The U.S. is now facing a wide new array of weapons being marketed worldwide by Moscow and Beijing. In some cases the weapons are of Western origin. In other cases, the weapons in question are obtained from Russia and China. One such weapon sale threatens to upend the balance of power in the Middle East.
Russia stands poised to sell Iran one of the most advanced antimissile systems ever developed despite repeated denials from Moscow. Iran plans to acquire the Russian SA-20 — NATO codenamed "Gargoyle" — surface-to-air missile.
The SA-20 is not only a challenge to the air forces of other Gulf States but to even the most advanced U.S. aircraft. The SA-20 can shoot down aircraft (without stealth technology) at ranges in excess of 100 miles.
Even stealth aircraft have to be cautious around the SA-20. The missile is reportedly so deadly that even the B-2 stealth bomber is considered vulnerable once it flies within firing range of the SA-20. Only the U.S. F-22 Raptor is considered capable of penetrating the SA-20's deadly firing range.
Russia plans to mask the export of the SA-20 to Iran by using contacts within friendly nations such as Belarus to act as intermediaries for the sale. Moscow can maintain an air of deniability by using an ally to perform the export to Tehran.
It would likely take the Iranian armed forces up to two years to train in order to make the SA-20 system operational. However, the SA-20 export would almost certainly cover training support in the interim.
In addition, Israel might be tempted to pre-emptively strike suspected nuclear sites prior to the SA-20 becoming operational or even try to hamper delivery.
Another weapon in Iranian hands has recently been tested. Iran's defense ministry stated it flight-tested a Ghadr-110/Samen/Sejjil solid-propellant ballistic missile with a 1,200-mile range.
The new Iranian missile has two solid-propellant stages, a technology never demonstrated by Tehran before. The first stage uses steering vanes mounted in the rocket nozzle, a technique dating to German World War II-era V-2s.
The use of solid propellant substantially reduces the warning time for the missile because of its high velocity. After the test vehicle's 9-second flight, it either exploded due to a malfunction or was deliberately destroyed.
Defense sources are concerned about the Ghadr-110 because Iran previously did not have the technology to manufacture large stage solid propellant engines. However, the missile's first and second stages closely resemble Chinese made designs such as the DF-11 and DF-15.
While it is possible that Beijing may have sold the industrial equipment to mix and manufacture solid propellant engines to Iran — it is far more likely that Iran has purchased the engines outright from Beijing. The export of either the manufacturing capability or the engines themselves would require the U.S. to impose sanctions against China.
China is also working closely with Iran on guided cruise missile projects. One such missile is the C-704 designed and manufactured by the CASIC — the China Aerospace Science and Industry Corp. In Iran the C-704 is known as the Nasr.
CASIC publications show that the C-704 has a 286-pound warhead and 35-kilometer range. The missile is guided with either an infrared or a TV camera mounted in the seeker warhead.
Another CASIC weapon associated with Iran is the C-701 family of small anti-ship missiles.
The radar-guided version, known as the C-701AR, is likely equivalent to the Iranian Kosar 3, while the Kosar 1 equates to the TV-guided version, the C-701T.
Iran is known to have re-exported Chinese made cruise missiles to Hezbollah during the 2006 war with Israel. Hezbollah was able to score a direct hit on an Israeli warship with the Chinese weapons.
Other new threats, involving advances in commercially available electronics, are now facing American and allied commanders around the globe. For example, during the Mumbai India attacks, terrorists talked by cell phone and voice over Internet protocol (VOIP) to their commanders in Pakistan for orders about avoiding police, attacking additional sites, and selecting hostages for execution.
Another example is the 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon. Hezbollah was able to set up command-and-control networks — using commercially available, Chinese-built, high-power cordless phones to issue instructions to combat teams and rocket launcher sites. The calls could not be intercepted by the Lebanese or Israeli governments.
The advances in commercial communications are not lost on the Chinese army. Recent pictures of the interior of a new Chinese missile control vehicle show two Lenovo laptops and the commander of the integrated air defense system talking on a BlackBerry. In addition, the Chinese command vehicle was also equipped with a VOIP connection.
So far the U.S. has done little to stop the flow of western military technology to Beijing. Despite more than 100 cases of illegal exports being brought against China by the U.S. Justice Department, sanctions were recently dropped against China for the export of missile technology to Iran.
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