Shutting down bloggers, forums and Free speech

[American Patriot]

Here you go:

S.987 -- Free Flow of Information Act of 2013 (Introduced in Senate - IS)

S 987 IS

113th CONGRESS

1st Session

S. 987

To maintain the free flow of information to the public by providing conditions for the federally compelled disclosure of information by certain persons connected with the news media.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

May 16, 2013

Mr. SCHUMER (for himself and Mr. GRAHAM) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary

A BILL

To maintain the free flow of information to the public by providing conditions for the federally compelled disclosure of information by certain persons connected with the news media.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the `Free Flow of Information Act of 2013'.

SEC. 2. COMPELLED DISCLOSURE FROM COVERED PERSONS.

(a) Conditions for Compelled Disclosure- In any proceeding or in connection with any issue arising under Federal law, a Federal entity may not compel a covered person to comply with a subpoena, court order, or other compulsory legal process seeking to compel the disclosure of protected information, unless a Federal court in the jurisdiction where the subpoena, court order, or other compulsory legal process has been or would be issued determines, after providing notice and an opportunity to be heard to such covered person--

(1) that the party seeking to compel disclosure of the protected information has exhausted all reasonable alternative sources (other than a covered person) of the protected information; and

(2) that--

(A) in a criminal investigation or prosecution--

(i) if the party seeking to compel disclosure is the Federal Government, based on public information or information obtained from a source other than the covered person, there are reasonable grounds to believe that a crime has occurred;

(ii) based on public information or information obtained from a source other than the covered person, there are reasonable grounds to believe that the protected information sought is essential to the investigation or prosecution or to the defense against the prosecution;

(iii) the Attorney General certifies that the decision to request compelled disclosure was made in a manner consistent with section 50.10 of title 28, Code of Federal Regulations, if compelled disclosure is sought by a member of the Department of Justice in circumstances governed by section 50.10 of title 28, Code of Federal Regulations; and

(iv) the covered person has not established by clear and convincing evidence that disclosure of the protected information would be contrary to the public interest, taking into account both the public interest in gathering and disseminating the information or news at issue and maintaining the free flow of information and the public interest in compelling disclosure (including the extent of any harm to national security); or

(B) in a matter other than a criminal investigation or prosecution, based on public information or information obtained from a source other than the covered person--

(i) the protected information sought is essential to the resolution of the matter; and

(ii) the party seeking to compel disclosure of the protected information has established that the interest in compelling disclosure clearly outweighs the public interest in gathering and disseminating the information or news at issue and maintaining the free flow of information.

(b) Limitations on Content of Information- A subpoena, court order, or other compulsory legal process seeking to compel the disclosure of protected information under subsection (a) shall, to the extent possible, be narrowly tailored in purpose, subject matter, and period of time covered so as to avoid compelling disclosure of peripheral, nonessential, or speculative information.

SEC. 3. EXCEPTION RELATING TO CRIMINAL CONDUCT.

(a) In General- Section 2 shall not apply to any information, record, document, or item obtained as the result of the eyewitness observations of, or obtained during the course of, alleged criminal conduct by the covered person, including any physical evidence or visual or audio recording of the conduct.

(b) Exception- This section shall not apply, and, subject to sections 4 and 5, section 2 shall apply, if the alleged criminal conduct is the act of communicating the documents or information at issue.

SEC. 4. EXCEPTION TO PREVENT DEATH, KIDNAPPING, SUBSTANTIAL BODILY INJURY, SEX OFFENSES AGAINST MINORS, OR INCAPACITATION OR DESTRUCTION OF CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE.

Section 2 shall not apply to any protected information that is reasonably necessary to stop, prevent, or mitigate a specific case of--

(1) death;

(2) kidnapping;

(3) substantial bodily harm;

(4) conduct that constitutes a criminal offense that is a specified offense against a minor (as those terms are defined in section 111 of the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006 (42 U.S.C. 16911)), or an attempt or conspiracy to commit such a criminal offense; or

(5) incapacitation or destruction of critical infrastructure (as defined in section 1016(e) of the USA PATRIOT Act (42 U.S.C. 5195c(e))).

SEC. 5. EXCEPTION TO PREVENT TERRORIST ACTIVITY OR HARM TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY.

