Obama, Now Biden, Guts the Military

[Ryan Ruck]

US Air Force Sees Risk In Halting F-22 Production

The decision to stop producing Lockheed Martin Corp's F-22 fighter jet at 187 planes would pose a "moderate to high risk" if the service needed to fight two wars simultaneously, U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff General Norton Schwartz said on Thursday.

Schwartz and Air Force Secretary Michael Donley have publicly endorsed Defense Secretary Robert Gates' plan to halt production of the F-22 after ordering just four more fighters under the fiscal 2009 war spending budget.

But Schwartz last week told lawmakers that for now the military requirement remains at 243 fighters.

On Thursday, he told the Senate Armed Services Committee that it would be challenging to manage a much smaller fleet of 187 fighters, including just 126 aircraft specifically set aside for combat.

"We will have to manage this fleet in a different way than a much larger fleet," Schwartz said. "We will have to look hard, for example, at whether we have dedicated training aircraft. We might have to use combat-coded (aircraft) to do training as well."

Asked to assess the risk of capping the fleet at 187, Schwartz told the panel it was "moderate to high."

In an article published last month in the Washington Post, Donley and Schwartz said they had previously settled on a moderate-risk fleet of 243 F-22s, but several things had changed, including another look at the underlying scenarios and the anticipated cost of $13 billion for 60 more planes at a time when defense budgets were under increasing pressure.

Senator Saxby Chambliss, a member of the committee from Georgia, where Lockheed builds the F-22, said he remained concerned about the risks in capping production.

Chambliss noted that U.S. military commanders in the field had agreed to let the Air Force retire 250 other older fighter jets on the condition that it would buy more F-22s. Instead, the Pentagon decided to cap production of the F-22 and still proceed with the retirements, he said.

Chambliss recently criticized Gates' decision on the F-22 as clearly budget-driven and not rooted in solid analysis.

Congressional aides said Chambliss and other lawmakers concerned about maintaining F-22 production could add funding for additional aircraft to the fiscal 2010 defense budget.

"It's definitely an issue that's going to get a lot of attention," said one congressional aide who asked not to be identified because lawmakers were still hammering out their positions. But he said there was clear support for the F-22 in both political parties, and in both houses of Congress.

For its part, Lockheed has said it would not mount a big campaign to revive the program.

Michele Flournoy, defense undersecretary for policy, said possible exports of the F-22 to close allies would be discussed during the Quadrennial Defense Review that just got under way and is due to wrap up by late summer.

Current U.S. law prohibits export of the F-22, so lawmakers would have to rescind the law to allow any foreign sales of the radar-evading fighter.

[Ryan Ruck]

F-22 Raptor Program Cancellation: Will We Learn From It?

While Defense Secretary Robert Gates' decision to halt production of the costly Lockheed Martin/Boeing F-22 Raptor low-observable/stealth fighter aircraft is perhaps not the best long-term strategic decision he could have made, it's certainly understandable. Given the U.S. government's–and thus DoD's–current money crunch vs. the program's high cost and lack of current combat-utility in Iraq and "Stan" (Afghanistan), cutting the Raptor program's reported $3.5 billion per year cost certainly has some logic to it. Some programs simply have to go, and we might as well start with the expensive ones that don't have any seeming immediate tactical or strategic utility for the two wars we're currently fighting, right? Let's face it, air superiority is not exactly an issue right now in either theater. We've got the air, and we don't need F-22s to maintain it.

So, what's wrong with cancelling the Raptor? Well, for one thing, we finally got the production cost down to approximately $143 million per aircraft. If they cancel the F-22 program at 187 total aircraft–56 aircraft short of the 243 aircraft the U.S. Air Force had stated as its requirement–the F-22 Raptor will really come in somewhere around $350 million apiece, with the last four aircraft coming off the line at an estimated cost of approx. $200 million per, due to the $147 million "end-of-production expenses" that will be rolled into their procurement price. Understand that the Air Force originally wanted 750 aircraft, but they wittled that number down to 442 aircraft, then 381, then 243, and then 183, before bring that number back up to 187.

This leads us to the second reason why F-22 Raptor program cancellation is a bad idea. Strategically, 187 F-22 Raptors simply isn't an adequate number for a future war against China and/or Russia, and the F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), also made by Lockheed Martin, simply doesn't have the Raptor's air-to-air combat capability, so it can't fulfill the same air-superiority role against the latest Russian fighters, let alone their Gen-5 fighters that are currently either under development or on the drawing board–and Russia likes to export their fighters. DefenseReview would therefore feel much more comfortable with a quiver of at least 1,000 Raptors for a war against the Dragon or the Bear. Both countries are currently developing low-observable, supermaneuvarable 5th Generation fighter aircraft, and Russia's latest 4th-Gen. Sukhoi and MiG aircraft are arguably superior to our latest F-15 and F-16 fighter aircraft in a number of aspects.

But, having stated the above, do we have any sympathy for the Air Force, Lockheed Martin, or Boeing? No, and here's why. First, it's they're own fault. They brought this situation on themselves. The fact is that the F-22 Raptor took WAY too long and cost WAY too much money to develop, period, end of story. There is simply no reasonable explanation for it to have taken almost 16 years for the F-22 to have entered service from the time of contractor selection. Actually, it really took about 19.5 years if you start the clock from the Air Force's request for proposal (RFP) in July of 1986, which resulted in the YF-22 and YF-23, and over 24 years if you start the count from the inception of the Advanced Tactical Fighter (ATF) program in 1981.

There is simply no justifiable reason why ANY new tactical fighter aircraft, or any new combat aircraft of any kind, for that matter, should take longer than 5 years to develop from initial concept to combat (production and procurement). And it definitely shouldn't take longer than 5 years for any aircraft system to go into production from the time the Air Force selects a contractor. Don't agree? Well, here's our retort, consisting of four examples:

1) The North American Aviation (NAA) P-51 Mustang, the most advanced piston-engined fighter aircraft of World War II (WWII) was developed in approx. 120 days. That's 4 months, folks. Wikipedia provides more specifics: "The prototype NA-73X was rolled out just 117 days after the order was placed, and first flew on 26 October 1940, just 178 days after the order had been placed — an incredibly short gestation period."

2) The Messerschmitt Me-262 Schwalbe (Swallow), the world's first operational jet fighter aircraft and the most advanced fighter aircraft of WWII went operational within 5 years from the start of development. This was a truly revolutionary aircraft for its time, and was arguably more revolutionary than the F-22 relative to contemporary aircraft of both models.

3) The Lockheed SR-71 Blackbird was brought from concept to production by Lockheed Skunk Works as a black project within 5 years. The SR-71 and its precurser aircraft (the A-12 and YF-12A) were truly revolutionary aircraft in a number of ways (design aspects, speed, capability, materials, manufacturing requirements, maintenance requirements, etc.), every bit as revolutionary as the F-22 Raptor, if not more so, relative to their contemperary aircraft.

4) The McDonnell Douglas (now Boeing) F-15 Eagle, our most advanced and capable 4th-Gen. fighter aircraft (and a very large leap ahead of the F-4 Phantom), went into production within 5 years of contractor selection.

So, what happened with the ATF and subsequent F-22 Raptor programs in the 1980's, 1990's, and 2000's? In a word, racketeering. In another word, corporatism. Here's one more: corruption, corruption of the U.S. military procurement system. Somewhere along the line, someone (or a number of people) somewhere in the U.S. military industrial complex discovered that they could accomplish a number of objectives by dragging system (including aircraft) development time out over many more years, instead of developing and fielding a finished product as quickly as possible. The private sector/contractors figured out that they could make a lot more money, squeezing hundreds of millions to billions of dollars from the Department of Defense (DoD) before ever going into production. After all the development money, the actual production contract was just a bonus, the icing on the cake, if you will. And, the public sector/military folks realized that they could safeguard or prolong careers and create a more advantageous public-sector-exit/private-sector-entry strategy for themselves. Synergy. Of course, you can apply this to pretty much all areas of current U.S. military procurement.

And so went the F-22 Raptor, which has cost the U.S. government approx. $11 billion–that's "billion" with a "b"–for Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) alone, according to the Federation of American Scientists (FAS). That's before you even get into production! According to GlobalSecurity.org, "as of 2002, DOD had [already] spent $26 billion of the $69 billion planned for the F-22 program." $69 billion…for an aircraft program.

Perhaps the greatest tragedy is the F-22 program's suppression of evolutionary 4th-Gen. figher aircraft design concepts. The F-15 Silent Eagle (F-15SE) is a perfect example. What, you think Boeing just came up with Silent Eagle in the last few months? Anyone reading this who doesn't think that significant capability and performance upgrades haven't been available for the F-15 Eagle, F-16 Falcon, and F/A-18 Hornet–including low-observability/stealth upgrades, thrust vectoring, canards, and upgraded flight software and systems, (for supermaneuverability), conformal fuel tanks (CFT), integrated flight and fire control (IFF) and ramjet missiles with tail control, just to name a few–for the last 20-25 years while the F-22 Raptor has been ravenously and rapaciously eating taxpayer dollars, well, let's just say I've got some swamp land in Florida I'd like to sell you. All of a sudden, just as the Raptor is getting cancelled, here it is (Silent Eagle)! As the Church Lady might say, "Well…isn't that convenient!"

Of course, the F-15 Silent Eagle is only the latest in succession of F-15 and F-16 upgrade/improvement/modernization concepts. It's been preceded by the F-15 ACTIVE (Advanced Control Technology for Integrated Vehicles), F-15 S/MTD (Short Takeoff and Landing/Maneuver Technology Demonstrator) a.k.a. STOL Eagle, and the AFTI F-16, just to name a few. "AFTI" stands for "Advanced Fighter Technology Integration", by the way.

