President Obama seeks Russian deal to slash nuclear weapons

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U.S. is expected to reveal size of nuclear stockpile

By Mary Beth Sheridan and Walter Pincus
Washington Post Staff Writers
Saturday, May 1, 2010

The Obama administration is likely to reveal a closely guarded secret -- the size of the U.S. nuclear stockpile -- during a critical meeting starting Monday at which Washington will try to strengthen the global treaty that curbs the spread of nuclear weapons, several officials said.

Various factions in the administration have debated for months whether to declassify the numbers, and they were left out of President Obama's recent Nuclear Posture Review because of objections from intelligence officials.

Now, the administration is seeking a dramatic announcement that will further enhance its nuclear credentials as it tries to shore up the fraying nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

The numbers could be released as soon as Monday, when Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton is to address the NPT Review Conference in New York, officials said.

She will speak after Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who is likely to repeat his demands for more global controls over the stockpiles of the nuclear nations.

U.S. officials fear he could hijack the conference with such demands, diverting attention from his own nuclear program, which is widely seen as violating the nonproliferation treaty.

Arms-control groups estimate the U.S. arsenal contains 9,000 weapons, with roughly 5,000 of them active and the rest in line for dismantlement.

Arms-control activists and officials in the Energy and State departments have argued that making the numbers public would prove how much progress the U.S. government has made in shrinking its Cold War arsenal.

That's important because, under the NPT, nuclear-weapons countries promise to move toward disarmament, while non-nuclear nations pledge they won't build a bomb. A total of 189 countries are treaty members.

The last NPT Review Conference, in 2005, collapsed in failure, with many countries accusing the Bush administration of shirking its disarmament obligations.

'A major step'

Jeffrey Lewis, director of the Nuclear Strategy and Nonproliferation Initiative at the New America Foundation, said releasing the U.S. numbers would be "a major step forward in transparency."

"The United States has not gotten enough credit for the reductions it has made," he said. "That's even true of the Bush administration. . . . It makes it easier for us to make the case we are in fact reducing the number of nuclear weapons."

The U.S. intelligence community has been concerned that terrorists or states with nuclear ambitions could use the numbers to figure out how much plutonium or uranium is needed to make a bomb. But Lewis and other arms-control advocates say information on that is easy to find.

Several officials said the announcement on the stockpile numbers will be made during the conference. But one senior official cautioned that no final decision had been made. He noted that legally, such information could be declassified only if it were clear it would not lead to further nuclear proliferation. The officials spoke on condition of anonymity. There appears to be only one instance when current figures on the size of the U.S. stockpile were made public. In 1992, Gen. Colin L. Powell, then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, included aggregate stockpile numbers in a chart used at a congressional hearing on a new strategic arms agreement.

The numbers had not been declassified, but the disclosure apparently attracted no news coverage at the time. According to a 2000 Department of Energy document, the Defense Department steadfastly refused to declassify the stockpile figures even after the Powell presentation.

On a nuclear roll

The Obama administration believes it is going into the NPT conference in a position of strength, pointing to a string of recent nuclear achievements -- including an arms treaty with Russia and a nuclear-terrorism summit that drew 46 countries to Washington.

The NPT, which took effect in 1970, is widely seen as one of the world's most successful treaties. But it is facing its greatest strain in a quarter-century, due to the Iranian program and North Korea's decision to quit the pact after having secretly developed a bomb. Iran insists its program is aimed at producing peaceful nuclear energy, but it has hidden its nuclear facilities from inspectors. It has also been sanctioned three times by the U.N. Security Council for defying its orders to stop enriching uranium.

The NPT review conferences, held every five years, have often turned into battles between the nuclear haves and have-nots. Several of the meetings have ended without final declarations, which require consensus.

U.S. officials are trying to lower expectations for this month-long conference, noting that Iran will likely object to any final declaration constraining its program.

"A final document should not be the measure of success," said Ellen O. Tauscher, the undersecretary for arms control, in a speech Thursday at the Center for American Progress.

The U.S. strategy is to get a supermajority of countries to agree to a plan to pursue new ways to punish nuclear cheaters and encourage the adoption of more nuclear safeguards. U.S. officials said it could provide momentum for seeking change in other venues, such as at the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Staff writers Glenn Kessler and Colum Lynch contributed to this report.

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Ahmadinejad calls U.S. a bully at nuclear conference

U.S. and European diplomats walk out as the Iranian leader accuses the U.S. and its allies of using the nonproliferation pact to protect their own arsenals.


By Paul Richter, Los Angeles Times
May 4, 2010

Reporting from the United Nations

Iran's president castigated the United States on Monday as an expansionist bully whose leaders had become "among the most hated …in human history" for using nuclear weapons.

Mahmoud Ahmadinejad denied that his country was seeking to develop its own nuclear weapons, a charge frequently leveled by U.S. officials and their allies.

Ahmadinejad, speaking at a conference on the world's cornerstone nuclear treaty, said the United States and its allies have used the pact to protect their own arsenals while making it hard for non-nuclear states such as Iran to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

"The United States not only used nuclear weapons but continues to threaten the use of nuclear weapons against other countries, including my country," Ahmadinejad told diplomats from 189 nations gathered to consider changes to the cornerstone Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. He said that no non-nuclear states were able to pursue peaceful nuclear programs without coming under pressure that the United States brought to bear through the mechanisms of the 40-year-old treaty.

Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton was scheduled to address delegates later.

While the United States has assumed a leadership role in review of the treaty, it is "the main suspect in the stockpiling and use and threat of nuclear weapons," Ahmadinejad said. He said an American ally, Israel, uses its undeclared weapons to threaten non-nuclear states in the Middle East.

U.S. and European diplomats walked out during the Iranian president's 35-minute speech to show their displeasure.

The nonproliferation treaty is the principal international tool for limiting the spread of nuclear weapons. The monthlong NPT Review Conference sponsored by the U.N. is not technically about the international dispute over Iran's nuclear program. But the gathering has become another front in the struggle.

Obama administration officials are hoping to use the conference to build international support for strengthening the treaty's mechanism to punish countries that embark on secret nuclear weapons programs. They are pushing, too, for further limiting non-nuclear countries' access to sensitive parts of the nuclear fuel cycle.

Iran is trying to tap into resentment among non-nuclear countries of the developing world. Iran hopes that it can mobilize them to help it resist new sanctions under discussion to dissuade Tehran from continuing with nuclear enrichment.

The nonproliferation treaty calls for states with nuclear weapons to gradually give up their arsenals, and outlines rewards for non-nuclear states that reject nuclear arms, including assistance with their civilian nuclear energy programs.

But Ahmadinejad said the treaty along with the U.N.'s nuclear watchdog agency, the International Atomic Energy Agency, were failures because they had done nothing to force states with nuclear weapons to give them up. The Iranian president called for new structures to supervise the dismantling of the nuclear arsenals. He also insisted that countries that threaten to use nuclear weapons be stripped of authority at U.N. bodies.

Ahmadinejad pointed repeatedly to the U.S. use of nuclear weapons in World War II, and said the officials who directed the bombing of Japan were "among the most hated individuals in the history of mankind."

Ahmadinejad called on President Obama to join in his agenda for overhauling the treaty and its apparatus. He said he invited "the respectful president of the United States to join this humane movement if he is still committed to his motto of change."

Ahmadinejad's condemnation was not unexpected, and U.S. officials have warned Iran not to try to shift attention from what the Obama administration regards as the principal aims of the conference.

The treaty review conference is a piece of Obama's agenda for reducing the spread of nuclear weapons as well as their role in the world. Administration officials don't expect the conference to reach an agreement on ways to substantially alter the treaty.

The treaty organization runs strictly by consensus, so a single dissenter, such as Iran, can block any attempted reform.

But U.S. officials are hoping that world powers will commit themselves voluntarily to moving toward the treaty's goals.

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US Says It Has Over 5,000 Nuclear Warheads


Carole Erskine, Sky News Online The US has revealed it has 5,113 nuclear warheads in stockpile.



The US has reduced the size of its stockpile by 75% since 1989

This is the first time the Pentagon has officially disclosed the number after previously regarding the information as top secret.

A senior defence official said the size of the stockpile represents a 75% reduction since 1989.

"Increasing the transparency of global nuclear stockpiles is important to non proliferation efforts," said a statement from the Pentagon.

The US government last disclosed details of the stockpile in 1993, releasing figures current up to 1961.

The total does not include warheads that have been retired and scheduled for dismantlement - an estimated 4,600 according to the Federation of American Scientists group.



Hillary Clinton addresses the UN nuclear summit

The release coincides with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's address to the United Nations nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) review conference.

It is checking up on efforts to contain the spread of nuclear weapons around the world.

Mrs Clinton accused Iran of "flouting the rules" and called for a strong international response to Tehran's alleged development of a nuclear weapons program.

She added that Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad would fail in his bid to wreck the NPT review conference, currently taking place in New York.

"It appears that Iran's president came here today with no intention of improving the NPT," Clinton told a press conference after her speech to delegates to the conference.

"He came to distract attention from his own government's failure to live up to its international obligations, to evade accountability for defying the international community and to undermine our shared commitment to strengthening the treaty," she said.

"But he will not succeed."

Earlier the Iranian President had addressed the conference and denounced the Obama administration's refusal to rule out the use of U.S. nuclear weapons.

"Regrettably the government of the United States has not only used nuclear weapons but also continues to threaten to use such weapons against other countries, including Iran," Ahmadinejad said.

As he spoke, the U.S. delegation walked out of the General Assembly hall, as did several European delegations including the French and British.

The NPT is regarded as the world's single most important pact on nuclear arms.

It is credited with preventing their proliferation to dozens of nations since it entered into force in 1970.

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Pentagon to unveil size of nuclear arsenal
AFP, May 3, 2010, 09.30pm IST

The information will be unveiled after US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton addresses a UN conference to review the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, a cornerstone of global counter-proliferation efforts, said Colonel David Lapan.

"Obviously the impact is the fact that they've been classified for so long," Lapan said of the statistics. Experts estimate that the United States has about 9,000 nuclear weapons, including 5,000 that are deployed.

Washington has launched various initiatives recently to give weight to President Barack Obama's vow to work for a world free of nuclear weapons.

On April 8, Obama signed a new strategic arms reduction treaty with Russia that aims to slash their respective arsenals to no more than 1,500 deployed warheads each.

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Clinton, Gates urge Senate to back nuclear deal with Russia

(AFP) – 4 days ago


US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton urged the Senate Thursday to support a new nuclear weapons treaty with Russia

WASHINGTON — US President Barack Obama's administration urged the Senate Thursday to back a new nuclear weapons treaty with Russia, telling Republicans the pact would not undermine US missile defense plans.

"From the very beginning of the negotiations, this administration has been very clear. This treaty limits strategic offensive nuclear arms, not missile defenses," Secretary of State Hillary Clinton told a Senate hearing.

