President Obama seeks Russian deal to slash nuclear weapons

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http://russianforces.org/navy/slbms/bulava.shtml

Bulava


Bulava missile test history

	Date		Comment
0.1	12/11/03	Success	Pop-up test of a mockup of the missile.
0.2	09/23/04	Success	Pop-up test.
1	09/27/05	Success(?)	First flight test. Launch from a surfaced submarine. Reports about failure of the third stage.
2	12/21/05	Success	First launch from a submerged submarine.
3	09/07/06	Failure	Launch from a submerged submarine. The first stage failed shortly after launch.
4	10/25/06	Failure	Launch from a submerged submarine. Failure of the first stage.
5	12/24/06	Failure	From a surfaced submarine. Problems with the third stage.
6	06/28/07	Success	Unconfirmed reports about problems with one of the warheads.
7	11/10/07	Failure	The first stage failed shortly after launch.
8	09/18/08	Failure	Failure of the bus.
9	11/28/08	Success	The "first fully successful test" of the missile
10	12/23/08	Failure	Failure of the third stage.
11	07/15/09	Failure	Failure of the first stage
12	12/09/09	Failure	Failure of the third stage
13	10/07/10	Success
14	10/29/10	Success
15	06/28/11	Success	First launch from Project 955 submarine
16	08/27/11	Success	Full-range test from the White Sea to the Pacific.
17	10/28/11	Success

There is some uncertainty about results of two tests. The one on 27 September 2005 was reported to be successful at the time, but in December 2006 Ivan Safronov reported that the third stage of the missile failed in that test. Also, there were some reports about problems in the June 28th, 2007, but it is not clear whether these were credible.
Bulava missile has also been tested in pop-up tests from a land-based launcher.

[vector7]

New nuke-carrying Borey class submarine tested

Published: 24 October, 2011, 13:13


New nuke-carrying Borey class submarine tested

Sea trials of the new Rusian Borey class submarine, the Aleksandr Nevsky, has started in the White Sea. The boat is the first series-produced vessel of its kind and is to become part of Russia’s nuclear deterrence.

The submarine was laid down in March 2004 and first launched in December 2010 reports Itar-Tass. The company trial of the Nevsky is done under the command of Captain 1st rank Vasily Tankovid. His crew come from the Pacific Fleet and have passed special training course to man the modern submarine.

The first vessel of this class, the Yury Dolgoruky, is currently involved in fire tests of the nuclear ballistic missile Bulava and its upgraded version the Liner. Producer of the submarines, Sevmash shipyards, are building another boat of the series, the Vladimir Monomakh, at the moment.

The Navy wants a total of eight Borey class submarines deployed by 2020.

They will be the backbone of Russian naval nuclear deterrence for at least several decades to come. Each vessel costs about $750 million, according to the producer.

The submarines are 170 meters long, 13.5 meters wide, have a displacement of 24,000 tonnes, can submerge up to 450 meters and travel at speeds of up to 29 knots. They can carry between 12 and 20 MIRVed nuclear missiles, depending on the vessel. They are also armed with six 533-caliber torpedo tubes, which fire Vyuga cruise missiles.

The vessels are manned by 107 officers and sailors. They are equipped with a rescue capsule, which can bring call crew members back to the surface in an emergency.

[Ryan Ruck]

Rethinking The ‘Zero Option’

View that ‘less is more’ is obsolete in increasingly hostile world

November 2, 2011

“Assumption is the father of error,” or so we’re told. When it comes to nuclear weapons, the Obama administration and many others are making assumptions that could lead our nation to catastrophic errors.

From the earliest days of the nuclear era, it was clear that these unfathomably destructive weapons had unprecedented implications for war and peace. So we worked hard to build our understanding of their role in maintaining our security, not on assumption and intuition, but on rigorous logic and searching analysis. Path-breaking books applied game theory, mathematical models and other analytical tools to ensure that these weapons would function as tools for maintaining a general peace, not launching a general war. Over time, thinking on nuclear deterrence became codified into the doctrine of mutually assured destruction. Ironically, though its acronym, MAD, implied “insane,” the underpinnings were rigorous theories that shaped the size and posture of U.S. nuclear forces.

An early assumption of the nuclear age - that “more was better” - itself was fairly quickly replaced by more sophisticated ideas. Already in the early 1960s, U.S. planners were opting for smaller, more precise and accurate missiles and warheads - a contrast with Soviet choices. By the mid- to late-1960s, a “less is more” corollary to the deterrence doctrine took hold: the notion that U.S.-Soviet agreements to mutually reduce their nuclear arsenals would enhance security.

But whether understood as MAD or in a more nuanced variation, the doctrine of nuclear deterrence was a fundamentally two-sided, symmetrical confrontation - a Mexican standoff with the biggest guns imaginable. Though a handful of other nuclear powers emerged through the 1960s - the United Kingdom, France and China - the two-sided deterrence model could incorporate them as “lesser included cases” without much conceptual or practical difficulty.

Impressive nuclear-arms reductions were achieved in this fundamentally bilateral context. From a peak of 31,255 U.S. nuclear weapons and 2,268 U.S. strategic nuclear delivery vehicles in 1967, the New START Treaty signed by President Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev in 2010 limits each side to a maximum of 1,550 actively deployed strategic nuclear weapons, and 700 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles through 2021 - an 85 percent reduction in actively deployed U.S. nuclear weapons. The assumption - the presumption - is that, just as in the Cold War years, fewer deployed nuclear weapons make the world a safer place.

But do they?

Many, of course, say yes. Beginning in 2007, former Secretaries of State Henry Kissinger and George Shultz, former Defense Secretary William Perry and former Sen. Sam Nunn, Georgia Democrat, published a series of articles that took this thinking to its logical conclusion: The United States should embrace the elimination of all nuclear weapons - a so-called “zero option” - as its ultimate arms-control goal, they said. In 2009, President Obama made the zero option the declared objective of U.S. policy. The New START reductions represent a down payment. Further cuts are in the works.

Still, what’s wrong with that?

First, in case anyone missed it, the world has changed - a lot - since the 1970s and ‘80s. The Soviet Union has collapsed. Russia is no longer deemed a U.S. adversary, although its once-and-future-president, Vladimir Putin, often acts like one. India and Pakistan - despite dramatic U.S.-Russian arms reductions - have become nuclear powers, locked into their own bilateral MAD standoff. Israel is assumed to have nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them. North Korea has tested a nuclear weapon and progressively longer-range missiles. Iran’s nuclear and long-range missile programs remain unconstrained - and even the see-no-evil International Atomic Energy Agency is alarmed at the prospect of its imminent development of nuclear weapons.

In short, today’s nuclear game is organized around not two-way, but multiplayer, equations. It is purely an assumption that the axioms, theorems and logic of the bilateral U.S.-Soviet deterrence equations will continue to work as well as ever - if they haven’t already become counterproductive.

Second, as nuclear players proliferate, the Obama administration’s instinctive response is to reassure allies and tamp down pressures on friendly countries for still further proliferation by extending a U.S. nuclear umbrella that is shrinking. Since the 1950s, these guarantees have been extended to more than 30 allies. More recently, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton suggested that such guarantees might be extended to friendly Persian Gulf states should Iran acquire “the bomb.” It is assumed that U.S. nuclear forces, with delivery vehicles now at one-fourth of their peak strength, are as credible in backing these guarantees as they ever were - to a widening circle of countries.