Note: DefenseReview has been informed by an aerospace insider that an even lower-observable/stealthier F-15 than the Silent Eagle was flown across the continental United States without detection by radar during the 1980's, and that it's possible to make an F-15 just as low-observable/stealthy as an F-22. Since we only have one source and no confirmation or documentation on this '80's-era low-observable F-15, we have to consider it as an unconfirmed/unverified report for now, no matter how trustworthy our source is (but this source is very trustworthy). If anyone out there has any more information on this unconfirmed low-observable F-15 project, we'd love to hear from you on it.

The bottom line is that we could have had F-15s, F-16s, and F/A-18s with low-observable design upgrades, thrust vectoring, canards, conformal fuel tanks, IFF, better missiles etc. a long time ago had these types of upgrades to our 4th-Gen fighter aircraft not been considered a threat to our 5th-Gen fighter program (F-22 Raptor) and therefore suppressed. In other words, F-22 Raptor program survival trumped viable upgrades that would have brought our 4th-Gen. aircraft into flight-capability parity with the latest Russian Sukhoi and Mikoyan fighter aircraft like the Sukhoi Su-30 MKI Flanker-H and Su-35 Flanker-E, and Mikoyan MiG-29OVT, and MiG-35 Fulcrum-F.

So, while Defense Review likes the F-22 and thinks we should build more of them (again, at least 1,000) to be help to ensure U.S. air dominance even if China and/or Russia become a serious military threat or enemy in the future, we're not going to cry about it, since the Air Force and contractors (Lockheed Martin and Boeing) could have developed the F-22 much more quickly and at significantly lower cost. If they had done it the right way, we could have had operational Raptors by the 1996-1997 time frame and had the full compliment of 750 aircraft–or possibly even DefenseReview's desired 1,000. Let this be a lesson to the United States Air Force. Do it right, do it better, next time.

Think about it. If another country can develop a next-gen fighter in 5 years, but it takes us 15-25 years to develop one, that puts us at an obvious and very significant deveopment-cycle and cost disadvantage, and potentially a strategic warfighting disadvantage, as well, since the technology might be obsoleted by other countries' tech by the time development is done. So, U.S. Air Force, give us an operational next-gen aircraft (fighter, CAS, tanker, transport, whatever) within five years. That's 5 years from concept to combat. We need to be able to do that, and we can do that. After all, we're still the United States of America, at least for the time being.

[Ryan Ruck]

Lawmaker: Time To Put Osprey Out Of Its Misery

The chairman of the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee recommended Tuesday that the production of all MV-22 Ospreys be halted, saying that after more than two decades the hybrid aircraft still can't complete the missions for which it was designed.

"It's time to put the Osprey out of its misery, and time to put the taxpayers out of their miseries," Rep. Edolphus Towns, D-N.Y., said following testimony on Capitol Hill from leading Marine aviation officials, representatives of the Government Accountability Office and defense analysts. Towns said he plans to present his recommendation to the House Appropriations Committee.

His comments come after the release Tuesday of a scathing report from the GAO questioning the Osprey's ability to operate in Afghanistan and on Navy ships. Moreover, the program's research, development, test and evaluation costs soared more than 200 percent — from $4.2 billion to $12.7 billion — between 1986 and 2007, according to the report, which notes also that the cost to procure the aircraft has jumped from $34.4 billion to $42.6 billion, even though the total buy has dropped from nearly 1,000 aircraft to less than 500.

And while its three consecutive deployments to Iraq prove the Osprey can complete its mission, "challenges may limit its ability to accomplish the full repertoire of missions of the legacy helicopters it is replacing," the report says.

Marine officials staunchly defended the aircraft, saying it has the ability to save lives by flying high above the threats that insurgents and traditional combat weapons present.

The GAO report makes several observations, including:

* The Corps has been forced to "cannibalize" its MV-22s and the Osprey production line because parts wear out much quicker than anticipated.

* The aircraft lacks an integrated weapon system capable of suppressing threats while approaching a landing zone.

* The Osprey's size prohibits it from fully using all the deck spots aboard Navy ships, and its "large inventory" of spare parts takes up too much room on the hangar deck space.

Retired Lt. Col. Dakota Wood, senior fellow for the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, has suggested the Corps reconsider its plan to replace all of its CH-46E Sea Knight and CH-53D Sea Stallions and consider a mixed fleet instead.

"A mixed medium-lift fleet composed of MV-22s and a new helicopter would provide more options and increased flexibility for the service at less cost than a fleet composed only of MV-22s," Wood said.

[vector7]

Why Congress is at War with the Air Force to Save the F-22

Posted:
07/13/09

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Having been in and out of war zones over the past 30 years, I am used to loud noises. But few of them compare to what I once experienced while fishing from a canoe in a mirror-still Maine lake at dawn. I studied the water for rising smallmouth bass, utterly unaware that I was directly in the flight path of a B-52 bomber practicing its low-level ingress to a mock target.




Absolute silence, and seconds later, 136,000 bone-crushing pounds of turbofan thrust bursting overhead at 300 feet. I was shocked and awed, all right. And, after I back-flipped over the side, completely wet.
I dredge up this memory to help explain how I'm thinking about the struggle Congress is waging this week to shove dozens more F-22 fighters down the throat of an unwilling Air Force, and in direct defiance of Defense Secretary Robert Gates. The Air Force currently operates with 134 of these high-performance air-to-air fighters (none have flown operationally outside the United States) with 53 more in production, and sees no military need for more. It has proposed shutting down the production lines. Congress wants to keep producing the planes.

Some, like Sen. Joe Lieberman, the independent from Connecticut (where the F-22's engines are built) make no bones about the real reason they love this airplane: They argue that production-line jobs must be saved. The F-22 Raptor, as it is called, is built by Lockheed Martin in partnership with Boeing as well as Pratt & Whitney, along with some 1,000 subcontractors in 44 states.

Last month, the House voted overwhelmingly to keep the production lines open. The Senate Armed Services Committee subsequently did the same, albeit on a narrower vote. On Monday, the full Senate will begin debating the full Department of Defense budget, and key votes on the F-22 could come this week. It promises to be messy hand-to-hand political combat, pitting many Democrats against a president of their own party – a president who may veto their spending bill because of the Raptor.

In actual warfare, however, it's hard to see how additional copies of this $350 million aircraft will help anyone.

Perhaps unbeknownst to some in Congress, most combat aircraft at work over Afghanistan and Iraq don't even drop bombs. They whoosh around scaring people.

I've seen it work lots of times, and it's instructive how fast the bad guys' bravado evaporates when a pair of A-10 Warthogs roars in without warning. One minute the Taliban is menacing friendly troops from a tree line; the next they're clutching the earth and then making a fast exit.

Despite the recent storm about American pilots dropping bombs on civilians, the fact is the vast majority of air "attacks'' in war today are like my B-52 fright. Just noise. The Air Force calls them "shows of force.''

That means when insurgents gather, a common U.S. response from the air is to fake-attack, as in this recent mission:

Near Asmar, two Air Force F-15E Strike Eagles successfully deterred anti-Afghan forces activity by conducting a show of force, expending flares. The jets executed the maneuver after enemy forces had opened fire on a friendly convoy.

In its most recent 12-month report on air operations, the 9th Air Force , in charge of air operations across southwest Asia, said its crews flew 18,019 strike sorties over Afghanistan. Weapons were used in only 3,330 of these missions.

"Where we see crowds gathering or we have maneuver units going through a town, well, just low overhead passes and dropping a few flares is enough to say, 'Hey! Don't' try anything, we got airplanes up here,''' Maj. Gen. David Edgington, who ran the air war in Iraq, once explained to me in Baghdad.

From the most daily operations summary from Afghanistan, the 9^th Air Force:

A-10's providing convoy escort received a call for a show of force after the convoy started receiving assault rifle fire near Soltani. The enemy's fire ceased after the jets arrived.

In the Tarin Kowt area, a Navy F/A-18F Super Hornet provided overwatch for a vehicle struck by an improvised explosive device. The show of force provided an alert to enemy forces that appropriate protection was being provided to the downed vehicle.
Which raises a timely question: Why should the United States buy more and more expensive aircraft to perform functions that much cheaper – heck, even unmanned -- aircraft can do?

The F-22 costs $350 million a copy. It goes supersonic, is said to be nearly invisible to high-tech enemy radar, and is tricked out with all the latest electronic wizardry "allowing the pilot to track, identify, shoot and kill air-to-air threats before being detected,'' according to the Air Force.

How is that useful over Afghanistan?

By one measure: priceless. "Is a show-of-force mission worth the cost of buying and operating one F-16? The guys on the ground would sure say so,'' a senior Air Force officer told me.

But using a $350-million aircraft to knock over a few Pashtuns with rifles doesn't seem to be a cost-effective way to fight a war. Then-Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld reached a similar conclusion six years ago as he was fretting about having to use high-tech, high-cost military force against rag-tag Iraqi insurgents.

"The cost-benefit ratio is against us!'' he fumed in an October 2003 memo to top aides. " Our cost is billions against the terrorists' costs of millions.''

Of course, there often is kinetic (explosive) work to be done from the air, and it's being done just fine with "legacy'' aircraft designed and built decades ago.

From the 9^th Air Force daily report:
In Afghanistan, in the vicinity of Gereshk, an Air Force B-1B Lancer [1986, $283 million each] quelled an enemy attack point hidden in a row of trees.

The enemy position was firing on friendly forces. The aircraft targeted the Guided Bomb Unit -38's [500-pound guided bombs] for maximum effect.

On the outskirts of Chahar Bagh, friendly forces came under fire from automatic weapons and rocket propelled grenades. A B-1B dropped a GBU-31 [2,000-pound guided bomb] on the building used as an enemy firing point and the attack stopped immediately. Prior to dropping the bomb, ground forces verified there were no civilians in the area.

