture that Iran made last month.
Israel, the United States and other countries have said they suspect that Iran is trying to build nuclear weapons. International inspectors also have voiced concern, but Iran insists that its nuclear program is for peaceful civilian purposes. Israel has spoken openly about the possibility of an attack on Iran's nuclear program.
Inspectors want to enter Iran's Parchin military base to investigate evidence of ongoing activities there. Iran offered Tuesday to let international nuclear inspectors in, but only after details are worked out, its team at the IAEA said. IAEA inspectors had asked to visit the facility during a February trip to Iran but were rebuffed, the agency and Iran have both said.
Inspectors say they believe Iran may have used Parchin to test explosives that could be used to detonate a nuclear weapon. IAEA inspectors visited Parchin twice in 2005, but inspectors did not enter the building that housed the test chamber.
Most recently, after the February visit by inspectors, the agency issued a report announcing that Iran had stepped up its efforts to produce enriched uranium in violation of international resolutions and calling on it to stop. In that report, the agency expressed "serious concerns" about potential military uses by Iran.
Among other things, Iran has tripled its monthly production of uranium enriched to contain a 20% concentration of radioactive material and taken other steps to ramp up its nuclear program, Amano said Monday.
While Iran has said the higher-level enrichment is meant to produce therapies for cancer patients and other peaceful purposes, international critics have called the efforts a troubling step toward possible militarization. Nuclear weapons require concentrations of about 90%.
On Wednesday, two Western diplomats told CNN that satellite images show trucks and earth-moving vehicles at Parchin. The description buttresses IAEA concerns, reported last week by CNN's Chance last week, that the Iranians were trying to clean up the facility.
But the sources say that, while the imagery does show cleanup activity, it's not clear what might be being cleaned up.
The Iranians said this week said they would relent and allow IAEA inspectors in, but that decision came amid what diplomatic sources tell CNN is evidence that Iran is trying to clean up before allowing the United Nations inspectors to enter.
The IAEA suspects that research on triggers for nuclear weapons is being carried out at the site. In a recent report, the agency said experiments with a nuclear detonation system had been conducted inside a large metal container at Parchin.
But David Albright, president of the Institute for Science and International Security, said the satellite images do not suffice for the IAEA inspectors to draw any conclusions."They would have to have additional information," he told CNN in a telephone interview.
Most evidence of Iranian involvement in developing and testing components for nuclear weapons dates back to 2002 and 2003, he said. "Some may have continued afterward, but the evidence for work after 2003 is weaker."
Still, he added, "it's enough to warrant a visit to check it out ... Iran should allow the IAEA to go there."
Regarding possible work on triggers, Albright said finding evidence of them would be difficult.
"Our feeling is that this doesn't in any way warrant military strikes," he said. "It just warrants pressuring Iran to let the IAEA in, let them do their job and cooperate more and we can all avoid a war. So it shouldn't be seen as evidence of a nuclear weapons program."

[American Patriot]

WRAPUP 2-Powers to Iran: open army site to nuclear inspectors





Thu Mar 8, 2012 11:47am EST

(Adds Iranian, U.S. remarks at IAEA meeting)
* Iran: suspicions of bomb tests, cover-up are "ridiculous"
* Western powers, Russia, China show unity before Iran talks
* Khamenei hails Obama remarks on "diplomatic opportunity"
* But says Obama's harsh sanctions against Iran won't work
* Israel seeks advanced U.S. bunker buster bombs to hit Iran
By Fredrik Dahl
VIENNA, March 8 (Reuters) - Six world powers demanded on Thursday that Iran fulfil a promise to let international inspectors visit a military installation where the U.N. nuclear watchdog believes that explosives tests geared to developing atomic bombs may have taken place.
The joint call demonstrated unusual unity among the powers on Iran ahead of a planned revival of high-level talks as well as widening disquiet about the nature of Tehran's nuclear quest, with Israel threatening last-ditch military action.
Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei welcomed comments by U.S. President Obama about a diplomatic "window of opportunity" offered by renewed talks, but said Washington's simultaneous moves to "bring the Iranian people to their knees" with harsh sanctions were driven by delusion.
Heaping pressure on Iran to come clean on its nuclear activity, the United States, Russia, China, Britain, France and Germany used a U.N. nuclear watchdog governors' meeting to urge Tehran to grant prompt access to its Parchin military facility.
They voiced concerned that no deal was reached between Iran and International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors at talks in January and February, "including on the access to relevant sites in Iran, requested by the agency ... In that context we urge Iran to fulfil its undertaking to grant access to Parchin."
Iran has said inspectors can go to Parchin, but only after a broader deal is reached on how to address all outstanding issues between Tehran and the U.N. agency -- an approach Western diplomats dismissed as a procedural stalling tactic.
Iran's IAEA ambassador, Ali Asghar Soltanieh, told reporters outside the board meeting that the suspicions aired about Parchin were "childish" and "ridiculous". He did not elaborate.
Robert Wood, acting U.S. envoy to the IAEA, said the powers had signalled to Iran that it was "on notice to comply with its obligations" and he suggested agency governors may take further action if Tehran did nothing before they reconvened in June.
GETTING RID OF TELLTALE EVIDENCE?
Western diplomats briefed by a senior IAEA official said Iran might be delaying an inspectors' trip to Parchin so that it could first clear away evidence of research with high explosives tests relevant to designing a nuclear bomb.
They referred to a recent sequence of satellite pictures of the Parchin complex showing apparent changes to its structure.
The six powers made no mention of "sanitizing" the Parchin premises in their statement at a closed-door session of the 35-nation International Atomic Energy Agency governing board.
But their language regarding Parchin and other aspects of Iran's shadowy nuclear programme sent a message to Tehran of a cohesive stance within the group on how to diplomatically tackle the long-running stand-off, which has stirred fears of war that could inflame the Middle East and send oil prices skyrocketing.
The six powers voiced "regret" about Iran's escalating campaign to enrich uranium, which can yield material for electricity or nuclear bombs and is now centred in a mountain bunker chosen as protection from air strikes.
Iran, now facing sanctions targeting its oil exports for defying international demands to curb its nuclear activities, denies suspicions of a camouflaged bid to develop atom bombs, insisting it wants nuclear power for electricity generation.
But Israel, feeling in mortal danger from Iran's nuclear advances, openly doubts sanctions and diplomacy will rein in its arch-enemy's nuclear activity and is speaking more stridently of resorting to pre-emptive bombings of Iranian nuclear sites.
Continuing the war of words, Soltanieh warned that any Israeli attack on Iranian atomic sites would lead to the collapse of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
Iran is a party to the 1970 pact aimed at preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. But some analysts believe Iran may quit the NPT if attacked and race to build atomic bombs. Israel is not an NPT member and is believed to harbour the Middle East's only nuclear arsenal.
"Inevitably attacks on safeguarded nuclear installations of a party to the NPT by a non-party shall lead to the collapse of the NPT," Soltanieh said in a speech to the IAEA governors.
REVIVING BIG POWER TALKS WITH IRAN
Temporarily quieting the sabre-rattling, the European Union's foreign policy chief said on Tuesday the six powers had accepted Iran's offer to revive talks after a year's standstill.
To that end, the six powers said in their statement to the IAEA board read out by China's envoy: "We call on Iran to enter, without preconditions, into a sustained process of serious dialogue which will produce concrete results".
The Islamic Republic's chief nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili last month promised to float "new initiatives" at the talks, whose venue and date are not yet decided.
But Iran's ambassador to France, Ali Ahani, said on Thursday its "inalienable" right to enrich uranium would not be on the table - a stance redolent of past talks that ran aground over an inability to agree even on an agenda.
Iran has long declared its nuclear work non-negotiable and rejected, on sovereignty grounds, closer international inspections and oversight as guarantees that its enrichment activity remains peaceful, as called for by Western powers.
Ahani said all parties must be realistic in their approach to negotiations and the powers should not be worried by Iran's nuclear activities. "We have to try through dialogue to resolve them (issues) and reach a compromise and in my opinion it's better not to prejudge these negotiations in advance."
KHAMENEI PRAISES, RAPS OBAMA
Obama on Monday warned against "bluster" and "loose talk of war" over Iran, which he felt had driven up oil prices, and said he was convinced "that an opportunity remains for diplomacy - backed by pressure - to succeed".
Khamenei hailed Obama's reference to opportunity. "We heard two days ago that the U.S. president said that (they) are not thinking about war with Iran. These words are good words and an exit from delusion," Khamenei was quoted by IRNA as saying.
But Khamenei's praise for a U.S. leader, rare for Iran's paramount conservative clerical leader, was tempered by criticism of what he called an Obama remark about "bringing the Iranian people to their knees through sanctions".
"This part of his comments shows that the illusion continues," Khamenei said, according to IRNA.
The United States has succeeded in severely limiting Iran's access to global financial services and in extending its own ban on Iranian oil to the European Union and beyond.
Khamenei has stressed that no obstacle can hinder Iran's nuclear drive, which he called a "pillar of national dignity".
Preparing for war contingencies, Israel has asked Washington for advanced "bunker-buster" bombs and refuelling planes that could improve its ability to attack Iran's subterranean nuclear sites, an Israeli official said.
"Such a request was made" around the time of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's visit to Washington for talks with Obama earlier this week, said the official.
Israel's conventional military firepower may not be enough to deliver lasting damage to Iran's distant, widely dispersed and well-fortified facilities, many experts say.
Reflecting its concern that Islamist militants could attack Israel in retaliation for any military action against Iran by tunnelling in from neighbouring Lebanon or Palestinian territories, Israel is training its troops to hunt below ground with robot probes and sniffer dogs.
INTELLIGENCE TROVE
An IAEA report last year revealed a trove of intelligence pointing to research activities in Iran of use in developing the means and technologies needed to assemble nuclear weapons, should it decide to do so.
One salient finding was information that Iran had built a large containment chamber at Parchin in which to conduct high-explosives tests that the IAEA said are "strong indicators of possible weapon development".
IAEA chief Yukiya Amano this week said there were indications of unspecified "activities" at Parchin and that this made the agency want to visit the site sooner rather than later.
Suspicions about activities at the Parchin complex date back to at least 2004, when a prominent nuclear expert said satellite images showed it might be a site for nuclear weapons research.
U.N. inspectors did in fact visit Parchin in 2005. But they did not see the place where the IAEA now believes the explosives chamber was built.
Iran, one of the world's largest oil producers, has dismissed intelligence suggesting it has a nuclear weapons, rather than nuclear energy, agenda as forged and baseless. (Additional reporting by John Irish in Paris, Marcus George in Dubai, Mayaan Lubell in Jerusalem; Writing by Mark Heinrich; Editing by Peter Millership)

