President Obama seeks Russian deal to slash nuclear weapons

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Russia reserves pre-emptive nuclear strike right

Tue Oct 13, 2009 2:30pm EDT



MOSCOW, Oct 13 (Reuters) - Russia in a new review of its policy on use of nuclear weapons will reserve the right to undertake a pre-emptive strike if it feels its security is endangered, a senior Kremlin official told a Russian newspaper.

Russian and U.S. negotiators are in talks to find agreement on a new bilateral pact cutting stocks of strategic nuclear weapons. Both sides are working to a December deadline for a new treaty to replace the landmark Cold War-era START pact.

While Moscow and Washington have made progress in strategic nuclear arms talks, Russia's security may come under threat from regional conflicts and local wars, Nikolai Patrushev, secretary of the Kremlin's powerful Security Council, said in an interview with Izvestia newspaper to be published on Wednesday.

Russia was revising its military doctrine to include new terms of use of its nuclear forces, he said, adding that President Dmitry Medvedev, who chairs the Security Council, would be presented with the new doctrine by the end of the year.

"Conditions of using nuclear weapons to repel an aggression with the use of conventional weapons not only in a large-scale but also in a regional and even local war have been revised," he said, without naming these conditions.

"Moreover, different variants are considered to allow the use of nuclear weapons depending on a certain situation and intentions of a would-be enemy. In conditions critical for national security one should not also exclude a preventive nuclear strike on the aggressor."

Russia's current doctrine says the "most important task is to be able to deter, including with the use of nuclear weapons, an aggression of any scale against Russia and its allies".

As Russia's conventional troops lack modern equipment and undergo a painful reform aimed to cut their numbers and create professional armed forces, Moscow relies heavily on its formidable arsenal of nuclear weapons.

The Kremlin prided itself on defeating tiny neighbour Georgia in a five-day war in August 2008. But many Russia watchers are sceptical that Moscow would be able to defeat with the same ease a larger and stronger nation. (Reporting by Dmitry Solovyov)

© Thomson Reuters 2009 All rights reserved

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13.10.2009
Politicians pleased, activists skeptical about nuclear talks

Nuclear bomb

The start of something new or a load of hot air? Deutsche Welle asked a member of the German parliament and a peace activist to assess the ongoing US-Russian talks on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.

The buzz coming out of US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's meeting on Tuesday with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov was predictably positive. Speaking after the talks in Moscow, Clinton stressed the prospects for closer cooperation between the two countries on a variety of issues, including Iran's alleged nuclear ambitions.

Moscow and Washington will continue their dialogue in the coming weeks and months and there's a lot more at stake than just Iran. With the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) scheduled to expire in December, the two powers need to come up with a replacement for the agreement that drastically cut the size of their respective nuclear arsenals over the past 20 years.

The United States and Russia possess 90 percent of the world's nuclear weapons. According to the US State Department, Washington currently maintains 5,916 nuclear warheads, while Russia has 3,897 and the US is the only nation to deploy nuclear weapons outside its own border, with some 400 warheads in Europe, and 150 in Germany alone.

So what are the prospects of an agreement about further nuclear disarmament and a common strategy for preventing other countries from acquiring atomic weapons?

Calls for disarmament

Anti-nuclear protestorsBildunterschrift: Großansicht des Bildes mit der Bildunterschrift: The majority of Germans are against US nuclear weapons being deployed in their country

The man almost sure to become Germany's next foreign minister, Guido Westerwelle, has called for US nuclear weapons to be removed from German soil. But Rolf Muetzenich - a Social Democrat member of the Bundestag and one of the leaders of his party's committee on disarmament - says the first priority will be the weapons stationed at home in both the US and Russia.

"I don't think Germany is the focus yet," Muetzenich told Deutsche Welle. "I think they'll start by examining their long-range weapons systems, including the delivery systems, which is also in Germany's interest. The second step would then be to discuss short-range systems."

The US is thought to have removed nuclear weapons from its military base in Ramstein, Germany in 2007. But by all accounts, they are still present at a Buechel Air Base in the west of the country.

Marion Kuepker, a German activist associated with Abolition 2000 - a network of more than 2,000 organizations in more than 90 countries working for a global treaty to eliminate nuclear weapons - says she sees few signs of real change.

"I personally think it's a smoke screen," Kuepker said. "At the same time as the US may have cancelled plans for a missile defense shield in Europe, money is still being allocated for new weapons systems."

Indeed, under President Barack Obama, the United States has slightly increased the amount of money it spends on its military, although not necessarily on nuclear weapons.

Proliferation process

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, right, and U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton Bildunterschrift: Großansicht des Bildes mit der Bildunterschrift: Iran was one hot topic when Clinton met her Russian counterpart Sergei Lavrov

The US and Russia not only want to reach an agreement about limiting their own arsenals, but prevent nuclear proliferation particularly in nations like Iran, which are often seen as unreliable.

Can Washington and Moscow reach a joint position on Iran, given the economic and political rivalries that are also in play?

Muetzening, who also a spokesman for his party's discussion group of the Middle East, says the answer is yes.

"It's absolutely crucial because Iran will only be impressed by a unified front," he said. "The US and Russia, which nearly borders on Iran, have a host of common interests, and I think Obama has done a lot to build trust on this issue."

For Kuepker, on the other hand, countries like Iran and North Korea aren't the true problem. "The leadership in both nations knows that any sort of nuclear attack on their part would be suicide," she said.

And she takes Obama particularly to task for failing to back up his talk about non-proliferation with radical steps toward disarmament.

"It's propaganda with little content," the peace activist said. "Obama is basically continuing George Bush's policies but within NATO, instead of in isolation."

A world without nuclear weapons

Obama speaking in PragueBildunterschrift: Revolutionary vision or foggy utopia?

In a speech last April in Prague, Obama held out a vision of a world entirely free of nuclear weaponry. That sentiment drew widespread praise, but also raised questions about whether the US President was indulging in an empty utopia - or even truly meant what he said.

For Muetzening, vision is an important part of the political process.

"I found it very refreshing," Muetzening said. "Without a long-term vision, it won't be possible to reach a meaningful agreement with Russia and a new arms-control pact could serve as the basis for the future. We need more courageous politicians. We need more than one Barack Obama."

But Kuepker says that there's no need to wait to start ridding the world of the threat of nuclear weaponry.

"Larger nations should cancel their nuclear weapons modernization projects," she told Deutsche Welle. "NATO should also depart from its stance that nuclear weapons are an option because they clearly are not an option. If they do that, then everyone will follow suit."

As the US and Russia continue to wind their way toward an agreement to replace START I and try to cope with the alleged threats posed by countries like Iran, it will be interesting to see how much vision survives the perceived political realities.

Author: Jefferson Chase

Editor: Rob Mudge

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October 13, 2009
Obama's Nuclear Agenda
By Joseph Nye

The announcement of a secret uranium enrichment facility located on a military base in Iran has sharpened U.S. President Barack Obama’s efforts to place nuclear proliferation issues at the top of the world agenda. 2010 will be a critical year.

In September, both at the United Nations and at the Group of 20 summit in Pittsburgh, many countries agreed to work on Obama’s nuclear agenda. But, in the midst of those meetings, it was revealed that Iran has been secretly building a second enrichment facility with the potential to produce weapons-grade uranium.

In early October, Iranian officials met in Geneva with representatives of the permanent members of the UN Security Council (plus Germany) and agreed to allow the International Atomic Energy Agency to inspect the hitherto secret plant. In addition, the Iranians said that they would export their existing low-enriched uranium to be fabricated into nuclear fuel outside of Iran.

If these measures are implemented, they will represent important steps. There has been widespread fear that Iran would abrogate the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, or NPT, and use its enrichment facilities to develop a nuclear weapon. It is not yet clear whether words will be matched with deeds.

Meanwhile, the United States and Russia, whose stockpiles contain more than 90 percent of the world’s nuclear weapons, are negotiating in Geneva to produce a new strategic arms reduction treaty to replace their START I arms-control agreement, which expires in December. If those talks are successful, they may yield cuts of up to one-third of all strategic nuclear warheads.

The U.S. Senate would then consider the new treaty for ratification next year. The Obama administration is also consulting with Congress on when to resubmit the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, or CTBT, which was rejected by the Senate 10 years ago.

International agreements regulating the size and composition of national defenses have often been controversial in the Senate. The new strategic arms reduction treaty, which is still a work in progress, and the CTBT have already aroused skepticism from opposition legislators and opinion-makers. If Obama submits both treaties to the Senate in 2010, he will need to convince the public that they serve an integrated strategy for enhancing national and international security. If he fails and the Senate rejects one or both of the treaties, it could have a strong negative effect on the nonproliferation regime.

In May, 189 member states of the NPT will meet in Vienna to review its status. When the NPT entered into force in 1970, it was intended to limit the number of nuclear-weapons states to five (the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, France, and China). Overall, the treaty has been a success. Many people, including President John F. Kennedy, believed in the 1960s that there would be dozens of countries with nuclear weapons by now, and that their use would be highly probable. Fortunately, this has not been the case.

Since 1970, three states that never signed the treaty have acquired nuclear weapons (India, Israel, and Pakistan). In addition, North Korea violated its treaty obligations and exploded two crude devices. Iran’s suspected nuclear-weapons program has now raised new fears that the global nonproliferation regime may unravel.

Averting that danger will require multiple, coordinated, and sustained efforts for many years to come, but ratification of post-START and the CTBT would help. For example, a new arms-reduction agreement would improve the U.S.-Russian relationship, and that, in turn, could translate into a more constructive Russian position on Iran in the Security Council. Senate approval of the CTBT would also restore America’s credibility in its efforts to get other countries to forgo nuclear testing.

Next March, Obama will host a global nuclear security summit with the aim of developing new means to combat nuclear smuggling and terrorism. In addition, his proposed long-term goal of abolishing nuclear weapons will require a great deal of preparatory work before it becomes an operational rather than an aspirational objective.

Obama will need to begin discussions with the Russians, for example, on how to handle the question of short-range nuclear weapons, and how to regulate anti-ballistic missile defenses to maintain stability in a world of fewer offensive weapons. At some point, he must open discussions with countries like China, France, and Britain to understand better the conditions for transparency and verification that would be necessary for a clearer path toward eventual elimination of nuclear weapons in accordance with Article VI of the NPT.

At the same time, Obama cannot allow these long-term issues to divert his attention from crucial short-term issues. So long as the world remains a dangerous place with several nuclear-weapons states, Obama must reassure its allies about the credibility of American guarantees of extended deterrence. Otherwise, reductions that create anxieties in other countries could lead them to develop their own weapons and thus increase the number of nuclear weapons states.

Obama will also need to pursue negotiations to persuade North Korea to return to the six-party talks with the objective of eventually giving up its nuclear weapons (as South Africa once did). And, of course, he will need to pursue the negotiations with Iran to persuade them to keep their word and remain in the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state.