Third, the reduced size of the U.S. arsenal may be approaching - or has already reached - levels at which it invites other countries, in particular China, to become true peer competitors. This, of course, would contradict our assumptions about the beneficial effects of arms reductions.

Finally, we have done no significant theoretical or analytic work - certainly nothing on the scale, depth or thoroughness of the 1950s and ‘60’s research - to develop a foundation for calculating the force requirements and conditions to achieve stable deterrence in a multiplayer setting. We don’t even know if multiplayer deterrence stability is possible. We just assume it is - just as we assume that greatly reduced nuclear forces will be adequate to handle any and all threats that lie ahead. This is comforting, since it permits us to assume that the next arms-reduction treaty will only enhance our own, and the world’s, security. Besides, the signing ceremony will make for great press coverage.

Now, this really is MAD-ness. What should we be doing instead?

1. We should announce a pause in further nuclear arms reduction negotiations. As we implement the New START reductions, we can re-examine our nuclear force requirements in a “brave new world” with new nuclear proliferators like Iran and North Korea and unstable nuclear powers like Pakistan.

2. We should get to work now - rapidly and urgently - on doing our homework on the problems, challenges, conundrums, paradoxes and complications of achieving stable nuclear deterrence in a multiplayer setting. And we should be prepared for that research to tell us things we don’t really want to hear about its implications for future U.S. nuclear force requirements.

3. We should get on with revitalizing the U.S. nuclear-weapons production capability - negotiated by Senate Republicans as the price of ratifying New START. We should ensure that we are sustaining the industrial base for our nuclear delivery systems, in case the proliferated, multiplayer nuclear environment ahead requires larger or different nuclear capabilities than our Cold War legacy forces.

4. We should resolve now that U.S. nuclear force levels have reached a plateau - and sustain them without further reductions until we have worked through the implications and requirements of the new world we’re entering.

It is time to stop assuming that “less is more” for security in a proliferated world.

G. Philip Hughes, former executive secretary of the National Security Council, has held appointments in the departments of Defense, State and Commerce. Mark Davis drafted START I addresses as a White House speechwriter for President George H.W. Bush and is author of “Digital Assassination” (St. Martin’s Press, 2011). Both are senior directors of the White House Writers Group.

[vector7]

New U.S. Defense Strategy Lays Groundwork for More Nuclear Cuts

This article was originally published in Global Security Newswire, produced independently by National Journal Group under contract with the Nuclear Threat Initiative. NTI is a nonprofit, nonpartisan group working to reduce global threats from nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons.


By Elaine M. Grossman
Updated: January 6, 2012 | 2:44 p.m.
January 6, 2012 | 2:42 p.m.



A fresh U.S. defense strategy unveiled by President Obama at the Pentagon on Thursday asserts that nuclear deterrence can be maintained with a smaller stockpile, while renewing earlier assurances that the remaining arsenal would be kept “safe, secure and effective” (see GSN, Jan. 5).

The Defense Department released an 11-page document outlining a new set of priorities for the military at what it called an “inflection point,” as longtime troop commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan wind down.

The strategy blueprint, titled “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense,” is short on specifics but indicates that a secret nuclear-policy review the Pentagon completed last month set the stage for reductions below New START levels (see GSN, Nov. 8, 2011).

The U.S.-Russian arms-control treaty, which entered into force last year, mandates that by February 2018 each side cap its fielded strategic nuclear arsenal at 1,550 warheads. The pact also limits each nation’s deployed nuclear delivery systems to 700, with an additional 100 bombers, ICBMs or sea-based ballistic missiles permitted in reserve.

“It is possible that our deterrence goals can be achieved with a smaller nuclear force, which would reduce the number of nuclear weapons in our inventory as well as their role in U.S. national security strategy,” the new policy outline states.

Details about how a more limited U.S. atomic arsenal could continue to deter conflict even as conventional defense equipment, troop levels, and major operations abroad are being scaled back were largely left out of the strategy document.

Defense Secretary Leon Panetta and his deputy, Ashton Carter, said on Thursday that specific programs and force structure to be reduced would be identified within the next few weeks as Obama delivers his State of the Union speech -- slated for Jan. 25 -- and sends a fiscal 2013 federal budget request to Congress shortly thereafter.

“Our judgment [is] that we can maintain deterrence at lower levels of forces, but I will defer any discussion of specific programmatic details to the budget when it rolls out,” Michele Flournoy, the Defense undersecretary for policy, said at the Thursday press briefing.

An overall defense-strategy relook would have been necessary at such a juncture but was hastened by a roughly $490 billion budget cut over the next decade that represents the Pentagon’s “part in helping the nation put its fiscal house in order,” Panetta told reporters after the president delivered remarks without taking questions.

The department might also have to absorb another $500 billion in reductions over the same time frame if lawmakers fail to negotiate a new approach to deficit reductions by the end of this year.

The administration also used the policy document to reaffirm its commitment to maintaining viable U.S. nuclear warheads and the technologies built to deliver them.

“As long as nuclear weapons remain in existence, the United States will maintain a safe, secure and effective arsenal,” states the policy directive. “We will field nuclear forces that can under any circumstances confront an adversary with the prospect of unacceptable damage, both to deter potential adversaries and to assure U.S. allies and other security partners that they can count on America’s security commitments.”

Pentagon leaders plan to design and build new bomber aircraft and ballistic-missile-carrying submarines over the next couple of decades, as well as replace the nation’s aging ICBM fleet, all of which is expected to cost hundreds of billions of dollars. A former vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the since-retired Marine Corps Gen. James Cartwright, said in July that the Defense Department challenge is that "we have to recapitalize all three legs [of the triad] and we don't have the money to do it."

It is unclear whether the upcoming budget plan for fiscal 2013 and future years would significantly alter any of these nuclear modernization efforts. If the administration wants to avoid unilateral reductions to the nuclear arsenal, it is likely to await new negotiations with Russia on lower numbers before enshrining cuts in its out-year budget plans.

In an e-mailed commentary on Thursday, Daryl Kimball and Tom Collina of the Arms Control Association focused on the indications that the size of the nuclear arsenal might be permitted to shrink more in the years to come. The two experts estimated that the nation could “save at least $45 billion over the next decade, and still maintain a formidable nuclear force” through possible reductions across all three legs of the nuclear triad (see GSN, Dec. 16, 2011).

The pair also said further-negotiated reductions could improve security around the globe.

“Maintaining excessive nuclear force does nothing to help convince nations, such as Iran or North Korea, or terrorist actors to abandon their pursuit of dangerous weapons. It does nothing to encourage nuclear restraint by China and Russia,” Kimball and Collina said. “In fact, by maintaining a larger nuclear force than we need, we are more likely to induce Russia to build up its own arsenal. It is in the security and financial interests of both countries to pursue further, parallel reductions in nuclear forces.”

The nuclear-policy statements in the newly released strategy are also drawing some slight nudges from the Left and more pointed barbs from the Right.

“The strategy’s take on nuclear issues is cautious but hints at positive steps,” said Stephen Young, a senior analyst at the Union of Concerned Scientists. By contrast, a bolder policy statement could help Obama honor his “sensible commitment to reducing the role of nuclear weapons and ending Cold War thinking,” he said.

“The administration would be better served by declaring the truth: The United States would be more secure with far fewer nuclear weapons undertaking fewer missions,” Young told Global Security Newswire in an e-mailed response to questions. “This approach would have the additional benefit of saving significant sums of money.”

Christopher Ford, a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute, said the United States could face new levels of risk by cutting its conventional forces and nuclear arsenal simultaneously.