In the vicinity of Tarin Kowt, friendly aircraft came under small arms fire while providing friendly forces with air cover. A B-1B was dispatched to eliminate anti-Afghan forces firing from a ridge. This was accomplished using GBU-38's, stopping the small arms fire.

In Asmar, friendly forces under small arms fire called for strafing by Air Force A-10 Thunderbolt II's [1977, $11.7 million each]. Upon completion of the strafing runs the enemy fire ceased.

Near Now Zad, an Air Force MQ-9A Reaper [2007, $13.3 million each] and several Navy F/A-18A Hornets [1995, $57 million each] engaged Anti-Coalition forces. The Reaper utilized a GBU-12 [500-pound guided bomb] to eliminate enemy forces armed with a RPG. A second GBU-12 was dropped to destroy unexploded ordnance keeping friendly forces and local civilians safe. The Hornets used strafing runs with 20mm weapons to destroy numerous Anti-Coalition forces hidden in a tree line position that had been firing on friendly forces.

(I have given the then-year initial production costs for these aircraft, not adjusted for inflation).

That's the real war, the one going on today and the kind of fighting that Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates and others believe will characterize future conflicts.

"We have to be prepared for the wars we are most likely to fight, not just the wars we have been traditionally best suited to fight, or threats we conjure up from potential adversaries,'' Gates told Congress this spring, explaining why he opposes purchasing more F-22s. "As I've said before, even when considering challenges from nation-states with modern militaries, the answer is not necessarily buying more technologically advanced versions of what we built . . . to stop the Soviets during the Cold War.''

[Ryan Ruck]

Defense: They Build While We Cut

Russia and China, two potential U.S. adversaries in a future war, are committed to big increases in defense spending and global military adventures in the coming years, just as President Obama is forcing the Pentagon to scale back.

The imbalance has defense experts worried that re-emergent Russia and China will be able to defeat U.S. forces in an air, sea and ground conflict because they will field superior fighters, ships and tanks in the next decades.

This week, China announced its most ambitious military exercise to date. The People's Liberation Army is sending 50,000 troops to far reaches of the country to fight land battles against theoretic foes.


"In the unprecedented exercise, one of the PLA's major objectives will be to improve its capacity of long-range projection," the state-run Xinhua News Agency said.

Most troubling to pro-defense conservatives is the president's decision to terminate production of its most futuristic air superiority fighter, the F-22 Raptor, and retired in one year 200 other warplanes. Obama has also scaled back missile defense, a long-range bomber and Army ground vehicles.

His projected five-year defense spending, beginning in 2010, will not keep pace with inflation, meaning Pentagon eye-shaders will be forced to inflict more cuts in the 2011 budget and beyond.

"Shorting future defense programs, like missile defense, is a real mistake from a strategic standpoint," Larry Wortzel, a defense analyst and former military attache in Beijing, told Human Events. "You have to worry about future relationships with China. You don't know what will happen with North Korea."

Wortzel said that in 2004 the Chinese Communist Party's Central Military Commission decreed it "must develop the capability to protect China's global strategic interest. They need a more active navy so that they can project sea lanes all the way out to the Persian Gulf. There are theoretical writings inside the People's Liberation Army about long-range strike aircraft. They are thinking about becoming a more globally active military in the future and we don't know what our future relations will be."

It is not just conservatives sounding the alarm.

Michael O'Hanlon, a liberal defense analyst at the Brookings Institution, wrote in the Washington Post that Obama is providing the military with "no real growth" over the next five years.

"The administration is right to propose increasing resources for the State Department and aid programs," he wrote. "But it is unwise politics and unwise strategy to put these key elements of foreign policy in direct competition with each other, as appears to be the case in the new budget."

Although not a direct attack on Obama's defense budget, the Rand Corp. this month released a study that warned of China's growing might. The U.S. may well lose an air war with China over control of Taiwan because of Beijing's massive arms buildup.

"Chinese military capabilities have advanced rapidly over the past decade," said Rand. "China has deployed or is deploying modern fighter aircraft, such as the Su-27/J-11, Su-30, and J-10, in sizable numbers."

It added, "Our analysis of the air war indicates that China's growing military power has changed the nature of the fight for air superiority."

The Air Force fighter community, which opposes Obama's decision to cap the F-22 at 187 planes, fears it will not have sufficient fighters to cover hotspots in Asia and the Middle East.

Said Wortzel, "We need to keep ahead of China significantly to be comfortable in terms of our air capacity."

In addition, the report said, China has stationed so many short-range ballistic missiles on its coast (over 1,000, the Pentagon says) it could unleash a barrage that would destroy every military runway in Taiwan, knocking its air force out of the war. China could also hit two U.S. Air Force bases in Japan.

"The United States is unlikely to be able to compensate for the hundreds of [Taiwanese] fighters burning on their parking ramps, trapped behind cratered runways, or hiding in underground shelters," Rand said. "The danger to both ROCAF and USAF operations in the Taiwan Strait is sufficiently grave that a credible case can be made that the air war for Taiwan could essentially be over before much of the Blue air forces have even fired a shot.

Titled "A Question of Balance: Political Context and Military Aspects of the China-Taiwan Dispute," the Rand report could be held up as a counter to Defense Secretary Robert Gates. He often complains of his generals having "next-war-itis" funding futuristic system for possible wars instead of focusing on the one they are fighting now.

But if the Air Force does not own sufficient tactical aircraft to fend off a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, then curing the top brass of one "itis" means you may lose the patient in this case democratic ally Taiwan.

Wortzel said it is not just Taiwan control that could ignite a fight with China.

"The next conflict with China could be over how you stabilize North Korea," he said. "It could be over some mistake over the way they defend their territorial claims in the South China Sea. There's still volatility in the western Pacific even without Taiwan."

Meanwhile, Russia's new prime minister, Dmitriy Medvedev, announced in March a "comprehensive rearmament" of his military.

Russia already has tested Washington. It invaded the republic of Georgia, flies long-range bombers near Alaskan air space and is again positioning nuclear-armed attack submarines off the U.S. coast.

The Defense Intelligence Agency has briefed Congress on both Russia's and China's major military expansions.

Lt. Gen. Michael Maples, until recently the DIA director, said China is improving its F-10 air-to-air fighter, and buying sophisticated surface-to-air and anti-ship missiles.

"The People's Liberation Army (PLA) is increasingly building its own sophisticated aircraft, surface combatants, submarines and weapon systems while still purchasing select systems from overseas," the general said. "China is looking beyond a potential Taiwan contingency and is pursuing capabilities needed to become a major regional power. The navy already operates a large surface fleet, an increasingly modern submarine fleet, and increasingly appears likely to pursue an aircraft carrier development program. The air force is developing an extended-range, land-attack cruise-missile-capable bomber."

If that is not troubling enough, China is working to make its nuclear ICBM force more survivable meaning it is gaming how to win an all-out war with the United States.

China's defense budget has grown to nearly $200 billion. While it may be less than half the U.S.'s, Beijing's cost for some items, particular personnel, is much less than the Pentagon's. It is focusing on dominating one theater southeast Asia while Washington must budget money to defend multiple regions.

The DIA says Russia has committed $200 billion in 2007-2015 to build new conventional and nuclear weapons. It continues to export advanced arms to U.S. adversaries Syria, Iran and Venezuela, creating more headaches for a stretched U.S. military.

"Perceived Western encroachment into its claimed areas of interest and Islamic or insurgent threats along its periphery are driving Russia's current military activities and modernization efforts," Maples said.

[vector7]

September 24, 2009
Categories: Sarah Palin
Palin breaks with McCain on F-22 cuts




Sarah Palin, outlying her "common sense conservative" foreign policy views in Hong Kong yesterday, denounced her former running mate's push to cut new F-22 Raptor fighter jets, an efficiency move in which Senator John McCain allied himself with the White House and against many other Republican hawks.

"Though we are engaged in two wars and face a diverse array of threats, it is the defense budget that has seen significant program cuts and has actually been reduced from current levels!" Palin said, according to a portion of the private speech I obtained. Defense spending will, in fact, increase this year over last, but the Obama administration has cut back from a budget released at the end of the Bush Administration.

"Despite the need to move men and material by air into theaters like Afghanistan, the Obama Administration sought to end production of our C-17s, the work horse of our ability to project long range power. Despite the Air Force saying it would increase future risk, the Obama Administration successfully sought to end F-22 production – at a time when both Russia and China are acquiring large numbers of next generation fighter aircraft. It strikes me as odd that Defense Secretary Gates is the only member of the Cabinet to be tasked with tightening his belt," Palin said.


McCain said earlier this year:

[G]ven our very best planning scenarios, does producing any more F-22s best ensure that our current fighter fleet will bridge to a smaller, more lethal fifth-generation fighter capability? In my view, the answer is, no.

Palin's views aren't a departure from the Republican Party line. Indeed, they move her closer toward Republican orthodoxy, and away from another of her former running mate's views that sometimes rankled on the right.

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Here is a sobering assessment.

I down loaded it over a week ago and got around to hearing it over the weekend.

Not good; I think this interview was done before we ditched missile defense in Eastern Europe on 9/17/09.

Peter Huessy Interview

Thursday, September 17, 2009 11:15 PM

Jeff Nyquist interviews Peter Huessy, President of GeoStrategic Analysis, a Potomac, Maryland national security consulting firm.

[vector7]

Obama's deadly defense cuts threaten safety

The Bakersfield Californian | Saturday, Sep 26 2009 08:23 PM

Last Updated Saturday, Sep 26 2009 08:25 PM

In foreign policy, seemingly minor signals can have far-reaching consequences -- the assassination of a minor dignitary in a small European country can trigger a world war.