How successful Obama is in managing the domestic politics and international diplomacy of his nuclear agenda will be an important factor in his effectiveness as a world leader. Even more important, his progress in 2010 will say a lot about the world’s ability to maintain the existing 60-year taboo against the use of nuclear weapons.

Joseph S. Nye, Jr. teaches at Harvard University and is author of The Powers to Lead.

© Project Syndicate

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Report: Russia to allow pre-emptive nukes

Oct 14 11:09 AM US/Eastern
By DAVID NOWAK
Associated Press Writer



MOSCOW (AP) - A top Russian security official says Moscow reserves the right to conduct pre-emptive nuclear strikes to safeguard the country against aggression on both a large and a local scale, according to a newspaper interview published Wednesday.

Presidential Security Council chief Nikolai Patrushev also singled out the U.S. and NATO, saying Moscow's Cold War foes still pose potential threats to Russia despite what he called a global trend toward local conflicts.

The interview appeared in the daily Izvestia during a visit by U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, as U.S. and Russian negotiators try to hammer out a nuclear arms reduction treaty by December. It also came amid grumbling in Moscow over U.S. moves to modify plans for a missile shield near Russia's borders rather than ditch the idea outright.

Patrushev said a sweeping document on military policy including a passage on preventative nuclear force will be handed to President Dmitry Medvedev by the end of the year, according to Izvestia.
Officials are examining "a variety of possibilities for using nuclear force, depending on the situation and the intentions of the possible opponent," Patrushev was quoted as saying. "In situations critical to national security, options including a preventative nuclear strike on the aggressor are not excluded."

The proposed doctrine would allow for the use of nuclear weapons "to repel an aggression with the use of conventional weapons not only in a large-scale but also in a regional and even local war," Patrushev was quoted as saying. He said a government analysis of the threat of conflict in the world showed "a shift from large-scale conflicts to local wars and armed conflicts."

"However, earlier military dangers and threats for our country have not lost significance," he was quoted as saying. "Activity on receiving new members into NATO is not ceasing. The military activity of the bloc is being stepped up. U.S. strategic forces are conducting intensive training on using strategic nuclear weapons."

Russian military analysts said the hawkish former domestic intelligence chief's remarks were mostly muscle-flexing for show, because what he revealed about the proposed new doctrine suggests it differs little from the current one.

One independent analyst, Alexander Golts, said current policy already allows for a nuclear strike to repel an aggression of any sort. Another, Pavel Felgenhauer, said that effectively allows for a pre-emptive strike because the type of aggression that would warrant such a strike is not clearly defined.

Russia' NATO envoy, Dmitry Rogozin, argued the proposed doctrine does not contradict arms reduction efforts. "We are moving toward a reduction in nuclear arsenals," he told Ekho Moskvy radio.
Still, Patrushev's focus on local conflicts could rattle Georgia, the small neighbor that Russia routed in a five-day conventional war with Russia last year.

Analysts also said his description of the proposed policy shows Russia's growing reliance on nuclear arms as its conventional arsenal decays and unpopular military reforms stall. Observers say the war with Georgia exposed frailties in Russia's military, adding urgency to planned reforms.

In a symptomatic setback, a scheduled test launch of the new Bulava intercontinental ballistic missile—which has failed in seven of its 11 test launches so far—was postponed, the state-run RIA Novosti news agency reported. The Bulava has been billed as the future of Russia's nuclear arsenal.

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Disarming America

by J. R. Nyquist

Weekly Column Published: 10.16.2009

Print As part of the next arms reduction treaty between superpowers, the United States has tentatively agreed to unprecedented Russian access to American nuclear missile sites. According to published accounts, Russian weapons inspectors will be given an open door to American nuclear sites in order to monitor the number of missiles and warheads. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov is quite satisfied with the deal. Perhaps it is an error of omission, but there is no news of a similar concession from the Russian side. This is psychologically and strategically significant: first, because it presents us with a President and a Secretary of State who are mistaken in their assessment of Kremlin trustworthiness; second, because it shows weakness in the President; third, because the Russians are demonstrating a kind of superiority.

The leaders of the United States are unlike any previous leaders we’ve seen at the helm of a major power. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton recently made an extraordinary statement: “We want to ensure that every question that the Russian military or Russian government asks is answered.� And she means it. If a Russian foreign minister made a similar statement, one might expect to glimpse his colleagues suppressing giggles in the background. The America side makes such statements without the least cynicism, irony or humor. The U.S. Secretary of State is putting the concerns of her Russian colleagues first.

She is not putting the concerns of the American people first. This is at the core of the process. The strategic interest of the United States holds no place in the President's policy. Some greater good – or alleged greater good – is being promoted. You may call this greater good by the name of "world peace."

This state of affairs is even more peculiar when we consider Russia's declared war policy. On 13 October Reuters reported that Russia had publicly reserved to itself “the right to undertake a pre-emptive strike if it feels its security is endangered....� This was recently announced by a senior Kremlin official. Meanwhile, the United States is publicly renouncing its right to undertake a preemptive nuclear strike in turn. If the United States sees someone else preparing a strike, no preemptive action will be taken. Washington is resolved to accept the strike, and heaven knows whether we have the will to retaliate.

Now let us imagine, if we can, the United States making an announcement that we are prepared to initiate a preemptive nuclear war. Imagine the outcry from the media, from the liberal pundits, and from Europe. Such would rate as a political bombshell, denounced at home and decried abroad as provocative. So we find, as with every issue along the Left versus Right divide, that a double standard exists.

On the Russian side, provocative actions are acceptable. On the American side, they are deplorable. We must suspect that the Russians adopted their preemptive strike policy to reassure themselves, once again, that the Americans are guilty and timid creatures who are easily manipulated into concessions.

Under the present administration the policy is clear: The American side gives up one strategic advantage after another; and the Russians have come to expect these concessions. Logically, the Kremlin envisions a day when there is a final concession; a concession that cannot be revoked; a concession that is strategically decisive. Perhaps the arms reduction talks of today are approaching that point. Once the U.S. reduces its nuclear arsenal below 500 warheads – especially if those warheads are kept on submarines - a successful Russian preemptive attack becomes possible.

Many Americans will be puzzled by the analysis presented here. They do not see a threat from Russia. They see a threat from greedy corporate interests that allegedly own governments, like our own. I recently corresponded with a reader who described the market process of today as something that needs "to be put into the service of humanity...."

Such an imperative is socialist, and whatever faults we find in capitalism (and they are many), socialism is far worse. And those countries that lived under socialism during the Cold War are still suffering from despotism and backwardness. You can ask anyone who has lived in a socialist country versus an imperfectly free country, and only those who have swallowed socialist propaganda will champion the socialist system as a better way of life. An honest and sensible person, having lived under both systems, realizes what socialism signifies. Such people appreciate American power as the only thing that stands between the imperfect freedom that makes a decent life possible, and a perfect tyranny that hinders and constrains.

It is difficult for Americans to grasp the psychology of socialist leaders in the former Soviet Union. The American Left supposes that government is benevolent, that it can be controlled once it is given absolute control over the economy. They see the corruption of capitalism and are disgusted. They have yet, in their own country, to taste the corruption of absolute government power over human economic choice.

President Obama and Secretary of State Clinton treat with the Russians as though America was guilty of imperialist ambition and trickery. They give Russian military experts unprecedented access to U.S. missile sites. Could it be, having sat in the Trinity United Church of Christ, listening to Rev. Jeremiah Wright calling God's wrath down on America, that Barack Obama is unconsciously setting up our nuclear destruction?

Copyright © 2009 Jeffrey R. Nyquist

KGB Defector Weighs in on US/Russian Relations

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Obama to allow Russian visits at U.S. nuclear sites

FOXNews.com
Tuesday, October 13, 2009



Russia and the United States have tentatively agreed to a weapons inspection program that would allow Russians to visit nuclear sites in America to count missiles and warheads.

The plan, which Fox News has learned was agreed to in principle during negotiations, would constitute the most intrusive weapons inspection program the U.S. has ever accepted.

Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, who met with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, said publicly Tuesday that the two nations have made "considerable" progress toward reaching agreement on a new strategic arms treaty.

The 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, or START, expires in December and negotiators have been racing to reach agreement on a successor.

Clinton said the U.S. would be as transparent as possible.

"We want to ensure that every question that the Russian military or Russian government asks is answered," she said, calling missile defense "another area for deep cooperation between our countries."
On another critical issue, Lavrov declared that it would be counterproductive to threaten Iran with more sanctions over its nuclear program -- as he resisted efforts by Clinton to win agreement for tougher measures should Iran fail to prove its program is peaceful.

Clinton visited Moscow on her first trip since becoming America's top diplomat, in an effort to gauge Moscow's willingness to join the U.S. in imposing sanctions.

Clinton said the U.S. agreed it was important to pursue diplomacy with Iran.

"At the same time that we are very vigorously pursuing this track, we are aware that we might not be as successful as we need to be, so we have always looked at the potential of sanctions in the event we are not successful and cannot assure ourselves and others that Iran has decided not to pursue nuclear weapons," she said at a joint news conference.

Iran insists it has the right to a full domestic nuclear enrichment program and maintains it is only for peaceful purposes, such as energy production.

President Obama -- who visited Russia in July -- has vowed to "reset" U.S.-Russia relations. On Tuesday, Clinton apologized for missing that meeting because of a broken elbow.

"But now both my elbow and our relationships are reset and we're moving forward, which I greatly welcome," she said.

She was to meet with Russian President Dmitry Medvedev later Tuesday.

Fox News' Dana Lewis and The Associated Press contributed to this report.

[vector7]

Not the same topic but similar to the post above. Someone is giving Russia and now China more access to our National Security capabilities.

Top Chinese general to visit US: Pentagon

2 hrs 39 mins ago



WASHINGTON (AFP) – China's second-ranking military officer will travel to Washington later this month on a week-long visit designed to promote trust and avoid "misunderstandings," the Pentagon said Wednesday.

General Xu Caihou, vice chairman of the People's Liberation Army central military commission, will hold high-level meetings from October 24-31 and visit military commands and bases across the United States, press secretary Geoff Morrell told a news conference.

Since Defense Secretary Robert Gates paid a visit to China two years ago, the Chinese official "has been committed to fostering a better and deeper strategic dialogue with that country, especially better trust and transparency between our two militaries," Morrell said.

Gates "has been pushing for quite some time to have this kind of visit," he said.

"The more transparency there is, the more dialogue that goes on, the less chance there is for a misunderstanding between two very formidable powers on the world's stage," Morrell said.

China is in the midst of a drive to modernize its armed forces and has announced large military budget increases in recent years, prompting US officials to question Beijing's intentions.

The two nations also experienced a series of standoffs involving Chinese vessels and US navy ships in waters off China earlier this year.
China cut military exchanges with the United States for months last year over a proposed 6.5-billion-dollar US arms package to Taiwan, but agreed to resume them in February.

Since then, the two countries have held several rounds of military talks.