“If the White House were serious” about both reducing the role of nuclear arms in national security and assuring foreign partners of Washington’s security commitments, “they'd be keeping a large and robust conventional military force, and developing improved ways to hold challenging targets at risk through nonnuclear means,” Ford told GSN in a written response to questions.

“It's logically impossible to meet all these objectives at the same time. You might be able to reassure allies without nuclear weapons, but it would take new conventional muscle and lots of money,” he said. “You're not going to reassure allies while cutting both nuclear weapons and conventional budgets. Our friends around the world are a lot smarter than that."

A key finding of the president’s defense strategy review was that the time had come for a significant downsizing of the nation’s ground troops, which would leave them with less capability to perform long-term stability missions abroad. Defense leaders emphasized on Thursday, though, that the U.S. Army and Marine Corps would continue to train for a wide array of combat tasks, and an ability to “regenerate” more ground forces would be maintained.

Rep. Mike Turner, R-Ohio, who chairs the House Armed Services Strategic Forces Subcommittee, said on Thursday that the defense strategy’s new emphasis on a heightened U.S. role in Asia could be hurt by the administration’s nuclear policies.

“Deeper nuclear cuts will actually undermine the president’s stated shift of focus to the Pacific,” Turner said in a released statement. “Our allies across Asia, much like others around the globe, rely on a strong U.S. nuclear deterrent for their security.”

Ford also questioned the document’s portrayal of nuclear deterrence as presenting a threat of unacceptable damage to would-be antagonists.

“What damage is 'unacceptable' will vary hugely from country to country, and with the circumstances -- such as what is at stake in any particular potential conflict,” he said. “It doesn't make much sense as a guideline for sizing one's arsenal.”

The Hudson analyst also echoed concerns, voiced recently by Republican lawmakers, that a smaller nuclear arsenal might limit targeting options to such an extent that the Pentagon could no longer expend bombs or missiles on an adversary’s military facilities, and would go after population centers instead (see GSN, Dec. 9, 2011).

“Countervalue [targeting] might certainly provide a rationale for much lower numbers, but this would come at great moral cost: Mass murder would become not the derivative and unfortunate result of targeting military assets but the actual objective of U.S. policy," Ford said.

Administration officials and congressional Democrats have argued that U.S. nuclear-targeting strategy for years has put a potential adversary's cities at risk, regardless of which party held the White House. A significant number of military and industrial targets are located near large population centers, meaning that almost any plausible nuclear-war plan would result in catastrophic levels of civilian casualties, according to this line of thinking (see GSN, May 27, 2011).

Rep. Edward Markey, D-Mass., who in October led 64 lawmakers in proposing deep nuclear cuts to help close the federal budget deficit, lauded the new strategy as a step in the right direction (see GSN, Oct. 12, 2011).

“America’s nuclear-weapons policy is the epitome of overkill, and nuclear weapons and related programs must be on the chopping block like all other defense programs,” the lawmaker said in a written statement. Markey said he planned to introduce legislation to “address the wasteful spending on nuclear weapons and related programs.”

[Ryan Ruck]

Just heard on the radio Obama has a plan to cut nukes 80%, taking deployed weapons down to 300 or less.

[American Patriot]

Just heard on the radio Obama has a plan to cut nukes 80%, taking deployed weapons down to 300 or less.

/Sigh

America is going to go down in flames now.

[vector7]

Just heard on the radio Obama has a plan to cut nukes 80%, taking deployed weapons down to 300 or less.

Not a peep on the cuts for Axis nations...

Companion Post:

• RUSSIA FLOPS SUDDENLY ON SYRIAN REGIME CHANGE -- MULTI-NATIONAL INVASION IMMINENT
  

Barack Obama weighs major cuts to US nuclear arsenal

The Obama administration is weighing options for a sharp reduction to the US nuclear stockpile, including cutting up to 80 percent of America's deployed warheads.


The cuts could reduce the US nuclear stockpile to its lowest levels since the 1950s Photo: AP/U.S. Navy, Fireman Roderick Eubanks

By Raf Sanchez, Washington

11:10PM GMT 14 Feb 2012

While no final decision has been made, plans drawn up by the Pentagon raise the idea of cutting the US's strategic weapons from 1,550 to just 300.


Other options include more modest cuts 700 or to 1,000, the Associated Press reported, citing a former administration official and a congressional aide.

If President Barack Obama were to embrace the most radical option - and a spokesman said that the plans had not yet been submitted to the White House - it would reduce the US nuclear deployment to the lowest levels since the 1950s.

Related Articles

• China 'hiding up to 3,000 nuclear warheads in secret tunnels'
  01 Dec 2011
• US dismantles last big Cold War nuclear bomb
  26 Oct 2011

Mr Obama has repeatedly voiced his desire to see a world "free of nuclear weapons" and gave a major speech in Prague in 2009 calling for the Cold War powers to cut their stockpiles.

A year later he returned to the Czech capital, one of the front lines of the Cold War, to sign a replacement to 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (Start), which reduced the number of weapons deployed by Russia and the US to their current level of 1,550.

The administration is likely to propose that Russia match whatever reduction is eventually decided on, rather than cutting the US stockpile unilaterally.

A spokesman for the Pentagon refused to comment on the specific weapon numbers but said that Mr Obama has requested that the military begin developing "alternative approaches" for US nuclear strategy.

It was not clear what the timescale for a decision would be, or even if the president planned to make one before November's elections.

News of the possible cuts is likely to be seized upon by Mr Obama's Republican opponents, who sharply criticised his deal with Russia in Prague.

In an article in 2010, Mitt Romney, the Republican front-runner, said the treaty could be Mr Obama's "worst foreign policy mistake yet". The treaty was eventually ratified by the US Senate, securing the support of 11 Republican senators.

[vector7]

US weighing steep nuclear arms cuts

By ROBERT BURNS
AP National Security Writer



WASHINGTON (AP) -- The Obama administration is weighing options for sharp new cuts to the U.S. nuclear force, including a reduction of up to 80 percent in the number of deployed weapons, The Associated Press has learned.

Even the most modest option now under consideration would be an historic and politically bold disarmament step in a presidential election year, although the plan is in line with President Barack Obama's 2009 pledge to pursue the elimination of nuclear weapons.

No final decision has been made, but the administration is considering at least three options for lower total numbers of deployed strategic nuclear weapons cutting to around 1,000 to 1,100, 700 to 800, or 300 to 400, according to a former government official and a congressional staffer. Both spoke on condition of anonymity in order to reveal internal administration deliberations.

The potential cuts would be from a current treaty limit of 1,550 deployed strategic warheads.

A level of 300 deployed strategic nuclear weapons would take the U.S. back to levels not seen since 1950 when the nation was ramping up production in an arms race with the Soviet Union. The U.S. numbers peaked at above 12,000 in the late 1980s and first dropped below 5,000 in 2003.

Obama has often cited his desire to seek lower levels of nuclear weapons, but specific options for a further round of cuts had been kept under wraps until the AP learned of the three options now on the table.

A spokesman for the White House's National Security Council, Tommy Vietor, said Tuesday that the options developed by the Pentagon have not yet been presented to Obama.

The Pentagon's press secretary, George Little, declined to comment on specific force level options because they are classified. He said Obama had asked the Pentagon to develop several "alternative approaches" to nuclear deterrence.

The U.S. could make further weapons reductions on its own but is seen as more likely to propose a new round of arms negotiations with Russia, in which cuts in deployed weapons would be one element in a possible new treaty between the former Cold War adversaries.