(a) In General- Section 2 shall not apply to any protected information if--

(1) the party seeking to compel disclosure is the Federal Government; and

(2)(A) in a criminal investigation or prosecution of the allegedly unlawful disclosure of properly classified information, the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the protected information for which compelled disclosure is sought would materially assist the Federal Government in preventing or mitigating--

(i) an act of terrorism; or

(ii) other acts that are reasonably likely to cause significant and articulable harm to national security; or

(B) in any other criminal investigation or prosecution, the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the protected information for which compelled disclosure is sought would materially assist the Federal Government in preventing, mitigating, or identifying the perpetrator of--

(i) an act of terrorism; or

(ii) other acts that have caused or are reasonably likely to cause significant and articulable harm to national security.

(b) Deference- In assessing the existence or extent of the harm described in subsection (a), a Federal court shall give appropriate deference to a specific factual showing submitted to the court by the head of any executive branch agency or department concerned.

(c) Relationship to Section 2- Subsection (a) shall not apply, and, subject to sections 3 and 4, section 2 shall apply, to any criminal investigation or prosecution of the allegedly unlawful disclosure of properly classified information other than one in which the protected information is sought by the Federal Government to prevent or mitigate the harm specified in subsection (a)(2)(A). In considering the extent of any harm to national security when applying section 2 to such cases, a Federal court shall give appropriate deference to any specific factual showing submitted to the court by the head of any executive branch agency or department concerned.

(d) Subsequent Unlawful Disclosure- The potential for a subsequent unlawful disclosure of information by the source sought to be identified shall not, by itself and without any showing of additional facts beyond such potential disclosure, be sufficient to establish that compelled disclosure of the protected information would materially assist the Federal Government in preventing or mitigating--

(1) an act of terrorism; or

(2) other acts that are reasonably likely to cause significant and articulable harm to national security.

SEC. 6. COMPELLED DISCLOSURE FROM COMMUNICATIONS SERVICE PROVIDERS.

(a) Conditions for Compelled Disclosure-

(1) IN GENERAL- Except as provided in paragraph (2), if any document or other information from the account of a person who is known to be, or reasonably likely to be, a covered person is sought from a communications service provider, sections 2 through 5 shall apply in the same manner that such sections apply to any document or other information sought from a covered person.

(2) EXCEPTION- If any document or other information from the account of a person who is known to be, or reasonably likely to be, a covered person is sought from a communications service provider under section 2709 of title 18, United States Code, the provisions of sections 2 through 5 governing criminal investigations and prosecutions shall apply in the same manner that such sections apply to any document or other information sought from a covered person in the course of a criminal investigation or prosecution, except that clauses (i) and (iii) of section 2(a)(2)(A) and the phrase `particularly with reference to directly establishing guilt or innocence' in section 2(a)(2)(A)(ii) shall not apply.

(b) Notice and Opportunity Provided to Covered Persons- A Federal court may compel the disclosure of a document or other information described in this section only after the covered person from whose account the document or other information is sought has been given--

(1) notice from the party seeking the document or other information through a subpoena or other compulsory request, not later than the time at which such subpoena or request is issued to the communications service provider; and

(2) an opportunity to be heard before the court before compelling testimony or the disclosure of a document.

(c) Exception to Notice Requirement- Notice under subsection (b)(1) may be delayed for not more than 45 days if the Federal court involved determines by clear and convincing evidence that such notice would pose a substantial threat to the integrity of a criminal investigation, a national security investigation, or intelligence gathering, or that exigent circumstances exist. This period may be extended by the court for an additional period of not more than 45 days each time the court makes such a determination.

(d) Notice to Communications Service Provider- In all cases in which notice is required to be provided to the covered person under this section, a copy of such notice shall be provided simultaneously to the communications service provider from whom disclosure is sought. Once it has received such notice, the communications service provider shall not comply with the request for disclosure unless and until disclosure is either ordered by the court or authorized in writing by the covered person.

SEC. 7. SOURCES AND WORK PRODUCT PRODUCED WITHOUT PROMISE OR AGREEMENT OF CONFIDENTIALITY.

Nothing in this Act shall supersede, dilute, or preclude any law or court decision compelling or not compelling disclosure by a covered person or communications service provider of--

(1) information identifying a source who provided information without a promise or agreement of confidentiality made by the covered person as part of engaging in journalism; or

(2) records, other information, or contents of a communication obtained without a promise or agreement that such records, other information, or contents of a communication would be confidential.