[vector7]

General Boykin to Beck: ‘I Believe Iran Has a Nuclear Warhead Now’

The Blaze
By Mytheos Holt | The Blaze – Wed, Mar 7, 2012

On the Glenn Beck Program tonight, Glenn welcomed two eminent guests with a great deal of experience analyzing the current state of world affairs to talk about the escalating tensions between Iran and Israel. Joining Glenn were General Jerry Boykin, and author Erick Stakelbeck, each of whom came equipped with a great deal of knowledge and some frightening predictions. Video and highlights follow:

“Don’t worry, President Obama says he’s not bluffing now, Glenn, he’s not bluffing. He really means it this time,” Stakelbeck said sarcastically. “When you have to reassure your enemies that you mean business, you’re not bluffing, you’re probably bluffing.”

When Glenn asked how close Iran was to having a nuclear weapon, Stakelbeck said he believed they were “very, very close.” General Boykin was more pessimistic.

“I have a different view, Glenn, I believe that Iran has a nuclear warhead now. Now, that’s gonna shock a lot of people, but they‘ve been working for 25 years and they’ve had the assistance of North Korea as well as the Russians. You don’t work for 25 years without succeeding in the development of a warhead.”

Boykin also explained something Glenn called the “Bubba effect,” named for the sort of person some would expect to be involved in anti-Islamic violence. Watch below:

[vector7]

LEAKED STRATFOR EMAILS:
Iranian Fighters Are Killing Syrian Troops Who Refuse to Fire On Protesters





The 125,000 IRGC fighters are responsible for the protection and survival… (Flickr/SaFoXy)

Thousands of members of Iran's Islamic Revolution Guards Corps and Lebanon's Hezbollah were fighting in Syria as of July and killing Syrian troops who refused to open fire on protestors, according to internal Stratfor emails leaked by WikiLeaks.

The email, sent on August 16, is an analyst's report on information received from one source and corroborated by another.

The source— described as a "sub-source via ME1"— is a Hezbollah student activist whose claims were "unconditionally verified" by a Hezbollah media source.


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"He says there are in Syria about 3,000 IRGC men and 2,000 HZ fighters, in addition to 300 Amal Movement men [i.e. Lebanese Resistance Detachments] and 200 [Syrian National Socialist Party] militiamen.The IRGC men are leading the pro-regime armed gangs. Syrian soldiers who refuse to open fire on protesters are killed by the Iranians and pro-Syrian Lebanese allies. The Iranians and Lebanese usually stand behind Syrian troops and kill Syrian soldiers immediately if they refuse to open fire. The 17 Syrian troops dumped in the Orontes River in Hama were killed by HZ men."

The first source also said that 42 IRGC members and 27 Hezbollah fighters were killed in Syria during July, and that Syrian cargo planes transported the dead Iranians to Tehran while several vans transported dead Hezbollah fighters to Lebanon.

Another analyst report—sent only to "[alpha]" analysts— presents "ME1 reflecting on his meetings with Turkish and Saudi ambassadors to Lebanon."