During his tour, the Chinese general was due to visit sites from all the US armed services, including the US Naval Academy in Maryland, US Strategic Command in Nebraska, Nellis Air Force Base in Nevada, the US Army's Fort Benning in Georgia, the North Island Naval Air Station in San Diego and US Pacific Command in Hawaii, Morrell said.

"We will show him a great deal of how our military operates in this country," he added.

[zenbudda]

what the living f*ck!?

am i nervous for good reason? i mean i'm skeptical about a lot of things i hear/read. but this is mainstream news. how in "THE" hell is this a good thing?

[zenbudda]

OHHH is there chatter that the US is interested in using nukes in Afghanistan? Are we asking permission from Russia to use one and Russia wants to know the capabilities of the nukes?

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More deals with China at the same time we are folding to the Russians

EXCLUSIVE: Obama loosens missile technology controls to China


By Bill Gertz INSIDE THE RING



President Obama recently shifted authority for approving sales to China of missile and space technology from the White House to the Commerce Department -- a move critics say will loosen export controls and potentially benefit Chinese missile development.

The president issued a little-noticed "presidential determination" Sept. 29 that delegated authority for determining whether missile and space exports should be approved for China to Commerce Secretary Gary Locke.

Commerce officials say the shift will not cause controls to be loosened in regards to the export of missile and space technology.

Eugene Cottilli, a spokesman for Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security, said under new policy the U.S. government will rigorously monitor all sensitive exports to China.

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The presidential notice alters a key provision of the 1999 Defense Authorization Act that required that the president notify Congress whether a transfer of missile and space technology to China would harm the U.S. space-launch industry or help China's missile programs.
The law was passed after a late-1990s scandal involving the U.S. companies Space Systems/Loral and Hughes Electronics Corp.

Both companies improperly shared technology with China and were fined $20 million and $32 million, respectively, by the State Department after a U.S. government investigation concluded that their know-how was used to improve China's long-range nuclear missiles.

Section 1512 of the 1999 law requires the president to certify to Congress in advance of any missile equipment or technology exports to China that the export will not harm the U.S. space-launch industry and that "missile equipment or technology, including any indirect technical benefit that could be derived from such export, will not measurably improve the missile or space launch capabilities of the People's Republic of China."

The new policy appears aimed at increasing U.S.-China space cooperation, which has been limited since the Loral and Hughes case. It follows the Chinese military's test of an anti-satellite missile that produced potentially dangerous space junk after the missile destroyed a Chinese weather satellite in a January 2007 test.

Henry Sokolski, director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, said restoring Commerce Department control over the sensitive experts is a "step backward."

"It's as though Commerce's mishandling of missile-tech transfers to China in the 1990s never happened," said Mr. Sokolski, a former Pentagon proliferation specialist. "But it did. As a result, we are now facing much more accurate, reliable missiles from China."

Mr. Sokolski said he expects the U.S. government under the new policy to again boost Chinese military modernization through "whatever renewed 'benign' missile technology" is approved.

"It was foolish for us to do this in the 1990s and is even more dangerous for us to do now," he said.

Gary Milhollin, director of the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, which monitors export control policies, said he was surprised by the decision to shift responsibility back to Commerce -- a change that Presidents Clinton and George W. Bush did not make.

"It is shocking that it would be delegated to the secretary of commerce, whose job it is to promote trade, rather than to the secretary of state or the secretary of defense, who have far more knowledge and responsibility within their organizations for missile technology," Mr. Milhollin said.

Mr. Milhollin said a similar delegation of power would have been criticized in previous administrations. "In fact, the delegation turns the present law upside down because Congress passed it after finding that the Commerce Department had improperly helped China import U.S. missile technology in the 1990s," he said.

Edward Timperlake, a Pentagon technology-security official during the George W. Bush administration, said he agrees that the new policy likely will loosen export controls on dual-use technology that could be used to boost China's large-scale missile program.

China's military recently displayed new long-range and cruise missiles during a military parade in Beijing marking the 60th anniversary of communist rule.

"It looks like we're going to have Loral-Hughes part two," Mr. Timperlake said of the policy shift.

"The issue is that this will renew the pattern and practices of the Department of Commerce in the 1990s, when sensitive technology flowed under the rubric of space cooperation and, tragically, the Chinese ICBM force was fixed and modernized," he said.

Mr. Timperlake said the new policy is "greenlighting engagement with China in very bad areas that will negatively impact United States' national security."

Petraeus: No
Debate over a new troop surge, this one in Afghanistan, is again throwing the political spotlight on Gen. David H. Petraeus.

"Former Senate Majority Leader Bob Dole of Kansas, the Republican nominee in 1996, told Politico that he would like to see Army four-star Gen. David Petraeus - the head of the U.S. Central Command, which includes Iraq and Afghanistan -- run for president as a latter-day Ike," the news organization's heavyweights, Mike Allen and Jim VandeHei, wrote last month.

Of course, Dwight D. Eisenhower, our 34th president, is the most famous general-politician. Most recently, Gen. Wesley K. Clark, a retired four-star Army general and former commander of NATO, ran unsuccessfully for the White House in 2004.

But Gen. Petraeus, who has undergone treatment for prostate cancer, denies that he has any political aspirations. He has no intention of changing his mind, a colleague told special correspondent Rowan Scarborough. The colleague asked not to be named because he was discussing private conversations.

The publicity recalls the first time the topic of Gen. Petraeus as a political candidate arose. As the Iraq troops surge proved successful in late 2007, pundits began floating his name.

"Gen. David Petraeus has a sterling reputation, the love of the press and the adoration of the GOP," wrote the liberal American Prospect in January 2008. "Don't be surprised if a Democratic presidential win in '08 starts an effort to recruit Petraeus as the Republican candidate in '12."
The clatter became so incessant that year that Gen. Petraeus, then the top general in Iraq, convened a meeting of a few close advisers to find a way to put out the fire and end the

He had invoked "Shermanesque" type statements to no avail. When Civil War Gen. William Tecumseh Sherman was being prodded to run as a Republican in the 1884 election, he said, "I will not accept if nominated and will not serve if elected."

Since then, that statement has been uttered in various forms by scores of American politicians, including President Lyndon Johnson when he declined to run for re-election in 1968.

But Sherman was failing Gen. Petraeus. He wanted a new way of saying "no."

That is when his public relations officer, Col. Steven A. Boylan, tapped into his love of country music. He suggested the general recite a classic song, "What Part of No Don't You Understand?"

The general was immediately intrigued. "Find me exactly what was said and who said it," Gen. Petraeus ordered.

Col. Boylan researched, found the 1992 Lorrie Morgan hit and the lyrics and presented them to his boss.

By April 2008, Gen. Petraeus had the world audience he needed. Brian Williams asked him on "The NBC Nightly News" if he had a political future.

"Never," the general answered. "And I've tried to say that on a number of occasions. Some folks have reminded me of a country-western song that says 'What part of no, don't you understand?' "

B61 update
Congressional appropriators have compromised in the fight over funding a study to extend the shelf life of a 1960s nuclear bomb that the Pentagon said is urgently needed for NATO and the new F-35 jet.

Conferees working on Energy Department appropriations earlier this month agreed to approve $32.5 million of the $65 million requested by the Obama administration for the B61 nuclear bomb life extension program study, according to the Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference.

Under the compromise, the Energy Department's National Nuclear Security Administration also will be able to shift $15 million more from other programs to the bomb upgrade once the Pentagon completes its Nuclear Posture Review.

The House Appropriations subcommittee on energy and water cut all funds for the B61 upgrade because of what the subcommittee said was a lack of direction for U.S. nuclear weapons. The counterpart Senate Appropriations subcommittee version of the funding bill contained the full $56 million request.

The B61 upgrade study will help meet a deadline of 2017 for modifying the bomb so it can be carried by the F-35, according to defense officials. The F-16s that now can carry the bomb are being phased out of service over the next eight years.

The U.S. Strategic Command has said the B61 is the oldest nuclear weapon in the stockpile and needs "urgent upgrades" to include modern safety and security features.

Command briefing slides show that the B61 upgrade would boost reliability by upgrading arming, fusing and firing.

Climate spying?
The recent creation of a CIA center to study climate change does not mean the agency will be conducting espionage operations against greenhouse-gas emitters or spying on polluted skies or rivers around the world.

"This small unit -- which will engage closely with its government counterparts and private-sector experts -- is focused solely on the potential national security implications of climate change," said CIA spokesman George Little.

"Of course, intelligence is provided only to our government," he said. "This isn't about deploying clandestine officers to take air samples in polluted cities or to monitor sea lions. It's about developing analytical insights for policymakers."

The CIA announced Sept. 24 that it had created the Center on Climate Change and National Security, led by analysts within the Directorate of Intelligence and the Directorate of Science and Technology.

It will examine the national security impact of climate-change phenomena, such as desertification, rising sea levels, population shifts and heightened competition for natural resources.

"Decision-makers need information and analysis on the effects climate change can have on security. The CIA is well-positioned to deliver that intelligence," said CIA Director Leon E. Panetta.

Much of the work will focus on reviewing and declassifying satellite images and other data that could be useful for scientists.

The center also will involve "outreach" to academics and think tanks.

"The goal is a powerful asset recognized throughout our government, and beyond, for its knowledge and insight," the CIA statement said.

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Russia: We’ll Nuke ‘Aggressors’ First

• By Nathan Hodge
• October 14, 2009 |
• 10:31 am |
• Categories: Nukes, Russia, Tactics, Strategy and Logistics

Russia is weighing changes to its military doctrine that would allow for a “preventive� nuclear strike against its enemies — even those armed only with conventional weapons. The news comes just as American diplomats are trying to get Russia to cut down its nuclear stockpile, and put the squeeze on Iran’s suspect nuclear program.

In an interview published today in Izvestia, Nikolai Patrushev, the secretary of the Kremlin’s security council, said the new doctrine offers “different options to allow the use of nuclear weapons, depending on a certain situation and intentions of a would-be enemy. In critical national security situations, one should also not exclude a preventive nuclear strike against the aggressor.�

What’s more, Patrushev said, Russia is revising the rules for the employment of nukes to repel conventionally armed attackers, “not only in large-scale, but also in a regional and even a local war.�

Gulp. If I were in Georgia — or in any other country Russia considers part of its sphere of influence — that formulation would make me pretty anxious.

The Russian Federation is considering the “first strike� option as part of a larger overhaul of military doctrine. The new doctrine, which is supposed to be presented to President Dmitry Medvedev later this year, is supposed to provide “flexible and timely� responses to national security threats.

The United States and Russia may prepping to negotiate a new strategic arms reduction treaty after President Obama declared a “reset� in relations between Moscow and Russia. But Patrushev, apparently, didn’t get the memo. In the interview, he takes a swipe at the United States and NATO, saying that the alliance “continues to press for the admission of new members to NATO, the military activities of the bloc are intensifying, and U.S. strategic forces are conducting intensive exercises to improve the management of strategic nuclear weapons.�

In other words, Moscow is holding to a hard line, precisely at a time when Washington is trying to play nice. The administration wants the Kremlin’s help — to pressure Iran, to revive the arms-control process — but the bear still needs to brandish nukes.