"We share a strong belief that the new start treaty will make our country more secure and we urge the Senate to ratify it expeditiously."

Clinton and other key members of Obama's administration argued before the Senate Armed Services Committee for ratification of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), signed with Russia on April 8.

Russia has said it reserves the right to withdraw from the treaty if Washington presses ahead with missile defense systems in Europe in a way that Moscow opposes.

Republican Senator John McCain said the Russian statements are "bound to be worrisome to anyone" and sounded unconvinced by explanations offered by Clinton, Defense Secretary Robert Gates and Admiral Mike Mullen, chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff.

"It's clear from many statements that the Russian leadership has made that there is a very different interpretation of this treaty, from what has been stated here, concerning the connection to missile defense systems and that of the Russians," he said.

But Clinton said the statement made by Russia "does not limit or constrain our missile defense efforts."

"Indeed, a US unilateral statement makes it clear that, quote, 'our missile defense systems are not intended to affect the strategic balance with Russia,'" she said.

The administration has stated that the United States plans to improve and deploy missile defense systems to defend against a limited attack, and not against Russia's vast arsenal, Clinton and Gates told the panel.

Moscow has always opposed US missile defense projects, dating back to the 1970s, said Gates, a former CIA analyst and agency director.

"The Russians can say what they want, if it's not in the treaty, it's not binding on the United States," he said.

But Gates said even Russia's unilateral statement "hedged," giving Moscow the option to accept US missile defense weaponry if it is not aimed at Russia's nuclear force.

Under the new pact, each nation will be allowed a maximum of 1,550 deployed warheads, about 30 percent lower than a limit set in 2002.

They are also restricted to 700 air, ground and submarine-launched nuclear intercontinental ballistic missiles.

But Republicans have cautioned they will oppose the pact if they think it will hamper US missile defense.

Treaty ratification needs 67 votes, but Democrats and their two independent allies hold only 59 seats in the 100-member Senate, meaning they will need to rally at least eight Republicans to their side.

Copyright © 2010 AFP. All rights reserved.

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U.S. Department of Defense

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)
Speech

On the Web:
http://www.defense.gov/Speeches/Spee...?SpeechID=1489
Media contact: +1 (703) 697-5131/697-5132 Public contact:
http://www.defense.gov/landing/comment.aspx
or +1 (703) 428-0711 +1

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Senate Armed Services Committee - New START Treaty

Remarks as Delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, U.S. Capitol, Thursday, June 17, 2010

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Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, members of the Committee:

Thank you for the opportunity to speak today regarding the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty between the United States and Russia –an agreement that reduces the strategic nuclear forces of our two nations in a manner that strengthens the stability of our relationship and protects the security of the American people.

America’s nuclear arsenal remains a vital pillar of our national security, deterring potential adversaries and reassuring allies and partners. As such, the first step of the year-long Nuclear Posture Review was an extensive analysis which, among other things, determined how many nuclear delivery vehicles and deployed warheads were needed. This in turn provided the basis for our negotiations of New START. The results of those studies give me confidence that the Department of Defense will be able to maintain a strong and effective nuclear deterrent while modernizing our weapons to ensure that they are safe, secure and reliable, all within the limits of the new treaty.

The U.S. strategic nuclear deterrent will continue to be based on the triad of delivery systems – intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and nuclear-capable heavy bombers – within the boundaries negotiated in the New START treaty.

These are:

An upper boundary of 1,550 deployed warheads;
Up to 700 deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs and nuclear-capable heavy bombers; and
Up to 800 deployed and non-deployed ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers and heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments.

Under this treaty, we retain the power and the freedom to determine the composition of our force structure, allowing the United States complete flexibility to deploy, maintain and modernize our strategic nuclear forces in a manner that best protects our national-security interests. The Defense Department has established a baseline force structure to guide our planning, one that does not require changes to current or planned basing arrangements.

The department will retain 240 deployed submarine-launched ballistic missiles, distributed among 14 submarines, each of which will have 20 launch tubes. This is the most survivable leg of the triad.

Recognizing the need for flexibility in the bomber leg, we will retain up to 60 deployed heavy bombers, including all 18 operational B-2s.

Finally, the U.S. will retain up to 420 deployed single-warhead Minuteman 3 ICBMs at our current three missiles bases.

Let me also address some of the things the treaty will not affect.

First, the treaty will not constrain the United States from deploying the most effective missile defenses possible, nor impose additional costs or barriers on those defenses. I remain confident in the U.S. missile defense program, which has made considerable advancements, including the testing and development of the SM-3 missile, which we will deploy in Europe.

As the administration’s Ballistic Missile Defense Review and budget plans make clear, the United States will continue to improve our capability to defend ourselves, our deployed forces and our allies and partners against ballistic missile threats, and as Secretary Clinton has pointed out ,our request for missile defense in the FY11 budget is 700 million dollars over FY10 number, and we are looking at an increase beyond that of potentially up to another billion dollars for FY12. We made all this clear to the Russians in a unilateral statement made in connection with the treaty.

It is not surprising that Russia continues to object to our missile defense program as they have objected to all U.S. missile defense efforts for several decades. The Russians know that our missile defenses are designed to intercept a limited number of ballistic missiles launched by a country such as Iran or North Korea. Our missile defenses do not have the capability to defend against the Russian Federation’s large, advanced arsenal. Consequentially, U.S. missile defenses do not, and will not, affect Russia’s strategic deterrent. To build such a capability – a missile shield of the kind envisioned in the 1980’s – is technologically unfeasible, cost prohibitive, and destabilizing. Therefore we have no plans to do so. Separately from the treaty, we are discussing missile defense cooperation with Russia, which we believe is in the interest of both nations. But such talks have nothing to do with imposing any limitations on our programs or our deployment plans.

Furthermore, the New START treaty does not restrict our ability to develop and deploy conventional prompt global strike capabilities that could attack targets anywhere on the globe in an hour or less. The treaty’s limit of 700 deployed delivery vehicles, combined with the ceiling of 1,550 deployed warheads, accommodates the limited number of conventional warheads we may need for this capability. We are also currently examining potential future prompt global strike systems that would not be limited by this treaty.

In my view, a key contribution of this treaty is its provision for a strong verification regime. While the intelligence community will provide a detailed classified assessment, I would like to emphasize some of the key elements of this regime, which will monitor Russia’s compliance with the treaty while also providing important insights into the size and composition of Russian strategic forces.

The treaty allows each party to conduct up to 18 on-site inspections each year at operating bases for ICBMs, SSBNs and nuclear-capable heavy bombers, as well as storage facilities, test ranges and conversion and elimination facilities.

The agreement establishes a database, updated every six months, which will help provide the United States with a rolling overall picture of Russia’s strategic offensive forces.

Unique identifiers for the first time will be assigned to each ICBM, SLBM and nuclear-capable heavy bomber, allowing us to track accountable systems throughout their life cycles.

The treaty provides for noninterference with national technical means of verification such as reconnaissance satellites, ground stations and ships.

While telemetry is not needed to verify the provisions of this treaty, the terms nonetheless call for the exchange of telemetry on up to five launches per year, for each side.

I am confident that the New START treaty will in no way compromise America’s nuclear deterrent. Maintaining a credible deterrent requires an adequate stockpile of safe, secure and reliable nuclear warheads. This calls for a reinvigoration of our nuclear weapons complex – that is, our infrastructure and our science, technology and engineering base. And I might just add, I've been up here for the last four springs trying to get money for this and this is the first time I think I've got a fair shot of actually getting money for our nuclear arsenal.

To this end, the Department of Defense is transferring $4.6 billion to the Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration through fiscal year 2015. This transfer will assist in funding critical nuclear weapons life-extension programs and efforts to modernize the nuclear weapons infrastructure. The initial applications of this funding along with an additional $1.1 billion being transferred for naval nuclear reactors are reflected in the President’s FY 2011 budget request, which I urge the Congress to approve. These investments and the Nuclear Posture Review strategy for warhead life extension represent a credible modernization plan to sustain the nuclear infrastructure and support our nation’s deterrent.

Let me close with a final, personal observation. I first began working on strategic arms control with the Russians in 1970, 40 years ago, a U.S. effort that led to the first strategic arms limitation agreement with Moscow two years later. The key question then and in the decades since has always been the same: is the United States better off with a strategic arms agreement with the Russians, or without it? The answer for successive presidents of both parties, as Secretary Clinton has said, has always been, with an agreement. The U.S. Senate has always agreed.

The same answer holds true for New START. The U.S. is better off with this treaty than without it, and I am confident that it is the right agreement for today and for the future. It increases stability and predictability, allows us to sustain a strong nuclear triad, and preserves our flexibility to deploy the nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities needed for effective deterrence and defense.

In light of all these factors, I urge the Senate to give its advice and consent to ratification on the new treaty.

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Russian Lawmakers Rule Out Prompt START Ratification

Thursday, June 17, 2010

The lower house of Russia's parliament is not expected to take up ratification of a new nuclear arms control treaty with the United States until later this year at the earliest, ITAR-Tass reported today (see GSN, June 16).

Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and U.S. President Barack Obama in April signed the replacement to the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. The "New START" pact would obligate the nations to cap their fielded strategic nuclear weapons to 1,550 warheads, down from the maximum of 2,200 allowed each country by 2012 under the 2002 Moscow Treaty. The deal would also limit U.S. and Russian deployed nuclear delivery vehicles to 700, with another 100 platforms allowed in reserve. The pact has been submitted for ratification by legislative bodies in Russia and the United States.

“We continue the procedures, and as far as the ratification is concerned, we shall try to make it [simultaneously]” with the United States, said Boris Gryzlov, speaker of the Russian Duma.

"First of all, over the spring session this matter will not be on the agenda of a plenary session," Gryzlov said.

“I do not think we shall have to organize an additional plenary session,” the lawmaker said. “So this will be a question for the autumn session’s consideration” ( ITAR-Tass I, June 17).

The Duma's defense and international affairs committees were set to discuss the pact's merits today in a closed-door meeting with Russian New START negotiators, as well as other defense and foreign officials and related specialists.

"This is the first large-scale meeting at this level on debating" the treaty's ratification, said Leonid Slutsky, the international affairs committee's first deputy chairman.

The U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee is also expected to discuss the treaty today, the lawmaker added (ITAR-Tass II, June 17).

Three senior U.S. defense officials yesterday touted the treaty's provisions in testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the Defense Department said (see related GSN story, today).

“I was fully consulted in the negotiation process, and I fully support (the treaty),” Strategic Command head Gen. Kevin Chilton said. Once in force, the document would cap the number of nuclear warheads and delivery systems trained on the United States while restoring a regime for monitoring compliance with the pact and allowing Washington to retain a flexible nuclear strategy.