SEC. 8. PROCEDURES FOR REVIEW AND APPEAL.

(a) Conditions for Ex Parte Review or Submissions Under Seal- With regard to any determination made by a Federal court under this Act, upon a showing of good cause, that Federal court may receive and consider submissions from the parties in camera or under seal, and if the court determines it is necessary, ex parte.

(b) Contempt of Court- With regard to any determination made by a Federal court under this Act, a Federal court may find a covered person to be in civil or criminal contempt if the covered person fails to comply with an order of a Federal court compelling disclosure of protected information.

(c) To Provide for Timely Determination- With regard to any determination to be made by a Federal court under this Act, that Federal court, to the extent practicable, shall make that determination not later than 30 days after the date of receiving a motion requesting the court make that determination.

(d) Expedited Appeal Process-

(1) IN GENERAL- The courts of appeal shall have jurisdiction--

(A) of appeals by a Federal entity or covered person of an interlocutory order of a Federal court under this Act; and

(B) in an appeal of a final decision of a Federal court by a Federal entity or covered person, to review any determination of a Federal court under this Act.

(2) EXPEDITION OF APPEALS- It shall be the duty of a Federal court to which an appeal is made under this subsection to advance on the docket and to expedite to the greatest possible extent the disposition of that appeal.

SEC. 9. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.

Nothing in this Act may be construed to--

(1) preempt any law or claim relating to defamation, slander, or libel;

(2) modify the requirements of section 552a of title 5, United States Code, or Federal laws or rules relating to grand jury secrecy (except that this Act shall apply in any proceeding and in connection with any issue arising under that section or the Federal laws or rules relating to grand jury secrecy);

(3) create new obligations, or affect or modify the authorities or obligations of a Federal entity with respect to the acquisition or dissemination of information pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.); or

(4) preclude voluntary disclosure of information to a Federal entity in a situation that is not governed by this Act.

SEC. 10. AUDIT.

(a) In General- The Inspector General of the Department of Justice shall perform a comprehensive audit of the use of this Act during the period beginning on the date of enactment of this Act and ending on December 31, 2016. The audit shall include an examination of each instance in which a court failed to compel the disclosure of protected information under this Act, and whether this Act has created any procedural impediments that have had a detrimental operational impact on the activities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

(b) Report- Not later than June 30, 2017, the Inspector General of the Department of Justice shall submit to the Committee on the Judiciary and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Committee on the Judiciary and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives a report containing the results of the audit conducted under subsection (a).

(c) Review- Not later than 30 days before the submission of the report under subsection (b), the Inspector General of the Department of Justice shall provide the report to the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence. The Attorney General or the Director of National Intelligence may provide such comments to be included in the report submitted under subsection (b) as the Attorney General or the Director of National Intelligence may consider necessary.

(d) Form- The report submitted under subsection (b) and any comments included under subsection (c) shall be in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

SEC. 11. DEFINITIONS.

In this Act:

(1) COMMUNICATIONS SERVICE PROVIDER- The term `communications service provider'--

(A) means any person that transmits information of the customer's choosing by electronic means; and

(B) includes a telecommunications carrier, an information service provider, an interactive computer service provider, and an information content provider (as such terms are defined in section 3 or 230 of the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 153 and 230)).

(2) COVERED PERSON- The term `covered person'--

(A) means a person who--

(i) with the primary intent to investigate events and procure material in order to disseminate to the public news or information concerning local, national, or international events or other matters of public interest, regularly gathers, prepares, collects, photographs, records, writes, edits, reports or publishes on such matters by--

(I) conducting interviews;

(II) making direct observation of events; or

(III) collecting, reviewing, or analyzing original writings, statements, communications, reports, memoranda, records, transcripts, documents, photographs, recordings, tapes, materials, data, or other information whether in paper, electronic, or other form;

(ii) has such intent at the inception of the process of gathering the news or information sought; and

(iii) obtains the news or information sought in order to disseminate the news or information by means of print (including newspapers, books, wire services, news agencies, or magazines), broadcasting (including dissemination through networks, cable, satellite carriers, broadcast stations, or a channel or programming service for any such media), mechanical, photographic, electronic, or other means;

(B) includes a supervisor, employer, parent company, subsidiary, or affiliate of a person described in subparagraph (A); and

