The Endangered F-35

[American Patriot]

Answer to the second question first. In ten years if things continue as they are, we will NOT be a superpower. We will be under the thumb of some communist empire.

First question second, yes, right now we are still a superpower.

[MinutemanCO]

Sorry to vent my frustration with our current administration, but man it's just so aggravating to watch our military be slowly dismantled along with our dominance and our capabilities.

[Chameleon]

At the rate America is falling apart, I am seriously worried about the same thing dad. Just think, ten years, the US could very well be a third world country...

[Phil Fiord]

Chameleon,

I am sorry to say you may not see the America we all grew up with. That is sad to me on many levels.

[American Patriot]

I too am concerned. For me to say this is scary. Anyone that knows me knows I don't believe (can't believe) that America would spiral downward as it has.

Over the past couple of years with Obama in the White House I've come to the conclusion that one of my statements over time is not only wrong, but not true. I used to say, "One man can not ruin America. We have Congress, Supreme Court and the People as checks and balances."

There was a time when this was true. Today, I'm sad to say I was wrong, and Obama and Democrat controlled Congress has fouled this country up so badly, given over rule making to Agencies and then allowed them to do what was needed to destroy the country's economy.

We still have "The People" as check and balance, but unless enough of us wish to CHECK the problem and BALANCE it out, nothing more can be said of America and her fall.

We will all be losers when the winners re-write history soon.

[MinutemanCO]

It's hard not to be fatalistic about our future as a sovereign free nation. My son, Chameleon, as an intelligent young man from today's generation, has a unique perspective on the problem at hand. He's one of the few of his peers that gets it.

I feel similarly, Rick. My sense is that something drastic must happen to correct our current path. I hope I'm wrong.

[Phil Fiord]

I have a sense that some heads of military have and will play cards as they ought to be played forcing O to take credit when successful or admit he was circumvented. Osama is one such matter I am dead certain he did not originate the order on, but had to take credit.

[American Patriot]

I am pretty sure you're right. Men at very high levels in the military will not overtly say anything against the President. Too many generals have been fired already, but I've heard my own share of griping with him from the lower ranks of the military (all the way up to Colonel) and all the way down to the lowest Airman and Solider. On the other hand, I've heard some of them who claim to be "socialists" and "muslims" and are in my opinion a liability to the military.

[Ryan Ruck]

I'm betting if these defense cuts being talked about go through, the F-35 is almost certainly history.

[Ryan Ruck]

Pentagon Official Calls for F-35 Production Slowdown

December 2, 2011

A top Pentagon official is calling for a production slowdown for the costly F-35 fighter jet after fatigue testing exposed potential cracks in the design.

In an interview with AOL Defense, U.S. Navy Vice Adm. David Venlet said it would be "wise to sort of temper production" of Lockheed Martin's Joint Strike Fighter, calling initial assumptions about the design a "miscalculation."

Venlet said early tests revealed that parts would need to be replaced and redesigned, adding several million dollars to the cost of planes that already carry a $111 million price tag on average.

"The analyzed hot spots that have arisen in the last 12 months or so in the program have surprised us at the amount of change and at the cost," he told AOL Defense, adding that the fatigue spots are tough to get at, meaning "the cost burden of that is what sucks the wind out of your lungs."

He said the upgrades aren't necessary for safety but are important to ensure the jets last longer.

He said early tests performed after discovering a crack in one F-35 type showed other spots that could prematurely show wear.

"The question for me is not: 'F-35 or not?'" Venlet told AOL Defense. "The question is, how many and how fast?"

[vector7]

Trillion-Dollar Jet Has Thirteen Expensive New Flaws

• By David Axe
• Email Author
• December 13, 2011 |
• 2:07 pm |
• Categories: Air Force

The most expensive weapons program in U.S. history is about to get a lot pricier.

The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, meant to replace nearly every tactical warplane in the Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps, was already expected to cost $1 trillion dollars for development, production and maintenance over the next 50 years. Now that cost is expected to grow, owing to 13 different design flaws uncovered in the last two months by a hush-hush panel of five Pentagon experts. It could cost up to a billion dollars to fix the flaws on copies of the jet already in production, to say nothing of those yet to come.