The Obama administration's proposed defense budget cuts -- particularly the deep cuts to our homeland missile defense system - are signaling North Korea and Iran that we do not have the will to counter their aggressive actions. In response, Iran and North Korea have tested ballistic missiles or nuclear weapons on numerous occasions, flouting decades of diplomatic non-proliferation efforts and nudging the U.S. onto a crash course towards armed conflict. Wisely, North Korea and Iran are watching the money trail. The Pentagon's proposed 2010 budget would cut the funding for homeland missile defense -- known as the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system, or GMD -- in half, allowing the U.S.'s only defense against long-range ballistic missiles to stall and eventually become obsolete.

The budget halts the installation of interceptor missiles in silos in Alaska and California, leaving us approximately a dozen missiles short of what security analysis has shown we need to counter the threat from North Korea. The budget also cuts the funding for GMD research and development by one third, making more robust testing impossible and potentially eliminating threat-representative missile shoot-downs.

According to the budget, after a few years, there will be no more practice missiles available for operational tests. Ironically, this only strengthens critics' hollow complaints that the system has not been tested enough against realistic threats.

Moreover, the budget makes no funding available for the planned procurement of a Polish missile defense site, which would defend our allies in Europe from a potential Iranian nuclear strike. President Obama regrettably offered to scuttle the plans for the European missile defense site as a concession to Russia, indicating that the U.S. is not serious about countering Iran's nuclear and missile programs.

Iran has responded to the administration's overtures and dismantling of our defense not with an outstretched hand, but with more missile tests.

In early February 2009, the country put a satellite into orbit using the basic missile technology needed to propel a nuclear warhead into Europe on the back of a multi-stage rocket. In late May, Iran test-fired a medium-range missile capable of reaching Israel and U.S. bases in the Persian Gulf. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad boasted that "in the short future we will launch longer rockets with bigger reach from this province."

In 2009 alone, North Korea has test-fired ballistic missiles on multiple occasions; one of the missiles was a complicated three stage rocket that traveled 2,000 miles, bringing its range perilously close to the U.S. North Korea has also loudly restarted its nuclear program, recently detonating a nuclear bomb in an underground test. Russia claimed that the nuclear device packed a power equivalent to the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. And weapons are one of North Korea's largest exports, netting the country $1.5 billion annually.

Also deeply troubling is the administration's budget request for a new Air Force refueling tanker. The KC-X tanker program, plagued by delay and by the highly questionable awarding of the contract to the French conglomerate EADS (which the GAO overturned), is critical to keeping our war fighters fueled and in the air over critical theaters of battle. Yet the Obama administration requested only $430 million and has given no indication of when the tanker will be rebid or built. We should replace our aging and decrepit tanker fleet at a rate of a minimum of 36 aircraft per year, and do so in a way that protects U.S. national security and American jobs.

Dismissing missile and nuclear tests as mere theater reflects genuine ignorance of world history or willful foreign policy naiveté. A boxer's right hook is just a gesture unless someone's chin happens to be in its path.

The best insurance that such a gesture doesn't turn into an act of aggression is to keep a glove up - to fully fund the defensive systems that quiet our enemies' threats and make peace possible.

If the Obama administration is serious about avoiding future wars, it would wisely start paying greater heed to the signals of its defense budget cuts and the threatening responses of Iran and North Korea.

Malcolm Wallop served the citizens of Wyoming in the U.S. Senate from 1976 to 1994. Wallop served on numerous committees, including Energy and Natural Resources, Finance, Small Business, Armed Services and the Select Committee on Intelligence.

[vector7]

White House aides insisted F-22 be removed from Obama speech venue

Exclusive: White House aides insisted F-22 be removed from Obama speech venue

Wed, 12/02/2009 - 4:08pm



When President Obama spoke to troops at Alaska's Elmendorf Air Force Base last month, the unit there parked a shiny new F-22 fighter plane in the hangar. But according to multiple sources, White House aides demanded the plane be changed to an older F-15 fighter because they didn't want Obama speaking in front of the F-22, a controversial program he fought hard to end.

"White House aides actually made them remove the F-22-said they would not allow POTUS to be pictured with the F-22 in any way, shape, or form," one source close to the unit relayed.

Stephen Lee, a public affairs officer at Elmendorf, confirmed to The Cable that the F-22 was parked in the hangar and then was replaced by an F-15 at the White House's behest.

The airmen there took offense to the Obama aides' demand, sources told The Cable, seeing it as a slight to the folks who are operating the F-22 proudly every day. They also expressed bewilderment that the White House staff would even care so much as to make an issue out of the fact that the F-22 was placed in the hangar with the president.

A White House official, commenting on background basis, told The Cable that yes, there were discussions about which plane or planes would be in the hangar, but that they were not meant as an insult to the pilots and other personnel who work on the F-22. The official couldn't elaborate on why the White House aides felt it necessary to get involved in the matter in the first place.

The official pointed to Obama's speech to the troops that day, where he praised both the 90th Fighter Squadron, known as the "Dicemen," and the 525th Fighter Squadron, the "Bulldogs," both of which operate the F-22.

Even so, the Air Force personnel thought it odd the White House wanted to display the older plane rather than the more advanced plane that, in the eyes of its supporters, represents the latest and greatest in American aviation.

The Obama administration fought hard and successfully to cut off production of the F-22 at 187 planes, a number Defense Secretary Robert Gates endorsed but that was hundreds less than originally planned and about half of the 381 planes Air Force leadership lobbied hard for in the years preceding Obama's inauguration.

"It's one thing to be against further production; quite another to slight the folks who are flying them in the operational world," one source said, adding that "the F-15 pictured was put into service roughly around the same period when Obama graduated from college. It's vintage.

[Ryan Ruck]

Two Wright-Patt Programs See Reductions In Obama Budget

February 2, 2010

President Obama's new federal budget proposal increases the defense budget, cuts the Veterans Affairs portion, would halt purchase of additional C-17 transport planes and give military personnel a 1.4 percent, across-the-board pay increase.

(A brilliant plan considering we are chartering Russian air lift to supplement our already strained air lift capabilities.)

Not buying the additional C-17s would save $2.5 billion, the Obama administration said Monday, Feb. 1. The government used C-17s, typically employed to transport military cargo, to carry humanitarian cargoes to earthquake-ravaged Haiti.

Obama's budget for the government fiscal year that will begin on Oct. 1 also would eliminate the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter's alternate engine program, which is a joint effort of the aircraft engines divisions of General Electric Co. and British manufacturer Rolls-Royce. Pratt & Whitney is providing the original engine for the Joint Strike Fighter.

Deleting funding for the alternate engine program would save $465 million, the Obama administration said.

The Defense Department intends to use the Joint Strike Fighter to modernize the fleets of the Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps. U.S. allies want to buy the plane, also.

The administration still regards the Joint Strike Fighter as a top priority, Gates told reporters in Washington.

Congress has resisted the Pentagon's prior efforts to kill the alternate engine program for the F-35. GE and congressional supporters contend that the alternate engine encourages price competition and would ensure the availability of interchangeable engines for the Joint Strike Fighter.

Defense Secretary Robert Gates said Monday, however, that he would urge the president to veto any efforts by Congress to buy more C-17s or continue the F-35 alternate engine program. Gates said the Defense Department has more important budget priorities, primarily taking care of its personnel and winning the wars in which the United States is involved.

The Aeronautical Systems Center at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base manages the C-17 program and the Air Force portion of the Joint Strike Fighter program.

Wright-Patterson declined comment Monday on the president's budget, referring questions to the Air Force headquarters and Defense Department.

The Defense Department's budget is set at $768.2 billion, up by 2.2 percent increase from the current fiscal year, and the VA's budget is at $121.7 billion, down by 2.6 percent from the current allocation, according to The Associated Press. Congress, however, has yet to have its say about the budget.

Republicans said Obama's overall budget proposal of $3.8 trillion spends too much, taxes too much and borrows too much.

"I don't know we're going to be able to reduce the deficit and continue cutting wasteful Washington spending when you have a $3.8 trillion budget proposal," said U.S. Rep. Steve Austria, R-Beavercreek.

About $3 billion will have been spent by the end of this year on the F-35 alternate engine program and about $1 billion is needed to complete that development for the government, GE spokesman Rick Kennedy said Monday. The company is talking to its congressional supporters in efforts to ensure that the alternate engine program is continued, Kennedy said.

Congress has argued that alternate engine programs promote competition. They also provide coveted defense jobs in lawmakers' home districts.

Austria said he would support restoring funding for the F-35's alternate engine. Competition could hold down the engine's costs and would help defense contracting companies in Ohio, he said.

GE Aviation's headquarters complex in the Cincinnati suburb of Evendale is testing the alternate engine. Approximately 1,000 people in the Cincinnati area, mostly GE personnel but including some contractors, are involved in the engine's development and testing program, Kennedy said. Rolls-Royce is also doing development work at its Indianapolis operations.

Gates repeated his goal of adding thousands of positions to the government's acquisition work force, to help the administration gain more control over defense spending. Gates wants to centralize more acquisition control within the government and reduce delegation of authority to acquisition specialists employed by defense contracting companies.

[Ryan Ruck]

Coast Guard Commandant Says Budget Cuts Will Hurt

February 12, 2010

The U.S. Coast Guard will risk a drop in readiness and become a more "fragile" force to accommodate cuts in President Obama's 2011 spending proposal, its commandant, Adm. Thad W. Allen, is expected to say today.

In a preview of the service chief's fourth and final annual State of the Coast Guard address Friday, aides said Allen will describe hard choices to meet Obama's call for belt-tightening in the federal government while fulfilling the Coast Guard's top budget priority, replacing obsolescent ships and planes.

"We are ready and resilient, as we demonstrated in the first hours and days following the Haitian earthquake," in which Coast Guard ships and planes were the first U.S. assets on scene of the Jan. 12 disaster, Allen is to say, according to an excerpt of prepared remarks provided to The Washington Post. "That said, our force is more fragile this year than last and we are accepting increased operational risk while recapitalizing aging cutters."