[PHOTO: Wikimedia]

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Who should fear Russia’s new military doctrine?

14:3123/10/2009



MOSCOW. (RIA Novosti military commentator Ilya Kramnik) – Russia’s new military doctrine, which is to come into force in 2010, has provoked a heated debate, first of all because it stipulates preemptive nuclear strikes.

Moreover, it says that nuclear weapons may also be used in local conflicts in case of critical threats to Russia’s national security.

The wording has encouraged some people to say that Russia intends to use nuclear weapons in conflicts with its closest neighbors – former Soviet republics.

A critical threat to Russia’s national security can come from different types of conflicts, including a large-scale war with a block of countries, or a hypothetical territorial conflict with one or several militarily developed countries.

Since the armed forces of the former Soviet republics are not very efficient, it can be assumed that only the Baltic countries, which are NATO members, can pose a critical threat to Russia. Although there is zero probability of a conflict with a Baltic country, if such a war does break out, it will immediately overgrow the scale of a local conflict, and it is not a Baltic territory that will be Russia’s target in this case.

A critical threat can also be created by an attempt by a more developed neighbor who is not a member of a NATO-type military alliance to use military force against Russia to settle a territorial dispute. Theoretically, such a conflict is possible with Japan if Japanese politicians seeking to use military force to solve the Kuril problem come to power there.

However, a critical threat to Russia is more probable in a larger war. Russia started speaking about the possibility of delivering preemptive nuclear strikes long ago, in the late 1990s after NATO bombed Yugoslavia. Russia subsequently held war games West 1999 simulating a military conflict with NATO similar to the one in Yugoslavia.

That war game showed that only nuclear weapons would save Russia in case of a Western aggression. The Russian government subsequently changed the schemes of using nuclear weapons, especially tactical ones.

The new provision was sealed in two fundamental documents – the military doctrine and the national security concept adopted in 2000. They read that the use of nuclear weapons is justified and necessary “to repel a military aggression when all other methods of settling the crisis have been used and proved ineffective.�

The decision looked logical at the time since NATO’s military power was superior to Russia, and the situation has not changed much since then. On the other hand, the possibility of a dispute – let alone a military conflict – with NATO has decreased because Russia has launched a new round of dialogue with the bloc. But military doctrines stipulate basic provisions that do not take into account the current tactical situation.

It should be said that other countries, including the United States, are also considering preemptive nuclear strikes.

Russia’s new military doctrine also has a clause on the use of military force to protect the lives and interests of Russian citizens abroad. This new addition to the Law On Defense was approved in the summer of 2009, and it will also be sealed in the new military doctrine.

On the whole, the new military doctrine reflects Russia’s gradual movement toward Western standards of the use of military force. The ideological provisions of the Soviet Union’s military doctrine – with the exception of the term “potential enemy� – have long been forgotten. Russia now intends to use its military force when and where necessary, and against any opponent.

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Russian submarine successfully test-launches ballistic missile




12:2701/11/2009

MOSCOW, November 1 (RIA Novosti) - A Russian nuclear submarine has successfully test-launched a ballistic missile, the Defense Ministry said on Sunday.

"On November 1, the Northern Fleet's nuclear-powered missile-carrying submarine, Bryansk, successfully test-launched an intercontinental ballistic missile in the Barents Sea from a submerged position," the ministry said in a statement.

"The warheads reached the target area at the designated time," the statement said.

Russia's nuclear triad comprises land-based ballistic missile systems, nuclear-powered submarines armed with sea-launched ballistic missiles, and strategic bombers carrying nuclear bombs and nuclear-capable cruise missiles.

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U.S. officials optimistic about new nuclear treaty with Russia

Kremlin says there is 'every chance' to agree on START successor

COMMENT
28 Comments | View All »

By Mary Beth Sheridan and Walter Pincus
Washington Post Staff Writer
Sunday, November 8, 2009

After months of negotiations with Russia, Obama administration officials are hopeful about a breakthrough -- possibly this week -- that would enable the two sides to sign a successor to their most extensive nuclear weapons treaty before it expires Dec. 5.

The optimism stems from a trip to Moscow in late October by national security adviser James L. Jones, who gave his Kremlin counterpart a package of proposals for the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, or START, according to U.S. and Russian officials. Moscow has not yet formally responded, but high-level Russian officials have reacted positively, senior U.S. officials said.

Russian President Dmitry Medvedev said in remarks released Saturday that both sides "have every chance to agree on a new treaty, determine new [weapons] levels and control measures and sign a legally binding document [by] the end of the year." With U.S. policymakers and the Pentagon united behind Jones's proposals, Kremlin policymakers have gone back to the Russian military to get its approval or perhaps recommendations for counterproposals.

Securing a replacement for the 1991 treaty is a critical first step in President Obama's ambitious global arms-control agenda. Analysts and lawmakers have watched nervously as the agreement's deadline approaches, fearing a lapse in the complex verification procedures that are credited with providing stability between the nuclear giants. Both sides have discussed leaving those procedures in place until a new pact goes into effect.

U.S. officials' optimism contrasted with concerns expressed recently by American and Russian analysts that the talks have not produced final agreement on key issues: limits on nuclear-capable launchers; verification procedures; U.S. proposals to put conventional warheads on strategic land- and submarine-based ballistic missiles; and missile defense systems. The United States remains reluctant to give much ground on a Russian request for strong language linking disarmament to missile defense.

The new START agreement will contain relatively modest cuts in the 1,700 to 2,200 deployed warheads allowed to each side under a June 2002 agreement between President George W. Bush and then-Russian President Vladimir Putin. At a summit in July, Obama and Medvedev agreed on a new ceiling of 1,500 to 1,675 for each side.

A more contentious issue has been reducing the number of nuclear-capable bombers and land- or submarine-based missiles, with the Russians pressing for deeper cuts than the U.S. side. The Russians have proposed that the current limit of 1,600 each be slashed to 500; U.S. negotiators have suggested 1,100. Jones's proposal was a "judicious compromise," a U.S. official said, without disclosing a figure. Outside speculation has put the number at about 700.

The Russians still want that total to include any strategic missile launchers that carry conventional rather than nuclear warheads, a position the U.S. negotiators may accept.

Another debate focuses on verification programs. The Russians have talked of halting U.S. inspections of their missile factories because they have no equal role in the United States, which is no longer building strategic intercontinental ballistic missiles.

Although a new accord seems within reach by Dec. 5, it is still not likely to win ratification in the U.S. Senate for months. With that in mind, Sen. Richard G. Lugar (R-Ind.) introduced a bill Thursday that would allow Obama to temporarily extend, on a reciprocal basis, privileges to Russian arms inspection teams that travel to the United States.

"Allowing a break in verification activities is not in the interest of the United States or Russia," Lugar said on the Senate floor.

Senior U.S. officials told The Washington Post that they also want to put in place a "bridge mechanism" when the treaty expires to allow for the continuation of inspections, exchanges of data, and notification about the testing and movement of weapons and other changes. They spoke on the condition of anonymity because of the sensitive nature of the talks.

The United States and Russia control more than 90 percent of the world's nuclear weapons, and both sides have said they hope that shrinking their stockpiles will inspire other nations to support tougher measures to prevent the spread of the deadly weapons to countries such as Iran.

A Russian response to Jones's proposals is expected soon, perhaps when both sides return to the negotiating table in Geneva on Monday.

"We hope that this will be the last round and that by December 5 we will have agreed on a new accord," Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman Andrei Nesterenko told the Interfax news agency, according to Agence France-Presse.

Ellen O. Tauscher, the undersecretary of state who oversees arms control and who accompanied Jones to Moscow, said, "There are issues that we have to work through, but there is also a path forward."

Even if a new treaty is signed soon, there is no chance it will be sent to the Senate for ratification before next year. Administration officials recognize that they have to prepare extensive backup material based on questions already raised by key Republicans, including Sen. Jon Kyl (Ariz.), who has been monitoring the talks.

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November 9, 2009
Dangerous Trajectories: Obama's Approach to Arms Control Misreads Russian Nuclear Strategy

by Ariel Cohen, Ph.D.
Backgrounder #2338

Abstract: Russia still considers the United States its "principal adversary." Moscow relies on its nuclear weapons to compensate for its inferiority in conventional power relative to the U.S., NATO, and China. Russian political and military leaders are still captives of czarist and Soviet geopolitical thinking and military traditions. U.S. policymakers need to understand this background and Russia's Soviet-style negotiating tactics when negotiating realistic and verifiable arms control agreements with Russia. The Obama Administration's wishful thinking and unilateral concessions will not produce a better nuclear treaty.

As the Obama Administration negotiates a range of arms control initiatives with Russia, U.S. policymakers need to critically examine Russia's views on nuclear weapons and doctrine. While successive U.S. Administrations have announced that Russia is no longer the enemy, Russia still considers the United States its "principal adversary," despite President Barack Obama's attempts to "reset" bilateral relations. U.S. national leadership and arms control negotiators need to understand Russia's nuclear doctrine and negotiating style as they are, not as the U.S. wants them to be.

U.S. nuclear policymakers need to protect the United States from nuclear threats; reduce the risk of nuclear conflict; and negotiate transparent, verifiable, and workable arms control agreements with Russia and other nuclear powers. It is in U.S. interests to convince Russia to adopt a similar agenda and to pursue arms control and nonproliferation in areas where U.S. and Russian national interests coincide. A win-win strategy may conflict with 800 years of Russian history in which it fought regional and global powers, but the alternative -- a new arms race reminiscent of the Cold War -- is economically and politically unpalatable to both nations.

The Obama Administration's approach of unilateral concessions will not prevent a new arms race. Nor should the Administration pursue an overambitious arms control strategy. Instead, it should negotiate a verification and transparency protocol to the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT or Moscow Treaty). Meanwhile, the U.S. should not accept a Russian strategic posture designed to threaten the U.S. and its allies or the further reduction of Russia's threshold for using nuclear weapons. Rather, the U.S. should pursue a "protect and defend" strategic posture, which includes a defensive nuclear posture, missile defense, and nuclear modernization. Finally, the U.S. should propose a realistic, detailed, transparent, verifiable, and enforceable arms control and nonproliferation agenda with the Russian Federation.

Only by understanding the evolution and current state of Russia's nuclear doctrine and its approach to negotiations can U.S. decision makers develop a coherent policy toward Russia.

Looking Back to Look Forward

Russia's approach to arms control is a product of Soviet and subsequent Russian nuclear strategy. Russia integrates its nuclear strategy with arms control, missile defense, a lower threshold for the first use of nuclear weapons, nonproliferation, nuclear modernization, and development of next-generation weapons into a strategic posture that maximizes deterrence and warfighting capability at a minimal cost.