In addition to costing more, the stealthy F-35 could take longer to complete testing. That could delay the stealthy jet’s combat debut to sometime after 2018 — seven years later than originally planned. And all this comes as the Pentagon braces for big cuts to its budget while trying to save cherished but costly programs like the Joint Strike Fighter.

Frank Kendall, the Pentagon’s top weapons-buyer, convened the so-called “Quick Look Review” panel in October. Its report — 55 pages of dense technical jargon and intricate charts — was leaked this weekend. Kendall and company found a laundry list of flaws with the F-35, including a poorly placed tail hook, lagging sensors, a buggy electrical system and structural cracks.

Some of the problems — the electrical bugs, for instance — were becoming clear before the Quick Look Review; others are brand-new. The panelists describe them all in detail and, for the first time, connect them to the program’s underlying management problems. Most ominously, the report mentions — but does not describe — a “classified” deficiency. “Dollars to doughnuts it has something to do with stealth,” aviation guru Bill Sweetman wrote. In other words, the F-35 might not be as invisible to radar as prime contractor Lockheed Martin said it would be.

The JSF’s problems are exacerbated by a production plan that Vice Adm. David Venlet, the government program manager, admitted two weeks ago represents “a miscalculation.” Known as “concurrency,” the plan allows Lockheed to mass-produce jets — potentially hundreds of them — while testing is still underway. It’s a way of ensuring the military gets combat-ready jets as soon as possible, while also helping Lockheed to maximize its profits. That’s the theory, at least.

“Concurrency is present to some degree in virtually all DoD programs, though not to the extent that it is on the F-35,” the Quick Look panelists wrote. The Pentagon assumed it could get away with a high degree of concurrency owing to new computer simulations meant to take the guesswork out of testing. “The Department had a reasonable basis to be optimistic,” the panelists wrote.

But that optimism proved unfounded. “This assessment shows that the F-35 program has discovered and is continuing to discover issues at a rate more typical of early design experience on previous aircraft development programs,” the panelists explained. Testing uncovered problems the computers did not predict, resulting in 725 design changes while new jets were rolling off the factory floor in Fort Worth, Texas.

And every change takes time and costs money. To pay for the fixes, this year the Pentagon cut its F-35 order from 42 to 30. Next year’s order dropped from 35 to 30. “It’s basically sucked the wind out of our lungs with the burden, the financial burden,” Venlet said.

News of more costs and delays could not have come at a worse time for the Joint Strike Fighter. The program has already been restructured twice since 2010, each time getting stretched out and more expensive. In January, then-Secretary of Defense Robert Gates put the Marines’ overweight F-35B variant, which is designed to take off and land vertically, on probation. If Lockheed couldn’t fix the jump jet within two years, “it should be cancelled,” Gates advised.

Tasting blood in the water, Boeing — America’s other fighter-plane manufacturer — dusted off plans for improved F-15s and F-18s to sell to the Pentagon, should the F-35 fail. Deep cuts to the defense budget certainly aren’t helping the F-35′s case.

Humbled, Lockheed agreed to share some of the cost of design changes, instead of simply billing the government. The aerospace giant copped to its past problems with the F-35 and promised better performance. “There will not be another re-baseline of this program. We understand that,” Lockheed CEO Robert Stevens said in May.

But another “rebaselining,” or restructuring, is likely in the wake of the Quick Look Review. F-35 testing and production should be less concurrent and more “event-based,” the panelists advised. In other words, the program should worry less about meeting hard deadlines and more about getting the jet’s design right. It’ll be ready when it’s ready. Major production must wait, even if that means older warplanes — the planes the F-35 is supposed to replace — must stay on the front line longer.

Needless to say, that’s got some members of Congress up in arms. “It is at this exact moment that the excessive overlap between development and production that was originally structured into the JSF program … is now coming home to roost,” said Sen. John McCain, an Arizona Republican and the ranking member of the Senate Armed Services Committee. “If things do not improve — quickly — taxpayers and the warfighter will insist that all options will be on the table. And they should be. We cannot continue on this path.”