Stephen Young, senior analyst at the Union of Concerned Scientists, which favors nuclear arms reductions, said Tuesday, "The administration is absolutely correct to look at deep cuts like this. The United States does not rely on nuclear weapons as a central part of our security."

Even small proposed cuts are likely to draw heavy criticism from Republicans who have argued that a smaller nuclear force would weaken the U.S. at a time when Russia, China and others are strengthening their nuclear capabilities. They also argue that shrinking the American arsenal would undermine the credibility of the nuclear "umbrella" that the United States provides for allies such as Japan, South Korea and Turkey, who might otherwise build their own nuclear forces.

The administration last year began considering a range of possible future reductions below the levels agreed in the New START treaty with Russia that took effect one year ago. Options are expected to be presented to Obama soon. The force levels he settles on will form the basis of a new strategic nuclear war plan to be produced by the Pentagon.

The U.S. already is on track to reduce to 1,550 deployed strategic nuclear warheads by 2018, as required by New START. As of last Sept. 1, the United States had 1,790 warheads and Russia had 1,566, according to treaty-mandated reports by each. The treaty does not bar either country from cutting below 1,550 on their own.

Those who favor additional cuts argue that nuclear weapons have no role in major security threats of the 21st century, such as terrorism. A 2010 nuclear policy review by the Pentagon said the U.S. nuclear arsenal also is "poorly suited" to deal with challenges posed by "unfriendly regimes seeking nuclear weapons" - an apparent reference to Iran.

It's unclear what calculus went into each of the three options now under consideration at the White House.

The notion of a 300-weapon arsenal is featured prominently in a paper written for the Pentagon by a RAND National Defense Project Institute analyst last October, in the early stages of the administration's review of nuclear requirements. The author, Paul K. Davis, wrote that he was not advocating any particular course of action but sought to provide an analytic guide for how policymakers could think about the implications of various levels of nuclear reductions.

Davis wrote that an arsenal of 300 weapons might be considered adequate for deterrence purposes if that force level was part of a treaty with sound anti-cheating provisions; if the U.S. deployed additional non-nuclear weapons with global reach, and if the U.S. had "hypothetically excellent," if limited, defenses against long- and medium-range nuclear missiles.

In 2010, three Air Force analysts wrote in Strategic Studies Quarterly, an Air Force publication, that the U.S. could get by with as few as 311 deployed nuclear weapons, and that it didn't matter whether Russia followed suit with its own cuts.

New U.S. cuts could open the prospect for a historic reshaping of the American nuclear arsenal, which for decades has stood on three legs:

submarine-launched ballistic missiles, ground-based ballistic missiles and weapons launched from big bombers like the B-52 and the stealthy B-2. The traditional rationale for this "triad" of weaponry is that it is essential to surviving any nuclear exchange.

As recently as last month the administration said it was keeping the triad intact under current plans, while also hinting at future cuts to the force. In the 2013 defense budget submitted to Congress on Monday, the administration proposed a two-year delay in the development of a new generation of ballistic missile submarines that carry nuclear weapons. That will save an estimated $4.3 billion over five years.

In congressional testimony last November, the Pentagon's point man on nuclear policy, James N. Miller, declined to say what options for force reductions the administration was considering. Rep. Michael Turner, R-Ohio, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee's strategic forces subcommittee, unsuccessfully pressed Miller for key details about his policy review. As recently as last month Turner said in an interview that he feared the administration was bent on cutting the force.

In his written testimony at a Nov. 2 hearing chaired by Turner, Miller made it clear that the administration was making a fundamental reassessment of nuclear weapons requirements. In unusually stark terms he said the critical question at hand was "what to do" if a nuclear-armed state or non-state entity could not be deterred from launching an attack.

"In effect, we are asking: what are the guiding concepts for employing nuclear weapons to deter adversaries of the United States, and what are the guiding concepts for ending a nuclear conflict on the best possible terms if one has started?" he said.

Nuclear stockpile numbers are closely guarded secrets in most states that possess them, but private nuclear policy experts say no countries other than the U.S. and Russia are thought to have more than 300. The Federation of American Scientists estimates that France has about 300, China about 240, Britain about 225, and Israel, India and Pakistan roughly 100 each.

Since taking office Obama has put heavy emphasis on reducing the role and number of nuclear weapons as part of a broader strategy for limiting the global spread of nuclear arms technology and containing the threat of nuclear terrorism. That strategy is being put to the test most urgently by Iran's suspected pursuit of a nuclear bomb.

[Ryan Ruck]

Davis wrote that an arsenal of 300 weapons might be considered adequate for deterrence purposes if that force level was part of a treaty with sound anti-cheating provisions; if the U.S. deployed additional non-nuclear weapons with global reach, and if the U.S. had "hypothetically excellent," if limited, defenses against long- and medium-range nuclear missiles.

To quote one Jayne Cobb, "I'm smelling a lot of 'if' comin' offa this plan."

[eversman]

It wont happen. Obama wont get re-elected. Certain class clowns here think he will, but there are too many economic problems, too much blame centered on him for them whether he admits it or not. to a narcissist, nothing is their fault regardless of reality. Reality has a way of biting them in the !@#$%^&*. The second problem is China and Iran. Sure, North Korea is playing ball, but thats because the writing is on the wall. They, and Europe can see Obama is gonna lose and the socialist train is over. Thats why Greece isnt getting bailed out, germany renounced socialist programs, and Brittian is distancing herself from the EU. Obama cant save them, he isnt going to win. China is hiding nukes, so is russia. Its F'ing obvious to all who are in the Defense sector, and work in national security.

NDAA 2012 will reduce real world strength to below the levels of 1940 in terms of power projection capability and manpower strengths. We will only have our nuclear shield to rely on at that point. Add to that cutting benefits and retirement for vets and current servicemen while expanding already out of control social welfare programs???

Fucking newsflash: 49% of Americans paid income taxes. 50.xxx% did NOT. We have passed the tipping point and the pendulum is about to swing back. Best of all, liberal fucktards like Reid and Pelosi didnt learn a !@#$%^&* thing in the 2010 drubbing they took in the house, and near loss of the senate. This time will be WORSE.

You think im kidding? look how the Democrat operatives are doing their best to screw with Republican primaries in a desperate attempt to skew who the candidate against Obama will be. The house of reps passed over 30 budgets this year alone. Did the Senate even vote on a single one? no. And we are how many trillion in debt due to Reid, Pelosi and Obama? dont think the Americans have forgotten that fact. The Record Is Crystal Clear. Even the libtard propaganda media cant cover up the fact that foreclosures are at a record level this year, unemployment hasnt even gone down a single full point in his term (real U/E is 17%), and gas is a SUSTAINED $5 a gallon BEFORE WE EVEN HIT SUMMER, and the president doesnt give a !@#$%^&* about any of it. and thats BEFORE we talk about the fucking nightmare he's made of national security.

Obama reelected? 45% of Americans are welfare loving deadbeats OR willfully blind good little socialists. 45% of Americans are normal red blooded patriotic hard working responsible for themselves taxpayers. 10% of Americans are in the middle, and in the middle class income bracket that Obama is fucking over daily. for four years. You think that 10% is gonna vote for Obama? people who believe they will are closet liberals masquerading as independants, or are liberals who dont openly say how liberal they are because they understand what a negative that is these days.

Ev

[American Patriot]

I'm about to join the group not paying taxes. Not of course because I won't pay taxes, but rather because I'm refusing to have an income for at least five years.