"Both diplomats say [Syrian president Bashar al-Assad] has defied their repeated requests that he listens to his people but he chose, instead, to deal with the protests in a very heavy-handed manner. The Turkish diplomat says [al-Assad] thinks that former Egyptian president Husni Mubarak and his Tunisian counterpart Zayn al-Abidin bin Ali fell because they did not use enough coercive force to crush the protests and gave up too soon. The Saudi Diplomat says [al-Assad] has consistently discarded king Abdullah's advice."

Stratfor provides confidential intelligence services to large corporationsand government agencies, including the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, the U.S. Marines and the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency.

WikiLeaks has published 782 out of what they say is a cache of 5 million internal Stratfor emails dated between July 2004 and December 2011 obtained by the hacker collective Anonymous around Christmas.

[AGEUSAF]

Well I wouldn't be surprised, if Pakistan can figure it out then the Iranians and all the help they got probably already do have it. This thing is going to get interesting.

[vector7]

The White House
Office of the Press Secretary
For Immediate Release
March 16, 2012

Executive Order -- National Defense Resources Preparedness

EXECUTIVE ORDER
NATIONAL DEFENSE RESOURCES PREPAREDNESS

By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including the Defense Production Act of 1950, as amended (50 U.S.C. App. 2061 et seq.), and section 301 of title 3, United States Code, and as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States, it is hereby ordered as follows:

PART I - PURPOSE, POLICY, AND IMPLEMENTATION
Section 101. Purpose. This order delegates authorities and addresses national defense resource policies and programs under the Defense Production Act of 1950, as amended (the "Act").

Sec. 102. Policy. The United States must have an industrial and technological base capable of meeting national defense requirements and capable of contributing to the technological superiority of its national defense equipment in peacetime and in times of national emergency. The domestic industrial and technological base is the foundation for national defense preparedness. The authorities provided in the Act shall be used to strengthen this base and to ensure it is capable of responding to the national defense needs of the United States.

Sec. 103. General Functions. Executive departments and agencies (agencies) responsible for plans and programs relating to national defense (as defined in section 801(j) of this order), or for resources and services needed to support such plans and programs, shall:

(a) identify requirements for the full spectrum of emergencies, including essential military and civilian demand;

(b) assess on an ongoing basis the capability of the domestic industrial and technological base to satisfy requirements in peacetime and times of national emergency, specifically evaluating the availability of the most critical resource and production sources, including subcontractors and suppliers, materials, skilled labor, and professional and technical personnel;

(c) be prepared, in the event of a potential threat to the security of the United States, to take actions necessary to ensure the availability of adequate resources and production capability, including services and critical technology, for national defense requirements;

(d) improve the efficiency and responsiveness of the domestic industrial base to support national defense requirements; and

(e) foster cooperation between the defense and commercial sectors for research and development and for acquisition of materials, services, components, and equipment to enhance industrial base efficiency and responsiveness.

Sec. 104. Implementation. (a) The National Security Council and Homeland Security Council, in conjunction with the National Economic Council, shall serve as the integrated policymaking forum for consideration and formulation of national defense resource preparedness policy and shall make recommendations to the President on the use of authorities under the Act.

(b) The Secretary of Homeland Security shall:

(1) advise the President on issues of national defense resource preparedness and on the use of the authorities and functions delegated by this order;

(2) provide for the central coordination of the plans and programs incident to authorities and functions delegated under this order, and provide guidance to agencies assigned functions under this order, developed in consultation with such agencies; and

(3) report to the President periodically concerning all program activities conducted pursuant to this order.

(c) The Defense Production Act Committee, described in section 701 of this order, shall:

(1) in a manner consistent with section 2(b) of the Act, 50 U.S.C. App. 2062(b), advise the President through the Assistant to the President and National Security Advisor, the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, and the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy on the effective use of the authorities under the Act; and

(2) prepare and coordinate an annual report to the Congress pursuant to section 722(d) of the Act, 50 U.S.C. App. 2171(d).

(d) The Secretary of Commerce, in cooperation with the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and other agencies, shall:

(1) analyze potential effects of national emergencies on actual production capability, taking into account the entire production system, including shortages of resources, and develop recommended preparedness measures to strengthen capabilities for production increases in national emergencies; and

(2) perform industry analyses to assess capabilities of the industrial base to support the national defense, and develop policy recommendations to improve the international competitiveness of specific domestic industries and their abilities to meet national defense program needs.

PART II - PRIORITIES AND ALLOCATIONS
Sec. 201. Priorities and Allocations Authorities. (a) The authority of the President conferred by section 101 of the Act, 50 U.S.C. App. 2071, to require acceptance and priority performance of contracts or orders (other than contracts of employment) to promote the national defense over performance of any other contracts or orders, and to allocate materials, services, and facilities as deemed necessary or appropriate to promote the national defense, is delegated to the following agency heads:

(1) the Secretary of Agriculture with respect to food resources, food resource facilities, livestock resources, veterinary resources, plant health resources, and the domestic distribution of farm equipment and commercial fertilizer;

(2) the Secretary of Energy with respect to all forms of energy;

(3) the Secretary of Health and Human Services with respect to health resources;

(4) the Secretary of Transportation with respect to all forms of civil transportation;

(5) the Secretary of Defense with respect to water resources; and

(6) the Secretary of Commerce with respect to all other materials, services, and facilities, including construction materials.

(b) The Secretary of each agency delegated authority under subsection (a) of this section (resource departments) shall plan for and issue regulations to prioritize and allocate resources and establish standards and procedures by which the authority shall be used to promote the national defense, under both emergency and non-emergency conditions. Each Secretary shall authorize the heads of other agencies, as appropriate, to place priority ratings on contracts and orders for materials, services, and facilities needed in support of programs approved under section 202 of this order.

(c) Each resource department shall act, as necessary and appropriate, upon requests for special priorities assistance, as defined by section 801(l) of this order, in a time frame consistent with the urgency of the need at hand. In situations where there are competing program requirements for limited resources, the resource department shall consult with the Secretary who made the required determination under section 202 of this order. Such Secretary shall coordinate with and identify for the resource department which program requirements to prioritize on the basis of operational urgency. In situations involving more than one Secretary making such a required determination under section 202 of this order, the Secretaries shall coordinate with and identify for the resource department which program requirements should receive priority on the basis of operational urgency.

(d) If agreement cannot be reached between two such Secretaries, then the issue shall be referred to the President through the Assistant to the President and National Security Advisor and the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism.

(e) The Secretary of each resource department, when necessary, shall make the finding required under section 101(b) of the Act, 50 U.S.C. App. 2071(b). This finding shall be submitted for the President's approval through the Assistant to the President and National Security Advisor and the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism. Upon such approval, the Secretary of the resource department that made the finding may use the authority of section 101(a) of the Act, 50 U.S.C. App. 2071(a), to control the general distribution of any material (including applicable services) in the civilian market.