"What we want is transparency and insight to know that either side is complying with the treaty,” Chilton added. “I would worry about any ability for Russia to make strategically significant changes (to its arsenal) that we don’t detect and couldn’t respond to.”

“This treaty does not constrain any current (U.S.) missile defense plans,” the official said. “America’s nuclear arsenal remains a vital pillar of U.S. national security” (see related GSN story, today).

“I do not see any limitation on my ability to develop missile defenses,” Missile Defense Agency Director Lt. Gen. Patrick O'Reilly said ( U.S. Defense Department release, June 16).

In addition, the treaty would not hinder U.S. plans to place non-nuclear warheads on some of its ICBMs, the Washington Post quoted Principal Deputy Defense Undersecretary James Miller as saying (Walter Pincus, Washington Post, June 17).

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Article published Jun 20, 2010
Lugar: It's time for a new START

By JACK COLWELL
WASHINGTON

Sen. Richard G. Lugar is reminding opponents of the New START Treaty about the Cold War days when Soviet missiles armed with 13,300 nuclear warheads were aimed at us.

No more aiming, thanks to past agreements. In fact, thousands of those warheads and missiles have been dismantled or destroyed through Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction programs.

The programs, carrying the name of Lugar, the six-term Republican senator from Indiana, brought deactivation of 7,519 strategic nuclear warheads from the old Soviet Union through 2009 and elimination of missiles, silos, submarines and bombers as well.

Lugar noted over breakfast in the Senate Dining Room that all this Nunn-Lugar success in making the world safer came over opposition from "groups on the far right that found it outlandish to trust agreements with the Russians."Now, Lugar views the New START Treaty with Russia negotiated by President Obama as a "modest step" but a vital one for further reduction of nuclear arsenals and also for better relations as Russia's help is sought in containing threats from Iran and North Korea.

Modest step?

Some of those same "groups on the far right" that Lugar cited oppose ratification of the treaty, suggesting that it is a dangerous step and promoting instead the old "Star Wars" fantasy of a missile defense shield to ward off even a barrage of missiles rather than reducing arsenals and providing for strict verification and what Lugar calls "boots on the ground" inspections.

"Just madness," Lugar says of reliance on non- existent "Star Wars" technology to down thousands of missiles if they were again aimed at targets all around the United States.

At a hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, where Lugar is the top Republican, he recalled those bad old days of Cold War, telling of "the chilling experience" of inspecting a deactivated Soviet missile silo where he found posted pictures of 10 American cities once targeted by the 10 nuclear warheads in the horrible place.Lugar is all for development of a realistic shield that could perhaps down a missile fired by some rogue nation such as North Korea. And he says there is nothing in the treaty, not a word, that would prohibit this development, even though Russia continues to be suspicious about any shield deployment.

He prefers a treaty to eliminate hundreds of nuclear warheads now rather than count on some future "Star Wars" to somehow render them harmless much later, if ever.

The Foreign Relations Committee has held numerous hearings on the treaty, with testimony both in public and in private, from defense officials, treaty negotiators and top administration officials such as Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.

Committee Chairman John Kerry, D-Mass., and Lugar are in bipartisan agreement on a vote on the treaty by the committee before the August congressional recess, with hope of ratification by the full Senate yet this year.

Action is important, Lugar says, because the old START agreement expired last December and he wants to get back to those "boots on the ground" inspections.So far, Lugar is the only Republican to support ratification. And it takes a two-thirds vote, 67 votes, for ratification.

Democrats and their two independent allies have 59 votes, so support from at least eight Republicans is needed.

Part of the problem with Republican support, Lugar knows, is reluctance to support a treaty negotiated by Obama. Also, there are the questions raised by those "groups on the far right" that distrust both the Russians and Obama.

But respect for Lugar's foreign policy expertise and his role in eliminating those warheads once aimed at us could help to sway enough support for ratification, at least in the "lame duck" session expected after the Nov. 2 election.

Also, Lugar's voting record as a solid supporter of conservative fiscal policy makes it difficult for treaty skeptics to portray him as some kind of ungrounded liberal.And Lugar is likely to be around for a lot longer as top GOP spokesman on foreign affairs. He held a fundraising breakfast Tuesday, works 12-hour legislative days at age 78 and shows every intent to run for a seventh term in 2012. He won with 87 percent of the vote in Indiana in 2006.

Jack Colwell is a columnist for The Tribune. Write to him in care of The Tribune or by e-mail at jcolwell@comcast.net.

Jack Colwell

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Missing Defense

Posted 06/18/2010 07:04 PM ET

National Security: There seems to be only one thing White House arms negotiators want more than a reduction in U.S. nuclear weapons — a reduction in U.S. missile defenses to protect us from such weapons.

The Washington Times' Bill Gertz reports that U.S. diplomats are secretly negotiating with Russia to link nuclear arms reduction to limits on our anti-missile defenses.

As Gertz points out, "Pro-arms-control officials within the administration dislike missile defenses, viewing them as an impediment to offensive arms agreements."

Ellen Tauscher, the undersecretary of state for international security and arms control, has been talking to Moscow's deputy foreign minister, Sergei Rybakov, and that in and of itself should generate fears.

Tauscher's qualifications for her current job amount to little beyond her experience as a Democratic Party fundraiser and seven terms as a San Francisco congresswoman with a reputation, according to the media at least, as a centrist, but a voting record that shows her to be an unalloyed liberal.

Tauscher let it be known when she left the House for the State Department last year that her priority was to eliminate all nuclear weapons in the world.

If that requires giving away the store on missile defense, it's worth it in the worldview of an administration that was sure an extended hand would lead Iran to end its nuclear program.

Deputy Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty negotiator Frank Rose less than a month ago said at a London conference that the Obama administration was seeking a deal on missile defense "cooperation" via the Tauscher-Rybakov negotiations.

As quoted by Gertz, Rose said, "The door to tangible, mutually beneficial missile defense cooperation with the United States, and potentially with NATO, is wide open."

President Obama has already abandoned the Czechs and the Poles on missile defense against Russian aggression under the rule of former KGB operative Vladimir Putin.

Are we now going to leave ourselves defenseless too?

It's worth remembering the crucial role that a commitment to missile defense played in the demise of the Soviet empire.

Soviet dissident Natan Sharansky noted that President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative, and the realization that Moscow didn't have the resources to compete with it, made Mikhail Gorbachev's advisers "finally accept demands for internal reform."

As British historian Andrew Roberts notes in his "History of the English-Speaking Peoples Since 1900," Reagan himself would call strategic missile defense "the single most important reason, on the United States' side, for the historic breakthroughs that were to occur" in the years before the fall of the Berlin Wall.

Yet the Obama administration's attitude is like that of the liberal internationalists of the 1980s, described by Reagan Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger in his autobiography: "The idea that any country might try to defend itself against the nuclear weapons of another country was not only revolutionary, it was sacrilegious."

As Roberts notes, detentists at the time "alternately (and contradictorily) denounced" missile defense "as expensively unworkable and strategically destabilizing."

The decades since have proved that missile defense is fantastically workable. The only thing that will stop free people from defending themselves against nuclear missiles is leaders deluded by notions of utopianism and appeasement.

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Flashpoint: Atomic affairs
Nervousness over nuclear moves

BY PETER BROOKES

At a near-breathless pace over a month’s time, the Obama administration released a nuclear strategy, inked a new strategic treaty, hosted an all-world atomic affair and attended a major nonproliferation conference.

The efforts to reduce nuclear arsenals, secure materials and prevent proliferation seemed to be warmly welcomed as a step in the direction of controlling and ridding the world of the most horrific weapons mankind has ever known.

But a closer look at the whirlwind of policy, treaty, summitry and conferencing that swept across the American national security landscape this spring is not leaving everyone as sanguine about the direction of our new nuclear policy as the administration had hoped.

As usual, the devil is in the details.

In early April, President Obama released the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) to Congress, a report required by law of every new administration, looking at our nuclear capabilities and policies over the next five to 10 years.

“To stop the spread of nuclear weapons, prevent nuclear terrorism and pursue the day when these weapons do not exist, we will work aggressively to advance every element of our comprehensive agenda — to reduce arsenals, to secure nuclear materials and the strengthen the NPT [Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty],” Obama said in unveiling the NPR.

It is hard to argue with that well-intentioned strategic sentiment, but getting beyond the speech’s rhetorical flourishes, there are real concerns about the commander in chief’s plans for our strategic policy and forces.

First, the NPR creates a new, lawyerly — and confusing — matrix of “assurances” outlining when the U.S. might (or might not) use nuclear weapons, creating possible immunities for some who might deserve our strategic wrath, according to analysts.

One example: The U.S. would not use nuclear weapons in response to a chemical or biological attack. Instead the attacker would face a “devastating conventional military response.” But, the U.S. “reserves the right” to change that assurance since biotechnology is evolving so rapidly, according to the NPR.

While seemingly apologizing for America’s nuclear might, the introduction of this sort of complex, categorical policy could mistakenly lead to misperception and miscalculation by potential adversaries — and insecurity on the part of our allies and friends worried about our commitment to their defense. Do not forget that there are some countries that are friendly to the U.S. (e.g., South Korea) that have forgone their own nuclear programs, believing they would be secure under the extended U.S. nuclear “umbrella.”

In addition, the new nuclear strategy aims to create a smaller nuclear force, while not developing any new strategic weapons. We will instead focus on extending the service life of existing warheads rather than modernizing our already-aging nuclear force.

The new policy also calls for us to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which would effectively prevent us from modernizing our strategic forces to meet ever-changing threats, saddling us with an increasingly obsolete, Cold War-vintage nuclear arsenal. This is troubling, considering the Chinese, Russians, North Koreans and Iranians are at the moment modernizing, or developing, their nuclear arsenals and delivery systems.

Unfortunately, the concerns about our nuclear policy only deepened the following week with the signing of the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START).

A BAD START

The week after unveiling the NPR, Obama flew to Prague, where he had given a major proliferation speech the year before, to sign the “Son of START,” with his Russian counterpart, President Dmitry Medvedev.

The worry about new START is not just the reduction in the size of the U.S. nuclear arsenal, which the administration characterized as a 30 percent reduction below the 2002 Moscow Treaty, but the glaring disparity in the drawdown between the American and Russian sides.

START looks like a good deal for the Kremlin, which the Obama administration has been courting since arriving at 1600 Pennsylvania Ave., repeatedly speaking of a “reset” in U.S.-Russian relations. For instance, to meet the START-mandated maximum number of warheads, the U.S. has to eliminate 76 more warheads than Russia does, reducing its arsenal from 1,815 to 1,550. In contrast, Russia will cut its arsenal from 1,739 to 1,550.

Moreover, regarding delivery and launch vehicles (e.g., missile silos, bombers and submarines), America needs to eliminate 151 platforms to reach the START requirement of 700, while Russia can oddly plus-up 134 vehicles to the 700 level. Correct: Moscow can actually increase the number of its launch/delivery platforms under the new START agreement.