And when it comes back, it will be government money that they owe me for having served 26 God Damned Years in the military.

And you know what? IF I have my boat in the next year (which I plan to do, given I don't have other problems like getting rid of my house) I won't give a shit if they DON'T give me anything because I still have stuff put away to live off of. Worse, I can fish.

I can leave the country.

I can go somewhere else.

I can work somewhere else and not pay ANY US taxes

[vector7]

Obama’s Nuclear Strategy Starts to Feel Dangerous



14:58 GMT, April 2, 2012

For the last sixty years -- since Russia developed its first atomic weapons -- U.S. survival has depended on a strategic concept called deterrence. Lacking the ability to defend itself against a large-scale nuclear attack, Washington sought to discourage aggression by threatening devastating retaliation. The thinking behind U.S. strategy was that no sane country would attack us if the consequences looked suicidal.

Although U.S. leaders seldom talk about it in public, deterrence is still the foundation of U.S. nuclear strategy. But in order for deterrence to work, our leaders need to keep three fundamental facts in mind:

1. What matters isn't how many weapons you have before you're attacked, but how many remain afterwards with which to retaliate. It's the weapons that would survive a surprise attack that deter the attack in the first place.

2. The smaller nuclear arsenals get, the more likely it is enemies can gain an advantage by cheating. If America and Russia each have 5,000 nuclear warheads, the fact Russia has hidden 50 probably won't make war more likely; but if both sides only have a hundred and Russia has hidden 50, that could provide an edge that makes it more likely to launch in a crisis.

3. Leaders make mistakes. They often don't communicate clearly or assess options objectively, especially in a crisis, so America needs the kind of nuclear posture that leaves no doubt in the minds of enemies as to what would happen if they commit aggression.

Like most people, Barack Obama probably hadn't given the peculiar logic of nuclear deterrence much thought before he became president. To the extent he had, it seems he came to the same conclusion regarding nuclear weapons that most progressives do concerning handguns: the fewer there are, the safer everybody will be. That reasoning was on display this week at the 53-nation nuclear summit in South Korea, when the resident once again said he was working toward "a world without nuclear weapons." Sadly, the pursuit of that goal could get millions of Americans killed by delivering their fate into the hands of adversaries who are not trustworthy.

It has never been clear how literally Obama took the oft-started goal of a nuclear-free world. Declaratory nuclear strategy is usually a good deal different from operational strategy, and you wouldn't expect the president to show up at an arms-control conference brandishing nuclear weapons. So the best measure of whether he was being realistic about nuclear strategy was whether the administration funded programs necessary to sustain an adequate deterrent. Up until this January he did. But now I'm beginning to have doubts.

The doubts arise from the administration's decisions regarding replacement of Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines. Submarine-based ballistic missiles are the backbone of a secure retaliatory force, because unlike bombers and land-based missiles, enemies can't destroy them in a surprise attack. At least, not the ones that are at sea on the day the attack occurs. But that could change as new ways of looking into the oceans from above are developed, and delays the administration has announced in developing an Ohio replacement will result in a prolonged period during the 2030s when there are only ten ballistic missile subs in the fleet. A third of the subs would probably be in port on the fateful day, so is it really prudent to have only seven subs at sea?

The administration says the risk would be "manageable," but there's no way it can possibly know what the global situation will be like 20 years from now. Twenty years after the Treaty of Versailles was signed to end World War One, Europe was again at war. What if America is facing a robustly-armed, expansionist China or Russia 20 years from now -- one that thinks it has figured out how to detect or track U.S. ballistic missile subs? Might they be emboldened to strike, knowing that success would bring global dominance? Might we be inclined to appease, fearing that our retaliatory force has become vulnerable?

Every time I hear the president talk about a nuclear-free world, it worries me that nobody in his inner circle is posing such questions. And when I see his Pentagon team delay development of a next-generation ballistic missile submarine even though the existing subs must soon be retired, I know that team is not taking future nuclear threats seriously. Al Qaeda may be defeated, but human nature has not changed. If we take all the rhetoric about a world without nuclear weapons too seriously, we may instead end up in a world without America.


----
Loren Thompson, Ph.D.

[American Patriot]

Bowing AGAIN... fucker

[vector7]

New nuclear arms cuts seem likely, maybe not until after election

By Robert Burns - Associated Press
Monday, July 2, 2012



The Obama administration is edging toward decisions that would further shrink the U.S. nuclear arsenal, possibly to between 1,000 and 1,100 warheads, reflecting new thinking on the role of nuclear weapons in an age of terrorism, say current and former officials.

The reductions under consideration align with President Obama’s vision of trimming the nation’s nuclear arsenal without harming national security in the short term, and in the longer term, eliminating nuclear weapons.

The White House has yet to announce any plan for reducing the number of nuclear weapons, beyond commitments made in the recently completed New START with Russia, which obliges both countries to reduce their number of deployed long-range nuclear warheads to no more than 1,550 by 2018. As of March 1, Russia already had dropped its total to 1,492, and the U.S. stood at 1,737.

Mr. Obama has been considering a range of options for additional cuts, including a low-end range that would leave between 300 and 400 warheads. Several current and former officials, who spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss internal deliberations, said a consensus appeared to be building around a reduction to 1,000 to 1,100 deployed strategic warheads.

Officials have said in recent days that a decision could be announced this month. But given Republican criticism of any proposed further cuts and the heating up of the presidential election campaign, the White House might put the decisions on hold until after November.

The administration has indicated it would prefer to pursue further reductions as part of a negotiation with Russia, but some have suggested that reductions could be done unilaterally.

Any reductions are likely to stir opposition among Republicans in Congress, who say Mr. Obama underestimates the importance of a stable nuclear deterrent.

“I just want to go on record as saying that there are many of us that are going to do everything we possibly can to make sure that this preposterous notion does not gain any real traction,” said Rep. Trent Franks, Arizona Republican and House Armed Services Committee member, when the Associated Press revealed the scope of possible cuts in February.

Beyond the argument over numbers is a more fundamental issue: What role do nuclear weapons have after the Cold War, now that the threat of all-out nuclear war with Moscow has abated? Do nuclear weapons deter al Qaeda or other terrorist organizations? The administration considered these questions in an internal reassessment of nuclear weapons policy.

Advocates of cutting below 1,550 argue that nuclear weapons serve an increasingly narrow purpose and that their large numbers undercut the credibility of demands that Iran and other nations forgo acquiring their own.

Opponents argue that the U.S. should not risk losing its predominant position in the nuclear arena while North Korea, Iran and other nations are pursuing their own nuclear ambitions.

Mr. Obama has made clear in recent statements that he thinks the time is right to break with the past.

“The massive nuclear arsenal we inherited from the Cold War is poorly suited to today’s threats, including nuclear terrorism,” he said March 26 in Seoul. “We can already say with confidence that we have more nuclear weapons than we need.”

[vector7]

US edging toward decision on new nuclear arms cuts

Published July 02, 2012
Associated Press



WASHINGTON – The Obama administration is edging toward decisions that would further shrink the U.S. nuclear arsenal, possibly to between 1,000 and 1,100 warheads, reflecting new thinking on the role of nuclear weapons in an age of terror, say current and former officials.

The reductions that are under consideration align with President Barack Obama's vision of trimming the nation's nuclear arsenal without harming national security in the short term, and in the longer term, eliminating nuclear weapons.