Sec. 202. Determinations. Except as provided in section 201(e) of this order, the authority delegated by section 201 of this order may be used only to support programs that have been determined in writing as necessary or appropriate to promote the national defense:

(a) by the Secretary of Defense with respect to military production and construction, military assistance to foreign nations, military use of civil transportation, stockpiles managed by the Department of Defense, space, and directly related activities;

(b) by the Secretary of Energy with respect to energy production and construction, distribution and use, and directly related activities; and

(c) by the Secretary of Homeland Security with respect to all other national defense programs, including civil defense and continuity of Government.

Sec. 203. Maximizing Domestic Energy Supplies. The authorities of the President under section 101(c)(1) (2) of the Act, 50 U.S.C. App. 2071(c)(1) (2), are delegated to the Secretary of Commerce, with the exception that the authority to make findings that materials (including equipment), services, and facilities are critical and essential, as described in section 101(c)(2)(A) of the Act, 50 U.S.C. App. 2071(c)(2)(A), is delegated to the Secretary of Energy.

Sec. 204. Chemical and Biological Warfare. The authority of the President conferred by section 104(b) of the Act, 50 U.S.C. App. 2074(b), is delegated to the Secretary of Defense. This authority may not be further delegated by the Secretary.

PART III - EXPANSION OF PRODUCTIVE CAPACITY AND SUPPLY
Sec. 301. Loan Guarantees. (a) To reduce current or projected shortfalls of resources, critical technology items, or materials essential for the national defense, the head of each agency engaged in procurement for the national defense, as defined in section 801(h) of this order, is authorized pursuant to section 301 of the Act, 50 U.S.C. App. 2091, to guarantee loans by private institutions.

(b) Each guaranteeing agency is designated and authorized to: (1) act as fiscal agent in the making of its own guarantee contracts and in otherwise carrying out the purposes of section 301 of the Act; and (2) contract with any Federal Reserve Bank to assist the agency in serving as fiscal agent.

(c) Terms and conditions of guarantees under this authority shall be determined in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). The guaranteeing agency is authorized, following such consultation, to prescribe: (1) either specifically or by maximum limits or otherwise, rates of interest, guarantee and commitment fees, and other charges which may be made in connection with such guarantee contracts; and (2) regulations governing the forms and procedures (which shall be uniform to the extent practicable) to be utilized in connection therewith.

Sec. 302. Loans. To reduce current or projected shortfalls of resources, critical technology items, or materials essential for the national defense, the head of each agency engaged in procurement for the national defense is delegated the authority of the President under section 302 of the Act, 50 U.S.C. App. 2092, to make loans thereunder. Terms and conditions of loans under this authority shall be determined in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury and the Director of OMB.

Sec. 303. Additional Authorities. (a) To create, maintain, protect, expand, or restore domestic industrial base capabilities essential for the national defense, the head of each agency engaged in procurement for the national defense is delegated the authority of the President under section 303 of the Act, 50 U.S.C. App. 2093, to make provision for purchases of, or commitments to purchase, an industrial resource or a critical technology item for Government use or resale, and to make provision for the development of production capabilities, and for the increased use of emerging technologies in security program applications, and to enable rapid transition of emerging technologies.

(b) Materials acquired under section 303 of the Act, 50 U.S.C. App. 2093, that exceed the needs of the programs under the Act may be transferred to the National Defense Stockpile, if, in the judgment of the Secretary of Defense as the National Defense Stockpile Manager, such transfers are in the public interest.

Sec. 304. Subsidy Payments. To ensure the supply of raw or nonprocessed materials from high cost sources, or to ensure maximum production or supply in any area at stable prices of any materials in light of a temporary increase in transportation cost, the head of each agency engaged in procurement for the national defense is delegated the authority of the President under section 303(c) of the Act, 50 U.S.C. App. 2093(c), to make subsidy payments, after consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury and the Director of OMB.

Sec. 305. Determinations and Findings. (a) Pursuant to budget authority provided by an appropriations act in advance for credit assistance under section 301 or 302 of the Act, 50 U.S.C. App. 2091, 2092, and consistent with the Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990, as amended (FCRA), 2 U.S.C. 661 et seq., the head of each agency engaged in procurement for the national defense is delegated the authority to make the determinations set forth in sections 301(a)(2) and 302(b)(2) of the Act, in consultation with the Secretary making the required determination under section 202 of this order; provided, that such determinations shall be made after due consideration of the provisions of OMB Circular A 129 and the credit subsidy score for the relevant loan or loan guarantee as approved by OMB pursuant to FCRA.

(b) Other than any determination by the President under section 303(a)(7)(b) of the Act, the head of each agency engaged in procurement for the national defense is delegated the authority to make the required determinations, judgments, certifications, findings, and notifications defined under section 303 of the Act, 50 U.S.C. App. 2093, in consultation with the Secretary making the required determination under section 202 of this order.

Sec. 306. Strategic and Critical Materials. The Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of the Interior in consultation with the Secretary of Defense as the National Defense Stockpile Manager, are each delegated the authority of the President under section 303(a)(1)(B) of the Act, 50 U.S.C. App. 2093(a)(1)(B), to encourage the exploration, development, and mining of strategic and critical materials and other materials.

Sec. 307. Substitutes. The head of each agency engaged in procurement for the national defense is delegated the authority of the President under section 303(g) of the Act, 50 U.S.C. App. 2093(g), to make provision for the development of substitutes for strategic and critical materials, critical components, critical technology items, and other resources to aid the national defense.

Sec. 308. Government-Owned Equipment. The head of each agency engaged in procurement for the national defense is delegated the authority of the President under section 303(e) of the Act, 50 U.S.C. App. 2093(e), to:

(a) procure and install additional equipment, facilities, processes, or improvements to plants, factories, and other industrial facilities owned by the Federal Government and to procure and install Government owned equipment in plants, factories, or other industrial facilities owned by private persons;

(b) provide for the modification or expansion of privately owned facilities, including the modification or improvement of production processes, when taking actions under sections 301, 302, or 303 of the Act, 50 U.S.C. App. 2091, 2092, 2093; and

(c) sell or otherwise transfer equipment owned by the Federal Government and installed under section 303(e) of the Act, 50 U.S.C. App. 2093(e), to the owners of such plants, factories, or other industrial facilities.

Sec. 309. Defense Production Act Fund. The Secretary of Defense is designated the Defense Production Act Fund Manager, in accordance with section 304(f) of the Act, 50 U.S.C. App. 2094(f), and shall carry out the duties specified in section 304 of the Act, in consultation with the agency heads having approved, and appropriated funds for, projects under title III of the Act.

Sec. 310. Critical Items. The head of each agency engaged in procurement for the national defense is delegated the authority of the President under section 107(b)(1) of the Act, 50 U.S.C. App. 2077(b)(1), to take appropriate action to ensure that critical components, critical technology items, essential materials, and industrial resources are available from reliable sources when needed to meet defense requirements during peacetime, graduated mobilization, and national emergency. Appropriate action may include restricting contract solicitations to reliable sources, restricting contract solicitations to domestic sources (pursuant to statutory authority), stockpiling critical components, and developing substitutes for critical components or critical technology items.