The Obama Administration has been preoccupied with pushing Russia to sign a successor to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) before the December 2009 deadline. The proposed treaty, which is opposed by a number of Members of Congress, would limit both countries to 1,500-1,675 warheads and 500-1,100 delivery platforms (land-based missiles, submarine-launched missiles, and strategic bombers).[1] The Moscow Treaty, signed by President George W. Bush and President Vladimir Putin in 2002, limits both sides to 2,200 warheads and 1,600 delivery vehicles until 2012, but its verification procedures are flawed.[2]

The Obama Administration's arms control strategy to date has been deeply flawed. The Administration cancelled deployment of 10 ground-based missile interceptors in Eastern Europe and publicly embraced the "road to zero" (full nuclear disarmament), which is unrealistic in today's unstable and proliferating world. This approach, based on outdated 1970s arms control strategy and 1960s idealism and naïveté will not work because it does not account for Russian nuclear strategy, which is based on approximate parity between the two sides, Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD), denial of missile defenses to the U.S., and nuclear warfighting capability.

The Burden of History

Twenty years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, communist ideology is almost dead in Russia, but Russian great power ideology has replaced it. Russian national leaders, generals, and experts are still captives of the czarist and Soviet geopolitical thinking and military traditions.[3] Theirs is a deeply suspicious and xenophobic worldview shaped by incessant wars against regional and global powers -- from the Tatars to the Germans.

In the 20th century, the USSR could compete with the United States only in the military arena. By the late 1960s, Russia had almost caught up with the United States in the size and sophistication of its nuclear deterrent. In all else the socialist camp lagged hopelessly behind the West, including consumer goods, popular culture, health care, and standard of living.[4]

Ostensibly, the purpose of the Soviet-era arms control was to lock the U.S. and the USSR into nuclear parity, reducing the chances of either side launching a first strike. Meanwhile, the USSR pursued illegal defense options and obtained a first-strike capability. At the same time, the Soviet Union pursued strategic challenges to the U.S. through Third World expansion, Finlandization of Europe, and intelligence-based influence operations ("active measures").

Arms control agreements, such as the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) and the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, limited both offensive and defensive weapons. SALT I limited strategic nuclear forces on both sides and froze deployment of anti-ballistic missile defenses, but not research and development. The USSR had already deployed a missile defense system around Moscow, and the U.S. decided not to deploy one. Yet SALT I failed to stop the arms race. By 1981, Russia had almost quadrupled its arsenal to more than 8,000 warheads, while the U.S. had more than doubled its stockpile to more than 10,000 warheads.[5]

The follow-on Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), signed by President George H. W. Bush and President Mikhail Gorbachev on July 31, 1991, drastically cut the number of warheads to reflect the end of the Cold War. On May 24, 2002, President George W. Bush and President Putin signed the Moscow Treaty, the shortest and least detailed arms control agreement of the post-Cold War era.

The Moscow Treaty called for each side to reduce the number of nuclear warheads from the 6,000 under START to 1,700-2,200 operationally deployed warheads, but it did not limit the number of tactical nuclear weapons (TNW). Russia reportedly has several thousand TNWs. SORT abandoned qualitative and quantitative parity in offensive strategic nuclear capabilities and relied on less explicit verification and implementation arrangements, although the START verification provisions that applied to warheads and delivery vehicles remained in place. SORT allowed Russia to pursue nuclear modernization, eliminate obsolete or costly weapons systems, and design and produce more cost-effective and modern missiles.[6]

Today, Russia is pursuing an arms control regime that would allow it to accomplish these goals while keeping U.S. programs, such as global missile defense, in check or even discrediting them. It also designed to maintain Russia's prestige and the semblance of strategic parity with the United States.

Restoring Russia's Power

Under Putin's leadership, Russia is reviving its great power status by rebuilding its military, especially its nuclear component, and capitalizing on its massive energy resources. Russia's geopolitical clout is benefiting from Europe's dependence on Russian energy exports.[7]

After the Soviet collapse, many in the upper echelons of the Russian elite retained the vision of global grandeur. As early as 1999, retired General Makhmout Gareyev, a leading Soviet and Russian military thinker and former deputy chief of the Soviet general staff, stated:

One of the most important unifying factors is the idea of Russia's rebirth as a great power, not a regional power...but a truly great power on a global scale. This is determined not by someone's desire, not just by possession of nuclear weapons or by size of territory, but by the historic traditions and objectives met in the development of the Russian society and state. [8]

Today's Russia is continuing the strategic stance and policies that characterized the Soviet military, including MAD targeting plans, strategic bomber flights over the Atlantic and the Pacific Oceans near U.S. and allied airspace, navy and air force visits to Venezuela and Cuba, and military base construction in the Arab world.[9] The increasing militarization of Russian foreign policy has also brought a buildup of nuclear weapons.

Nuclear Weapons as a Policy Tool. The Russian elites view nuclear weapons as a warfighting tool and an instrument of foreign and security policy. In 2006, President Putin emphasized the importance of the nuclear arsenal:

When looking at today's international situation and the prospects for its development, Russia is compelled to realize that nuclear deterrence is a key element in guaranteeing the country's security.... The Russian nuclear weapons complex constitutes the material basis for this nuclear deterrence policy.... Keeping the necessary minimum of nuclear deterrence remains one of the main priorities of Russian Federation policy in this arena.[10]

During the Cold War, the USSR pursued the "struggle for peace." The Soviet intelligence services recruited "useful idiots" and fellow travelers to mouth the disarmament propaganda for consumption by the West. Even today, the Russian leadership makes peaceful statements for dissemination abroad, which are often clearly contradicted by "true confessions" at home. For example, in 2003, Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov said:

What we say is one thing. That sounds cynical, but everything that we plan does not necessarily have to be made public. We believe that from the foreign-policy viewpoint it is better to say that. But what we actually do is an entirely different matter if we're talking about nuclear weapons. They are the chief components of our security, and there can be no doubt that attention toward them cannot be relaxed.[11]

This statement reflects the old Soviet approach in which speeches for external consumption were understood as just propaganda. The USSR launched and operated dozens of front organizations to support the disarmament of the West, all of them ultimately run and/or supervised by the KGB.[12] At the same time, the Soviet intelligence apparatus was busy stealing Western technology to develop a superior nuclear arsenal.

Ex-Soviet intelligence officers, such as Putin and Ivanov, cannot easily forget their Soviet-era conditioning. Under their leadership, Russia's attempts to rebuild its regional and global power are founded on modernizing its nuclear weapons, updating its nuclear doctrine, and clinging to the nexus between missile defenses and offensive weapons in the arms control negotiations.

The Russian Strategic Objective: Parity with the United States. Since the Soviet victory in World War II and the occupation of Eastern Europe, Soviet leaders and later Russian leaders believed that the United States should treat their country as an equal, especially in the military realm. The constant barrage of demands for honor, recognition, and status has continued since the end of World War II, freezing the adversarial U.S.-Russia relationship in a posture of mutual deterrence. If the sides looked at each other without the prism of nuclear deterrence, the comparatively small size of Russia's economy (approximately one-ninth of the U.S. economy) would be visible to all. The American "adversary" is a projection of Russia's chronically insecure rulers. It is also a standing justification for Russia's bloated military, intelligence, and secret services budgets and a useful means of consolidating domestic support for the regime.[13]

However, additional threats have appeared on Russia's security horizon. In 1969, Soviet troops clashed with Chinese infantry in the Russian Far East.[14] Today, China is numerically and economically superior to Russia, and it possesses long-range and intermediate-range nuclear-armed ballistic missiles. Furthermore, with Soviet and Russian assistance, North Korea and Iran have acquired intermediate-range ballistic missiles and are busy developing nuclear weapons, despite international pressure. Russia may eventually need to address these developing threats.

At the same time, qualitatively new weapon systems in Western military arsenals -- including missile defenses, conventionally armed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), stealth technology, space systems, and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) -- highlight the Russian military's conventional inferiority. More than ever before, Russia relies on nuclear weapons, and the United States and NATO remain its proclaimed principal security concerns.

Dark Vision: The Kremlin's Threat Perception

When President Boris Yeltsin led an independent Russian Federation out of the ruins of the USSR in January 1992, official security doctrine proclaimed that Russia had no enemies. Yet that attitude was undermined by those, such as spy chief and later Foreign Minister and Prime Minister Yevgeny M. Primakov, who yearned for a multipolar world in which U.S. power would be diluted by Russia, China, India, and the Islamic world. The Russian military leadership articulated an anti-American strategy due to a combination of belief and pragmatism. It would also justify multi-billion dollar budgets for weapons modernization and much-needed reform.

After the confrontation with NATO in Kosovo in spring 1999, two rounds of NATO expansion, and the Iraq war, Russia's anti-American rhetoric escalated. Statements by Russian leaders from Putin on down demonstrated that the Russian national leadership still viewed the United States as Russia's glavny protivnik (principal adversary). For example, after the horrific 2004 terrorist attack in Beslan, Putin stated:

Some want to cut off a juicy morsel from us while others are helping them.

They are helping because they believe that, as one of the world's major nuclear powers, Russia is still poses a threat to someone, and therefore this threat must be removed.

And terrorism is, of course, only a tool for achieving these goals.[15]

Putin and his surrogates clarified that he blamed the West led by the U.S., despite the total lack of evidence that the West was involved in the barbaric hostage taking.[16] Vladislav Surkov, Putin's chief of ideology, announced in the daily Komsomolskaya Pravda that Russia was being confronted by "[a]ctors that still live by Cold-War phobias" and that "[t]heir goal is destroying Russia and filling its immense space with multiple weak quasi-states." He warned, "The enemy is at the gate. The front line crosses every city, every street, every house."[17]

Putin also addressed the trauma caused by the breakup of the USSR, terming it "the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century."[18] This trauma is at the root of the inferiority complex of today's post-Soviet Russian ruling elite, which demands symbolic compensation: oil, territory, nuclear weapons, restoration of a Russian sphere of influence throughout the former Soviet Union and in areas of former Soviet influence, such as in the Middle East.[19]

Russian Nuclear Weapons: Defense on the Cheap. Russia views its nuclear deterrent as the most cost-effective way to preserve its security. Its formidable strategic triad consists of silo-based and mobile missiles of the Strategic Nuclear Forces, submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and strategic bombers. (See Table 1.) These are regulated by extant arms control agreements. In addition, Russia has thousands of TNWs, which are not regulated by such treaties. Russia sees these weapons as "nuclear equalizers," compensating for Russia's conventional inferiority vis-Ã*-vis the U.S., NATO, and China.

In November 2008, President Dmitry Medvedev threatened Poland with short-range Iskander missiles, while Chief of the General Staff Nikolai Makarov publicly proclaimed that Russia would retain its tactical nuclear weapons as a guarantee of Russian security as long as Europe is "packed with armaments."[20] Prime Minister Putin has repeatedly promised to boost military allocations, including funding for nuclear modernization.