(C) does not include any person who is or is reasonably likely to be--

(i) a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power, as those terms are defined in section 101 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801);

(ii) a member or affiliate of a foreign terrorist organization designated under section 219(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189(a));

(iii) designated as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist by the Department of the Treasury under Executive Order No. 13224 (50 U.S.C. 1701);

(iv) a specially designated terrorist, as that term is defined in section 595.311 of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations (or any successor thereto);

(v) a terrorist organization, as that term is defined in section 212(a)(3)(B)(vi)(II) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(3)(B)(vi)(II));

(vi) committing or attempting to commit the crime of terrorism, as that offense is defined in section 2331(5) or 2332b(g)(5) of title 18, United States Code;

(vii) committing or attempting the crime of providing material support, as that term is defined in section 2339A(b)(1) of title 18, United States Code, to a terrorist organization; or

(viii) aiding, abetting, or conspiring in illegal activity with a person or organization defined in clauses (i) through (vii).

(3) DOCUMENT- The term `document' means writings, recordings, and photographs, as those terms are defined by rule 1001 of the Federal Rules of Evidence (28 U.S.C. App.).

(4) FEDERAL ENTITY- The term `Federal entity' means an entity or employee of the judicial or executive branch or an administrative agency of the Federal Government with the power to issue a subpoena or issue other compulsory process.

(5) PROPERLY CLASSIFIED INFORMATION- The term `properly classified information' means information that is classified in accordance with any applicable Executive orders, statutes, or regulations regarding classification of information.

(6) PROTECTED INFORMATION- The term `protected information' means--

(A) information identifying a source who provided information under a promise or agreement of confidentiality made by a covered person as part of engaging in journalism; or

(B) any records, contents of a communication, documents, or information that a covered person obtained or created--

(i) as part of engaging in journalism; and

(ii) upon a promise or agreement that such records, contents of a communication, documents, or information would be confidential.

[American Patriot]

Link to above: http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c113:S.987:

[Malsua]

Since every piece of legislature coming out of congress has the opposite effect of it's title, one must assume this piece of legislation is designed to squash dissidents and protect house organs.

[American Patriot]

ON CAPITOL HILL

Big chill: Feds want to scour Net, media for 'hate speech'

'Perhaps he could crack a briefing book on the crisis in Ukraine'

Published: 2 days ago

Aaron Klein About | Email | Archive Aaron Klein is WND's senior staff reporter and Jerusalem bureau chief. He also hosts "Aaron Klein Investigative Radio" on New York's WABC Radio. Follow Aaron on Twitter and Facebook.

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If two Democratic lawmakers have their way, Barack Obama’s Justice Department will submit a report for action against any Internet sites, broadcast, cable television or radio shows determined to be advocating or encouraging “violent acts.”




This according to the text of a new bill from Sen. Ed Markey, D-Mass., and Rep. Hakeem Jeffries, D-N.Y.


The Hate Crime Reporting Act of 2014 “would create an updated comprehensive report examining the role of the Internet and other telecommunications in encouraging hate crimes based on gender, race, religion, ethnicity, or sexual orientation and create recommendations to address such crimes,” stated a news release from Markey’s office.


The one-page bill, reviewed by WND, calls for the Justice Department and the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights to “analyze information on the use of telecommunications, including the Internet, broadcast television and radio, cable television, public access television, commercial mobile services, and other electronic media, to advocate and encourage violent acts and the commission of crimes of hate.”


The bill does not define which actions by broadcasters would be considered to have encouraged violence, seemingly leaving that open to interpretation.


Once the report is compiled, the bill calls for “any recommendations” for action “consistent with the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States” that is determined to be an “appropriate and necessary” way to address the purported encouragement of violent acts.


The Boston Herald took issue with the bill, calling it “frankly chilling” that Markey is seeking to “empower an obscure federal agency to begin scouring the Internet, TV and radio for speech it finds threatening.”


“Perhaps he could crack a briefing book on the crisis in Ukraine rather than looking for his own extra-constitutional methods of punishing speech he finds unacceptable,” added the Herald editorial.


With additional research by Joshua Klein.


Read more at http://www.wnd.com/2014/04/big-chill...VFLTrClQLAU.99

[Malsua]

I hope we can hold on until this regime is a disgraced footnote in the dustbin of history.