Of 12 major cutters assigned to Haitian relief efforts over the past month -- or more than one-fourth of the Coast Guard's fleet of vessels of that size -- 10 suffered mission-altering breakdowns, the service said, and three were forced to return to port or dry dock with propeller or propeller-shaft problems, the Coast Guard said.

The incidents recall a December 2007 incident in which the Coast Guard's oldest ship, the Cutter Acushnet, dropped a propeller and shaft at sea because of corrosion. The Acushnet is to be retired in 2011 after entering Navy service as a salvage ship in 1944; it saw action in the Pacific theater at Iwo Jima and Okinawa before being transferred to the Coast Guard in 1946.

Under the Coast Guard's 2011 spending plan, its funding and active-duty personnel would drop about 3 percent, to $10.1 billion and 41,984, respectively.

To trim roughly 1,112 military personnel, the service will decommission the Acushnet and four other of its oldest and largest cutters -- whose average service life is 41 years, compared with the Navy average of 14 years. The Coast Guard also plans to retire four HU-25 Falcon medium-range surveillance jet aircraft and five HH-65 Dolphin search-and-rescue helicopters, and dissolve five of 12 90-person marine safety and security teams.

The savings will pay for more capable replacements, including two top-of-the-line National Security Cutters and a new HC-144A Ocean Sentry patrol aircraft. Also planned are four new 154-foot Fast Response Cutters and 10 medium response boats.

The downsizing is a reversal for Allen, who lobbied hard during his tenure to expand the Coast Guard, saying it could easily grow by 1,500 to 2,000 members a year. The uniformed ranks of the country's smallest military service grew by an average of 1,000 over eight years in the past decade, reversing cuts in the 1990s that took it to a low of 34,000 active-duty members.

The retrenchment comes at a time of increased demands. Already tasked with marine safety, aiding commercial navigation, and enforcing environmental laws, the service increased homeland security missions for drug and migrant interdiction, port security and support of national defense after the 2001 terrorist attacks. Several Coast Guard patrol boats perform security missions near Iraq in the Persian Gulf, while a receding polar ice cap and expansion of navigable Arctic waters has led some to call for a bigger Coast Guard role there.

In a statement, Sen. Robert C. Byrd (D-W.Va.), chairman of the Senate Appropriations subcommittee on homeland security, called proposals to cut personnel, eliminate security teams and decommission ships before replacements are available "penny wise and pound foolish."

By replacing five cutters with two, the Coast Guard's "operational gap" -- the number of hours its vessels spend at sea compared with the agency's stated goal in a 2004 study -- will expand by nearly 5,000 hours, from 129,780, according to Byrd aides.

Byrd's House counterpart, Rep. David Price (D-N.C.), said the Coast Guard has been slow in delivering an updated strategic plan for its troubled $24 billion fleet replacement program, called Deepwater, which is costing more and taking longer than planned.

"How do we know that these moves will not open long-term capability gaps similar to the ones we have been struggling to fill over the years?" Price said. "I'm not automatically opposed to supporting the requested cuts, but there needs to be a stronger justification."

Republicans were harsher. Rep. Hal Rogers (Ky.), the ranking GOP member of Price's panel, said Obama's proposal reduces the number of Coast Guard vessels able to keep pace with Navy ships on important escort missions and will leave coastal cities including New York, San Francisco and New Orleans less secure.

The cuts are "indefensible" amid a war with Mexican drug cartels and a crisis in Haiti, Rogers said, while the Department of Homeland Security proposes to pay $200 million for state and local costs of securing "unwanted terror trials in the U.S. and . . . increased DHS bureaucrats in Washington."

The Coast Guard is already facing a number of issues:

• The Coast Guard, "Running on Empty"
• Coast Guard Cancels Patrol Boat Contract
• Billions Later, Plan to Remake the Coast Guard Fleet Stumbles

and now they have to deal with even less funding and personnel.

Pretty ignorant considering they are the last line of coastal defense of our nation and are responsible for such an immense area of operation.

[Ryan Ruck]

Air Force Cutting Its Fighter Fleet

Feb 15, 2010

By fall, 250 fighters will be in the boneyard and the 4,000 airmen who fly or fix them will have new jobs, according to an officer overseeing the aircraft drawdown.

The first planes head for retirement April 1; if all goes as planned, the last ones will be off the flight line by Sept. 30, the end of the fiscal year.

"Units have already started to put people on the move list," said Col. Jack Forsythe, with the Air Staff's strategic plans directorate.

The Air Force unveiled the retirement plans in May but needed congressional approval to decommission the fighters, including primary, attrition reserve and backup inventory aircraft. The permission came Dec. 19, when President Obama signed the Defense Department's fiscal 2010 budget.

Included in the budget, however, are stipulations that the Air Force write several reports explaining, for example, the rationale for the retirements and the impact that the smaller fleet will have on Operation Noble Eagle, the military operations related to homeland security.

"All the reports have been written and are under review," Forsythe said. "We expect to have them to Congress in time for the 1 April deadline." Retiring the planes — 135 F-15C/D Eagles, 112 F-16C Fighting Falcons and three A-10 Thunderbolts — should save $350 million in fiscal 2010 and $3.5 billion in the next five years, Forsythe said.

The service hopes the saved dollars help pay for new aircraft.

The positions assigned to the fighters will be transferred to growing missions such as surveillance and intelligence analysis, said Forsythe, who was operations group commander for F-117 Nighthawks at Holloman Air Force Base, N.M., when those jets were retired two years ago.

Planes will leave a few at a time and personnel will transfer when their fighters are retired. Maintainers and life support personnel will be reassigned to similar duties, Forsythe said.

Most pilots will continue to fly but may have to cross-train into new planes.

Last year, the Air Force identified many of the wings and squadrons to be decommissioned, but is still drawing up specific Air Force-wide retirement plans.

WHAT'S IN, WHAT'S OUT

Changes announced by the service last year*:

F-15C/D

• Eglin Air Force Base, Fla.: 85th Test and Evaluation Squadron loses two Eagles.
• Elmendorf Air Force Base, Alaska: 19th Fighter Squadron loses 24 jets.
• Hickam Air Force Base, Hawaii: 199th Fighter Squadron loses 15 aircraft.
• Langley Air Force Base, Va.: 71st Fighter Squadron loses 18 airplanes.
• RAF Lakenheath, England: 48th Fighter Wing loses six Eagles.
• Tyndall Air Force Base, Fla.: 325th Fighter Wing loses 48 fighters.

F-16

• Fort Wayne International Airport, Ind.: 163rd Fighter Squadron loses 18 fighters.
• Hill Air Force Base, Utah: 34th Fighter Squadron loses 24 Falcons.
• Kirtland Air Force Base, N.M.: 188th Fighter Squadron loses 18 jets.
• Luke Air Force Base, Ariz.: 56th Fighter Wing loses 28 fighters.
• Spangdahlem Air Base, Germany: 52nd Fighter Wing loses 18 Falcons.

A-10

• Barksdale Air Force Base, La.: 47th Fighter Squadron loses three fighters.
• Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Ariz.: 354th Fighter Squadron loses three Thunderbolts and 358th Fighter Squadron loses three aircraft.
• Moody Air Force Base, Ga.: 74th Fighter Squadron loses three aircraft and 75th Fighter Squadron loses three Warthogs.
• Fort Wayne International Airport, Ind.: 163rd Fighter Squadron gains 18 A-10s.
• Osan Air Base, South Korea: 25th Fighter Squadron loses three Thunderbolts.
• Whiteman Air Force Base, Mo.: 303rd Fighter Squadron loses three jets.

*The aircraft numbers don't include the backup and attrition reserve aircraft the units are retiring.

[Ryan Ruck]

Critics Worry Over Attack Sub Force Plan

Mar 2, 2010

The Navy’s plan to reduce its submarine fleet by 20 percent will render it unable to meet critical requirements, lawmakers and strategists say.

What’s still a mystery to many is whether the cuts are driven by decreasing missions or decreasing funding — or is this a gamble by the Navy that has a potential payout in the billions?

In the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, the Navy argued that a 48-attack-sub minimum is a moderate-risk force necessary to provide the roughly 10 subs that combatant commanders need on any given day.

But the 30-year shipbuilding plan released Feb. 1 would drop the current 53 attack subs to a low of 39 in 2030, then stabilize the fleet at 45 through 2040. The plan also eliminates the Navy’s four guided-missile subs in 2028 and replaces the 14 Ohio-class ballistic-missile submarines with 12 new boomers ().

“I have real reservations about attack subs hitting a low of 39 boats, which is well below the minimum required,” Rep. Rob Wittman, R-Va., a member of the House Armed Services Committee, told Navy Times. “We can’t meet the demand that is out there now, and requirements will only continue to grow in the future.”

[Ryan Ruck]

NY Air National Guard's 174th Fighter Wing Waves Goodbye To Piloted Flights

March 05, 2010

In 2001, when Lt. Col. Dan Tester turned his F-16 south into a September sky over Syracuse, no one could have guessed that the end of the combat plane’s mission was beginning.

On Saturday, the last F-16s to be piloted by members of the New York Air National Guard’s 174th Fighter Wing will fly away for good. A 63-year tradition of flying manned aircraft will end, as the fighter wing fully assumes its mission flying remotely piloted MQ-9 Reaper drones.

Pilots of the 174th flew missions during the 1991 Gulf War, when a massive air campaign destroyed Iraq’s military and civilian sites before the U.S. ground invasion. The Fighter Wing has provided support to ground troops in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The 174th has been scaling back F-16 training flights for a year. Its last overseas mission was June 2008. Most of the 17 jets formerly based at Hancock have left, bound for the “aircraft boneyard” at Davis-Monmoth Air Force Base near Tucson, Ariz., a desert location where thousands of retired aircraft are stored.