The White House has yet to announce any plan for reducing the number of nuclear weapons, beyond commitments made in the recently completed New Start treaty with Russia, which obliges both countries to reduce their number of deployed long-range nuclear warheads to no more than 1,550 by 2018. As of March 1, Russia had already dropped its total to 1,492 and the U.S. stood at 1,737.

Obama has been considering a range of options for additional cuts, including a low-end range that would leave between 300 and 400 warheads. Several current and former officials, who spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss internal deliberations, said there appeared to be a consensus building around the more modest reduction to 1,000 to 1,100 deployed strategic warheads.

Officials have said in recent days that a decision could be announced this month. But given Republican criticism of any proposed further cuts and the heating up of the presidential election campaign, the White House might put the decisions on hold until after November. The administration has indicated it would prefer to pursue further reductions as part of a negotiation with Russia, but some have suggested that reductions could be done unilaterally.

Any reductions are likely to stir opposition among Republicans in Congress, who believe Obama underestimates the importance of a stable nuclear deterrent, even though the cuts would likely save tens of billions of dollars.

"I just want to go on record as saying that there are many of us that are going to do everything we possibly can to make sure that this preposterous notion does not gain any real traction," Rep. Trent Franks, an Arizona Republican who sits on the House Armed Services Committee, said when The Associated Press first revealed the scope of possible cuts in February.

Beyond the argument over numbers is a more fundamental issue: What role do nuclear weapons have after the Cold War, now that the threat of all-out nuclear war with Moscow has abated? Do nuclear weapons deter belligerents such as al-Qaida, or other terrorist organizations? The administration considered these questions in an internal reassessment of nuclear weapons policy.

James Cartwright, the retired Marine Corps general who commanded U.S. nuclear forces from 2004-07, thinks the U.S. should acknowledge that a large nuclear force is of limited value in deterring today's major threats.

"No sensible argument has been put forward for using nuclear weapons to solve any of the major 21st century problems we face," including threats posed by rogue states, terrorism, cyber warfare or climate change, Cartwright and his colleagues at Global Zero wrote in a report in May. Global Zero is an organization that advocates a step-by-step process to achieve the eventual elimination of all nuclear weapons.

The group argues that the U.S. could safely reduce its arsenal over the coming 10 years to 900 total nuclear weapons -- 450 deployed at any given time and a like number held in reserve. That compares with the current U.S. arsenal of about 5,000 weapons, of which 1,737 are deployed.

Advocates of cutting below 1,550 argue that nuclear weapons serve an increasingly narrow purpose, and that their large numbers undercut the credibility of demands that Iran and other nations forgo acquiring their own. Opponents argue that the U.S. should not risk losing its predominant position in the nuclear arena while North Korea, Iran and other are pursuing their own nuclear ambitions.

Obama himself has made clear in recent statements that he thinks the time is right to break with the past.

"The massive nuclear arsenal we inherited from the Cold War is poorly suited to today's threats, including nuclear terrorism," he said March 26 in Seoul. He noted that last summer he ordered his national security team to undertake a comprehensive review of nuclear forces and policies, which was completed early this year.

"We can already say with confidence that we have more nuclear weapons than we need," Obama said.

Daryl Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association, said he interprets Obama's views as supportive of keeping only enough of them to deter existing nuclear powers like Russia and China -- not to deter attacks with other types of mass-casualty weapons like biological or chemical arms.

"Clearly we don't have to have 1,550 deployed strategic nuclear weapons to deter a Russian or Chinese nuclear attack," Kimball said in an interview. "Russia today has fewer than 1,500 deployed strategic warheads, and in five years they're not going to have any more than that -- they'll probably have fewer."

Also at stake are important decisions about multi-billion dollar investments in developing replacements for the current U.S. fleet of strategic nuclear submarines, as well as nuclear ground-based missiles and nuclear-capable bombers. Cartwright's Global Zero report estimated that U.S. nuclear modernization programs could run upwards of $200 billion over the next 20 years -- some portion of which could be saved if steps are taken now to further shrink the arsenal.

Russia faces a similar set of decisions about nuclear modernization, although it has publicly expressed little interest in starting a new round of negotiations with the U.S. on additional nuclear reductions. One sticking point for Moscow is its concern that U.S. missile defenses — particularly those being placed in Europe — could eventually undermine the deterrent value of Russia's strategic nuclear arsenal. In a meeting with then-President Dmitry Medvedev in March, Obama was heard saying that if reelected in November he would have more flexibility to deal with the matter of missile defense.

[vector7]

Report: State Dept. Considers Eliminating US Nuclear Arsenal



by AWR Hawkins 24 Aug 2012, 2:14 AM PDT

Although President Obama's current defense cuts are so drastic that even Rep. Nancy Pelosi is scared they might cost Democrats more seats in the House, State Dept. advisers are reportedly encouraging further cuts and even the all-out elimination of the U.S. nuclear arsenal.

A State Dept. report addressing this issue justifies the suggestion on the grounds that possessing nuclear weapons drives other nations to "acquisition and/or use of nuclear weapons."

In other words, as long as nations like the U.S., Israel, and Russia have nukes but rogue nations like Iran and North Korea don't, Iran and North Korea will continually pursue them with a willingness to use them. Yet if we get rid of ours, they will stop the pursuit of theirs... and everybody can hug and get along, naturally.

Explaining away Iran's nuclear ambitions by saying they only want such weapons because we have them is childish and irrational. It's much like saying burglars only want guns because the owners of the homes they burglarize have them. In truth, burglars want guns so they can operate from a position of strength.

Yet even Obama's State Dept. admits that such "a cooperative world scenario may be unrealistic to achieve in an acceptable timeframe." Thus, the first step would simply be more reductions, beginning with the U.S. and Russia. But even here, those behind the report admit that we will have to find other "weapons of mass destruction" with which to replace nuclear weapons in order to have a viable option for nuclear deterrence.

Now more than ever we need peace through strength. And that kind of peace relies not only on the possession of a nuclear arsenal but also on the assurance that we'd use that arsenal to defend ourselves if need be. The approach proposed by Obama's State Dept. will only lead to an ever more pitiful "mother may I?" foreign policy.

[American Patriot]

Now why would we eliminate our nuclear weapons?

Wow.

What kind of idiotic thinking does THAT take?

[Ryan Ruck]

The idiotic thinking of the old '60s and '70s anti-nuke crowd which are now in power.

[American Patriot]

Yeah, I guess I would have expected them to grow the hell up. Guess not.

[vector7]

Aging U.S. nuclear arsenal slated for costly and long-delayed modernization

By Dana Priest, Published: September 15
Comments 523



The U.S. nuclear arsenal, the most powerful but indiscriminate class of weapons ever created, is set to undergo the costliest overhaul in its history, even as the military faces spending cuts to its conventional arms programs at a time of fiscal crisis.

For two decades, U.S. administrations have confronted the decrepit, neglected state of the aging nuclear weapons complex. Yet officials have repeatedly put off sinking huge sums into projects that receive little public recognition, driving up the costs even further.

Now, as the nation struggles to emerge from the worst recession of the postwar era and Congress faces an end-of-year deadline to avoid $1.2 trillion in automatic cuts to the federal budget over 10 years, the Obama administration is overseeing the gargantuan task of modernizing the nuclear arsenal to keep it safe and reliable.

There is no official price tag for the effort to upgrade and maintain the 5,113 warheads in the inventory, to replace old delivery systems and to renovate the aging facilities where nuclear work is performed. A study this summer by the nonpartisan Stimson Center, a Washington think tank, estimated costs would be at least $352 billion over the coming decade to operate and modernize the current arsenal. Others say the figure could be far higher, particularly if the work is delayed even longer.