Sec. 311. Strengthening Domestic Capability. The head of each agency engaged in procurement for the national defense is delegated the authority of the President under section 107(a) of the Act, 50 U.S.C. App. 2077(a), to utilize the authority of title III of the Act or any other provision of law to provide appropriate incentives to develop, maintain, modernize, restore, and expand the productive capacities of domestic sources for critical components, critical technology items, materials, and industrial resources essential for the execution of the national security strategy of the United States.

Sec. 312. Modernization of Equipment. The head of each agency engaged in procurement for the national defense, in accordance with section 108(b) of the Act, 50 U.S.C. App. 2078(b), may utilize the authority of title III of the Act to guarantee the purchase or lease of advance manufacturing equipment, and any related services with respect to any such equipment for purposes of the Act. In considering title III projects, the head of each agency engaged in procurement for the national defense shall provide a strong preference for proposals submitted by a small business supplier or subcontractor in accordance with section 108(b)(2) of the Act, 50 U.S.C. App. 2078(b)(2).

PART IV - VOLUNTARY AGREEMENTS AND ADVISORY COMMITTEES
Sec. 401. Delegations. The authority of the President under sections 708(c) and (d) of the Act, 50 U.S.C. App. 2158(c), (d), is delegated to the heads of agencies otherwise delegated authority under this order. The status of the use of such delegations shall be furnished to the Secretary of Homeland Security.

Sec. 402. Advisory Committees. The authority of the President under section 708(d) of the Act, 50 U.S.C. App. 2158(d), and delegated in section 401 of this order (relating to establishment of advisory committees) shall be exercised only after consultation with, and in accordance with, guidelines and procedures established by the Administrator of General Services.

Sec. 403. Regulations. The Secretary of Homeland Security, after approval of the Attorney General, and after consultation by the Attorney General with the Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission, shall promulgate rules pursuant to section 708(e) of the Act, 50 U.S.C. App. 2158(e), incorporating standards and procedures by which voluntary agreements and plans of action may be developed and carried out. Such rules may be adopted by other agencies to fulfill the rulemaking requirement of section 708(e) of the Act, 50 U.S.C. App. 2158(e).

PART V - EMPLOYMENT OF PERSONNEL
Sec. 501. National Defense Executive Reserve. (a) In accordance with section 710(e) of the Act, 50 U.S.C. App. 2160(e), there is established in the executive branch a National Defense Executive Reserve (NDER) composed of persons of recognized expertise from various segments of the private sector and from Government (except full time Federal employees) for training for employment in executive positions in the Federal Government in the event of a national defense emergency.

(b) The Secretary of Homeland Security shall issue necessary guidance for the NDER program, including appropriate guidance for establishment, recruitment, training, monitoring, and activation of NDER units and shall be responsible for the overall coordination of the NDER program. The authority of the President under section 710(e) of the Act, 50 U.S.C. App. 2160(e), to determine periods of national defense emergency is delegated to the Secretary of Homeland Security.

(c) The head of any agency may implement section 501(a) of this order with respect to NDER operations in such agency.

(d) The head of each agency with an NDER unit may exercise the authority under section 703 of the Act, 50 U.S.C. App. 2153, to employ civilian personnel when activating all or a part of its NDER unit. The exercise of this authority shall be subject to the provisions of sections 501(e) and (f) of this order and shall not be redelegated.

(e) The head of an agency may activate an NDER unit, in whole or in part, upon the written determination of the Secretary of Homeland Security that an emergency affecting the national defense exists and that the activation of the unit is necessary to carry out the emergency program functions of the agency.

(f) Prior to activating the NDER unit, the head of the agency shall notify, in writing, the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism of the impending activation.

Sec. 502. Consultants. The head of each agency otherwise delegated functions under this order is delegated the authority of the President under sections 710(b) and (c) of the Act, 50 U.S.C. App. 2160(b), (c), to employ persons of outstanding experience and ability without compensation and to employ experts, consultants, or organizations. The authority delegated by this section may not be redelegated.

PART VI - LABOR REQUIREMENTS
Sec. 601. Secretary of Labor. (a) The Secretary of Labor, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense and the heads of other agencies, as deemed appropriate by the Secretary of Labor, shall:

(1) collect and maintain data necessary to make a continuing appraisal of the Nation's workforce needs for purposes of national defense;

(2) upon request by the Director of Selective Service, and in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, assist the Director of Selective Service in development of policies regulating the induction and deferment of persons for duty in the armed services;

(3) upon request from the head of an agency with authority under this order, consult with that agency with respect to: (i) the effect of contemplated actions on labor demand and utilization; (ii) the relation of labor demand to materials and facilities requirements; and (iii) such other matters as will assist in making the exercise of priority and allocations functions consistent with effective utilization and distribution of labor;

(4) upon request from the head of an agency with authority under this order: (i) formulate plans, programs, and policies for meeting the labor requirements of actions to be taken for national defense purposes; and (ii) estimate training needs to help address national defense requirements and promote necessary and appropriate training programs; and

(5) develop and implement an effective labor management relations policy to support the activities and programs under this order, with the cooperation of other agencies as deemed appropriate by the Secretary of Labor, including the National Labor Relations Board, the Federal Labor Relations Authority, the National Mediation Board, and the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service.

(b) All agencies shall cooperate with the Secretary of Labor, upon request, for the purposes of this section, to the extent permitted by law.
PART VII - DEFENSE PRODUCTION ACT COMMITTEE
Sec. 701. The Defense Production Act Committee. (a) The Defense Production Act Committee (Committee) shall be composed of the following members, in accordance with section 722(b) of the Act, 50 U.S.C. App. 2171(b):

(1) The Secretary of State;
(2) The Secretary of the Treasury;
(3) The Secretary of Defense;
(4) The Attorney General;
(5) The Secretary of the Interior;
(6) The Secretary of Agriculture;
(7) The Secretary of Commerce;
(8) The Secretary of Labor;
(9) The Secretary of Health and Human Services;
(10) The Secretary of Transportation;
(11) The Secretary of Energy;
(12) The Secretary of Homeland Security;
(13) The Director of National Intelligence;
(14) The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency;
(15) The Chair of the Council of Economic Advisers;
(16) The Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration; and
(17) The Administrator of General Services.

(b) The Director of OMB and the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy shall be invited to participate in all Committee meetings and activities in an advisory role. The Chairperson, as designated by the President pursuant to section 722 of the Act, 50 U.S.C. App. 2171, may invite the heads of other agencies or offices to participate in Committee meetings and activities in an advisory role, as appropriate.

Sec. 702. Offsets. The Secretary of Commerce shall prepare and submit to the Congress the annual report required by section 723 of the Act, 50 U.S.C. App. 2172, in consultation with the Secretaries of State, the Treasury, Defense, and Labor, the United States Trade Representative, the Director of National Intelligence, and the heads of other agencies as appropriate. The heads of agencies shall provide the Secretary of Commerce with such information as may be necessary for the effective performance of this function.