[Ryan Ruck]

Japan To Pick Lockheed’s F-35 As New Stealth Fighter

December 13, 2011

Japan is set to select the Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II JSF as its new stealth fighter, Japanese news media reported Tuesday, upgrading its air defense at a time when China and Russia pose growing threats to its territory.

The multibillion-dollar deal with the U.S. defense company also opens new opportunities for Japan to cooperate with Washington, its closest ally and military partner.

Japan will purchase roughly 40 fighter jets, the Yomiuri newspaper said, and as part of the deal, it will receive classified information about the F-35’s construction, allowing some of the fighter’s components to be manufactured in Japan.

The Japanese government will make a formal announcement about the decision on Friday, both the Yomiuri and the Kyodo news agency said. Japanese government officials often provide off-the-record briefings to the domestic news media in advance of major decisions.

Since September, Japan has been weighing bids from three of the world’s largest defense contractors. In addition to Bethesda-based Lockheed Martin, Seattle-based Boeing offered the F/A-18 Super Hornet, and a four-country European consortium, Eurofighter GmbH, offered its Typhoon. The decision for Japan came after years of declining defense budgets — a stark contrast to the rapid spending increases of an increasingly aggressive China.

Defense analysts had pegged the pair of U.S. bidders as the favorites, with diplomacy influencing the selection. But Japan also picked the priciest of the bids — a fraught decision at a time when the country must uncover untold billions to finance the reconstruction of its disaster-devastated northeastern coastline. Among the bidders, the F-35 uses the most advanced technology — with so-called “fifth-generation” design and a top-of-the-line stealth capability. The deal could be between $6 billion and $8 billion, according to estimates from defense experts.

Amid several high-profile territorial disputes with China and Russia, Japan has grown sensitive to incursions from its neighbors, often scrambling planes to chase off Chinese and Russian fighters. Japan’s newest defense strategy emphasized the growing threat of China, which this year will increase its military spending by more than 12 percent. Earlier this year, China tested its own stealth fighter, the Chengdu J-20, which features its own fifth-generation stealth technology.

Tokyo will receive its first four F-35s in 2016, the Yomiuri said. Eventually, the planes will replace the fleet of antiquated F-4s.

The F-35 has faced criticism for years of delays and cost overruns, with per-plane costs nearly doubling during development. But the Pentagon still expects the plane to come into service in 2016, and the Air Force, Navy and Marines plan to purchase more than 2,000 planes over the next 25 years.

Japan intends to import the first four planes that it will acquire in 2016, Kyodo said, but in the following years, it expects a hand in some of the production. Such a move would help domestic defense manufacturers, who now struggle under a national ban that restricts weapons exports.

The weapons export ban is a fundamental part of Japan’s pacifist constitution, but politicians have recently indicated an interest in relaxing the law. That would give Japan a place in joint development projects — a move that would be welcomed in Washington.

[vector7]

Companion Thread:

• Japan Begins Building its Own Stealth Fighters and More

How the F-35 May Hurt U.S.-Japan Ties

April 05, 2012
By Jeffrey W. Hornung

Japan’s defense ministry took a chance opting for the F-35 stealth fighter to replace its aging fleet. But soaring costs could undermine one of America’s closest alliances.

• Japan’s Defense Industry Lifeline
• How to Improve China-Japan Ties
• Politics Strains US-Japan Ties
• Japan-US ties in Question

In December, Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda relaxed Japan’s ban on exporting weapons and related-technology. The self-imposed ban, a legacy of Japan’s postwar pacifist movement, was introduced in 1967. While not a law, it prohibited Japan from selling weapons to communist states, countries subject to U.N. embargoes, and nations involved in international conflicts.

In 1976, it was expanded to all countries, although the United States was granted exemptions.

Noda’s relaxation allows Japan to participate in international joint development and production of military equipment and technology with a limited set of countries. Additionally, it enables transfer of finished equipment to countries where Japan’s military deploys during U.N. peacekeeping operations. This includes helmets, protective vests, and heavy machinery.