Besides pure numbers, this raises another potential problem with the treaty: START will limit U.S. “dual-use” strategic platforms such as bombers and submarines that have both nuclear and conventional military roles. Losing these platforms diminishes our conventional military punch, especially our ability to fight in places such as the Korean Peninsula or to counter China’s growing might in the Asia-Pacific region — no small matter these days.

Another concern: Under new START, U.S. conventional warheads on intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) or sea-launched ballistic missiles are counted toward the treaty’s nuclear warhead limits.

This could affect the development of weapons systems such as Prompt Global Strike, essentially an ICBM armed with a non-nuclear payload that could be used against critical targets across the globe on short notice. For example, Prompt Global Strike is an ideal platform for striking a high-value terrorist, a ballistic missile with a weapon-of-mass-destruction warhead on the launch pad, or even a counter-space asset aimed at our satellites, when other conventional assets are not in the vicinity or are restricted or unable to do so within a specific time window.

While the administration insists the treaty does not affect the American development or deployment of conventionally armed ballistic missiles, START language certainly makes it appear that it does.

A chorus of voices has also expressed distress at major reductions in the American nuclear force structure, especially the perception it might create in a world with an increasing number of countries in the once-exclusive nuclear weapons club: a world that is arming, rather than disarming.

Some worry whether an American drawdown will undermine U.S. deterrence, a bedrock of our defense policy, encouraging others, such as China, North Korea or near-nuclear Iran, to bolster their current or planned arsenals.

Nuclear proliferation trends are not positive. In 1998, there were just six nuclear states; today, there are nine with a 10th — Iran — moving in that direction. An undeclared nuclear program in Syria, which was being built by North Korea, only adds to the jitters.

Obama sees it differently, believing disarmament steps taken by the U.S. would give us greater moral standing and credibility in the nonproliferation effort, creating more leverage and international cooperation in wrestling with the nettlesome nuclear problems such as North Korea and Iran.

But not everyone is convinced that if we do the “right” thing by reducing our nuclear stockpiles, these rogue states will follow our lead. If nothing else, they know having nuclear weapons is one way to end-run our vast conventional force superiority.

It also allows them to punch way above their weight in international politics — and gives them a greater freedom of action in pursuing controversial or provocative policies. North Korea’s recent sinking of the South Korean ship Cheonan is a good example.

MISSILE DEFENSE

Some analysts are also anxious about how missile defense fared in the treaty.

While the White House insists new START does not affect our missile defense programs, the Kremlin has a different take on it, stating: “[START] can only operate and be viable if the United States of America refrains from developing its missile defense capabilities quantitatively or qualitatively.”

The treaty language seems to indicate either side would have the right to withdraw should strategic missile defense capabilities go beyond existing levels. Some argue the language includes theater-level missile defenses, too. While treaty limitations may comport with this administration’s missile defense plans based on current threats, the question is whether future administrations will find the agreement limiting to their missile defense plans — based on new threats.

In the end, the Senate will have to ratify the treaty, passing it with a minimum of 67 votes. Likewise, Russia will also have to send the treaty before its parliament, the Duma, before the treaty can go into effect.

START could have a very tough run in the Senate to ratification since it looks as if the U.S. got so little — and gave so much — in the successor to the 1991 agreement.

The week after signing START, the president hosted an international summit on securing nuclear materials, such as plutonium and highly enriched uranium, with the goal of keeping them out of the hands of terrorists.

It is a commendable goal.

The meeting resulted in the securing of some highly enriched uranium from Canada, Mexico, Ukraine and Vietnam, and a new agreement between Ottawa and Moscow to help protect Russian nuclear materials.

Unfortunately, critics believe the summit did not hit on some key issues such as “the ticking clock represented by Iran’s nuclear weapons program,” as expressed by Sen. Jon Kyl, R-Ariz. No small matter, as many experts believe Iran will have a nuclear weapons capability within one to two years. The North Korea nuclear problem also received scant attention at the summit.

And the elephant in the corner of the reactor room that no one is talking about is Russia’s arsenal of tactical, “battlefield” nuclear weapons, which was not addressed in START or the nuclear summit, but which proliferation experts rightfully fret over.

Russia is particularly secretive about its tactical nuclear arsenal, which may have numbered as many as 15,000 at the close of the Cold War, refusing to discuss the current size of its stockpile. Some analysts believe Russia may have a 10:1 advantage over the U.S. in this weapons category.

These weapons are difficult to track and easy to move because of their smaller size, creating nightmarish concerns about them falling into the wrong hands, such as those of a terrorist. Indeed, it has been reported that al-Qaida has been trying to acquire nuclear materials for some years — and would use them if possible.

Admittedly, the Obama administration says it will get to tactical nuclear weapons at a later date, but observers believe Russia will remain as steadfast about not including them in any agreement as it has before in order to maintain its advantage.

In late March, according to Russian newswire RIA Novosti, Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said that the next step in arms control should be addressing tactical nuclear weapons in third countries, likely referring to American weapons in Europe.

At the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty’s five-year review conference of the 40-year-old agreement, the last in the line of major nuclear events this spring, the administration set out to hem in Iran’s nuclear program and strengthen the treaty.

The predictable clash between the nuclear “haves” and “have nots” not withstanding, the U.S. seemed more willing to embrace the notion of complete nuclear disarmament by the original nuclear powers (as called for by the NPT) than in some time.

While expectations are modest for the nearly monthlong conference, the U.S. side did shock some by revealing the previously classified number of nuclear weapons in its arsenal: 5,113 (down from its reported peak of 31,255 weapons in 1967).

While the Obama administration saw the demonstration of transparency as an example of American nonproliferation leadership, calling on others to do the same, few — especially the Chinese and Russians — are likely to follow suit, but they, no doubt, appreciate the intelligence “gift.”

ROAD TO ZERO

In the end, Obama wants to eliminate nuclear weapons, driving the U.S. down the road to zero. Whether that is achievable, much less ill-advised, in a world where ever-more nations are pursuing and acquiring nuclear weapons is certainly going to be hotly debated, especially on Capitol Hill.

It would be great if the most devastating weapons in the history of warfare could be uninvented, but that is just not the case. The technology is here, and with a great reliance on nuclear power as a cleaner source of energy, the materials and technology may be even more available. Moreover, it can almost be guaranteed that there would be at least one country — or nonstate such as a terrorist group like al-Qaida — that would skirt any broad non-nuclear pledge, such as has happened with the NPT.

The NPT, which allows signatories to pursue peaceful nuclear power, but not weapons, is but a sheet of paper, as evidenced by North Korea’s (repeated) withdrawal and Iran’s blatant violation of it. Nuclear states India, Pakistan and Israel have never signed it.

Those who want to push back on critics of Obama’s emerging nuclear policies often invoke the name of Republican President Reagan, claiming he also wanted to eliminate nuclear weapons.

Sure, Reagan did — but there is a difference. He wanted it only as part of an active plan to defend the U.S. from attack with a ballistic missile shield, an idea that helped bury the Soviet Union and end the Cold War.

In fact, Reagan walked away from potential arms control agreements with the Russians due to their insistence that he surrender what was then called ”Star Wars.” He also ensured our conventional armed forces were as ready and highly capable as our strategic forces.

Reagan knew he could not put the security of the U.S. in others’ hands such as those of the Soviets. The same is true for this administration: It must ensure that its drive to zero does not give advantage to those who would do us harm. AFJ

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PETER BROOKES is a Heritage Foundation senior fellow and a former deputy assistant secretary of defense who also served in the Navy, with the CIA and on Capitol Hill.

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Sen. Inhofe Questions Start Treaty

Written by Staff Report Friday, 18 June 2010 13:05
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U.S. Sen. Jim Inhofe (R-Okla.), a senior member of the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC), today expressed his concerns over the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) on the Senate floor. Inhofe’s statement comes after yesterday’s SASC hearing on START with U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, Admiral Michael Mullen, and Secretary of Energy Dr. Steven Chu.

U.S. Sen. Jim Inhofe (R-Okla.), a senior member of the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC), today expressed his concerns over the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) on the Senate floor. Inhofe’s statement comes after yesterday’s SASC hearing on START with U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, Admiral Michael Mullen, and Secretary of Energy Dr. Steven Chu.

“My opinion on the START Treaty has not changed since President Obama signed the treaty in April,” said Inhofe. “I remain concerned about the limits this treaty places on our nation’s ability to advance our missile defense, also it’s lack of verification procedures that are proven to be robust, accurate and effective, and most importantly, its failure to deter proliferation and future attacks on our nation and allies.”

Inhofe continued, “As the Senate Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees continues to discuss the START Treaty, it is crucial we examine the military, political, technical, and intelligence impacts associated with START to include a comprehensive net assessment of benefits, costs, and risks along with a clear and precise listing of terms, definitions and banned or permitted actions. Without this information, it would be irresponsible for President Obama to ask the Senate to take up the new START ratification. In its current state, I do not believe this treaty is in the best interest of the United States as it will have profound negative implications on our national security.”

Inhofe's Full Statement

On 17 Jun, the Senate Armed Services Committee held its first hearing on the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, or new START. During the hearing, Secretary Clinton, Secretary Gates, Dr. Chu and Admiral Mullen all emphasized the importance of verifying the treaty. The bottom line question for all Americans and this legislative body is: does this treaty improve the national security of the United States, and the safety of Americans?

To put it bluntly, this treaty will have profound negative implications for US national security. We are being told repeatedly that it is this treaty or nothing…that is not an accurate statement. The United States and Russian are still committed under the 2002 Moscow Treaty. This treaty mandates a reduction of the number of deployed nuclear weapons to a range between 1,700 and 2,200…a decrease from 6,000 under START I.

Additionally, in 2009, the United States and Russia had the option to extend START I for 5-years, keeping in place the detailed verification and inspection protocols under START I. It was the decision of the Obama Administration to abandon the START I protocols and rush forward with new START. Nevertheless, both countries remain bound by the Moscow Treaty.

Yes, new START further reduces United States and Russian strategic nuclear weapons to 1,550 warheads and reduces launchers such as ICBMs, SLBMs, and bombers to 800 total and 700 ‘deployed’ - armed with nuclear weapons. However, prior to new START negotiations, neither the United States or Russia were increasing their nuclear arsenals and, in fact, due to fiscal concerns, Russia was looking at decreasing their levels of strategic nuclear weapons.
So what does this treaty accomplish, or more importantly, what does it fail to accomplish?

I said this when the Treaty was signed in April and my sentiments remain the same: I remain concerned about several critical pieces of this security treaty: modernization, force structure, missile defense, verification and most importantly, our overall ability to deter our enemies.