PART VIII - GENERAL PROVISIONS
Sec. 801. Definitions. In addition to the definitions in section 702 of the Act, 50 U.S.C. App. 2152, the following definitions apply throughout this order:

(a) "Civil transportation" includes movement of persons and property by all modes of transportation in interstate, intrastate, or foreign commerce within the United States, its territories and possessions, and the District of Columbia, and related public storage and warehousing, ports, services, equipment and facilities, such as transportation carrier shop and repair facilities. "Civil transportation" also shall include direction, control, and coordination of civil transportation capacity regardless of ownership. "Civil transportation" shall not include transportation owned or controlled by the Department of Defense, use of petroleum and gas pipelines, and coal slurry pipelines used only to supply energy production facilities directly.

(b) "Energy" means all forms of energy including petroleum, gas (both natural and manufactured), electricity, solid fuels (including all forms of coal, coke, coal chemicals, coal liquification, and coal gasification), solar, wind, other types of renewable energy, atomic energy, and the production, conservation, use, control, and distribution (including pipelines) of all of these forms of energy.

(c) "Farm equipment" means equipment, machinery, and repair parts manufactured for use on farms in connection with the production or preparation for market use of food resources.

(d) "Fertilizer" means any product or combination of products that contain one or more of the elements nitrogen, phosphorus, and potassium for use as a plant nutrient.

(e) "Food resources" means all commodities and products, (simple, mixed, or compound), or complements to such commodities or products, that are capable of being ingested by either human beings or animals, irrespective of other uses to which such commodities or products may be put, at all stages of processing from the raw commodity to the products thereof in vendible form for human or animal consumption. "Food resources" also means potable water packaged in commercially marketable containers, all starches, sugars, vegetable and animal or marine fats and oils, seed, cotton, hemp, and flax fiber, but does not mean any such material after it loses its identity as an agricultural commodity or agricultural product.

(f) "Food resource facilities" means plants, machinery, vehicles (including on farm), and other facilities required for the production, processing, distribution, and storage (including cold storage) of food resources, and for the domestic distribution of farm equipment and fertilizer (excluding transportation thereof).

(g) "Functions" include powers, duties, authority, responsibilities, and discretion.

(h) "Head of each agency engaged in procurement for the national defense" means the heads of the Departments of State, Justice, the Interior, and Homeland Security, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the General Services Administration, and all other agencies with authority delegated under section 201 of this order.

(i) "Health resources" means drugs, biological products, medical devices, materials, facilities, health supplies, services and equipment required to diagnose, mitigate or prevent the impairment of, improve, treat, cure, or restore the physical or mental health conditions of the population.

(j) "National defense" means programs for military and energy production or construction, military or critical infrastructure assistance to any foreign nation, homeland security, stockpiling, space, and any directly related activity. Such term includes emergency preparedness activities conducted pursuant to title VI of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. 5195 et seq., and critical infrastructure protection and restoration.

(k) "Offsets" means compensation practices required as a condition of purchase in either government to government or commercial sales of defense articles and/or defense services as defined by the Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq., and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations, 22 C.F.R. 120.1 130.17.

(l) "Special priorities assistance" means action by resource departments to assist with expediting deliveries, placing rated orders, locating suppliers, resolving production or delivery conflicts between various rated orders, addressing problems that arise in the fulfillment of a rated order or other action authorized by a delegated agency, and determining the validity of rated orders.

(m) "Strategic and critical materials" means materials (including energy) that (1) would be needed to supply the military, industrial, and essential civilian needs of the United States during a national emergency, and (2) are not found or produced in the United States in sufficient quantities to meet such need and are vulnerable to the termination or reduction of the availability of the material.

(n) "Water resources" means all usable water, from all sources, within the jurisdiction of the United States, that can be managed, controlled, and allocated to meet emergency requirements, except "water resources" does not include usable water that qualifies as "food resources."

Sec. 802. General. (a) Except as otherwise provided in section 802(c) of this order, the authorities vested in the President by title VII of the Act, 50 U.S.C. App. 2151 et seq., are delegated to the head of each agency in carrying out the delegated authorities under the Act and this order, by the Secretary of Labor in carrying out part VI of this order, and by the Secretary of the Treasury in exercising the functions assigned in Executive Order 11858, as amended.

(b) The authorities that may be exercised and performed pursuant to section 802(a) of this order shall include:

(1) the power to redelegate authorities, and to authorize the successive redelegation of authorities to agencies, officers, and employees of the Government; and

(2) the power of subpoena under section 705 of the Act, 50 U.S.C. App. 2155, with respect to (i) authorities delegated in parts II, III, and section 702 of this order, and (ii) the functions assigned to the Secretary of the Treasury in Executive Order 11858, as amended, provided that the subpoena power referenced in subsections (i) and (ii) shall be utilized only after the scope and purpose of the investigation, inspection, or inquiry to which the subpoena relates have been defined either by the appropriate officer identified in section 802(a) of this order or by such other person or persons as the officer shall designate.

(c) Excluded from the authorities delegated by section 802(a) of this order are authorities delegated by parts IV and V of this order, authorities in section 721 and 722 of the Act, 50 U.S.C. App. 2170 2171, and the authority with respect to fixing compensation under section 703 of the Act, 50 U.S.C. App. 2153.

Sec. 803. Authority. (a) Executive Order 12919 of June 3, 1994, and sections 401(3) (4) of Executive Order 12656 of November 18, 1988, are revoked. All other previously issued orders, regulations, rulings, certificates, directives, and other actions relating to any function affected by this order shall remain in effect except as they are inconsistent with this order or are subsequently amended or revoked under proper authority. Nothing in this order shall affect the validity or force of anything done under previous delegations or other assignment of authority under the Act.

(b) Nothing in this order shall affect the authorities assigned under Executive Order 11858 of May 7, 1975, as amended, except as provided in section 802 of this order.

(c) Nothing in this order shall affect the authorities assigned under Executive Order 12472 of April 3, 1984, as amended.

Sec. 804. General Provisions. (a) Nothing in this order shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect functions of the Director of OMB relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.

(b) This order shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations.

(c) This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.

BARACK OBAMA
THE WHITE HOUSE,
March 16, 2012.

[American Patriot]

whats happening here? did we miss some external threat?

[samizdat]

the head of each agency engaged in procurement for the national defense, as defined in section 801(h) of this order, is authorized pursuant to section 301 of the Act, 50 U.S.C. App. 2091, to guarantee loans by private institutions.

(b) Each guaranteeing agency is designated and authorized to: (1) act as fiscal agent in the making of its own guarantee contracts and in otherwise carrying out the purposes of section 301 of the Act; and (2) contract with any Federal Reserve Bank to assist the agency in serving as fiscal agent.

(c) Terms and conditions of guarantees under this authority shall be determined in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). The guaranteeing agency is authorized, following such consultation, to prescribe: (1) either specifically or by maximum limits or otherwise, rates of interest, guarantee and commitment fees, and other charges which may be made in connection with such guarantee contracts; and (2) regulations governing the forms and procedures (which shall be uniform to the extent practicable) to be utilized in connection therewith.