Nuclear Modernization and Military Reform. Putin has repeatedly reaffirmed that, despite the economic crisis, Russia will maintain a robust weapons procurement budget to purchase advanced military equipment, including nuclear weapons and space systems. Russia's defense procurement budget is $37 billion for 2009 and will total $114 billion over three years (2009-2011).[21]

Russia's Strategic Triad

Nevertheless, Russia is experiencing difficulties deploying the Bulava SLBM. Reportedly one Borey-class ballistic missile nuclear submarine is not armed with any missiles. Production of Topol-M mobile ICBMs is insufficient to maintain the numbers permitted by the START follow-on agreement and the number of deployed nuclear warheads may fall below 1,000. Another bottleneck of nuclear modernization is the age and the depletion of Russia's technical and scientific personnel.

As a part of its military reforms, Russia is drastically cutting the number of serving generals and officers. A senior policy adviser to the Minister of Defense told this author that the deep cuts in the officer corps and "paper" divisions are connected to the need to restructure the military away from its Soviet-era legacy toward the ability to deter foreign states and protect the long Russian borders, especially in the south and east.[22] With its considerably smaller conventional forces, challenges in modernizingthe military, and difficulties in deploying and integrating information technology and sufficient numbers of high-tech weapons, Russia will rely on a lower threshold for using nuclear weapons, including first strike.[23]

Nuclear Use Threshold. Current Russian military doctrine provides for:

...nuclear forces capable of delivering required damage to any aggressor state or a coalition thereof under any circumstances. The Russian Federation retains the right to use nuclear weapons in response to use against it and/or its allies, of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, as well as in response to wide scale aggression which uses regular weapons in a situation critical to the national security of the Russian Federation.[24]

The 2003 document "The Priority Tasks of the Development of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation"clarifies that the nuclear forces of the Russian Federation, in addition to the strategic nuclear forces (land-based missiles, submarines, and strategic bombers), include non-strategic nuclear forces, such as tactical nuclear weapons.[25]

Russian experts do not fully exclude the possibility of the U.S. using force against their state, especially after the wars in Yugoslavia and Iraq. Russian conventional forces clearly could not contain such a threat, so the "attention to nuclear weapons is a logical solution to the situation."[26] Russian leaders assume that the U.S. will not risk the use of force as long as Russia has a credible nuclear deterrent. Furthermore, Russia might use nuclear weapons in a "wide-scale" war or in a regional conflict that escalated from a local war.[27] However, the Russian leadership has since lowered the nuclear first-use threshold even more.

Nuclear weapons could be used in the Far Eastern, southern, or western theaters of operations. Russian generals explain the lowered nuclear threshold as an answer to both conventional inferiority and as a de-escalation tool. In other words, they believe that limited use of nuclear weapons early in a conflict could force the other side to cease hostilities.[28]

General Nikolay Patrushev is Secretary of the Russian National Security Council, the body in charge of military doctrine. He is also a Putin confidante and has served as the head of the FSB secret police, a KGB successor agency. Patrushev recently made an unprecedented statement in a interview with Izvestiya. He declared that Russia not only may use nuclear weapons preemptively in local conflicts, such as Georgia or Chechnya, but may deliver a nuclear blow "against the aggressor in a critical situation...based on [intelligence] evaluation of his intentions." The second half of the comment was removed from the newspaper's Web site the following day without explanations.[29] Alexander Golts, a leading Russian military analyst, views this statement as further lowering the nuclear threshold, allowing Russia to launch a first strike based on the Russian intelligence evaluation of a potential adversary.[30] While some ascribed this declaration to bravado, Washington has reason to worry because Russia views the U.S. as its principal adversary.

Missile Defense and Weapons in Space. In the 1960s, the USSR developed and deployed a missile defense around Moscow. The United States pleaded with the Soviets to limit competition in missile defenses and concluded the 1972 ABM Treaty. The strategic stability paradigm based on MAD was thus locked in place.[31] Today, Russia opposes the U.S. withdrawal from the ABM treaty in 2002, claiming that offensive and defensive strategic weapons are linked as they were in the 1970-1980s. Russia views the incremental deployment of U.S. missile defenses as detrimental to Russia's long-term ability to counter a U.S. first strike against Russian strategic weapons. Russia vociferously opposed the third missile defense site in central Europe[32] and is equally opposed to any militarization of space with offensive (nuclear) or missile defense systems beyond current communications, command, control, and intelligence systems. Russia regularly works with China and other states at the United Nations Disarmament Commission to imposean international ban on deployment of weapons in space.[33]

Tomorrow's Nuclear Weapons. Russian research into new categories of nuclear weapons is highly classified. However, publications indicate that the Russian military-industrial complex is developing precision low-yield nuclear weapons that are programmable to deliver yields less than the equivalent of 100 tons of TNT. According to former Atomic Energy Minister Victor Mikhaylov, Russia has also worked on developing penetrating nuclear weapons. Vladimir Belous, a retired general and nuclear expert, disclosed the development of fusion weapons that he characterized as mini neutron bombs. Other experts have emphasized that Russia has electromagnetic pulse (EMP) weapons capable of disabling all electronic systems in vast areas and that EMP research and development is continuing. According to Mikhaylov, Russia has emphasized development of high-precision and deep-penetration nuclear weapons, outstripping the U.S. in these areas.[34]

Russian Violations of Arms Control. The U.S. Congress has been informed of numerous accusations of Russian violations of arms control agreements. For example, in 1991-1992, the U.S. and the USSR/Russia committed in the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNIs) to dramatically reduce the number of deployed tactical nuclear weapons. In 2009, the Strategic Posture Commission stated, "Russia is no longer in compliance with its PNI commitments." Estimates of Russia's TNW arsenal are classified, but observers place the number as high as 3,800 -- several times larger than the U.S. stockpile.[35]

The U.S. and Russia have also undertaken an informal moratorium on nuclear weapons tests. However, "the Russian nuclear labs continue an active underground test program at Novaya Zemlya [islands in the Arctic Ocean] which includes release of low levels of nuclear energy." The U.S. interpretation of the testing moratorium involves a zero-yield standard; therefore, Russia is in violation of the arrangement.[36]

A 2005 State Department report noted multiple Russian violations of START verification provisions. Specifically, the State Department asserted that Russia was testing multiple warheads on SS-27 ICBMs, which is forbidden under START. These provisions are at the heart of the START follow-on treaty that the Obama Administration is currently negotiating.[37]

The U.S. intelligence community has accused Russia of violating nonproliferation agreements and arrangements by providing ballistic missile technology to Iran and North Korea. Kathleen Turner, Director of Legislative Affairs at the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, stated that "individual Russian entities continue to provide assistance to Iran's ballistic missile programs. We judge that the Russian-entity assistance...has helped Iran move toward self-sufficiency in production of ballistic missiles."[38]

While negotiating with the Kremlin, the U.S. team should keep in mind more than just these violations and deceptions. Fifty years of nuclear talks indicate that the USSR/Russia customarily opens talks with maximalist negotiating positions, threatens to use nuclear weapons against neighbors and launches demagogic public "peaceful initiatives" for external consumption. It then adopts a more pragmatic posture behind closed doors. Moscow would be highly suspicious of anything different from Washington. In this light, the Obama Administration's early concessions are counterproductive and self-defeating because they may result in a worse end-game position for the United States.

What Congress and the Administration Should Do

As the deadline for START follow-on treaty negotiations approaches, U.S. policymakers and Congress need to focus on the long-term objectives rather than the short-term goal of simply concluding arms control agreements at any price. Specifically, the U.S. should:

* Negotiate a transparent, verifiable, and enforceable protocol. Members of Congress and weapons experts have raised concerns about the expedited negotiations and the advisability of concluding the START II treaty on an unrealistic breakneck timetable.[39]The U.S. and Russia should negotiate a verification and transparency protocol to the Moscow Treaty, which expires in 2012 and lacks detailed verification procedures. The START verification protocol, which some have proposed using in the interim, does not fit the Moscow Treaty. Thus, a new verification protocol that includes measures to monitor reductions in the number of operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads is needed.[40] A transparent, adequately verifiable and enforceable protocol should be ratified by the U.S. Congress as a treaty document.
* Pursue a "protect and defend" strategic posture. TheU.S. should pursue a "protect and defend" strategic posture that shifts away from retaliation-based configurations and toward a defensive posture adapted to the emerging international environment. Such a shift is particularly necessary in view of Russia lowering its threshold for using nuclear weapons. If Russia and the U.S. subscribe to a "protect and defend" posture, they would not target the population centers or economic infrastructure of each other's countries.[41] However, with the escalating Iranian nuclear threat and China's nuclear buildup, the U.S. should not derail deployment of robust missile defenses in Europe and elsewhere. Finally, the Administration should follow the Strategic Posture Review recommendations to modernize U.S. strategic weapons systems selectively to address emerging nuclear threats.[42]
* Fight anti-Americanism with more effective public diplomacy. The Russian state-controlled media and some in Moscow's expert community are propagating a negative image of the U.S., repeatedly alleging that America wants to undermine Russian security. This often plays into the hands of those who seek to justify increased military budgets. Through the State Department and independent research institutions, the U.S. should promote a robust debate on U.S.-Russian relations, encouraging those who seek improvement. U.S. security experts should engage their Russian counterparts and the media in in-depth discussions of common security threats, such as Afghanistan and radical Islamist terrorism. Through international broadcasters, Internet communities, joint conferences, and visits of American security experts to Russia, the U.S. should engage Russian opinion leaders in debating nuclear weapons, arms control, and other defense-related subjects. The U.S. should communicate to the Russian people the truth that America is not entertaining plans to attack Russia.[43]
* Propose a realistic, detailed, transparent, enforceable, and verifiable joint arms control and nonproliferation agenda. The U.S. and Russia need to act jointly to prevent a renewed arms race and military confrontation. Instead, the U.S. should offer Russia an arms control and nonproliferation agenda that includes: (1) a bilateral transition to the "protect and defend" posture; (2) a Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty (SORT II), which would encourage nuclear forces that hold at risk the means of strategic attack; and (3) a strategic defense cooperation treaty, including coordinated ballistic missile defense and programs for common defenses against chemical and biological weapons, cruise missiles, and aircraft delivering weapons of mass destruction. Russia and the United States should also encourage third countries, especially China, to join an Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty. Finally, the U.S. and Russia should continue to spearhead the multilateral cooperative effort to address the threat of nuclear-armed terrorism.

Conclusion

Nuclear weapons have been center stage in U.S.- Russian relations since the 1950s. The confrontation stemming from the arms race and the threat of nuclear destruction defined the Soviet and then Russian view of the United States as the "principal adversary." Today, both countries can avert a new Cold War and move beyond the MAD paradigm of the 20th century.

New threats have arisen that concern both countries. These threats can be countered together without the extremes of a new arms race or a utopian (and potentially dangerous) approach toward total nuclear disarmament. With a commitment to robust national defenses, prudent, transparent, and verifiable arms control and political-military cooperation, both countries can ensure security in the 21st century.

Ariel Cohen, Ph.D., is Senior Research Fellow in Russian and Eurasian Studies and International Energy Policy in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The Heritage Foundation. The author is grateful to Baker Spring for his valuable advice.

[1]Barack Obama and Dmitry Medvedev, "Joint Understanding," July 6, 2009, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/The-Joint
-Understanding-for-The-Start-Follow-On-Treaty (October 30, 2009).