[Avvakum]

I hope we can hold on until this regime is a disgraced footnote in the dustbin of history.

Me too. My heart tells me these people are gutless wonders, but you never know, they need their minority shocktroops to get riled up about something soon.

[vector7]

Race Baiting Hackers Took Down Conservative Website Over THIS “BLACKS ONLY” Manual for “Black Brunch” protests!….

Posted on January 6, 2015 by sundance



Yesterday, we shared that Weasel Zippers had located and distributed the #BlackBrunch planning and coordination guide. Apparently this exposure to sunlight infuriated the organizers, and a DDoS attack was launched against Zippers taking down their servers for 10+ hours.
Now that Zippy is back up and running, there’s only one thing left to do.
Here it is again:

Black Brunch Manual For Disruption

View this document on Scribd

Because 108,000 people read it here yesterday, and 19,000 people read it via the SCRIBD account. So we added it to the CTH SCRIBD library, just to present additional highlights… And, as with all pdf documents we upload to the SCRIBD account, you can share, email or download – or, well, actually, do whatever you want with them, they’re free. Just saying.

[Phil Fiord]

The news today of said ISIS hacks to Pentagon social media accounts has a suspect smell to me. While it may indeed have been an outside source acting maliciously, what a wonderful way to have the State impose tougher regulation or prosecution upon blogger and forum sites by showing they themselves have been hacked.

[American Patriot]

Let me clarify something. The hacks were NOT to the Pentagon. They were to a Twitter account.

So, regardless of what the Pentagon, Obama or the Media says... it was an insignificant attack. It caused no damage, just made some PR people look STUPID for not practicing safe password protocol.

On the other hand, if Obama tries that SHIT there's going to be a SHIT STORM.

Several people (including Vector) have mentioned "the Internet Switch".

Like shutting it off is going to HELP? Most unreasonable, ignorant thing one can imagine would be to shut it down.

[American Patriot]

Phil and Vector... just saw this, thought you guys might be interested in reading this "theory".

http://nworeport.me/2015/01/13/isis-...-headquarters/

Apparently NSA is now being "implicated" as the actual hackers. Truth? I doubt it, but why not. If you guys are right we're being set up to shut it down.

ISIS Hack of Pentagon Twitter Accounts Traced Back to Maryland NSA Headquarters

January 13, 2015 Qronos 16 Leave a comment Go to comments
NSA implicated in latest cybersecurity scare?

[IMG]http://hw.********.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/120115isis.jpg[/IMG]

Source: Paul Joseph Watson |
According to the group which identifies itself as Anonymous, the ISIS hack of the Pentagon’s Twitter accounts traces back to Maryland – home of the National Security Agency.


Twitter and YouTube accounts belonging to the U.S. military command that oversees operations in the Middle East were reportedly hacked by ISIS sympathizers earlier today, with messages being sent out for almost an hour before the accounts were temporarily shut down.


“American soldiers, we are coming, watch your back, ISIS,” the hackers posted on the U.S. Central Command Twitter feed.


USA Today reports, “A Twitter account from a group identifying itself as Anonymous said Monday it had tracked the source of the hack to Maryland, but that was not confirmed by official sources.”


Maryland is of course home to the National Security Agency, an entity that has perfected the art of hacking and is able to compromise and take control of different systems and platforms “at the speed of light”.


The hack coincided with President Barack Obama addressing the nation on the subject of cybersecurity as he prepares to announce new legislation at the upcoming State of the Union speech.


Just as last year’s Sony hack, which was blamed on North Korea yet had all the hallmarks of an inside job, was used to reanimate zombie legislation which would increase White House control over the Internet, the Obama administration will undoubtedly cite the ISIS hack as another reason why more prohibitive restrictions need to be introduced.

[American Patriot]

What Those Pentagon Twitter Hackers Posted

• Mark Thompson @MarkThompson_DC

10:03 AM ET

Getty Images

An avalanche of almost-classified info sows confusion

The Pentagon held its breath Monday when Islamic State sympathizers hacked into U.S. Central Command’s Twitter and YouTube accounts and began posting internal U.S. military documents on the Twitter feed.