This weekend marks the F-16’s final and ceremonial departure, as the fighter wing commander, Col. Kevin Bradley, and Tester fly the last two F-16s out of Syracuse. They’ll land them at Fort Drum’s Wheeler-Sack Army Airfield. On Monday, the planes will be flown to Arizona.

For the public, the mission’s end means no more parade flyovers. No more glimpses of F-16s in formation as they head north for combat training over the Adirondacks. The F-16 fighter jet, introduced in 1976, is being retired. More profoundly for the 174th, its new mission is transforming the unit’s combat culture.

Each F-16 pilot and crew chief were partners with their dedicated plane. They deployed overseas together and built singular bonds. When a plane lands, the crew chief is the first to make eye contact with the pilot and climb the ladder to the cockpit to debrief. Visual communication on the runway, practiced over years, could be a raised finger, a subtle but clear signal.

“We put them (pilots) in the air. We take care of them,” said Staff Sgt. Gary Smith, a crew chief. “We’re not going to have that bond with the pilots anymore. We’re not going to be able to sit around the conference table and BS with them. The paradigm is changing.”

The 174th has flown F-16s for 20 years. The unit’s entire purpose was built around the fighter jet, from training to maintenance to coordination of overseas deployments. The name of each plane’s pilot was painted on the left side of the jet’s domed canopy; the crew chief’s name on the other. A cobra head, a unit insignia, was painted on the tail.

Names and insignias have now been stripped off the planes. Now that they remotely operate drones, pilots’ full names aren’t even acknowledged in public.

In the insurgent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, where roadside bombs and stray mortars are the threats and insurgents have virtually no air defense, the Reaper drone has proved invaluable, redefining how the military thinks about airplanes.

Cruising at roughly 200 mph, Reapers can fly up to 30 hours on one fueling, as high as 40,000 feet. The F-16 has a top speed of 1,500 mph, and can fly roughly 90 minutes before refueling.

Long surveillance time with the unmanned drones has enabled the U.S. to watch sites and track people nonstop for days. “The MQ-9 is doing the job in some ways better than the F-16,” Tester said. “With the F-16, when it gets low on gas, you’re like, ‘Hey, guys, I’ll be right back.’ The F-16 is a thirsty airplane. And it’s fast. Well, the Army doesn’t really need fast. It needs persistent airpower, or eyes, overhead.”

This week, some of the 174th’s remaining F-16 pilots flew their last flights. Tuesday, three went up for about an hour and 20 minutes, flying air combat maneuvers over the Tug Hill plateau. Among them were Lt. Col. Scott Brenton, Lt. Col. Sean McQuaid and Bradley, the wing commander. A firetruck met them as they taxied in, arcing water spray over the jets, a tradition for pilots completing their final flight. Brenton and McQuaid’s families greeted them. They toasted with champagne.

Flight helmets off, the pilots were beaming, as if they’d just had the ride of their lives. “This is the hottest ride in town,” Brenton said. “You don’t have to ask me twice to go up in an airplane like that. It’s tough to let it go.”

Brenton and Tester are staying with the 174th to operate Reapers and instruct other Reaper operators.

On the Sept. 11, 2001, morning that Tester took off nine years ago, the U.S. had been attacked by four rogue passenger jets hijacked by terrorists. The country’s airspace was shut down. Tester was sent up to make sure it stayed clear.

“It was eerie,” he said this week. “I was hoping I didn’t have to use the airplane for what it’s made for.”

Tester, an Air National Guard pilot since 1995, is also a pilot for United Airlines. Months before 9/11, he had flown both United Airlines planes that crashed. He did not the know the pilots who were killed.

Although the F-16’s G-force (up to nine times the pull of gravity) can be hard on his 42-year-old body, giving up the F-16 will be hard, he said. With the closing of a military aviation chapter, he knows his children won’t have the same opportunities he’s had. But he’s at peace with that.

“It’s not important driving the Ferrari,” he said. “It’s doing something significant. Serving other people. As long as they’re helping people and having a significant life, that’s what I want for them.”

[Ryan Ruck]

U.S. Coast Guard Nominee Would Reduce Terror Hunt

2/25/2010

President Obama's choice to lead the U.S. Coast Guard wants to make major cuts to the agency's counterterror mission during the next five years.

In an internal memo from Vice Admiral Robert Papp Jr., the Coast Guard commandant nominee says that starting in 2012, he would slash funding for programs in the agency's homeland security plan that would include homeland security patrols and training exercises.

The memo, marked "sensitive — for internal Coast Guard use only," was obtained by the Associated Press.

Papp's outline is significant because it could mean major changes for the more than 200-year-old agency that took on a significant homeland security duties after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks on the United States. Obama's 2011 proposed budget cuts for the Coast Guard already has caused outrage from some lawmakers.

According to Papp's memo, he would scale back the Coast Guard's counterterror priorities in favor of traditional search and rescue operations that save people in imminent danger on the water and maintaining the maritime transportation system.

In the memo, Papp said he wants to eliminate teams that are trained to respond to and prevent terror attacks. These teams also train other Coast Guard forces on counterterror operations.

Papp said the strike teams were created after the attacks "to fill a perceived void in national counterterrorism response capability." He says in the memo that other federal agencies are better at this type of mission.

He also would cut the Coast Guard's largest homeland security operation, which patrols critical infrastructure and other sensitive security structures on or near waterways. He would as well decrease the number of specialized units stationed in key coastal areas where an attack could be devastating.

Obama already has proposed closing five of the 12 specialized units in 2011.

"In view of the fiscal horizon, we must make bold and systematic strategic decisions," Papp wrote in the Nov. 10, 2009, memo. Obama announced his plans to nominate Papp on Dec. 22.

Coast Guard spokesman Ron LaBrec said the memo was written in response to a Coast Guard headquarters request to identify potential areas for budget cuts down the road. LaBrec said it is part of a department-wide review of homeland security missions so that officials work on spending proposals for 2012. But he said the memo does not represent Papp's own preferences or priorities.

Tom Gavin, the spokesman for the administration's Office of Management and Budget, said the White House is not involved in the internal budget considerations for 2012.

Papp also wants to cut back on the number of ships doing counternarcotics operations in the Caribbean Sea each day. Currently, about six ships carry out that mission daily, according to Papp's memo.

He wants to cut that back to an average of 4.5 ships a day, while at the same time keeping the Coast Guard cutters that perform anti-narcotics operations in transit zones to respond to specific intelligence about drug trafficking.

"What I offered above is just a fraction of what is needed, and I'm prepared to go further," Papp wrote in the memo.

After reading the memo, Rep. Pete Olson, R-Texas, said Papp's proposals would gut an agency critical to national security. Olson said he is "pretty scared" that Papp is the administration's pick to run the Coast Guard.

Obama himself proposed cutting 1,100 active duty personnel this year, a suggestion that is meeting resistance from some Republicans and Democrats in Congress.

Congress ultimately decides how federal agencies are funded and provides the money to the president.

"It's up to the Coast Guard to help protect our ports and our maritime industry, and it cannot do that without adequate funding," Sen. Frank Lautenberg, D-N.J., said in a statement.

Rep. Hal Rogers, R-Ky., warned that Obama's homeland security proposal is "dead on arrival." Rogers is the top Republican on the appropriations committee that overseas homeland security spending.

Responding to criticism about the proposed Coast Guard cuts in the 2011 budget, Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano said, "I think the Coast Guard is one of the most underappreciated assets of this country."

The Coast Guard was transferred from the Transportation Department to the newly created Homeland Security Department in 2003. In times of war, the Coast Guard may be transferred to the Department of the Navy. It has 42,000 active-duty volunteers.

A date has not been set for Papp's nomination hearing.

[Ryan Ruck]

USAF Abandons Large Helicopter For Rescue Mission, Proposes Buying 112 UH-60Ms

2/24/2010

The US Air Force has decided to buy 112 Sikorsky UH-60Ms to recapitalise its ageing combat search and rescue fleet, despite a standing requirement for a larger helicopter.

Sikorsky will modify the M-model aircraft to the HH-60L configuration, replacing a fleet of HH-60G Pave Hawks that has dwindled to about 101 airframes, says Lt Gen Mark Shackelford, head of USAF acquisition.

The HH-60 represents the current standard for the USAF's SAR mission, in which its crews are tasked to fly deep into enemy territory to retrieve downed airmen. "The new H-60s will be modified to be rescue helicopters, obviously with some tempering of performance," Shackelford says.


In 2006, the USAF signed the CSAR-X contract to buy 141 Boeing HH-47s, selecting the Chinook over the Sikorsky HH-92 and Lockheed Martin/AgustaWestland HH-71. But the contract award process became a landmark example of acquisition policy.

The US Government Accountability Office sustained two protests filed by the losing bidders, and the USAF's attempts to restart the competition without heeding its recommendations failed. The service terminated the contract with Boeing in June 2009, clearing the way for a sole-source contract to Sikorsky for the smaller helicopter.

If Congress approves funding for the plan, the USAF will recapitalise its existing fleet, but fall short of plans to broaden the mission with a larger and more capable aircraft.

Under the CSAR-X programme, the USAF envisaged not only rescuing downed airmen, but also picking up small units behind enemy lines, or even ferrying cargo or passengers during natural disasters. That requirement drove it to ask bidders to provide a medium or heavylift helicopter.

The requirement for "personnel recovery" still stands, Shackelford says, and will be addressed by the USAF in the future. But for now it is focused on ensuring that downed aircrews will not lack a helicopter force ready to retrieve them.

"Those [aircraft] are busy fliers in a war and very much sought after," he says.