Sec. 302. Loans.
the "small short war". 10 days notice. Can't pay for it. Nobody wins.
o_ welcome back beetle- thought you'd fallen off the map.

[vector7]

Russian troops just arrived in Syria and thousands at Iran's border...


Russia Deploying Troops for Temporary Dagestan Reinforcement

By Stepan Kravchenko and Ilya Arkhipov
March 19, 2012 8:43 AM EDT

Russia is sending a “temporary detachment” of troops into the southern region of Dagestan, whose border lies about 200 kilometers (124 miles) north of Iran, to combat terrorism, the Interior Ministry said.

“We are talking about a temporary deployment and coordination to prevent and counter terrorism and extremism across the whole territory of Dagestan,” Vyacheslav Makhmudov, a spokesman for the regional Interior Ministry, said from the republic’s capital city, Makhachkala.

About 1,000 troops are being moved from the nearby region of Chechnya to form temporary police units in municipalities with “complicated criminal conditions,” said Magomed Baachilov, the secretary of Dagestan’s state security council. The realignment of forces was ordered by Interior Minister Rashid Nurgaliev, with Oleg Kizhayev, a police colonel, named in charge of the ministry detachment in Dagestan, the Interior Ministry’s main directorate for the North Caucasus said on its website today.

The authorities were deploying 20,000 to 25,000 federal troops from Khankala, the main Russian army base in Chechnya, according to reports published in Caucasian Knot, a Moscow-based news and analysis group that tracks the situation in the North and South Caucasus, and the weekly Dagestani publication Chernovik, which cited unidentified local law-enforcement officials. A convoy of armored personnel carriers and military vehicles was seen moving toward southern Dagestan from March 14 to March 17, the reports said.
Separatist Insurgency

The North Caucasus has been the scene of separatist violence since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Federal forces fought two wars against rebels in Chechnya, and violence has been flaring in neighboring Dagestan, with a border shootout reported last month, a suicide bombing on March 6 and an attack on a local polling station during the March 4 presidential election. The government blames continuing violence on Islamist fighters and insurgents.

Law-enforcement agencies killed 171 militants and arrested 211 in Dagestan last year, with another eight surrendering without a fight, said Baachilov of the region’s state security council. One hundred “active members” of the insurgency remain after 15 have been killed in the first two months of this year, he said.

Vladimir Putin, then prime minister under late President Boris Yeltsin, sent ground troops into Chechnya in 1999 after four bombings of apartment buildings in Russia in September that year and an attack by Chechen fighters in August on Dagestani villages, which were occupied in an attempt to form an Islamic republic. Putin, who won a six-year term in the Kremlin in the March 4 election, served as president between 2000 and 2008.

[Ryan Ruck]

That's a sizable troop movement.

Khankala is home of the 42nd Motor Rifle Division, which has 2 Spetsnaz battalions.

[American Patriot]

We're looking at what used to be termed in the Cold War as "escalation".

Putin got in office and now he's pushing his troops out to help rogue regimes remain in power. Mutual support.

Fighting terrorism my freakin' ass. The only people who will die now will be those stupid enough to try to fend off the Russians.

I've said it before and so has about everyone else on this board.... there has to be a "big dog" and that Big Dog is going to be Russia and the "New Soviet" regime that is up and coming.

For evil to thrive good simply has to sit on it's ass and not interfere....

[vector7]

U.S. War Game Sees Perils of Israeli Strike Against Iran

By MARK MAZZETTI and THOM SHANKER



WASHINGTON — A classified war simulation held this month to assess the repercussions of an Israeli attack on Iran forecasts that the strike would lead to a wider regional war, which could draw in the United States and leave hundreds of Americans dead, according to American officials.

The officials said the so-called war game was not designed as a rehearsal for American military action — and they emphasized that the exercise’s results were not the only possible outcome of a real-world conflict.

But the game has raised fears among top American planners that it may be impossible to preclude American involvement in any escalating confrontation with Iran, the officials said. In the debate among policy makers over the consequences of any Israeli attack, that reaction may give stronger voice to those in the White House, Pentagon and intelligence community who have warned that a strike could prove perilous for the United States.

The results of the war game were particularly troubling to Gen. James N. Mattis, who commands all American forces in the Middle East, Persian Gulf and Southwest Asia, according to officials who either participated in the Central Command exercise or who were briefed on the results and spoke on condition of anonymity because of its classified nature. When the exercise had concluded earlier this month, according to the officials, General Mattis told aides that an Israeli first strike would be likely to have dire consequences across the region and for United States forces there.

The two-week war game, called Internal Look, played out a narrative in which the United States found it was pulled into the conflict after Iranian missiles struck a Navy warship in the Persian Gulf, killing about 200 Americans, according to officials with knowledge of the exercise. The United States then retaliated by carrying out its own strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities.

The initial Israeli attack was assessed to have set back the Iranian nuclear program by roughly a year, and the subsequent American strikes did not slow the Iranian nuclear program by more than an additional two years. However, other Pentagon planners have said that America’s arsenal of long-range bombers, refueling aircraft and precision missiles could do far more damage to the Iranian nuclear program — if President Obama were to decide on a full-scale retaliation.

The exercise was designed specifically to test internal military communications and coordination among battle staffs in the Pentagon; in Tampa, Fla., where the headquarters of the Central Command is located; and in the Persian Gulf in the aftermath of an Israeli strike. But the exercise was written to assess a pressing, potential, real-world situation.

In the end, the war game reinforced to military officials the unpredictable and uncontrollable nature of a strike by Israel, and a counterstrike by Iran, the officials said.

American and Israeli intelligence services broadly agree on the progress Iran has made to enrich uranium. But they disagree on how much time there would be to prevent Iran from building a weapon if leaders in Tehran decided to go ahead with one.

With the Israelis saying publicly that the window to prevent Iran from building a nuclear bomb is closing, American officials see an Israeli attack on Iran within the next year as a possibility. They have said privately that they believe that Israel would probably give the United States little or no warning should Israeli officials make the decision to strike Iranian nuclear sites.

Officials said that, under the chain of events in the war game, Iran believed that Israel and the United States were partners in any strike against Iranian nuclear sites and therefore considered American military forces in the Persian Gulf as complicit in the attack. Iranian jets chased Israeli warplanes after the attack, and Iranians launched missiles at an American warship in the Persian Gulf, viewed as an act of war that allowed an American retaliation.

Internal Look has long been one of Central Command’s most significant planning exercises, and is carried out about twice a year to assess how the headquarters, its staff and command posts in the region would respond to various real-world situations.

Over the years, it has been used to prepare for various wars in the Middle East. According to the defense Web site GlobalSecurity.org, military planners during the cold war used Internal Look to prepare for a move by the Soviet Union to seize Iranian oil fields. The American war plan at the time called for the Pentagon to march nearly six Army divisions north from the Persian Gulf to the Zagros Mountains of Iran to blunt a Soviet attack.