Morning Must Reads: January 13Twitter Hacking Gives Pentagon a Black EyeVietnam Vet With PTSD Claim Loses Bid to Stop Execution NBC NewsProfiting From Disaster? McDonald's 'Signs' Ad Panned NBC News'Heroes of Islam': Cleric Holds Funeral for Paris Killers NBC News

Could this be another Snowden job? Was any of the material classified? After all, they were posting the names, addresses and phone numbers of senior U.S. military officers.
Within an hour, the Pentagon’s sigh was audible. While there was a lot of official-looking, internal documents posted before both social-media accounts were shut down, none of it appears to have been classified.

“FOUO” can be found on many released Pentagon documents

Many sported the officious-sounding but non-classified For Official Use Only label.


Monday’s bullet-dodging highlights the U.S. government’s preoccupation with secrecy, and its downside: when nearly everything is classified, it can be harder to protect real secrets.

Central Command’s feed was back in operation Tuesday. Twitter

Think of the government’s penchant for secrecy like an iceberg: what’s showing above the water line is that tiny share that’s classified Confidential, Secret and Top Secret.
But underwater—where, strangely, you can’t see—are more than 100 different designations that boil down to “Don’t let the public see this.”

…but its feed still featured the CyberCaliphate avatar. YouTube

For example, the non-profit Project on Government Oversight grumbled last year about the Pentagon inspector general’s routine requirement that any member of the public wishing to see some of its more interesting reports file a formal Freedom of Information Act request. “As anyone familiar with the FOIA process knows, turnaround on a request can take anywhere from a few weeks to a few years,” POGO’s Neil Gordon noted. “So, it’s reasonable to assume that the DoD IG is indeed trying to bury the report to spare the Pentagon and … its … contractors the embarrassing publicity.”


The varying labels—and each agency’s rules for releasing non-classified information—is confusing, as the Obama Administration itself conceded in 2010:

At present, executive departments and agencies (agencies) employ ad hoc, agency-specific policies, procedures, and markings to safeguard and control this information, such as information that involves privacy, security, proprietary business interests, and law enforcement investigations. This inefficient, confusing patchwork has resulted in inconsistent marking and safeguarding of documents, led to unclear or unnecessarily restrictive dissemination policies, and created impediments to authorized information sharing. The fact that these agency-specific policies are often hidden from public view has only aggravated these issues.

That’s why it wants to toss all those agency-specific labels into the trash and designate them all as Controlled Unclassified Information. Perhaps the reduced profusion of almost-classified labels will help reduce confusion like Monday’s (the Pentagon, of course, has its own process underway for all its non-classified technical data). And having the word Unclassified in the designation should make it clear to even cable-news anchors what’s up.


The Administration plans to issue a proposed regulation to funnel all the labels into that single Controlled Unclassified Information designation this spring. It’s slated to be fully operational in 2018.


Obviously, in addition to craving secrecy, the government abhors alacrity.

[American Patriot]

Well, folks, here you go.


President Lucifer’s Cybertheft

Posted on January 13, 2015 by traildustfotm | 1 Comment
I just visited Drudge Report, and encountered the new lead story. While scanning the text I was struck by the sequence of the headlines in the last 24 hours. First there was a full panic about hacked government sites and ISIS threats to our soldiers. And now, the president uses the moment to push his next effort to control the internet. ~ TD

---

Obama pushes for internet rules


YahooNews: Obama renews push
for cybersecurity law

Washington (AFP) – President Barack Obama made a renewed push Tuesday for cybersecurity legislation Blah blah blah…


Blah blah blah… Sony attack… Blah blah blah…

Twitter account that was hacked by Islamist jihadist sympathizers yesterday… Blah blah blah…


“…make sure that we are much more effective in protecting the American people from these kinds of cyberattacks…” Blah blah blah…


…enhances collaboration and information sharing amongst the private sector” Blah blah blah…


…allow the private sector to share data on threats without fear of liability… Blah blah blah…

---

Remember the panicked headlines this morning about generals’ home addresses being published on ISIS hacked Twitter and CENTCOM pages?

Well now all you have is a couple of links on the lower right column of the DrudgeReport.






AND please note the downgraded link above, “Tracked Back to Maryland.”

Maryland? Hmmmm… kinda close to DC.


And one line of speculation about the “Sony Hack” was that it was a mutually beneficial fraud pulled of by Sony and the White House. It would benefit Sony as a publicity stunt for the release of a tediously sophomoric movie, and the White House in their push to take control of the internet. You know, the internet, that place where the government still can’t force their spin on the news.