The timing does not fit with the nation’s evolving defense posture, either. Over the past decade, the U.S. military has moved away from nuclear deterrence and major military interventions in favor of more precise tactics rooted in Special Operations forces and quick tactical strikes deemed more effective against today’s enemies.

Federal officials and many outside analysts are nonetheless convinced that, after years of delay, the government must invest huge sums if it is to maintain the air, sea and land nuclear triad on which the country has relied since the start of the Cold War. Failing to act before the end of next year, they say, is likely to mean that there won’t be enough time to design and build the new systems that would be required if the old arsenal is no longer safe or reliable.

“I’ve been doing this for 20 years, and I haven’t seen a moment like this,” Thomas P. D’Agostino, who leads the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), the federal agency charged with managing the safety of the nuclear arsenal, said in an interview.

The debate over the future of the nation’s nuclear arsenal is playing out in Congress and within the administration. Public reports, interviews with government officials and outside experts and visits to nuclear facilities rarely seen by outsiders provided a portrait of the scope and cost of maintaining and refurbishing the nuclear stockpile underlying the debate.



A glimpse at the aging nuclear stockpile and the rising budget


Expense has loomed for years

At the heart of the overhaul are the weapons themselves. Renovating nuclear bombs and missiles to keep them safe and ready for use will cost tens of billions of dollars. Upgrading just one of the seven types of weapons in the stockpile, the B61 bomb, is likely to cost $10 billion over five years, according to the Pentagon. The next two types of bombs in line for modification are estimated to cost a total of at least $5 billion. By comparison, the operating budget for Fairfax County government next year will cost about $3.5 billion, including its vaunted school system.

Replacing the aircraft, submarines and ground-launch systems that carry nuclear payloads will be the most expensive budget item. The nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office estimated it would cost up to $110 billion to build 12 replacements for the aging Ohio-class submarines first launched in the 1980s. The Minuteman III ballistic missiles are undergoing a $7 billion upgrade even as a new generation of intercontinental ballistic missiles is under consideration. Meanwhile, a nuclear-capable fleet of F-35 strike aircraft is being built to replace existing aircraft at a cost of $162 million an airplane.

Finally, there are the buildings and laboratories where the refurbishment of weapons and development of new technologies take place. Modernizing those facilities is expected to cost at least $88 billion over 10 years, according to the NNSA, which is part of the Department of Energy.

The need to spend heavily to modernize the nation’s shrinking nuclear stockpile has been apparent for at least two decades. President George H.W. Bush reduced the stockpile by nearly 40 percent and imposed a ban on nuclear testing. President Bill Clinton extended the ban while reaffirming the importance of maintaining the arsenal’s safety and performance.

President George W. Bush came into office in 2001 planning to shrink and modernize the vast and deteriorating nuclear complex. Although he cut the stockpile by almost 50 percent and made some progress on renovating the complex, the effort was largely derailed by the costs and complications of two wars. All the while, the backlog of urgent repairs accumulated, and the hidden costs increased steadily.

To catch up, the Obama administration’s budget for refurbishing the nuclear stockpile went from $6.4 billion in 2010 to a $7.5 billion request for next year — a 17 percent increase at a time of budget constraints. To help pay the bills, this year the Defense Department agreed for the first time to contribute $8 billion over five years.

“We came in thinking it had been taken care of and were shocked to hear how poorly it had been treated,” said Jon Wolfsthal, who worked on nuclear weapons issues for the Obama White House until March.

While the administration was surprised by the state of the stockpile, the decision to spend heavily on modernization was also driven by a deal cut with Senate Republicans in late 2010. As part of negotiations to win ratification of the New START accord and reduce the nuclear weapons maintained by the United States and Russia, the administration agreed to increase money for modernizing the nuclear-weapons complex. Some Republicans say the administration isn’t spending enough.

Los Alamos in disrepair

Situated on a remote mesa in the Jemez Mountains of northern New Mexico, Los Alamos National Laboratory was built secretly in early 1943 for the sole purpose of designing and building America’s first atomic bomb. In the decades since, the lab has emerged as one of the nation’s premier nuclear weapons design and research facilities, with 11,000 employees.

But parts of Los Alamos are in serious disrepair. Inside one critical building, pipes carrying dangerous wastewater are duct-taped together at the joints to plug leaks; plastic bags have been wrapped around the tape to trap seepage.

The building, called Wing 5, is part of the 50-year-old Chemistry and Metallurgy Research plant, which performs research on plutonium cores, the explosive “pits” for nuclear weapons. Sometimes liquid accidentally splashes under the ill-fitting doors and spills into the hallway, Bret Knapp, who heads the lab’s weapons program, said during a rare visit by an outsider. When a spill occurs, the building must be evacuated until inspectors can make sure that the liquid is not radioactive.

On other occasions, when the lights in the dilapidated structure flicker, electricians struggling to restore power pry open dozens of fuse boxes and expose brittle wiring far out of compliance with modern building codes.

The aging facility was slated for replacement 20 years ago. But in 1998, designers identified a fault line beneath the structure. The discovery pushed the price of reconstruction so high that no administration was willing to sign off. The Obama administration says safety requires its replacement — at a cost of $6 billion. Critics in Congress and among anti-nuclear groups, however, say the expensive new plant is unnecessary and would still present environmental dangers if built on the fault line.

The metallurgy facility at Los Alamos isn’t even the most pressing example of neglect and deterioration among the 40 buildings nationwide that the NNSA says need repair. That dubious honor goes to Building 9212, a uranium-processing facility at the Y-12 National Security Complex near Oak Ridge, Tenn.

Known in its heyday as the “Secret City,” Y-12 produced highly enriched uranium for “Little Boy,” the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima on Aug. 6, 1945. Today, Y-12 is the primary facility for processing and storing weapons-grade uranium and developing related technologies.

The 150-acre complex was in the news in late July when three peace activists, including an 82-year-old nun, cut the outer security fence, slipped past the perimeter and reached a building where highly enriched uranium is stored. They splashed blood on the outer walls and carried banners denouncing nuclear weapons. Though they never got inside the facility, the incident sparked a two-week shutdown at the plant and a security review across the nuclear complex. Several officials have been fired or reassigned.

Nearby is Building 9212. Protected by layers of razor wire two stories high and monitored by surveillance cameras and motion sensors, technicians inside process enriched uranium for civilian and naval nuclear reactors. Armed guards greet the few authorized visitors allowed into the structure.

The operations inside Building 9212 are deemed so vital that an unplanned shutdown could cause critical problems across the nuclear supply chain. An extended stoppage would disrupt the weapons safety work and could force the closing of domestic and foreign civilian reactors that rely on low-enriched uranium from the facility, according to the NNSA.

No reporter had been allowed inside Building 9212 before The Washington Post’s visit. Because of the radioactivity, visitors and workers must wear multiple pairs of yellow rubber gloves, socks and booties, an overcoat, goggles, a head covering and thermoluminescent dosimeters that measure possible radiation exposure.

Conditions inside belie the significance of the work and the danger of the radioactive material.

The building is made of clay tile and cinder blocks and looks its age. Darrel Kohlhorst, the general manager at the time, pointed out large patches of rust and corrosion on interior walls. He said the walls and roof leak when it rains.

“If water hits the floor, we treat it like a contaminated spill,” he said, adding that workers must mop the floors three times a day — and incinerate the mop heads afterward.