[2]Ibid. See also Andrei Shoumikhin and Baker Spring, "Strategic Nuclear Arms Control for Protect and Defend Strategy," Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 2266, May 9, 2009, p. 15, at http://www.heritage.org
/research/NationalSecurity/bg2266.cfm.

[3]Andrei Shoumikhin, Goals and Methods of Russian Arms Control Policy: Implications for U.S. Security, National Institute Press, August 2008, pp. 7-10, at http://www.nipp.org/Publication/Down...tion%20Archive
%20PDF/Russian%20Arms%20Control%20web.pdf (November 2, 2009). See also M. Zolotarev, ed., Istoria Voennoj Strategii Rossii (History of Russian military strategy) (Moscow: Kuchkovo Pole, 2000).

[4]Shoumikhin, Goals and Methods of Russian Arms Control Policy, pp. 12-18.

[5]Ibid., p. 14.

[6]Ibid., p. 38.

[7]Ariel Cohen, "Europe's Strategic Dependence on Russian Energy," Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 2083, November 5, 2007, at http://www.heritage.org/Research/Europe/bg2083.cfm.

[8]"Geopolitika i Russkaya Bezopasnost'" (Geopolitics and Russian security), Krasnaya Zvezda, July 31, 1999, p. 2, quoted in Stephen J. Blank, Russia and Arms Control: Are There Opportunities for the Obama Administration? Strategic Studies Institute, March 2009, p. 150, note 111, at http://www.strategic
studiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/download.cfm?q=908
(October 30, 2009).

[9]Ariel Cohen, "Russia Shields Syria," Space War, October 16, 2008, at http://www.spacewar.com/reports/Swor...Russia_shields
_Syria_999.html (October 30, 2009), and Ariel Cohen, "Russia Plans Three Military Bases in Abkhazia," EurasiaNet, February 6, 2009, at http://www.eurasianet.org/department...v020609g.shtml (October 30, 2009).

[10]Vladimir Putin, "Opening Address at Meeting on Developing Russian Nuclear Weapons Complex, March 30, 2006, quoted in Shoumikhin, Goals and Methods of Russian Arms Control Policy,p. 42.

[11]"Defense Minister Ivanov on New 'Doctrine', Iraq Restoration, Corruption," Moskovsky Komsomolets, October 28, 2003, Foreign Broadcast Information Services document CEP2003,1027000215, quoted in Mark B. Schneider, "The Strategic Nuclear Forces and Doctrine of the Russian Federation," Chap. 14, in Bradley A.Thayer, ed., Analyses of American National Security Policy: Essays in Honor of William R. Van Cleave (Fairfax, Va.: National Institute Press, 2007), p. 144.

[12]"Soviet Active Measures -- Sovietskie Aktivnye Meropriyatia," Pseudology.org, August 1987, at http://www.pseudology.org/information
/Active/T02.htm (October 30, 2009). For a more exhaustive list of the Soviet- run peace and disarmament active measures organization, see Shoumikhin, Goals and Methods of Russian Arms Control Policy, p. 27, note 103.

[13]Blank, Russia and Arms Control, p. 7.

[14]Damanski-Zhenbao, "Chronologia Sobytii" (Chronology of events), at http://www.damanski-zhenbao.ru/chronicals.htm (October 30, 2009).

[15]BBC News, "Excerpts from Putin's Address," September 4, 2004, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3627878.stm (October 30, 2009).

[16]Chris Stephen, "Putin Accuses 'Complicit' West of Harboring Chechen Terrorists," The Scotsman, September 18, 2004, at http://thescotsman.
scotsman.com/beslanschoolsiege/Putin-accuses-complicit-West-of.2565158.jp (October 30, 2009).

[17]Vladislav Surkov, Komsomolskaya Pravda, September 29, 2004, quoted in Sergei Medvedev, "Conspiracy Theory in the Construction of the New Russian Identity," slideshow presentation at the 4th Convention of the Central and East European International Studies Association, Tartu, Estonia, June 25-27, 2006,slide 4, at http://www.ceeisaconf.ut.ee/orb.aw/c...action=preview
/id=164134/Medvedev.pdf (October 30, 2009).

[18]BBC News, "Putin Deplores Collapse of USSR," April 25, 2005, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/4480745.stm (October 30, 2009).

[19]Medvedev, "Conspiracy Theory in the Construction of the New Russian Identity," slide 18.

[20]Blank, Russia and Arms Control, p. 3.

[21]"Putin poobeshchal ne ekonomit' na perevooruzhenii armii" (Putin promised not to economize on reequipping the military), Lenta, February 11, 2009, at http://www.lenta.ru/news/2009/02/11/defense (November 2, 2009).

[22]Interview, source who requests to be unnamed, Moscow, September 2009.

[23]A. S. Dyakov, E. V. Myasnikov, and N. N. Sokov, "Process sokrashchenia yadernyx vooruzhenij i kontrol' nad nimi v rossijsko-amerikanskix otnosheniyax: sostoyanie I perspectivy," (Process of nuclear weapons cuts and control over them in Russian-American relations: Conditions and Perspectives), Moscow Physical-Technical Institute, Center for Study of Problems of Disarmament, Energy and Ecology, 2006, p. 14.

[24]Dyakov et al., "Process sokrashchenia yadernyx vooruzhenij," p. 15.

[25]"Current Tasks of the Development of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation,"quoted in Marcel DeHaas, "Russia's Military Strategy: Preparing for the Wrong War," April 24, 2006, at http://www.clingendael.nl/
publications/2006/20060424_cscp_online_dehaas.pdf (November 3, 2009).

[26]Ibid., p. 16.

[27]Ibid.

[28]Schneider, "The Strategic Nuclear Forces and Doctrine of the Russian Federation," p. 153.

[29]Vladimir Mamontov, "Meniaetsia Rossiya, meniaetsia i ee voennaya doktrina" (Russia is changing, and with it its nuclear doctrine), Izvestiya, October 15, 2009, at http://www.izvestia.ru/politic/article3134180 (November 2, 2009).

[30]Alexander Golts, "Uprezhdayushchee Bezumie" (Preventive madness), Yezhenedel'ny Zhurnal, October 15, 2009, at http://www.ej.ru/?a=note
id=9542 (November 2, 2009).

[31]Shoumikhin, Goals and Methods of Russian Arms Control Policy, pp. 14-15.

[32]Ibid., p. iii-iv.

[33]Moscow reacted negatively to the U.S. decision to destroy a faulty intelligence satellite using a missile interceptor in January 2008. Experts speculate that Russia has had difficulty developing its existing anti-satellite (ASAT) capability. Ibid.,pp. v-vi and 52.

[34]Schneider, "The Strategic Nuclear Forces and Doctrine of the Russian Federation," p. 148.

[35]Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, America's Strategic Posture, United States Institute of Peace, 2009, p. 13.

[36]See ibid., p. 83. Similar allegations were made by Dr. John T. Foster, Jr., a member of the Strategic Posture Commission.

[37]Dr. Keith Payne, another member of the commission, testified before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. See also Baker Spring, "Rose Gottemoeller Should Concentrate on Her Day Job," The Heritage Foundation, unpublished, September 2009.

[38]Kathleen Turner, letter to Jeffrey T. Bergner, Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs, U.S. Department of State, March 1, 2007, at http://www.npec-web.org/US-Russia/20...siaAssistsIran
MissileProgram.pdf (November 2, 2009).

[39]Spring, "Rose Gottemoeller Should Concentrate on Her Day Job."

[40]Shoumikhin and Spring, "Strategic Nuclear Arms Control for Protect and Defend Strategy," p. 16.

[41]The approach also takes into account the principle that both arms control and missile defense can play positive roles in enhancing the security of both countries. A series of nuclear simulation games conducted at The Heritage Foundation in 2008-2009 demonstrated that a strong missile defense would keep both sides more safe and secure, despite the Kremlin's misgivings. See Nuclear Stability Working Group, Nuclear Games: An Exercise Examining Stability and Defenses in a Proliferated World (Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, 2005), at http://www.heritage.org/upload/
NuclearGames.pdf. A forthcoming Heritage Foundation publication will report on an exercise that examines arms race and arms control issues in an abstract setting based on a greater Middle East where nuclear weapons have proliferated.

[42]Senators Jon Kyl (R-AZ), John McCain (R-AZ), Richard Lugar (R-IN), Carl Levin (D-MI), John Kerry (D-MA), and Robert C. Byrd (D-WV) made this request in a letter to President Obama on July 23, 2009. See Jon Kyl, "Defense Authorization Bill," July 27, 2009, at http://kyl.senate.gov
/record.cfm?id=316224 (November 2, 2009).

[43]Tony Blankley, Helle C. Dale, and Oliver Horn, "Reforming U.S. Public Diplomacy for the 21st Century," Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 2211, November 20, 2008, at http://www.heritage.org/research/publicdiplomacy
/bg2211.cfm.

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Japan is not Poland, there is a lot at stake here. The new Democratic regime in Japan is becoming closer to the Axis members and the Communist Party has been active in Japan. Japan has had it with our derelict activity on their soil. We are on shaky ground.

* OPINION ASIA
* NOVEMBER 9, 2009, 4:06 P.M. ET
Japanese Missile Defense Matters
Tokyo can't afford Obama's faith in disarmament.
By BRIAN T. KENNEDY
Comments

On the eve of President Obama's first Asia visit, Japanese policy makers should be mindful that their island nation sits between two great countries—the United States and China—going in opposite strategic directions. Whether it is the basing of American forces or the commitment to missile defense, the choices Japan makes now over its defense relationship with the United States will have existential implications for the indefinite future.

Tokyo needs absolute clarity over what is at stake, particularly when it comes to Japan's need for missile defenses. Yet this seems to be in short supply at the moment. A Diet member and influential policy maker within the ruling Democratic Party of Japan, Tsuyoshi Yamaguchi, stated in September that missile defense is "almost totally useless" and accordingly the new government may cut missile defense spending. Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama and his government are still weighing the issue, and this is a decision of major import that requires greater analysis. Unfortunately both the new Japanese and the U.S. administrations appear to share an ideological predisposition against missile defense.

Mr. Obama believes that ballistic missile defense—in which the Japanese have invested billions in recent years—is an unnecessary component of American and allied defense. The president has scaled back funding and, while it is politically difficult to kill the missile defense program entirely, it appears that it will be administered so that it never becomes fully operational or effective during his presidency. The White House apparently believes such defenses will be unnecessary because President Obama will work toward nuclear-weapons reductions and a plan for eventual nuclear disarmament. In terms of Asia, this amounts to a bet that China will become a commercial republic whose economic growth and democratic reforms will dampen its desire for a large and deadly nuclear arsenal.

This misunderstands China completely. Chinese strategy begins with the desire to guarantee the country's freedom of action on the Eurasian landmass and in the Pacific Ocean. In the 20th century Beijing was not able to exercise such freedom because of Japanese and then American military power. China's goal is to be able to marginalize both peers, or anyone else who stands in its way.