[Ryan Ruck]

Budget Wars Spell Grim Future For F-22 and F-35 Planes

News of cost overruns roil the debate over the world’s two most advanced warplanes, the costly F-22 Raptor and the too-big-to-fail F-35 Lightning II. Will UAVs be the final victor?

March 4, 2010

There could be some bad news on the horizon for the F-35 Lightning II. Senior Air Force staff are saying that cost overruns might cause an automatic Congressional review of the F-35 program—-already the most expensive weapon procurement program in U.S. history, at about $300 billion. The news is roiling an ongoing debate over the future of U.S. warplanes: The F-35 (developed under the Joint Strike Fighter program and still in development) is on one side. The F-22 Raptor, currently flying in the Air Force fleet, is on the other.

But why? These airplanes are built for different roles, and have different strengths. The Raptor is built to gain air superiority, while the Lightning II is being created primarily to provide close air support and conduct precision air strikes. But both are staggeringly expensive, and with the Obama administration looking at belt-tightening within the Pentagon, the two marquee warplanes have been dueling for funds. In April 2009 the Pentagon announced it was stopping F-22 production, and some quickly said that the cost overruns of the F-35 were crowding out the expensive Raptor, the world’s best radar evader and dogfighter.

Now that the F-22 is canceled (freezing the fleet at 186 airplanes), the F-35 program faces even more scrutiny. Aerospace analysts, press and the discussion-board community frequently ask why a superior airplane like the F-22 is being axed while the problematic F-35 limps along during development. Secretary of the Air Force Michael Donley said this week that the F-35 would not be ready until 2015, rather than 2013.

Additionally, spiraling costs within the Lockheed Martin–run F-35 program will almost certainly trigger the Nunn-McCurdy amendment, a law that calls for a review of weapons programs whose total costs grow by more than 25 percent above projected outlays. When a program is cited under the terms of the amendment, the Pentagon must certify to lawmakers that the system is still worth pursuing, and that no alternatives of equal capabilities (at lower cost) exist. Some proponents say that the Navy’s F-18 and a rehabbed Army A-10 can fill the air-strike role of the F-35, but the fact is that the F-35 can better evade radar and other fighters. And after hundreds of billions have been invested and international partners await the final product, the program is considered too big—and too wide—to fail. Expect the program to be continued … but perhaps at reduced numbers within the United States military, down from 2500 planes. That move would increase the cost per airplane, and more congressional outrage could follow.

The costs, not the capabilities, are why many people are comparing the F-35 and the F-22 and trying to figure out which can be sacrificed. But technical arguments are flying, and there are a lot of facts out there to mull: The F-35 is not as stealthy as the F-22. The F-35’s cockpit, with its voice-command system and heads-up display projected on the pilot’s helmet, is beyond state-of-the-art and ideal for organizing information to conduct close air support. The F-22 can win dogfights with radical high-speed maneuvers and excellent radar. The F-35 includes a jump-jet variant for the Navy, and that service could certainly use a carrier-ready airplane that can evade ground radar and easily evade or kill other nations’ best defending planes while providing close air support to Marines on shore. The F-22 can turn at twice the rate as the F-35.

When you consider that arms sales are a vital part of international relations, don’t underestimate the fact that the F-22 faces congressionally mandated export bans while the F-35 is built for sale, as part of a coalition of international partners. This is good for businesses in certain congressional districts, and it also eases the complexities of international combat operations by having players use the same equipment.

Interestingly, RAND Corp. today released a study done for the Air Force that calculates the costs of restarting the F-22 program. It seems to say: Watch what you’re doing. "Because the F-22A manufacturing base is complex, shutting down the production line without making any investment in preserving key elements of production capability would make it expensive and difficult to restart production in the future, if that were desired." The report says that the cost of restarting the production line after a two-year hiatus will raise the cost at least $3.6 billion: Each warplane would cost $227 million instead of an estimated $173 million now.

But it’s not an either/or choice between the F-35 and the F-22: One third option would be to stop funding for both. The real winner in all of this could be unmanned airplanes. They are cheaper to build, have smaller, uncluttered airframes and designers are beginning to build them with stealth features so they can operate in airspace protected by radar networks. The Air Force this year released its road map to UAV development, and called for more autonomous drones conducting a variety of missions that the F-22 and the F-35 are slated to perform. The Army in several months will release its own UAV plan, and the Navy is eagerly pushing to field its own carrier-based attack drones. After the F-22 and F-35 fight each other into lower production orders, it could be that only the flying robots will be in good position to seize the day.

[Ryan Ruck]

Analyst: Stretch Sub-Buying Schedule

Mar 22, 2010

A top Congressional analyst suggests one alternative to ease the effect of paying for the Navy’s new missile submarine is to stretch the procurement schedule from 15 years to 19.

Ronald O’Rourke, naval analyst for the Congressional Research Service, wrote in a new report that stretching out the schedule would create more gaps between submarines, which would allow for greater use of split funding — the practice of paying for a ship in more than one year. O’Rourke wrote that expanding the schedule would mean eight of the proposed 12 submarines could be paid for in two-, three- or four-year increments. The Navy’s current plan would allow that option for only five of the subs, O’Rourke wrote.

The Navy now plans to buy the first SSBN(X) submarine — the replacement for today’s Ohio-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines — in 2019, and the last in 2033. O’Rourke’s alternative would purchase the first sub in 2017 and the last in 2035.

But O’Rourke pointed out the submarines could still be built at the existing schedule. Under that scenario, the Navy would request funding for the first SSBN(X) in 2017 but construction would still begin as if the ship was purchased in 2019. Similar schemes were used in the 1980s to pay for and build three aircraft carriers, he wrote.

The Navy is struggling to come up with a plan to pay for the submarines, which are roughly estimated to cost about $6 billion apiece — about four times the cost of a new Arleigh Burke-class destroyer. The service fears the impact of having to pay for the new subs while at the same time seeking about $15 billion a year for new carriers, destroyers, amphibious ships and attack submarines. One new SSBN(X) would be about 40 percent of an entire annual shipbuilding budget.

Buying Outside the Budget

One alternative to having the Navy pay for the new missile submarines — which are subordinated to a national, strategic deterrent role and do not normally take part in fleet operations — is to shift the burden to a separate Pentagon account. The new Nuclear Posture Review, which could be released in weeks, could address that issue.

O’Rourke, in his first report on the SSBN(X) replacement program, noted there are precedents for buying ships outside the Navy shipbuilding budget. Sealift ships, which largely carry Army and Air Force cargoes, and Navy auxiliary ships are funded through the National Defense Sealift Fund. And, he noted, the Pentagon already breaks out spending for strategic forces into its own budget area, with $10.7 billion requested last year.

Two-year split-funding, O’Rourke wrote, would be appropriate in years where no SSBN(X) submarine is planned for the following year. A two-year gap would mean three-year funding might be suitable, and a four-year gap would be appropriate when program procurement reaches its planned end in 2033 and funding would be pushed beyond that date.

O’Rourke noted that stretching out the payment schedule might actually raise the cost of a submarine, although it would be more affordable on a year-by-year basis.

[Ryan Ruck]

Drawdown: Force To Be Cut By 6,000 Airmen

Apr 13, 2010

Nearly 6,000 active-duty airmen — enlisted and officers — will be cut loose in the next two years because so few are leaving on their own to enter the tough civilian job market.

The drawdown, coupled with the delayed commissioning of hundreds of ROTC cadets and severely curtailed recruitment goals, should allow the Air Force to return to its congressionally mandated active-duty end strength of 332,200 by the start of fiscal 2012. Active-duty end strength at the end of February stood at 335,500. The number is projected to be 336,500 by Sept. 30, the end of fiscal 2010, if the service does not implement the cuts.

Air Force officials estimate the service would have to find nearly $200 million from existing accounts for salaries and benefits in 2010 alone if it does not begin trimming the ranks. They still expect to have additional personnel costs because of the phasing-in of the drawdown but could not give a dollar amount.

The drawdown is one of three reductions outlined to Air Force Times by Brig. Gen. Sharon Dunbar, the Air Staff’s director of force management policy. Those measures will:

— Pare down the officer corps by 1,373 and the enlisted force by 4,376; the numbers do not include expected retirements and separations.

— Postpone until 2011 the commissioning of the 737 ROTC cadets who graduate this spring.

— Hold back enlisted recruitment by 2,681; recruits with delayed entry agreements are not affected.

The service intends to make the reductions through voluntary and involuntary separation programs but will not resort to the involuntary programs until it sees how many airmen leave on their own, Dunbar said.

Voluntary programs such as asking the service to waive service obligations or requesting a transfer to the reserves or Army are available now. Airmen vulnerable to being cut will be notified by their commanders, she said.

The top uniformed leader, Chief of Staff Gen. Norton Schwartz, announced the reductions to airmen in a letter dated March 25.

“Please know that Secretary [Michael Donley] and I have carefully considered every option, but in the end, arrived at the conclusion that these force management initiatives are necessary,” Schwartz stated. “We must operate within our means.”

The Air Force knew it had too many airmen last fall, Dunbar said, and tried to address the high retention by asking officers to leave early and moving up separation dates for enlisted airmen already heading out.

About 3,700 airmen needed to take the options, but only 654 — 80 officers and 574 enlistees — signed up for early exits. In addition, more airmen decided to stay on active duty.

Today’s plan is similar to the one the service used to bring down active-duty end strength from 372,000 in 2004 to 328,000 in 2008.

The Air Force still feels the pains of that drawdown.

Several officer career fields targeted for cuts then, such as intelligence, security forces, public affairs and civil engineering, are now labeled as “stressed” — there are not enough officers to fill home base and combat zone requirements without resorting to frequent deployments.

Career fields targeted now, according to Dunbar, are considered overmanned after the service looked at how many officers are needed to do the job and long-term health of the career field.