Modernization

The Perry-Schlesinger Commission, a Bipartisan Congressional Commission on Strategic Posture of the United States, were unanimously alarmed by the serious disrepair and neglect of our nuclear weapons stockpile and complex. Sec Gates warned last October, saying: “there is absolutely no way we can maintain a credible deterrent and reduce the number of weapons in our stockpile without either resorting to testing our stockpile or pursuing a modernization program.” General Chilton, Commander of US Strategic Command, testified that modernization was not only important but “essential.”

The last B-52 was manufactured in 1964 and last Minuteman III was manufactured in 1975. We are the only major nuclear power not modernizing its’ weapons. Our weapons are an average of 26 yrs old and most are 15 or more years beyond design life. Some weapons lack modern safety features such insensitive high-explosives and unique signal generators and others rely on vacuum tubes.

No United States nuclear weapons have been fully tested since 1992 when the United States voluntarily suspended its Underground Nuclear Testing Program in anticipation of ratifying a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Meanwhile, other nuclear countries, to include Russia, continue to modernize and replace their nuclear weapons. These “fixes to fixes” without testing reduces overall US and
Allied confidence in our weapons.

Press reports indicate the administration will invest $100 billion over the next decade in nuclear delivery systems. About $30 billion of this total will go toward development and acquisition of a new strategic submarine, leaving about $70 billion. According to estimates by U.S. Strategic Command, the cost of maintaining our current dedicated nuclear forces is approximately $5.6 billion per year or $56 billion over the decade. This leaves roughly $14 billion of the $100 billion the administration intends to invest – even less if you factor in inflation. This $14 billion is not sufficient to develop and acquire: a next generation bomber, a follow-on ICBM, a follow-on nuclear air launched cruise missile, and develop a conventional prompt global strike capability.

I applaud Secretary Gates and the Department of Defense for committing $5 billion of their own budget authority to the Department of Energy to make a down payment on modernization, stating that this was “the only way to get modernization.” Unfortunately, apart from the $5 billion set aside for National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) by the Department of Defense, there appears to be no attempt to grow the budget and improve the infrastructure in the near term ($7.0B, $7.0B, $7.1B for the next 3 years).

I am also concerned that the Appropriators are not going to be able to fully fund the President’s FY11 budget request of $624 million for the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) due to budget limitations. The question that remains unanswered is will the President veto any appropriation that does not meet his full request for the nuclear weapons complex?

Section 1251 of FY10 NDAA requires that the submission of a new START agreement to the Senate be accompanied by a plan to modernize the US nuclear deterrent. Sadly, the Section 1251 modernization report does not even make a commitment to go forward with these delivery systems, putting off decisions on a follow-on bomber and ICBM until 2013 and 2015 respectively.

A letter written to President Obama on 15 Dec 09 and signed by 41 Senators stated that further reductions are not in national security interest of the United States without a significant program to modernize our nuclear deterrent. Enhanced safety, security, and reliability of nuclear weapons stockpile, modernization of the nuclear weapons complex, and maintenance of the nuclear delivery systems are key to enabling further reductions. Therefore, ratification of new START by this Senate must be linked to a commitment to modernize the nuclear enterprise.

Force Structure

According to the Perry-Schlesinger Strategic Posture Commission, “The triad of strategic delivery systems continues to have value. Each leg of the nuclear triad provides unique contributions to stability. As the overall force shrinks, their unique values become more prominent.” We need to understand what the Russian force structure will look like and do a net assessment to determine whether we can maintain a viable nuclear deterrent under this new agreement. We need to take into full consideration the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review which concluded that “large disparities in nuclear capabilities could raise concerns on both sides and among U.S. allies and partners, and may not be conducive to maintaining a stable, long-term relationship, especially as nuclear forces are significantly reduced.”

The Nuclear Force Structure suggested in the Section 1251 plan:
• Retains up to 420 of the 450 currently deployed single warhead ICBMs
• Retains up to 60 nuclear-capable B-52 and B-2 bombers, while converting the remaining 34 for only conventional use
• And retains all 14 strategic nuclear submarines but reduces the number of SLBM launchers in each submarine from 24 to 20, and deploy no more than 240 multi-warhead SLBMs at any time.

This Senate needs to fully understand the military force structure of the new nuclear force at 700 deployed launchers and 1550 warheads and the impact on our Nuclear Triad prior to ratifying this treaty, not seven years down the road as the Obama Administration officials are recommending.

The United States has stated it will unilaterally reduce the nuclear payload on each Minuteman III ICBM from 3 warheads down to a single warhead. Russia has not made any corresponding statement. This Senate also need to understand the impact of this unilateral statement on our forces and national security.

The Air Force recently completed a life-extension program for the Minuteman III ICBM, replacing the guidance and propulsion systems, to extend the service life until 2020 – and perhaps until 2030. Approximately $330 million is requested in FY11 to continue modifications to the Minuteman III and conduct technology development for a possible follow-on system. This Senate needs to see the analysis in order to understand whether further ICBM reductions are feasible or desirable in order to continue to carry out deterrence missions.

Additionally, this Treaty does not address tactical nuclear weapons even though tactical nukes remain one of the most significant threats to our national security. Russia has approximately 4,000 tactical nuclear weapons, a 10:1 superiority over the US inventory. Not only do the Russians maintain a 10-1 superiority in tactical nuclear weapons but their tactical nuclear weapons will outnumber our strategic nuclear weapons by at least 2-1 and Russian is increasing their reliance on their nuclear arsenal to make up for their declining conventional military capabilities Henry Kissinger stated on 25 May, 2010 that “The large Russian stockpile of tactical nuclear weapons, unmatched by a comparable American deployment, could threaten the ability to undertake extended deterrence.” The Perry-Schlesinger Strategic Posture Commission report notes “The combination of new warhead designs, the estimated production capability for new nuclear warheads, and precision delivery systems such as the Iskander short-range tactical ballistic missile, open up new possibilities for Russian efforts to threaten to use nuclear weapons to influence regional conflicts.” And going back to March 2003, then Senator Biden stated that “After entry into force of the Moscow Treaty, getting a handle on Russian tactical nuclear weapons must be a top arms control and non-proliferation objective of the United States Government.”

I cannot overemphasize the threat of tactical nuclear weapons and I ask you, where is that effort that our current Vice President so aptly stated during his time as a Senator? I can easily see a scenario where Russian tactical nuclear weapons reach the U.S. homeland by way of nuclear cruise missiles launched from submarines deployed near US shores. Or could you imagine a scenario where one of those tactical nukes falls into the hands of a terrorist organization bent on attacking America or our allies. Unfortunately, the new START does not address the threat of nuclear terrorism and proliferation and it does not ensure all existing weapons remain secure.

Missile Defense

We need to understand the implications of this Treaty on missile defense. I have heard many different explanations of the intent of Article V and the Treaty. The understanding of this treaty’s impact on missile defense is as clear as mud. On the one hand, the Obama Administration assures us there are no limitations on our missile defenses while on the other hand, the Russian Foreign Minister states that there are obligations regarding missile defense in the treaty text that constitute “a legally binding package.”

In the preamble, the treaty recognizes "the interrelationship between strategic offensive arms and strategic defensive arms, that this interrelationship will become more important as strategic nuclear arms are reduced and that current strategic defensive arms do not undermine the viability and effectiveness of the strategic offensive arms of the Parties." Article V, Section 3 of the treaty text, places restrictions on converting ICBM and SLBM launchers for placement of missile defense interceptors. The Unilateral Statement issued by the Russian side on missile defense released the same day as the full agreed-upon treaty text in Prague on April 8 states that the treaty "can operate and be viable only if the United States of America refrains from developing its missile defense capabilities quantitatively or qualitatively." Finally, Russia’s Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, stated “We have not yet agreed on this [missile defense] issue and we are trying to clarify how the agreements reached by the two presidents...correlate with the actions taken unilaterally by Washington,” and added that the “Obama administration had not coordinated its missile defense plans with Russia.”

When taken together, the Treaty Preamble, Russian unilateral statement, and pronouncements by senior Russian officials suggests the Russians believe there is a linkage between certain U.S. missile defense activities and their adherence to the treaty. While the Obama administration had made it clear that the treaty in no way limits any U.S. missile defense activity, what is more important is what the Russians think.

We do know that Russia believed the deployment of ten ground-based interceptors in Poland constituted a threat, even though we offered persuasive evidence to the contrary. We don’t know if the Russians will construe the deployment of advanced versions of the SM-3 missiles in Europe as a potential threat as well. We also don’t know what the Russians think constitutes a “qualitative” or “quantitative” improvement in U.S. missile defense capabilities that could impact their strategic capabilities.

Next week, Russian President Medvedev will be meeting with President Obama and one of the items on President Medvedev’s agenda is U.S. missile defense. These points of friction need to be resolved before the Senate ratifies this treaty. I do not believe there should have been any ties to missile defense included in this treaty. However one way to address this concern is by making it clear in the Resolution of Ratification that the U.S. will not be limited, in any fashion, in its missile defense deployments by the New Start Treaty.

Verification

Verification is critical to ratification and enforcement of this treaty. The verification process contained in this treaty must ensure treaty obligations can be monitored on both sides. As President Reagan put it, “trust but verify.”

However, verification appears to be less robust than in the 1991 treaty.

We have heard repeatedly by Assistant Secretary of State Rose Gottemoeller, the head treaty negotiator, that the verification procedures are simpler and cost less. Given that the verification measures for this treaty have been ‘simplified’, I am concerned that it will make it harder for our intelligence community to monitor Russian nuclear forces and may require additional resources, which we do not currently have, to ensure we are adequately monitoring Russian nuclear force developments. I am also concerned that 18 inspections per year, or 180 inspections in 10 years, is not robust enough given the fact we conducted on the order of 600 inspections during the 15 years of START I.

The top verification priorities need to be accuracy and effectiveness, not simplicity and cost. This Senate is still waiting on the National Intelligence Estimate that will assess our ability to monitor the treaty. We need to understand what methodology was used determine the number of inspections that would be undertaken each year as well as what our confidence level is regarding knowing precisely how many weapons and launchers, including MIRV’ed road mobile missiles, Russia will be building and deploying under the new treaty.

Deterrence

In no uncertain terms, the U.S. must maintain her nuclear arsenal in order to deter attacks on our nation and over 30 international allies that are protected by our nuclear umbrella. This reduces proliferation by their continued reliance on our nuclear deterrent rather than to develop their own, and deters our enemies from using weapons of mass destruction against our country or our allies. As Secretary Gates stated back in October 2008, “As long as others have nuclear weapons, we must maintain some level of these weapons ourselves to deter potential adversaries and to reassure over two dozen allies and partners who rely on our nuclear umbrella for their security, making it unnecessary for them to develop their own.”

However, new START is rooted in the paradigm of the Cold War…it is reactive vice proactive. New START focuses on reducing the strategic nuclear arsenals of Russia and the United States and fails to address proliferation of nuclear weapons in other countries, the large number of tactical nuclear weapons and the increased threat of a nuclear terrorist attack. New START does not reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism and proliferation and it does not ensure all existing weapons remain secure.