---

Is it just me, or is anybody else’s “Spidey sense” tingling about this sequence of news stories?

[Phil Fiord]

I understand how Sony seems suspect in their own hack, but if true, the release of some of the information broke privacy laws. California has very tough laws regarding this, for example. Therefore, I still find Sony as only having taken a great advantage of a bad situation and it worked out for them.

There is a definite smelly fish here though. The headlines have all been sequential. I agree the Pentagon social media hack was not a big deal. I even suggest that, but being it was their social feed it makes fantastic news to push an agenda. Sigh.

[American Patriot]

There's the issue. Last night I made some comments on the Hannity show through twitter. I was immediately jumped on by several people, which I found strange. Since I use my real name, real picture, real bio there and I'm obviously not a troll trying to disrupt I wonder what's really going on.

For instance, my message was (I don't remember the exact phrasing) something like:

It was a twitter account hack. It wasn't the SIPRNet.

1) People didn't know what SIPRNet was and those that did said 2) wanted me to shut up.

[Phil Fiord]

SIPRnet is not a secret since 2010 or so. Even Popular Mechanics did a bit on it a ways back. As I recall, it was expanded among agencies after 911 and remained a secret until Wikileaks outed it. Still, its a closed system for clearance access people with NIPRnet for less classified data.

[American Patriot]

I didn't say SIPRnet was a secret. It's the classified system. There's a difference. lol

[Ryan Ruck]

I think Phil meant the people who know about SIPR wanting you to shut up about it, and how stupid that is since its existence isn't actually news.

[Malsua]

Lousy formatting...but this fucker from the UK needs to be put out to pasture. What a piece of shit. No government should be able to read everything two people say, for any fucking reason. It's private you god damn mother fucker.

I don't give a shit if they are plotting to split the planet, it's PRIVATE!!!! You don't own our brains, our mouths and our ears. We have rights you global elitist shitbag.

----------
http://ukexpress.org/politics/can-th...an-encryption/

Can a supervision anathema encryption?