Despite cutting some Air Force Specialty Codes, many career fields are understaffed, Dunbar said. The Air Force continues to offer retention bonuses to pilots to meet the growing demand for airmen to fly remote-controlled airplanes.

The new cuts will not change the selective re-enlistment bonus program, Dunbar said. Changes, however, could come later this year for AFSCs exceeding their retention requirements.

Some specifics on the drawdown programs:

Enlisted

— Airmen in overmanned AFSCs who want to leave before the end of their four- to six-year contracts will find service commitments waived for up to two years.

— Airmen who have been denied or have declined re-enlistment and have no more than 13 years of service or more than 20 years of service will be required to separate by the end of August. The service estimates about 1,500 airmen are affected.

— Technical school students, not long out of basic training, with poor grades will be discharged instead of having a second chance and retraining into another career field.

— Airmen who want to join Air Force Reserve Command or the Air National Guard can choose the Palace Chase program, which requires only one year of service with the Reserve or Guard for every year left of the active-duty commitment. Programs in the past mandated airmen to serve at least two years for every year left of active-duty commitment.

Officers

— Officers commissioned in 2006 and 2007 — most of them lieutenants — and serving in overmanned career fields will have the option to leave with waived service commitments or face a force-shaping board with the power to dismiss officers with the evaluations. The service will not have to convene the board if 41 airmen volunteer to leave.

These officers do not qualify for separation pay because they have fewer than six years of commissioned service.

— Officers commissioned in 1998-1999 and 2002-2004 now serving in overmanned AFSCs will be eligible for voluntary separation pay. The VSP will be worth twice the involuntary separation payment that is based on their rank and years of service. For example, a major with 12 years of service will qualify for about $188,500.

Officers in the vulnerable AFSCs who do not take VSP could find their careers judged by a reduction-in-force board and then told to leave the service. The RIF boards will not be convened if enough officers — 585 — volunteer to exit. Officers told to leave by the board qualify for involuntary separation pay.

— Retirement-eligible lieutenant colonels and colonels can request a waiver allowing them to retire with just two years in grade instead of three years.

— About 685 lieutenant colonels passed over twice for promotion to colonel and 486 colonels in year groups 1981-1984 with four years in grade can volunteer to retire or face having their records reviewed by selective early retirement board in July.

The Air Force needs up to 30 percent of those officers to retire by January.

Thinning The Force — A Timeline

1986 — Air Force peaks at 603,373 active-duty airmen, the highest since Vietnam War.

1988 — The post-Cold War drawdown shrinks active-duty force to 571,648.

1989-2001 — Drawdown continues; force bottoms out at 347,782 in 2001.

2002-2004 — Service grows at start of two wars, peaking at 372,153 in early 2004, but budget calls for 360,000 airmen.

April 2004 — Air Force must cut 18,000 airmen by end of 2005. Enlisted airmen in 29 career fields compete to re-enlist; those not selected must leave the service.

May 2004 — Recruitment goal for 2005 cut to 20,000 enlistees — 10,000 fewer than 2004.

June 2004 — The Air Force waives service commitments for all career fields and most year groups in an effort to cut 8,000 airmen.

July 2005 — The Air Force hits its goal of about 360,000 airmen, but the service has 4,000 more captains and lieutenants than budgeted.

October 2005 — To rid the service of 1,700 junior officers, the Air Force announces creation of force-shaping boards to decide which officers must go. The young officers can leave voluntarily.

January 2006 — The service plans to cut the force to 316,000 by 2011 to help pay for new planes such as the F-22.

March 2006 — 6,000 unfilled positions get axed as a “painless” way to reduce the ranks.

June 2006 — Incentives are offered to get officers to leave; up to 3,700 airmen could find they can’t re-enlist.

June 2007 — The service shrinks the force to about 334,000 airmen, but still must cut about 18,000 by 2011.

September 2007 — Attrition and voluntary separation are expected to cut 5,600 positions, bringing the active-duty force to 328,000.

October 2007 — With the enlisted drawdown meeting goals, competition will ease in 2008 for first-term airmen who want to re-enlist.

February 2008 — Air Force leaders start pushing for a force of 330,000, but Congress approves money for just 316,000 airmen.

June 2008 — Secretary of the Air Force Michael Wynne and Chief of Staff Gen. Michael Moseley seek an end strength of about 330,000; Defense Secretary Robert Gates announces an end to the drawdown, leaving the service with about 328,000 airmen.

September 2008 — To convince airmen to stay, an expanded Selective Re-enlistment Bonus program is announced. About 17,500 airmen in 88 career specialties qualify.

May 2009 — With enlisted retention better than expected, SRBs are trimmed back, but still ahead of the offers during the drawdown.

November 2009 — Retention is too good, and the service will bust its limit of 331,700 active-duty airmen unless 2,074 officers and 1,633 enlisted airmen separate voluntarily or end their terms ahead of schedule by April 30 — officially called a “date of service rollback.”

January 2010 — The service tightens rules on how long enlisted airmen can stay on active duty if they are not promoted. The change is predicted to send about 2,500 sergeants packing over two years.

March 2010 — Without disclosing how many airmen need to go, the Air Force expands the date of service rollback program for enlisted airmen and offers incentives such as separation pay and extended medical benefits. One week later, the service announces it must cut 6,000 jobs, slow recruitment and delay officer commissionings.

Ways To Trim The Force

From asking for volunteers to ordering airmen to leave, the Air Force has several ways to cut its end strength. A sampling of the programs:

Blue to Green — Airmen can apply to join the Army and serve in jobs that match their Air Force duties and rank.

Date of separation rollback — Enlisted airmen ineligible to re-enlist or nearing retirement can leave earlier.

Force-shaping boards — Aimed at lieutenants who lack the career protection of other officers, these boards are used to select which lieutenants from overmanned Air Force Specialty Code year groups must leave the service. These young officers do not qualify for separation pay. Lieutenants facing review by the board can volunteer to leave.

Reduction-in-force boards — Among the harshest options for officers, these boards meet to decide which officers will be ordered to leave. Often the Air Force uses the threat of RIF boards to persuade officers in overmanned career field year groups to leave voluntarily rather than have their records reviewed by the board, typically composed of colonels and general officers.

Palace Chase — This program eases the transition for enlisted and officers from active-duty service to the Guard and Reserve.

Restricted accessions — The service cuts the number of new enlisted airmen and officers brought into the service.

Selective early retirement board — Usually aimed at officers already qualified to retire, these boards can require officers to retire sooner than they wanted.

Service commitment waiver — These waivers free airmen to leave the service without having to pay back education, training or permanent change-of-station costs.

Time in grade waiver — These waivers are used primarily to allow retirement-eligible lieutenant colonels and colonels to retire with just two years in their final rank instead of three years.

Voluntary separation pay — This payment is typically offered to midcareer officers, primarily captains and majors, as an enticement to leave before they become retirement eligible. The amount of pay varies based on such factors as the officer’s base pay and how much money the Air Force believes is needed to convince an officer to forgo retirement benefits. In 2007, VSP was roughly equal to three years’ base pay.

Who’s Out

Air Force Specialty Code and year groups that could face a force shaping board if not enough of the officers agree to leave:

13S Space & missiles — 2007

15W Weather — 2006

21A Aircraft maintenance — 2006

38F Force support — 2007

61A Operations research — 2006`

61B Behavioral scientist — 2006

61C Chemist/biologist — 2006-07

71S Special investigations — 2006-07

———

AFSC and year groups eligible for voluntary separation pay. If not enough officers take the incentive to leave, the service will stand up a reduction-in-force board for:

13S Space & missiles — 2002-04

15W Weather — 1998-99, 2002-04

21A Aircraft maintenance — 1998-99, 2002-04

33S Communications — 1998-99, 2002-04

38F Force support — 1999, 2002-04

52H Chaplain — 1998-99, 2002-04

61B Behavioral scientist — 2002-04

61C Chemist/biologist — 1998-99, 2002-04

65F Financial manager — 1998, 2002-03

[vector7]

Gates suggests changes for Navy

By ANNE FLAHERTY

updated 2 hours, 47 minutes ago



Washington- Defense Secretary Robert Gates on Monday called into question the Navy's heavy and expensive arsenal of ships and subs.

In a speech before naval officers and contractors, Gates did not say he was planning to cut any programs or its budget.

But he did say the military must rethink whether it can afford such a massive naval fleet at a time when the Army and Marine Corps need more money to take care of troops and their families.

"Do we really need 11 carrier strike groups for another 30 years when no other country has more than one?" Gates asked.

He noted that the Navy's most expensive resources aren't on the front lines when it comes to countering many modern threats, such as piracy.

"As we learned last year, you don't necessarily need a billion-dollar guided missile destroyer to chase down and deal with a bunch of teenage pirates wielding AK-47s" and rocket-propelled grenades, Gates said.

John Pike, director of the GlobalSecurity.org defense website based in Alexandria, Va., said this is the first time, as far as he knows, that Gates has addressed the cost of maintaining the roughly 300-ship Navy.

Pike said that Gates, by raising the issue of the size and composition of the fleet with the Navy league, had entered "the Lion's den" — a reference to the pushback he's likely to get from Congress. Many lawmakers protect the Navy shipbuilding industry because it means jobs in their districts.

Gates said the military still has a way to go to develop capabilities useful in places such as Afghanistan, where small insurgent groups are the primary threat, and Haiti, where the military is aiding humanitarian workers.

This year, the Defense Department requested nearly $190 billion to buy and develop weapons, but only 10 percent of that is dedicated toward counterinsurgency, humanitarian and similar missions.

"This approach ignores the fact that we face diverse adversaries with finite resources that consequently force them to come at the U.S. in unconventional and innovative ways," he said.

[Ryan Ruck]

Gates suggests changes for Navy

...

"Do we really need 11 carrier strike groups for another 30 years when no other country has more than one?" Gates asked.

...