Conclusion

The decision to commit the United States to international obligations must be made carefully and must be based on whether such a treaty will secure tangible benefits for the United States while ensuring there are little or no attendant risks. Unfortunately, we lack clarity and specificity with respect to this Treaty.

This Senate must receive a comprehensive net assessment of benefits, costs, and risks with clear and precise listing of terms, definitions and banned and permitted actions. Moreover, this Senate must continue to hold a series of follow on hearings that will provide all committees of jurisdiction greater details on the military, political, technical, and intelligence issues associated with new START ratification.

I for one cannot support a treaty that reduces our nuclear stockpile without specifying the means of verification, does not fully funding nuclear enterprise modernization, and fails to ensure that the resulting force structure will be able to provide a viable nuclear deterrent.

I see no way the President can ask the Senate to take up the new START ratification before acting upon these recommendations. This will take time and this body should not be rushed: whether the President wants this ratified before November or not.

In conclusion, I would reiterate that in evaluating treaties which bear upon the national security of the United States, we must weigh carefully the tangible benefits of any such treaty against the potential risks and costs. In its current state, I do not believe this treaty is in the best interest of the United States as it will have profound negative implications on our national security.

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James Carafano: 'New START' leads to bad end

By: James Carafano
Examiner Columnist
June 21, 2010

John Forbes Nash Jr. had a beautiful mind. Ron Howard said so.

Howard directed "A Beautiful Mind," the 2001 film about the prize-winning mathematician. The movie was artful. (Much of the story line was "cinematized," Howard explained, because "Nash is not particularly communicative about that sort of thing [his life]." But what Nash can do with numbers is fine art indeed. The letter of recommendation a professor wrote to get Nash into graduate school was one sentence long -- "This man is a genius."

What earned Nash notoriety and a place on the silver screen was his work on game theory. Game theories attempt to understand how competitions unfold. Here, "game" is a metaphor for a structured model designed to evaluate how competitors make choices.

During the Cold War, U.S. analysts used gaming exercises to evaluate the nuclear stand-off with the Evil Empire. Games let them examine -- without risking real-world nuclear war -- how nuclear deterrence might play out if one side or the other changed strategies.

Cold War games involved only two players -- us and them. Nash analyzed how to manage outcomes when several players were all operating independently: the Nash equilibrium. It earned him the Nobel Prize.

My Heritage Foundation colleague Baker Spring built on this concept to game what might happen in a world with numerous independent nuclear powers. Many experts believe that, once North Korea and Iran become established nuclear weapons nations, other regional powers will go nuclear too. And fast.

Welcome to the world of multiple proliferation. With so many fingers on so many buttons, it is not a neighborhood Mr. Rogers would like.

Spring will soon publish the results of his nuclear games. In one scenario, Spring directed the U.S. player to stick to President Obama's strategy for creating a nuke-free world: pursue arms control, let the U.S. arsenal atrophy, and minimize the role of missile defense.

The results offered good news (of a kind) and bad news. The good news: At game's end, there were, indeed, fewer nuclear weapons in the world. The bad news: It was because so many were used in the ensuing nuclear war.

That's the great tragedy of Obama's "road to zero": It is likely to achieve the opposite results of its aim. A deliberately self-weakened United States will exert little influence on the nuclear inventories and programs of other nations.

Rather, potential competitors will feel emboldened. They'll step up their programs. Allies will feel increasingly insecure and take matters more into their own hands.

The gateway to this road to disaster is the New START agreement that the president wants Congress to ratify. It's a bad agreement. It makes Russia a more dominant nuclear power, and it makes Russia more, not less, dependent on nuclear weapons.

Under this agreement, Russia can actually build more delivery systems. It can modernize its nuclear weapons just as much as it wants. And it does not have to count its tactical nukes. The latter is a huge problem because (a) it has way more tactical nukes than we do and (b) since Russia can use its tactical nukes to threaten nearby neighbors, they serve as potent strategic weapons, too.

The whole point of war games is to help strategic leaders avoid making stupid choices. America's New START negotiators could have benefited mightily from the lessons of Spring's "Nuclear Games." Here's hoping the "beautiful minds" of the Senate do better.

Examiner Columnist James Jay Carafano is a senior research fellow for national security at The Heritage Foundation ( heritage.org)

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Senate Republicans to Back Nuclear Arms Treaty

June 23, 2010 01:09 PM ET | Paul Bedard, Alex Kingsbury | Permanent Link |
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By Alex Kingsbury, Washington Whispers

The Nobel Prize committee may have been easily swayed by President Obama's quest for a world free of nuclear weapons, but getting the Senate to actually cut the U.S. nuclear arsenal looks to be a far tougher sell. Still, word on the Hill is that the New START treaty got a surprise boost last week. Sources say several Republicans on the Foreign Relations Committee are now considering backing ratification of the arms treaty that the White House negotiated with Moscow earlier this year.

Indiana Sen. Richard Lugar has already announced his support, and three others have hinted privately that they might be on board after heavyweights James Baker, Henry Kissinger, and Brent Scowcroft concurred that New START will not affect any U.S. missile defense plans, a key GOP objection to ratification. "The chances of a 'yes' vote now are at 30 percent, up from zero percent last week," says one senior Senate staffer. Others are a little more cautious. "It is still an open issue," says a GOP flack.

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If Russia looked in mirror, it'd see a Cold War thinker

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7:58 p.m., Wednesday, June 23, 2010

Russia often accuses the United States and NATO of still harboring Cold War prejudices. In February, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said, "Cold War stereotypes remain strong in Euro-Atlantic policies, and NATO is continuing its expansion." He accused NATO of global ambitions and implied its out-of-area operations in places like Afghanistan violate the U.N. Charter.

Talk about the pot calling the kettle black. No one is more steeped in Cold War thinking than the Russian government. Many of its policies are rooted in ancient Russian ideas of empire and spheres of influence - ideas that were as much part of the Soviet Union as Imperial Russia.

Resentful over the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russian leaders today appear dead set on reasserting Russia as a great power to regain some of the stature and respect they believe their country enjoyed during the Cold War but lost with the USSR's fall.

Case in Point No. 1: Russia's bitter opposition to NATO expansion. Let's get something straight: Moscow is not afraid of a Western military attack. But it is determined to keep countries along its borders within its sphere of influence. That's why it has rebuffed nearly every attempt by NATO to work together. Rather than join a Western club, Russia wants to be in charge of its own club - the center hub surrounded by smaller, dependent border countries that owe Russia respect and in some cases even fealty.

For President Dmitry Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, the real threat from NATO is not military, but geopolitical. No one, probably not even the Russian General Staff, seriously believes that today's NATO will mount a military offensive against Russia. But a strong military alliance that includes former members of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact is a blow to Russian prestige - a direct affront to Russia's claim of great-power status and its ability to influence its "near abroad" neighbors.

This attitude explains why Russians are trying to negotiate a new "European security architecture" with NATO. At the end of the Cold War, Mikhail Gorbachev talked of a "common European house" as a way of breaking down Europe's resistance to the Soviet Union. Moscow's renewed interest in a new European architecture is a throwback to that idea. Then, as now, the goal was to minimize U.S. influence in Europe and, through the soothing words of peace and common interest, suggest that the price of Russian contentment in Europe was to give it some degree of influence or control over Europe's destiny (particularly its foreign policies).

Russians seem unable to understand that countries want to join NATO because they share its democratic values. Nor do they admit that the historic reasons countries like Poland and the Czech Republic give for joining NATO are far more convincing than Russian reasons for opposing it. The Russian government often poses as a victim of NATO, but we shouldn't fall for it. More often than not, its rhetoric masks an inherently aggressive strategy against its neighbors. The sad truth is that the Russians think their neighbors have less of a right than they do to organize their external affairs. Just ask the Georgians.

Case in Point No. 2: Russians' attitudes about nuclear weapons. Russian thinking about the centrality of nuclear weaponry hasn't changed appreciably since the end of the Cold War. They believe Russia's nuclear arsenal is the one thing that makes it a great power. They are not about to give it up to satisfy President Obama's dream of a world without nuclear weapons.

One reason Russians are thrilled with the New START treaty is that it codifies and even enhances the military and geopolitical importance of nuclear weaponry. It either limits or raises questions about the utility of nonnuclear U.S. forces like conventionally armed ballistic missiles and missile defenses (which Russia opposes). At the same time, Russia's tactical nuclear weapons targeting Europe and others are left untouched. By some counting rules, moreover, Russia doesn't have to reduce its number of nuclear warheads as much as the U.S. does under the treaty.

Russia's resurrection of its ideological warfare against U.S. missile defenses is another throwback to the Cold War. After we withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, which limited our defenses, we thought that chapter of history was behind us. Today, not only are Russians routinely railing against U.S. missile-defense plans with Soviet-style vehemence, they are finding the Obama administration to be receptive to their complaints.

It may be understandable why some Russians think this way, but it is completely baffling why some Americans do. In a classic Orwellian case of doublethink, some pundits claim that to call attention to Russia's Cold War thinking is in itself Cold War thinking. "What sphere of influence?" they ask. "Give the Russians what they ask for and get over it!"

The same is true for Mr. Obama's claim that his arms-control policies will "put an end to Cold War thinking." It's the exact opposite. If ratified, Mr. Obama's New START treaty will enhance the Cold War's centrality of Russia's nuclear arsenal.

This is misguided. It's one thing to say you don't want to make enemies of the Russians or to reduce nuclear weapons. It's another to make excuses for them when they employ Cold War tactics against their neighbors or when they demand treaties that enhance a military mindset born in the USSR.

We should expect more from our leaders, who instead of trying to "reset" relations should be looking out for our best interests.

c Kim R. Holmes, a former assistant secretary of state, is a vice president at the Heritage Foundation. Follow him on Twitter @kimsmithholmes.

© Copyright 2010 The Washington Times, LLC.

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The Kremlin’s Nuclear Trump Card

28 June 2010
By Stephen G. Rademaker

A recurring theme in the U.S. Senate’s hearings on the New START treaty has been the disappointment expressed by many senators over the treaty’s failure to limit Russia’s tactical nuclear warheads.

Supporters of New START respond that the treaty’s exclusive focus on strategic nuclear warheads follows the pattern of all previous U.S.-Russian arms control agreements. But the critics are rightly concerned that the number of strategic warheads has fallen so low that the United States can no longer ignore Russia’s overwhelming advantage in tactical warheads.

Strategic nuclear weapons are intended to win wars by targeting major cities, military bases and other “strategic” targets. Tactical weapons, by contrast, are designed for use on the battlefield. In practical terms, strategic nuclear weapons target the Russian and U.S. heartlands, while tactical nuclear weapons were designed for use in combat in Central Europe.