13 Jan 2015
Last updated during 14:44

By Jane Wakefield
Technology reporter

Britain’s primary apportion wants new laws in a arise of a Paris attacks




Whenever a militant hazard is increased, as it has been given a comfortless events in Paris final week, so too are a calls from politicians to boost a powers of a people they occupy to strengthen a open from such threats.
Those agencies can usually do their job, a evidence goes, if they have full entrance to a online gibberish of those formulation militant atrocities.
As a UK’s Prime Minister David Cameron put it in a discuss this week – there should be no “means of communication” that “we can't read”.
But in an epoch when communication takes many forms, and with a combined problem that most of this communication is encrypted, how easy is it to spin this sound punch into reality?
Legislation
There are innumerable ways to promulgate online and many of them are encrypted
For Mr Cameron a answer lies in a new “comprehensive square of legislation” that will tighten a “safe spaces” used by suspected terrorists.
So what are those protected spaces?
Although Mr Cameron doesn’t name any, it is expected he is referring to new apps such as WhatsApp and Snapchat that concede people to discuss with relations anonymity by gripping their services encrypted.
But a conflict is most some-more wide-ranging as dynamic names such as Google and Apple guarantee to do some-more to safeguard that encryption is used as default on their services. After a revelations from whistle-blower Edward Snowden about mass notice programs, firms are dynamic to be seen to be putting a control of their information behind in a hands of consumers.
In a past, governments with a suitable warrants could go to firms such as Apple and ask them to clear a communications on phones.
The iPhone 6 is encrypted by default and Apple can't open it for anyone
No more. Apple has altered a infrastructure to make it unfit for it to palm over any information from a iPhone 6′s iMessage service, for example.
Such military-grade lock-down of inclination fundamentally terrifies governments so it should come as no advise that they are fighting behind with new legislation.
Although, it should be noted, that a new legislation Mr Cameron referred to in his discuss is substantially usually a rebirth of an aged law.
The Draft Communication Bill of 2012, dubbed a “snoopers’ charter” by critics, directed to extend a operation of information that communication companies had to store for 12 months.
It would have included, for a initial time, sum of messages sent on amicable media, webmail, voice calls over a internet and gaming. Officials would not have been means to see a calm though a aver though a check was blocked by a Liberal Democrats.
Politics continues to dog attempts to revitalise it with Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg observant after Mr Cameron’s latest discuss that his celebration will continue to conflict any such legislation.
Crypto-wars
Should governments have a master pivotal to clear communications?
At a heart of a discuss is a doubt about how a supervision deals with a fact that communication information is increasingly being encrypted.
As Prof Alan Woodward, a confidence consultant from a University of Surrey, puts it: “You can have all a legislation in a universe though we still competence not be means to review what you’ve got.”
Encryption has prolonged shocked governments.
The supposed crypto-wars began in a 1970s when a US supervision attempted to systematise encryption as munition.
The Clinton administration in a 1990s attempted to get attention to adopt a supposed Clipper chip – an encryption chip for that a supervision had a backdoor.
The US supervision also attempted to deliver something called pivotal escrow – a process that all encryption systems should leave a a gangling pivotal with a devoted third party.
When program developer Phil Zimmermann grown PGP, a giveaway mass-market encryption product for emails and files, a US supervision attempted to prosecute him since someone had exported his program from a US though supervision permission.
Cybercriminals
Backdoors could be exploited by criminals
And, however vast this might sound now, those dual options sojourn a usually ones for a supervision as, dual decades later, they fastener with accurately a same issues.
So does a thought of a golden key, a backdoor for a confidence service, make any some-more clarity now than it did in a 1990s?
Certainly a hazard from terrorism is larger and few would disagree with a view that, if we are in risk and a military officer turns adult during your backdoor – we are going to let them in.
But a analogy implies that someone has control over who uses a backdoor and, of course, in a program clarity this is impossible.
A backdoor in program is not usually something for a confidence service. Anyone – including a criminals – might learn it and feat it.
“A UK cryptographic backdoor would turn a series one tellurian aim for cybercriminals. The UK supervision would not be means to keep it secure for long, quite if it indispensable to give entrance to military and confidence services,” pronounced Matthew Bloch, handling executive of internet hosting organisation Bytemark.
All of this has been debated before, of course. Ahead of a argumentative Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, that came into force in 2000, both options of a backdoor and a thought of a pivotal stored by a third celebration were deliberate and deserted by lawmakers.
They opted instead for a third approach – that someone in possession of an encryption pivotal should be forced to palm it over to a authorities.
That too is diligent with complexities.
Often a chairman simply doesn’t know a key.
“It comes down to passwords on laptops and we can’t force someone to palm these over,” pronounced Prof Woodward.
And encryption record is evolving.
“Now there is a approach of safeguarding tip information into a destiny so if a pivotal is compromised a pivotal concluded for a sold event changes,” he explained.
“There are even technologies rising that can give a fake pivotal that creates a complement wakeful that a pivotal was given underneath compulsion and wipes a data.”
Mathematics not technology
Continue reading a categorical story

“Start Quote

Encryption is mathematics, not record – it can’t be suppressed by law”

End Quote
Matthew Bloch
Bytemark
The record attention tends to have a knee-jerk greeting to attempts from supervision to meddle in a processes.
Don’t disaster in things that we don’t understand, they warn. The record genie is out of a bottle and can't be put back.
In this sold case, some have interpreted Mr Cameron’s difference as definition that a supervision is seeking to ban, in effect, a record that underpins a tellurian economy.
SSL (Secure Sockets Layer) and TLS (Transport Layer Security) encryption protects financial sum when people emporium or bank online while supposed end-to-end encryption such as PGP (Pretty Good Privacy) assistance keep personal messages private.
“Encryption is mathematics, not technology. It can’t be suppressed by law,” Mr Bloch told a BBC.
Whatever track a supervision inaugurated in a UK in May decides to go, Prof Woodward hopes that it will listen delicately to a record industry.
“The supervision will need to take a lot of wide-ranging recommendation as this has a intensity to go spectacularly wrong.”
It is also value noting, he added, that a group concerned in a Paris shootings were famous to a authorities and had been underneath notice until it was deemed that a hazard from them had lessened.
“The confidence army need improved resources not some-more powers.”

[Ryan Ruck]

as a uk’s prime minister david cameron put it in a discuss this week – there should be no “means of communication” that “we can't read”.

wtf?

[American Patriot]

Dear Cameron,

Read this: GO FUCK YOURSELF.

Dear Obama,

DITTO.