Nuclear ballistic missiles provide the clearest demonstration of this intent. Today China possesses an arsenal of medium-, intermediate- and intercontinental ballistic missiles that could inflict destruction on the Japanese homeland. In addition, China possesses nuclear-tipped cruise missiles and is developing advanced stealth bombers to deliver them. Next year the Pentagon expects that Beijing's JIN-class nuclear ballistic missile submarine fleet to be operational. The missiles on these submarines could strike at Japan from a significant distance anywhere in the international waters of East Asia. Beijing also seeks space-based capabilities. If continued investment and deployment of space-based military assets are left unchecked, China could not merely dominate Asia but could achieve strategic superiority over Russia and the U.S. as well.

Today the Japanese are defended primarily by the American nuclear umbrella and to a growing degree by the U.S.-designed Aegis missile defense system deployed on Japanese destroyers. These same destroyers and sea and land-based radars are integrated into the U.S. sea-based missile defense system. Successful tests have been made as recently as October. Such success should give policy makers in both the U.S. and Japan confidence that the Aegis system can be an important layer of defense against both China and North Korea. The U.S. and Japan also should be building space-based defenses to ensure their national survival against nuclear weapons.

But the Obama administration is scaling back missile defense to the point that most of these programs will never be fully functional. Absent a renewed U.S. commitment to a robust missile defense for Asia, Japan will have to go it alone or rely on the aging U.S. nuclear deterrent. But it would be an enormous mistake for Tokyo to rely only on the threat of mutually assured destruction between the U.S. and China to ensure Japan's security. Beijing has never been disabused of Chairman Mao Zedong's belief that America is a "paper tiger" when it comes to the use of nuclear weapons.

Equally shortsighted is Tokyo's notion that scaling back missile defenses, and defense spending in general, will create better relations between China and Japan. Economic interests between the two nations may be paramount for now. But the Japanese must continue to build robust defenses. Otherwise it will not be possible to build a strategic relationship between the two over the longer term in which Japan is not merely the junior partner but a supplicant to Beijing.

The building of Japan's Aegis missile defense system under previous administrations demonstrated Japan's resolve for its freedom and the security of Asia. Mr. Hatoyama should realize that it is far better for Japan to continue to build missile defenses that discourage Chinese military planners than to allow China to believe it can dominate Asia by the threat of nuclear intimidation.

President Obama wishes for a world without nuclear weapons. China's growing nuclear arsenal suggests the world will be otherwise. Japan and the U.S. must be defended by something other than the potentially hollow threat of nuclear retaliation. A fully operational missile-defense system, which is well within the capability of Japan and the U.S., offers that and needs to be made a reality before it is too late.

Mr. Kennedy is president of the Claremont Institute in California and a member of the Independent Working Group on Missile Defense.

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Russia ups its nuclear triad

The first Topol-M mobile missile unit is deployed northeast of Moscow. In all, however, Russia has six road-mobile Topol M-missile systems and 50 silo-based units. File image courtesy AFP.

by Staff Writers
Moscow (UPI) Nov 20, 2009

Russia's Strategic Missile Forces will begin operating a second regiment armed with Topol-M mobile missile systems by the end of the year. The single-warhead Topol-M is an advanced version of the silo-based and mobile Topol-based inter-continental missile. It is the mainstay of the ground-based component of Russia's nuclear triad.

"We will complete the rearmament of the second missile regiment in the Teikovo division with mobile Topol-M systems," Lt. Gen. Andrei Shvaichenko was quoted as saying in Russia media after a news conference.

The nuclear-capable missile has a range of up to 6,800 miles, outranking any listed U.S. defense missile system.

"It is capable of making evasive maneuvers to avoid a kill using terminal phase interceptors and carries targeting countermeasures and decoys," Defensetalk reported. "It is also shielded against radiation, electromagnetic pulse, nuclear blasts and is designed to survive a hit from any form of laser technology."

The first Topol-M mobile missile unit is deployed northeast of Moscow. In all, however, Russia has six road-mobile Topol M-missile systems and 50 silo-based units.

News of the second regiment's deployment comes amid the Kremlin's designs to draft a new military doctrine by the end of the year. Reports suggest the new doctrine authorizes the country's armed forces to use nuclear weapons not only in retaliation to conventional attacks but even in pre-emptive strikes against small regional foes, including neighboring Georgia.

The draft doctrine, dubbed "The new face of the Russian Armed Forces until 2030," opts to transform the armed forces into a more effective and mobile military force. It is being developed by the General Staff, due to be presented to President Dmitry Medvedev for final consideration by the end of the year.

The current doctrine -- it was adopted in 2000 -- stresses the defensive strategy of the Russian military. It also encourages Russia's commitment to military reform but steers away from the use of conscripts, shifting towards a professional army.

Last year, Medvedev said Russia would make the modernization of his country's nuclear deterrent and military a priority until 2020. The doctrine has sent shock waves rolling around the world, generating a storm of controversy among military analysts.

In fact, critics argue that it's "bizarre to lower the threshold for using atomic weaponry at a time when Moscow is trying to negotiate radical reductions in strategic warheads with the United States," the Christian Science Monitor reported this week.

It remains unclear, however, whether final version of the new doctrine will include its provocative points on pre-emptive strikes.

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Obama to allow Russian visits at U.S. nuclear sites

FOXNews.com
Tuesday, October 13, 2009



Russia and the United States have tentatively agreed to a weapons inspection program that would allow Russians to visit nuclear sites in America to count missiles and warheads.

The plan, which Fox News has learned was agreed to in principle during negotiations, would constitute the most intrusive weapons inspection program the U.S. has ever accepted.

Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, who met with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, said publicly Tuesday that the two nations have made "considerable" progress toward reaching agreement on a new strategic arms treaty.

The 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, or START, expires in December and negotiators have been racing to reach agreement on a successor.

Clinton said the U.S. would be as transparent as possible.

"We want to ensure that every question that the Russian military or Russian government asks is answered," she said, calling missile defense "another area for deep cooperation between our countries."
On another critical issue, Lavrov declared that it would be counterproductive to threaten Iran with more sanctions over its nuclear program -- as he resisted efforts by Clinton to win agreement for tougher measures should Iran fail to prove its program is peaceful.

Clinton visited Moscow on her first trip since becoming America's top diplomat, in an effort to gauge Moscow's willingness to join the U.S. in imposing sanctions.

Clinton said the U.S. agreed it was important to pursue diplomacy with Iran.

"At the same time that we are very vigorously pursuing this track, we are aware that we might not be as successful as we need to be, so we have always looked at the potential of sanctions in the event we are not successful and cannot assure ourselves and others that Iran has decided not to pursue nuclear weapons," she said at a joint news conference.

Iran insists it has the right to a full domestic nuclear enrichment program and maintains it is only for peaceful purposes, such as energy production.

President Obama -- who visited Russia in July -- has vowed to "reset" U.S.-Russia relations. On Tuesday, Clinton apologized for missing that meeting because of a broken elbow.

"But now both my elbow and our relationships are reset and we're moving forward, which I greatly welcome," she said.

She was to meet with Russian President Dmitry Medvedev later Tuesday.

Fox News' Dana Lewis and The Associated Press contributed to this report.

US treaty inspections to end at Russia missile plant: report

by Staff Writers
Moscow (AFP) Dec 1, 2009

US arms inspectors must end their almost 15-year monitoring of Russia's main missile plant this week, as the key US-Russia nuclear treaty expires, a Russian military-diplomatic source said Tuesday. Under the old Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, or START, up to 30 US experts monitored traffic to and from Russia's foremost missile factory in the remote village of Votkinsk, about 580 kilometres (360 miles) northeast of Moscow.

"By December 5, when START expires, the team of US inspectors must fully dismantle their equipment and leave the Votkinsk factory," the source told Russian state news agency Interfax.

US and Russian negotiators have held frenetic talks in Geneva in recent months to thrash out a replacement for START, which imposes strict limits on the nuclear arsenals of the two former Cold War foes.

A major obstacle to a deal was eliminated in September when the US President Barack Obama's White House announced it was scrapping a plan to deploy a missile shield in eastern Europe, fiercely opposed by Russia.

But talks have reportedly hit a snag over the monitor missions to Russia.

Moscow wants to jettison any controls of its missile production under a new treaty, while Washington says monitoring is needed to ensure Russia complies with limits on the number of its nuclear-capable missiles.

"The situation under which the US inspectors conduct 24-hour controls on the activity of the Votkinsk factory cannot be seen as fair or balanced," the military source said.

"It would be inexpedient to transfer these terms to the new contract."

Russia views the US inspections as non-reciprocal because the US has no such plants producing mobile missiles for possible monitoring.

Moscow manufactures Topol-M and Bulava nuclear-capable intercontinental ballistic missiles at the plant.

START, signed in 1991 just before the break-up of the Soviet Union, bound both sides to deep cuts in their nuclear arsenals and to limits on long-range missiles.

At a Moscow summit in July, Obama and his Russian counterpart Dmitry Medvedev agreed to reduce their nuclear arsenal to between 1,500 and 1,675 warheads apiece within seven years.

They also agreed to cut the number of ballistic missile carriers to between 500 and 1,100.

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US and Russia pledge nuclear missile treaty soon

Russia and the US reached an outline arms agreement in July

The US and Russia say they want a new nuclear arms treaty to enter force at soon as possible, after failing to agree a successor to the Start I pact.

The nations uphold the "spirit" of the 1991 Cold War-era treaty despite its end, the US and Russian presidents said in a joint statement.

Talks on a new accord are expected to continue after the treaty expires. at midnight on Friday.

Russia's foreign ministry said "intense efforts" were ongoing on a new treaty.

US President Barack Obama and his Russian counterpart, Dmitry Medvedev, agreed in July that a new treaty should bring deep cuts in nuclear warheads.

It is confusing that Start and Sort run concurrently Paul Reynolds World affairs correspondent New Start treaty likely

Washington has indicated it would like an interim agreement to come into force until a new treaty is negotiated.
The Start I agreement was signed by Mikhail Gorbachev and George Bush senior in the final days of the Soviet Union. It led to deep cuts in nuclear arsenals on both sides.

The BBC's Tom Esslemont, in Moscow, says that in spite of frenetic diplomatic activity and the "reset" of relations between the two sides it was always going to be difficult for a replacement arms control treaty to come into force before Friday's deadline.

Kremlin sources appear optimistic that something can be agreed while President Obama is in Europe next week to receive his Nobel Peace Prize.

But the details of the new, complex agreement have not been finalised. It will also need to be ratified in both parliaments, and that could take months, our correspondent says.

Under the joint understanding signed in July, deployed nuclear warheads will be cut to below 1,700 on each side within seven years of a new treaty - a huge cut on Soviet-era levels.

In a joint statement, the US and Russian presidents said on Friday: "We express our commitment, as a matter of principle, to continue to work together in the spirit of the Start treaty following its expiration, as well as our firm intention to ensure that a new treaty on strategic arms enter into force at the earliest possible date."

[samizdat]