During the Cold War, the United States and Russia deployed large numbers of both strategic and tactical nuclear weapons. But U.S.-Russian arms control had always focused on strategic weapons on the theory that tactical weapons were irrelevant to keeping the nuclear peace as long as both sides deployed vastly larger numbers of strategic weapons. Events on the battlefield were thought to be of little consequence if Washington and Moscow were at risk of destruction by strategic weapons.

But what was true at the height of the Cold War when both sides possessed tens of thousands of strategic nuclear warheads has become increasingly less true as both sides have reduced their strategic forces. During the administration of former U.S. President George W. Bush, the agreed ceiling on deployed strategic weapons was reduced from 6,000 to 2,200 on each side. The New START drops the ceiling even further to 1,550.

Regrettably, these deep reductions in strategic weapons have not been matched by Russian reductions in tactical weapons. By most estimates, the United States today deploys just between 200 and 300 tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, compared to Russia’s arsenal of between 2,000 and 3,000.

The Obama administration has argued to the Senate that Russia’s 10:1 advantage in tactical weapons is militarily insignificant today and will remain insignificant even if U.S. strategic forces are cut to roughly half the size of Russia’s tactical forces as required by New START. But obviously there comes a point at which strategic nuclear reductions will be so deep — and Russia’s advantage in tactical weapons so large — that the disparity can no longer be ignored.

Incredibly, the arms control community, and even some U.S. allies in Europe, believe that the solution to this problem is to unilaterally withdraw the remaining U.S. tactical warheads from Europe, assuming incorrectly that Russia would, in turn, remove its warheads (at least those that are located in the European part of the country). The Obama administration has not embraced this solution, but it hasn’t rejected it either, promising instead to intensify consultations within NATO on the issue and calling on Russia to negotiate reductions in tactical weapons.

Indeed, persuading Russia simply to talk about tactical weapons would be a significant achievement. The Bush administration tried repeatedly to initiate such a discussion, but Russia always demurred, insisting there was nothing to talk about until the United States withdrew all its tactical weapons from Europe, while Russia kept its weapons in that theater. Russia has become no more flexible on this issue following the advent of the Obama administration. When asked by the Senate why New START addresses only strategic weapons, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton admitted “they were not willing to negotiate on tactical nukes.”

This inflexibility reflects a troubling reality. Russia emphatically has not embraced Obama’s vision of a world free of nuclear weapons. To the contrary, as U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates candidly told the Senate, “Everything we see indicates they’re increasing the importance and the role of their nuclear weapons in the defense of Russia.” Russian officials explain that the country’s conventional capabilities are much degraded since the demise of the Soviet Union, while threats to Russia’s security have increased.

These perceived threats include not just China to the East and unstable Islamic regions to the South, but also NATO to the West. In truth, NATO has served to stabilize Russia’s Western periphery rather than threaten it, but bitterness over the loss of so much of its former empire to NATO prevents Moscow from recognizing this reality.

In an environment where the threats perceived by Russia outstrip its ability to defend itself by conventional means, Russian officials see tactical nuclear weapons as the great equalizer. The United States has little to offer to persuade the Kremlin to reduce its 10:1 advantage, much less abolish these weapons entirely.

Washington would have even less to offer if the Obama administration unilaterally withdrew the remaining U.S. tactical weapons from Europe. Proponents of this idea misunderstand the nature of the problem. In reality, Russia deploys tactical nuclear weapons to counter an imagined conventional threat from NATO.

For these reasons, New START is likely to be the last arms control agreement signed with Russia for a long time to come. Another traditional strategic arms control agreement is out of the question. Any future agreement will have to limit tactical weapons as well, but Russia appears determined to keep its tactical nuclear trump card so long as it perceives NATO as a threat. Changing that perception will take a lot more than reset buttons and unilateral U.S. concessions.

Stephen G. Rademaker, who served as U.S. assistant secretary of state for arms control from 2002 to 2006, is senior counsel for BGR Government Affairs in Washington.

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Obama plan outlines reductions in U.S. nuclear arsenal

By Walter Pincus
Washington Post Staff Writer
Thursday, July 15, 2010; A02



The Obama administration's 20-year plan for the U.S. nuclear arsenal would reduce the number of deployed and stored warheads from 5,000 to a range of 3,000 to 3,500 and significantly increase spending on the complex that maintains them, according to newly disclosed documents.

Unclassified sections of the National Nuclear Security Administration's plan show that annual costs for the weapons complex would increase from about $7 billion in fiscal 2011 to $8.4 billion in 2017 and more than $9 billion by 2030.

The agency's infrastructure will support "active, logistic spare and reserve warheads," according to the plan, but it will not be "designed to have the capacity to support a return to historical Cold War stockpiles, or rapidly respond to large production spikes."

The plan does not say how many of the 3,000 to 3,500 warheads would be active or deployed.

The documents, which were sent in May to key members of the House and Senate Armed Services and Appropriations committees, were made public this week by the Federation of American Scientists and the Union of Concerned Scientists, two nonpartisan groups specializing in nuclear weapons.

The stockpile plans are expected to be discussed Thursday as two Senate panels hear testimony on the new U.S.-Russia Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) from the directors of the nation's three nuclear weapons laboratories.

Republican critics of the nuclear treaty have said that before they vote on ratification, they need assurance that the United States will continue rebuilding the weapons complex and refurbishing and replacing the aging nuclear stockpile, which includes some bombs and warheads that are 30 years old.

At least eight Republican votes are needed to get the two-thirds vote for Senate ratification of the treaty.

Just last week, Sen. Jon Kyl (R-Ariz.) said the Obama administration was underfunding the nation's nuclear weapons complex. "What little new funds may be available under the president's plan will not cover even pressing needs like replacing two decrepit and dangerous facilities that produce plutonium and uranium," Kyl wrote in an op-ed in the Wall Street Journal.

The NNSA stockpile plan, however, does include $3.5 billion for a new uranium-processing facility at Oak Ridge, Tenn., and funding for a planned $4 billion facility to handle plutonium at the Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico.

Additionally, the administration proposes spending about $1 billion a year from 2021 through 2030 on refurbishing and perhaps replacing the W-78 warhead for land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles and the currently deployed version of the B-61 nuclear bomb.

Hans M. Kristensen of the Federation of American Scientists said his analysis of NNSA's stockpile plan showed spending of "a whopping $175 billion over the next 20 years for new nuclear weapons factories, testing and simulation facilities, and warhead modernizations."

He described as "curious" that "it will cost more to maintain fewer weapons, even though NNSA has been able to maintain more weapons with less for a decade and a half."

"Nuclear weapons are now a liability, not an asset, so the plan to reduce the U.S. nuclear stockpile is a step in the right direction," said Lisbeth Gronlund of the Union of Concerned Scientists. She said, however, that maintaining "a large, capable weapons complex independent of the size of the arsenal . . . could be a problem for deeper reductions that are needed, since it would be possible for the United States to rapidly rebuild."

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New START to be ratified by US Senate despite protests-Lugar

20.07.2010, 09.44

WASHINGTON, July 20 (Itar-Tass) - The Russian-American Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) will be ratified by the US Senate despite resistance of many representatives of the Republican Party, influential Senator Richard Lugar who is active supporter of the treaty said in an interview to the National Journal weekly.

Asked about the START destiny in the upper house of the Congress Lugar noted that he thinks that the treaty’s prospects are good.

However, Lugar did not deny that he feels some concern over the possible deeper dragging of the treaty into the US internal political squabbles in the run-up to the primary elections to the Congress that will be held in November. There are those in the republican minority in the Senate who simply distrust Russians and the others regarding the victory every day before the elections on which nothing happened, the senator admitted.

He also confirmed that he totally disagrees with Massachusetts ex-governor Mitt Romney, member of the Republican Party who has recently published in The Washington Post an article devoted to the treaty entitled “Obama’s Worst Foreign Policy Mistake.” Romney wrote in the article, in particular, that the “New-START gives Russia a massive nuclear weapon advantage over the United States. The treaty ignores tactical nuclear weapons, where Russia outnumbers us by as much as 10 to 1. Obama heralds a reduction in strategic weapons from approximately 2,200 to 1,550 but fails to mention that Russia will retain more than 10,000 nuclear warheads that are categorized as tactical because they are mounted on missiles that cannot reach the United States. But surely they can reach our allies, nations that depend on us for a nuclear umbrella. And who can know how those tactical nuclear warheads might be reconfigured? Astonishingly, while excusing tactical nukes from the treaty, the Obama administration bows to Russia's insistence that conventional weapons mounted on ICBMs are counted under the treaty's warhead and launcher limits.”

Many Washington experts having read Romney’s opus directly accused the author of the total lack of knowledge about the subject he speculated on. Lugar called Romney’s arguments the repetition of discredited objections, and his fellow party member who put them forward – a person apparently unaware of the history of arms control and the context of the conclusion of the treaty.

In this connection Lugar explained that he considers the New START vitally important in the US relations with Russians at the current stage. The treaty is preparing the ground for the continuation of such relations with Russia that allows the sides to work together on issues of common interest. He believes that the new treaty’s coming into force will allow the sides to continue mutual confidence building and this in the future can result in breakthroughs that will be much more dramatic that something conceived in a specific treaty.

The New START is a bilateral nuclear arms reduction treaty between the United States and the Russian Federation. It is a follow-up to the 1991 START I treaty, which expired in December 2009, and to START II and the 2002 Treaty of Moscow (SORT), which was due to expire in December 2012. Prolonged talks were conducted by US and Russian delegations in Geneva, led on the American side by US State Department Assistant Secretary Rose Gottemoeller. The Russian delegation was headed by Anatoly Antonov, director of security and disarmament at the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Presidents Barack Obama and Dmitry Medvedev then announced on 26 March 2010 that they had reached an agreement. The new treaty was signed on 8 April 2010 in Prague by Obama and Medvedev.

If ratified, the treaty will limit the number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads to 1,550, which is down nearly two-thirds from the original START treaty and is 30% lower than the deployed strategic warhead limit of the 2002 Moscow Treaty and it will limit to 800 the number of deployed and non-deployed inter-continental ballistic missile (ICBM) launchers, submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers, and heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments. Also it will limit the number of deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments to 700.

These obligations must be met within seven years from the date the new treaty enters into force. The treaty will last ten years, with an option to renew it for up to five years upon agreement of both parties. The treaty first has to pass United States Senate’s advice and consent to ratification for the President to formally ratify and approval from the Federation Council of the Russian Federation. Once that is done, the treaty will enter into force on the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification. However the United States appears to be implementing the reductions even before the treaty is ratified.

The number of operationally inactive stockpiled nuclear warheads will remain in the high thousands in both the Russian and United States inventories.

The number of nuclear missile launchers will be reduced by half. A new inspection and verification regime will be established, replacing the mechanism defined by the earlier treaty. The new treaty has been described in the press as “substantial.”

