Mao's Perception of "Inevitability" and the CCP's Preparedness
Almost as soon as the Americans intervened in Korea and the Seventh Fleet entered the Taiwan Straits at the end of June, 1950, the CCFs long-standing suspicion of and hostility toward the U.S. turned into bellicosity. The Communists were convinced that direct armed struggle with the Americans had become inevitable.
On June 6, Mao was not in a mood to fight the Americans directly. He told the Party plenum that: "The world front of peace and democracy headed by the Soviet Union is stronger than it was last year... and the liberation movements against imperialist oppression are developing broadly... Although the danger of war from the imperialist camp is still there, so is the possibility of the third world war. The forces which can check the danger of war are increasing rapidly... and a new world war can be checked."
[8]
Based on such an optimistic estimation of the world situation, Mao emphasized
China's economic reconstruction and the liberation of Taiwan and Tibet as the Party's urgent tasks. However, Mao's bi-polarized outlook of the postwar world order lay the very foundation for Beijing's particular reaction, of its own choosing, toward the Korean crisis.
Only three days after Washington decided to intervene in Korea, Beijing shifted its military focus from the Taiwan Straits to Korea. On June 30, the CCP
Military Committee informed Xiao Jinguang,
commander-in-chief of the CCP navy, that the timing for liberating Taiwan be postponed, and the preparation for encountering the U.S. in Korea took the first priority.
[9]
On July 7, Zhou chaired a meeting of the CCP Military Committee, which decided to form the
Northeast Defense Army (NDA) immediately. Su Yu, the CCP general previously responsible for the liberation of Taiwan, was then appointed as the commander of the NDA, which would initially include four infantry armies and three artillery divisions. All of these troops were ordered to complete their gathering in the Manchurian border area by the end of that month.
[10]
The task of the NDA was not to defend the Sino-Korean border, but to take part in the Korean War. From the very beginning, the military training program of the NDA was geared toward fighting the Americans in Korea.
[11]
As early as August 4, when the U.N. forces were still hard-pressed by Kim Il-sung's North Korean armies in the South
[12] ,
Mao stated in a Politburo meeting that if U.S. imperialists gained the upprehend in Korea, they would become cockier, and would further threaten Communist China. Therefore, Mao insisted that Beijing assist their North Korean comrades by sending Chinese volunteers. Although the timing of this could be decided l ater, Mao continued, the preparation for it should be initiated.
[13]
In the same Politburo meeting, Zhou Enlai expressed the same opinion.
He said that it would be disadvantageous to world peace if the North Koreans were defeated, because the Americans would become more rampant. To achieve victory in Korea, the Chinese factor must be added to the struggle, and that would encourage a change worldwide for the better of the revolutionary forces. [14]
This theme was repeated in Mao's telegram to Stalin on October 2. Apparently, Beijing did not perceive the necessity of Chinese intervention in Korea only in terms of self-defense of China's border. For the CCP leadership, the result of the Korean crisis would be symbolic.
An American victory would mean a major setback of the world revolutionary forces headed by the Soviet Union.
The rampant reactionary forces headed by the United States would step up their offensive against the world "revolutionary front," as Mao termed it; and Communist China might very well be the next target of the reactionary assault. If concern over U.S. "credibility" was a major factor in Washington's postwar policy making, to establish the "credibility" of new China on behalf of the "revolutionary front" of the world clearly played an important role in Beijing's decision to assist Kim Il-sung. From such a point of view, Mao vigorously pushed for Chinese preparedness.
On August 5, one day after the above-mentioned Politburo meeting, Mao telegraphed Gao Gang, the Commander and Commissar of the NDA, that "there will probably be no fighting (for the NDA) in August, but (it) should be prepared for combat in early September. Every unit should be ready within this month in order to move to the front to fight."
[15]
To carry out Mao's instructions, Gao called all division commanders to a meeting on August ll, but those who attended believed that it was impossible to be ready and move into Korea during August. Gao telegraphed Mao on August 15, suggesting that the time for sending the NDA to Korea be postponed. On August 18, Mao replied. While being agreeable to Gao's suggestion, he pressed Gao to pick up speed and emphasized that the NDA "must complete all preparations before September 30."
[16]
By the end of August, the situation in Korea appeared gloomy to the Communists. On August 27, Mao felt it necessary to increase the strength of the NDA, and he telegraphed Peng Dehuai proposing that 12 armies be called upon to reinforce the four armies already near the Sino-Korean border.
[17]
In accordance with Mao's idea, Zhou Enlai chaired another military meeting on August 31. The meeting decided that the NDA would be strengthened to include ll armies with 700,000 troops, which would form three echelons with the 13th, 9th and 19th Army Corps in sequence.
[18]
On September 9, the Military Committee ordered the 9th Army Corps in the Shanghai area and the 19th Army Corps in the northwestern area to congregate along the railways, in order to move into Manchurian quickly when they were called upon.
[19]
Before September 1950, the North Koreans were advancing toward the south, and China's border security was not threatened by the Americans. Why was Mao so vigorously pushing for military preparedness to combat the Americans in Korea?
On the technical level, according to Nie Rongzhen, then the Chinese Chief of Staff, Mao felt in August that although the North Koreans were pushing toward the south, their northern rear was unprotected. The U.S. would not accept defeat and its further excise of naval and air force power might very well disadvantage Kim's forces.
Consequently, Mao was pushing for the completion of the Chinese preparations to invade Korea. [20]
More importantly, on the conceptual level, the CCP leadership was firmly convinced that a direct military confrontation with the U.S. was inevitable; the question was only when and where. Beijing perceived three possible locations in which the Sino-American confrontation might take place: the
Taiwan Straits,
Vietnam, and
Korea.
The men in Beijing calculated that since the PLA's navy and air force were weak, the Taiwan Straits was not an advantageous choice for them. Vietnam was so far a way that the logistics could be a problem if the PLA was to invade Vietnam to assist Ho Chi Minh's forces. Besides, the French, not the Americans, would be the direct enemy in Vietnam, and
Beijing intended to give the United States, not France,
a lesson. In comparison,
Korea would be the most advantageous location for Beijing to fight U.S. imperialism, because it was close to the Soviet Union, the supplier of the weapons and air cover. [21]
As Zhou Enlai later stated
"The confrontation between U.S. imperialists and us was inevitable; the question was the choice of location. This was (not only) up to the imperialists, we could also determine it.
The American imperialists decided (to have this showdown) in the Korean battlefield, this was advantageous to us, and we decided to confront the Americans and assist the Koreans, too. Looking back, it is' understood that everything considered it would have been much more difficult for us if (we had chosen)
Vietnam to fight, let alone the off-shore islands (in the
Taiwan Straits).
[22]
This indicates again that the formation of the NDA and Mao's push for military preparedness were not for "border security" perse. Because Beijing thought a Sino-American confrontation inevitable, and chose
Korea consciously as the battlefield to set the score straight with the Americans,
it was only a technical issue for the Chinese to decide the timing for invasion. The time came in October, 1950.
Re: BREAKING (5/25): North Korea Says It Has Conducted Nuclear Test
Reply With Quote
Originally Posted by Ryan Ruck
)
Bookmarks