In December 2002, Gen. Tommy R. Franks, who was the top officer at Central Command, used Internal Look to test the readiness of his units for the coming invasion of Iraq.

Many experts have predicted that Iran would try to carefully manage the escalation after an Israeli first strike in order to avoid giving the United States a rationale for attacking with its far superior forces. Thus, it might use proxies to set off car bombs in world capitals or funnel high explosives to insurgents in Afghanistan to attack American and NATO troops.

While using surrogates might, in the end, not be enough to hide Iran’s instigation of these attacks, the government in Tehran could at least publicly deny all responsibility.

Some military specialists in the United States and in Israel who have assessed the potential ramifications of an Israeli attack believe that the last thing Iran would want is a full-scale war on its territory. Thus, they argue that Iran would not directly strike American military targets, whether warships in the Persian Gulf or bases in the region.

Their analysis, however, also includes the broad caveat that it is impossible to know the internal thinking of the senior Iranian leadership, and is informed by the awareness that even the most detailed war games cannot predict how nations and their leaders will react in the heat of conflict.

Yet these specialists continue their work, saying that any insight on how the Iranians will react to an attack will help determine whether the Israelis carry out a strike — and what the American position will be if they do.

Israeli intelligence estimates, backed by academic studies, have cast doubt on the widespread assumption that a military strike on Iranian nuclear facilities would set off a catastrophic set of events like a regional conflagration, widespread acts of terrorism and sky-high oil prices.

“A war is no picnic,” Defense Minister Ehud Barak told Israel Radio in November. But if Israel feels itself forced into action, the retaliation would be bearable, he said. “There will not be 100,000 dead or 10,000 dead or 1,000 dead. The state of Israel will not be destroyed.”

[American Patriot]

ummmmmm....

/sigh

Sure wish I could make a comment here.

[American Patriot]

I'd say "driving a rocket" might end up being a one-way trip, and END in a catastrophic set of events, no?

LMAO

(Yes, I know you meant the vehicle and not the rocket, but could not resist poking fun)

[vector7]

WORLD WAR III: Countdown to Armageddon: USA and Israel Launches Massive Military Fleet of Super-Torpedoes, Gunboats and Sea-Bots as Iran Regime Threatens to Close Hormuz and Cut World Oil Supply!

7:35 AM Andre Heath No comments

United States President, Barack Obama has warned Iran’s leaders that “the window for solving the nuclear programme issue diplomatically is shrinking.” In accordance with this, the majority of Israel’s 14-member security cabinet now supports Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in launching a pre-emptive strike on Iran. This comes against the background of Iran's declaration that it will make no concessions, despite the high geopolitical tensions. And as the rhetoric escalates, the US navy will have three aircraft carriers positioned near Iran in the coming days, and is doubling the number of minesweeping ships and helicopters based in the Gulf.

Sending more aircraft carriers to the waters near Iran, it turns out, was just the start. Yes, the U.S. currently has more seapower aimed at Iran in the Persian Gulf than in the fleets of most countries on Earth, Iran included. But that was just the Navy cracking its knuckles. In the next few months, the Navy will double its minesweeper craft stationed in Bahrain, near Iran, from four to eight. Those ships will be crucial if Iran takes the drastic step of mining the Strait of Hormuz, one of the global energy supply’s most crucial waterways. Four more MH-53 “Sea Stallion” helicopters, another minesweeping tool, are also getting ready for Bahrain, to give the U.S. Fifth Fleet early warning for any strait mining. Then the Navy will prepare to get closer to Iranian shores. Much closer. It’s got five close-action patrol boats in the Gulf right now. Once the Coast Guard returns three that the Navy loaned out, the Navy will have five other patrol craft in the United States. All those boats are getting retrofitted. With Gatling guns. And missiles. Sure, the guns aboard the two aircraft carriers currently near Iran are the seapower equivalent of high-powered, long-range rifles. “But maybe what you need is like a sawed-off shotgun,” capable of doing massive damage from a closer distance, said Adm. Jonathan Greenert, the Navy’s senior officer. All 10 of those patrol boats, Greenert told reporters at a Friday breakfast in Washington, will get strapped with the Mk-38 Gatling Gun and should make it to the Gulf next year. (Though, alas, they won’t have the Gatling/laser gun mashup BAE Systems is working on.) They’ll also get close-range missiles that can hit Iranian shores from four miles away — the same kinds Navy SEALs use. - WIRED.

In addition, two Israeli naval vessels passed through Egypt's Suez Canal on Tuesday, headed from the Mediterranean to the Red Sea, Israeli and Egyptian sources said.

"It was routine, they were on their way to Eilat" where Israel has its Red Sea naval base, an Israeli security source told AFP on condition of anonymity. A source at the Canal Authority named the vessels as the Lahav and the Yafo, without giving their size or type. Israel dispatched two missile boats to the Red Sea last August after Iran deployed a submarine and a warship there on what it called a patrol mission. The Israeli military said at the time that its own naval deployment was "part of a routine exercise." After fighting several wars since Israel's foundation in 1948, Egypt and Israel signed a peace treaty in 1979, but Israeli vessels rarely pass through the strategic waterway. The military had no comment on Tuesday's crossing, which came to the backdrop of an international standoff over Iran's nuclear programme, which much of the world believes is geared toward developing atomic weapons. It also comes after four days of deadly fighting between Israel and militants in Gaza, some of whom were suspected of using Egypt's Sinai Peninsula as a launch pad for anti-Israeli attacks. - AFP.

Meanwhile, Iran is threatening to close the Strait of Hormuz and world oil supply after trade links cutoff .

Former Intelligence Minister Ali Falahian, Iran’s senior spokesman on sanctions, said Sunday, March 18, that if the US and Europe think they can ignore international law to promote their interests, they should know that Iran will respond in kind everywhere it can. “I suggest that the West take seriously our threat to close the Strait of Hormuz,” he said in Tehran’s first response to the SWIFT decision to sever ties with Iranian banks to enforce European sanctions on its nuclear program. A large fleet of 4 US and French nuclear aircraft carriers and a dozen or more minesweepers and mine-hunting helicopters have piled up on both sides of the Strait of Hormuz, through which 17 percent of the world’s daily oil supply passes, and Israeli naval vessels have deployed in the Red Sea. debkafile’s military and intelligence sources estimate Tehran may make good on its threats by trying to drop sea mines in the strategic strait and/or the approaches to the huge Saudi Ras Tanura oil export terminal. A small explosion by an unknown hand hit a major Saudi pipeline between Awamiya and Safwa on March 1. The damage was not great because the saboteurs used a small quantity of explosive but it appeared to be the work of professionals. While Saudi officials denied the incident, photos of a large fire appeared on the Internet. Gulf oil sources suspect that it was a warning from Tehran of the hazards facing the world’s largest oil exporter. - DEBKA.