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US: no worries about Russian nuke treaty cheating

By ROBERT BURNS (AP) – 12 hours ago

WASHINGTON — Even large-scale Russian cheating on a new nuclear arms treaty would not hurt U.S. security because U.S. nuclear superiority would more than offset any Russian actions, the Obama administration has concluded.

James Miller, the Pentagon's leading authority on nuclear arms, on Tuesday outlined for the Senate Armed Services Committee how the administration came to this previously undisclosed conclusion.

He was challenged by Sen. John McCain, R-Ariz., who asked in an incredulous tone why the Obama administration bothered to negotiate the treaty if Russian cheating is of no consequence.

"Why have a treaty?" McCain boomed.

"To say that (Russian cheating) has little, if any, effect, then we've been wasting a lot of time and money on negotiations," he added.

The ability to verify compliance with the treaty is a key point of debate as the Senate considers whether to ratify the deal, which was signed in April by President Barack Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev. Both governments hailed it as a major breakthrough in U.S.-Russian relations and a step toward making the world safer.

The treaty, known as New START, would shrink the limit on strategic warheads to 1,550 for each country, down about a third from the current ceiling of 2,200. It requires approval by the legislatures of both nations; the Russian Duma is waiting for the U.S. Senate to act first.

Prospects for ratification are considered strong for the treaty, which has drawn wide bipartisan support among think tank experts and former top-ranking officials. But Senate approval might not happen until this fall.

Miller told the committee that the size and structure of the U.S. arsenal of strategic nuclear weapons — the so-called triad of submarines, bomber aircraft and land-based launchers — provide assurance that any Russian cheating would have little military significance for the U.S.

"Because the United States will retain a diverse triad of strategic forces, any Russian cheating under the treaty would have little effect on the assured second-strike capabilities of U.S. strategic forces," Miller said. He added that he does not believe Russian cheating is likely.

The ability of U.S. missile-bearing submarines and bombers to survive any Russian first strike, and to deliver a devastating counterstrike, would be "unaffected by even large-scale cheating" by the Russians, Miller said. That fact will discourage Russia from trying to secretly exceed the pact's limits on warheads, he said.

What's more, in a crisis the U.S. would be able to add extra nuclear warheads to missiles aboard submarines and bombers — a capability the Russians apparently do not have, Miller said.

"Therefore any breakout scenario would have, at most, limited military significance," he said.

Miller later said any cheating would be politically significant, but he did not elaborate.

Although he did not say so in his testimony, Miller's remarks reflected the conclusions of a classified State Department report to the committee on enforcing the treaty. The report has not been released publicly, but Sen. Carl Levin, the Armed Services Committee's chairman, read unclassified portions aloud at the hearing.

"Given the terms of the New START treaty, the potential benefits to be derived by Russia from cheating or breakout from the treaty would appear to be questionable," the report said.

A copy of the unclassified passages of the State Department report was provided to The Associated Press after the hearing by the Republican side of the Armed Services Committee.

The report is dated July 12.

"The costs and risks of Russian cheating or breakout, on the other hand, would likely be very significant," the report said. Russia would face financial and international political costs if it violated the treaty's provisions, with little to be gained militarily, it said.

Air Force Gen. Kevin P. Chilton, commander of U.S. Strategic Command, which is responsible for ensuring the viability of the U.S. nuclear arsenal, said he agreed with Miller that the United States could adequately defend itself in the event Moscow ignored the treaty's limitations.

"I believe that we are in a good position" with the Russians in that regard, Chilton said.

"Well, what this brings to the casual observer's mind, general, is that if it doesn't have any consequences if they do any cheating, what's the point of having a treaty?" McCain asked in response.

McCain's point was a reminder of the Bush administration's initial approach to nuclear arms control with Russia, which put little stock in negotiating a detailed treaty. It saw little prospect of the Russians managing a sudden, large-scale buildup of their nuclear arsenal, and so it preferred to set broad disarmament goals with the Russians instead.

Late in his second term, however, President George W. Bush did propose a new, more detailed nuclear treaty with Moscow.

Copyright © 2010 The Associated Press. All rights reserved.

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— 19.07.2010 16:07 —
В России заступил на боевое дежурство первый дивизион ракет РС-24 «Ярс»

В России принят на вооружение и поставлен на боевое дежурство первый дивизион, оснащенный межконтинентальными ракетами последнего поколения РС-24 «Ярс», сообщил заместитель министра обороны России Владимир Поповкин.

«РС-24 принята на вооружение и боевое дежурство», – сказал Поповкин.

_______

Bablefish...

- 19.07.2010 16:07 -
In Russia interceded to standby alert the first battalion of the rockets RS -24 “Of [yars]”

By Russia is received for the armament and is set to standby alert the first battalion, equipped with the intercontinental missiles of the last generation RS -24 “Of [yars]”, reported the deputy minister of defense of Russia Vladimir [Popovkin].

“RS -24 is accepted to armament and standby alert”, said [Popovkin].

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State Department says Russia cheating on START insignificant

McCain hits stance on nuclear treaty

"I always believed in all the treaties that I've been involved in, in the past 28 years, General, that cheating does matter and it does have an effect. And to say that it has little if any effect, then we've been wasting a lot of time and money on negotiations," Sen. John McCain said. (Associated Press)

By Bill Gertz
Comments
8:39 p.m., Tuesday, July 20, 2010

A classified State Department report to Congress says that potential Russian cheating on the new START nuclear-arms pact would not be significant because of the size of U.S. nuclear forces.

But the senior Republican on the Senate Armed Services Committee on Tuesday questioned the commander of U.S. nuclear forces about the time and expense of negotiating the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty if Moscow is expected to violate the pact, now facing a difficult ratification fight in the Senate.

The State Department report on arms-control verification, dated July 12, stated that because of the terms of the new START, "the potential benefits to be derived from Russia from cheating or breakout from the treaty would appear to be questionable."

Because of the adequacy of U.S. land-based and sea-based missiles and nuclear bombers, "any Russian cheating under the treaty would have little effect if any on the assured second-strike capabilities of U.S. strategic forces," the report said in an unclassified section obtained by The Washington Times.

"In addition to the financial and international political costs of such an action, any Russian leader considering cheating or breakout from the new START Treaty would have to consider that the United States will retain the ability to 'upload' large numbers of additional nuclear warheads on both bombers and missiles under new START, which would provide the ability for a timely and very significant U.S. response," the report said.

The new treaty will provide an "improved understanding" of Russian nuclear forces, and the report noted that spy satellites and other technical intelligence gathering would deter Russian cheating.

The report was disclosed as the State Department prepared to release several long-delayed annual reports to Congress that are expected to show numerous incidents of Russian violations of arms treaties, including the 1991 START I pact that expired in December.

Additionally, U.S. intelligence analysts, in a major National Intelligence Estimate on START, have raised questions about whether Russian cheating could be detected.

Sen. John McCain, Arizona Republican and ranking member of the Armed Services Committee, asked Air ForceGen. Kevin Chilton, U.S. Strategic Command commander, whether he agreed with the State Department verification report that Russian cheating on START would be of little consequence.

"I do agree with that," Gen. Chilton said.

"Well, what this brings to the casual observer's mind, General, is if it doesn't have any consequences if they do any cheating, what's the point in having a treaty?" Mr. McCain said.

"I always believed in all the treaties that I've been involved in, in the past 28 years, General, that cheating does matter and it does have an effect. And to say that it has little if any effect, then we've been wasting a lot of time and money on negotiations," the senator said.

Gen. Chilton then clarified his remarks to say he agreed that cheating would have an effect, but that "we're in a good position with the treaty" and that "significant cheating" would be detected.

Under the treaty, U.S. and Russian nuclear forces will be limited to 1,550 warheads. U.S. nuclear forces will put those weapons on 420 single-warhead Minuteman III missiles, 14 missile submarines with 240 Trident II missiles, and on 60 B-2 and B-52 bombers.

Sen. Christopher S. Bond, Missouri Republican and vice chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, said he agreed with Mr. McCain.

Mr. Bond criticized rushing through the treaty's ratification before Congress can properly evaluate the intelligence community’s assessment of it and the treaty’s lack of verification provisions that are needed to prevent Russian cheating. "The administration is taking us down a dangerous path," Mr. Bond said in a statement.

Earlier during the hearing, James Miller, principal deputy undersecretary of defense for policy, also testified on the subject of Russian treaty cheating. He said "the survivability and responsiveness of [U.S.] strategic submarines at sea and alert heavy bombers would be unaffected by even large-scale cheating."

"This, of course, does not mean that Russian cheating or breakout is likely or that it would be acceptable," Mr. Miller said.

Signs of Russian treaty violations would be raised in a U.S.-Russian commission and, if not resolved, could lead to other unspecified action, he said.

Sen. Jon Kyl, Arizona Republican, raised the issue of Russian arms-control cheating in October during a Senate floor speech.

Mr. Kyl stated that Russia violated the 1991 START with a new multiple-warhead SS-27 missile that was tested as recently as May 2007.

He said the missile shows that "the Russians have cheated — if not in the letter of the START agreement, at least in its spirit — by converting one of their existing missiles, the Topol-M, to this new multiple-warhead variant."

Russia's government has denied that it violated the 1991 START.

Russia and its predecessor state, the Soviet Union, however, were accused of numerous violations of arms-control treaties, according to annual reports to Congress and other government reports.

One of the most significant reported treaty violations was Russia's building of a large anti-ballistic missile radar at Krasnoyarsk that violated the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Moscow admitted that the radar, which was built at an interior location, violated the ABM treaty.

The most recent State Department annual report on arms-control compliance, from 2005, stated that "a significant number of long-standing compliance issues" were raised with Moscow on the 1991 START, including the inability to determine if Russia exceeded the treaty's warhead limits, Moscow's failure to account for road-mobile ICBMs, its refusal to permit measurements of missile canisters and its failure to provide missile test data.

The annual compliance reports from 2006 to 2010 were made available to the Senate last week, and a State Department spokesman said unclassified versions would be made public soon.

Paula A. DeSutter, a former State Department arms-control official who worked on the missing compliance reports, told The Times in October that the reports, when made public, will show Moscow remains "in noncompliance on a whole range of START treaty issues."

Robert G. Joseph, former State Department undersecretary for arms control, told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on June 24 that the treaty verification provisions leave "significant gaps" in monitoring of Russian nuclear force.

"'Trust but verify' has been the standard for more than 20 years," Mr. Joseph said. "Whether the new START treaty meets this standard is a major issue."

Sen. Carl Levin, Michigan Democrat and Armed Services Committee chairman, said during the hearing that the treaty is "verifiable."

Mr. McCain, however, said "many of us have concerns about the new START treaty's methods of verification, its constraints on ballistic-missile defense and the accompanying plan for modernization of both the nuclear stockpile and our nuclear-delivery vehicles."