The floors themselves are stainless-steel panels bolted together at thick seams. With age, they have become uneven and warped. Control panels resemble props on a 1950s sci-fi movie set, with oversize black-and-white dials and big red “start” and “stop” buttons.

Plant officials said the outdated equipment has not caused a major safety problem only because they halt operations even when minor things go wrong. For instance, when one of the giant, half-century-old exhaust fans goes on the blink, the repair time idles 30 people “for a $15 part,” said Daniel Hoag, then deputy manager of Y-12. Two years ago, the vacuum system that keeps air flowing broke down, and the facility was closed for two weeks.

Nuclear experts say the building should have been replaced years ago. But successive administrations decided to fund less costly renovations and purely scientific endeavors instead. In the meantime, the replacement cost has risen from $600 million in 2004 to $6.5 billion today.

Explaining the huge increase, NNSA spokesman Joshua McConaha said that initial cost estimates are always “speculative” and that final figures can’t be determined until most of the design work is finished.

Other factors push up costs. These nuclear facilities are one-of-a-kind plants, and the expertise and equipment needed to build them often doesn’t exist anymore, so it has to be invented.

“We’re facing questions that have never been asked or answered, and we’re doing it 20 years after the urgency of the Cold War,” McConaha said. “We’re building rare, incredibly complex nuclear facilities that nobody has had to build in decades.”

Some 640 people are designing the new uranium processing plant at Y-12. It will use 10 experimental technologies still being invented. There will be elaborate air filtration systems, duplicative electrical and fire control systems, redundant security barriers, earthquake-proof concrete floors and impenetrable vaults — all required to maintain and work with highly radioactive material.

The construction requirements for new nuclear facilities can be seen not far from the 9212 site. The storage facility for highly enriched uranium where the July break-in occurred was completed in 2010 with 90,000 square feet of concrete. Its walls are 30 feet thick and two stories tall, with hidden gun ports. Inside the concrete box, every scrap of radioactive waste is carried to its eventual tomb by a series of mechanical arms and lifts requiring no human touch. Databases and computers track every trace of radioactive material continuously in this paperless, sterile world.

Chronic poor planning

Much of the blame for the soaring costs has fallen on the National Nuclear Security Administration, the division of the Department of Energy responsible for managing and modernizing the nuclear stockpile. For years, the Government Accountability Office, the Pentagon and some lawmakers have cited the NNSA for chronic poor planning and bad management. The GAO has had the NNSA on its “high-risk list” for fraud, waste and abuse in contracting and management since 1990.

Government reports show that the NNSA has blown budgets across the board. For instance, the projected cost of a new weapons conversion facility at the DOE’s Savannah River Site in South Carolina rose to $5 billion from $1.4 billion. It was eventually scrapped — after $700 million in planning costs. The cost of building a new fuel fabrication facility at Savannah River also has tripled to $5 billion, and it is scheduled to open in 2016, a decade late.

The George W. Bush administration’s solution to NNSA’s chronic problems was to transfer management of the national laboratories to profit-making corporations in 2008. Privatization was supposed to cut costs and boost efficiency, but GAO investigators and lawmakers say it is not clear that either has happened.

One concern is unexplained increases in administrative costs, which have reached about 40 percent of the labs’ budget, according to figures provided by NNSA. In fact, the annual contracts to run the facilities are among the largest in government — nearly $2.6 billion a year to operate Los Alamos and $2.4 billion for Sandia National Laboratories in Albuquerque.

The Defense Department became so alarmed by NNSA’s construction record that it recently embedded a team at the agency to examine books and management practices and come up with more realistic cost figures for projects under consideration.

Republicans say they support increased spending on the nuclear arsenal, but last year they were unable to muster the votes to fund the president’s entire budget request. Some worry, though, that costs are out of hand. Sen. Jeff Sessions (R-Ala.), ranking member of the Armed Services Committee’s subcommittee on strategic forces, said the NNSA management approach “perpetuates the status quo mentality that everything nuclear has to be expensive.”

Nuclear Posture Review

In an April 2009 speech, President Obama outlined his vision of a world free of nuclear weapons. Acknowledging that his goal might not be accomplished in his lifetime, Obama laid out an agenda for forging new partnerships to stop the spread of nuclear weapons, ending production of fissile material for weapons and ratifying new treaties to reduce their numbers.

Since then, though, the president has taken few steps to implement his objective. On the contrary, his 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, which lays out the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. security strategy, promised to maintain the triad of nuclear weapons favored by every president since Dwight Eisenhower.

In December 2010, the Senate approved ratification of the New START accord with Russia, which limits both sides to 1,550 warheads. But no progress has been made on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which would curb development of new nuclear weapons and impose a permanent ban on nuclear tests by signatories.

Over the past year, the president has been calculating his next nuclear step. Civilian and military advisers have presented him with countless options as he sets more precise guidelines that military planners will translate into intricate targeting plans.

The White House declined to comment on the president’s strategic direction, but some government officials and outside experts said they believe he favors renewed talks with the Russians to drop the warhead total from 1,550 to 1,100. Few, however, expect any announcement until after the presidential election in November.

All of the president’s decisions, from the broad nuclear structure to the number of warheads and the top-secret target list, cascade through the nuclear establishment, affecting the types of weapons and delivery systems that must be available to meet the objectives.

For their part, many anti-nuclear activists favor disarmament by atrophy, which would mean not repairing or extending the life span of the current arsenal. For now, the administration and its supporters argue that the country must maintain its nuclear assets as long as other nations are nuclear-armed.

Still, a growing number of former senior administration officials from both parties argue that more substantial cuts would encourage nonnuclear states to abandon their nuclear ambitions, making the world safer from political miscalculations and saving money for defense items that are actually used.

Among the members of this eclectic group are former Reagan administration officials George Shultz, Robert “Bud” McFarlane and Frank Carlucci; Clinton’s former defense secretary William Perry and ambassador to Russia Thomas Pickering; and retired Marine Gen. James Cartwright, former vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff under Obama and a former commander of U.S. nuclear forces.

“There are a growing number of my peers on the uniformed military side, and especially among civilian analysts and those on the policy side,” who believe a smaller and more modern force is appropriate, Cartwright said in an interview. “What we have is way more than what we need.”

Spending limits

The nuclear arsenal has not entirely escaped cuts. To comply with the new Budget Control Act spending limits, the NNSA decided this year that it could not afford to replace both the crumbling plutonium testing facility at Los Alamos for $6 billion and the deteriorating uranium processing facility in Building 9212 at Oak Ridge for $6.5 billion.

The NNSA chose to rehab Building 9212 because there was no alternative site where the critical work carried out there could be performed.

So, after 250 contractors moved into Los Alamos last year and tractors dug out 160,000 cubic feet of volcanic tuff rock from the side of a hill, NNSA and the administration decided that building a new plutonium-testing site would be delayed five years. The crews stopped work. The tractors were idled. A new reality sank in.

That new reality means some of the plutonium will be shipped to other facilities. Every couple of days, a UPS truck will deliver a dime-size slice of plutonium to Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, 45 miles east of San Francisco. Larger quantities of plutonium will be carried by secure vans to the Nevada National Security Site northwest of Las Vegas. Plutonium remaining at Los Alamos will be hand-delivered via an underground tunnel from one building to another.

The tunnel is being upgraded, and renovations are underway at Livermore and the Nevada site to handle the plutonium. Officials estimate the changes in the three locations will cost an additional $650 million over the next five years.

Julie Tate contributed to this report.

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