While in principle, Japan can now export weapons, this isn’t likely as the government aims to assist in peaceful activity. Quite simply, the new standards allow Japan to do more with some countries, but it will continue to abide by the 1967 ban.

Important is the motivation, which was economic. The ban restricted Japanese companies from joining production of equipment and technology with other countries. Not being able to enjoy the benefits of economies of scale, domestic production costs have been extremely high. Worse, although Japan is technologically advanced, developing state-of-the-art defense equipment is expensive, leaving Japan to buy expensive overseas equipment. This has fueled fears that Japan’s hi-tech weaponry is falling behind. Faced with these expensive costs against a declining defense budget, the Defense Ministry desperately wanted the relaxation.

Another factor was the state of Japan’s defense industry. Although companies like Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI), Kawasaki Heavy Industries, and Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Industries (IHI) depend on defense contracts for only a small percentage of their revenue, their subcontractors depend on such contracts for almost their entire revenue.

With limited contracts, these subcontractors were shrinking and some collapsing. This prompted the Defense Ministry and the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry to push for the relaxation to expand the production markets.

This brings us to Japan’s choice of its next generation fighter for its Air Self-Defense Forces. Relaxing the ban allows Japanese companies to join joint development projects. This proved timely, given that the government was deciding on its next generation fighter to replace Japan’s 40-year-old fleet of McDonnell Douglas F-4 Phantom fighters. Although two other options existed that are currently available and promised to involve Japanese companies in production at a much higher rate (Boeing’s F/A-18E/F Super Hornet and BAE Systems’ Eurofighter Typhoon), the Defense Ministry chose to procure 42 Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightening II Joint Strike Fighters.

This decision was due to it outscoring the other jets in terms of cost, ease of maintenance and repair and, most importantly, its performance capabilities. Specifically, its stealth technology and situational awareness capabilities. What it didn’t score highly on was the level of participation of Japanese firms. While companies like MHI and IHI will assemble the F-35 and Mitsubishi Electric Corporation will be responsible for wiring, there’s little opportunity for Japanese firms to contribute technology or obtain new technology.

Although the F-35 was the only 5th generation jet, the Defense Ministry’s choice was a gamble. Ongoing problems with the plane, such as cracks in the fuselage, fuel concerns over not only its performance and safety, but successful completion of its development. Persistent problems mean falling behind the development schedule and increases in the final cost. Worse, U.S. defense spending cuts and the European debt crisis could lead to reduced orders or even participation by some of the planes’ developers since four of the partner nations are EU members. Fewer orders or resources could lead to further spikes in costs.

The U.S. government is applying “Foreign Military Sales” (FMS) rules, which gives the United States the power to decide prices and delivery dates. This matters because U.S. officials promised delivery by FY2016 for a total price of 1.6 trillion yen, according to the Asahi Shimbun, but under FMS rules has the ability to change both. A delay in delivery and/or an increased price will negatively affect Japan’s security. The relaxation of the export ban was motivated by rising costs and a collapsing defense industry. With this relaxation, the Defense Ministry sought domestic licensed production of its next aircraft, which would also facilitate technology transfer to Japan.

Despite this, the Defense Ministry chose a jet that will offer little involvement of Japanese firms beyond assembly. With Japan’s current fighter fleet of F-4s possibly reaching their operational limit by the end of 2016, any delay in the F-35 will mean a serious gap in Japan’s air defenses.

This comes at a time when both China and Russia are making rapid progress in their development of 5th generation stealth fighters and enhancements in their air capabilities, fueling Japan’s sense of vulnerability. To counter both countries’ advances and maintain deterrence, Japan needs its new jets as promised. Without them, it has to depend on its aging jets with fewer capabilities.

While the Defense Ministry is responsible for choosing the F-35, officials are concerned about its delivery and price. In February, Defense Ministry officials told the U.S. government there’s a possibility of cancelling its order if things change. This followed news that the United States delayed, Italy reduced, and Australia and Canada were rethinking their acquisition plans.

All of these will increase the F-35’s cost. The Defense Ministry also requested the U.S. review its FMS-based acquisition program so Japan’s defense industry can have deeper involvement in the jet so as to acquire technical know-how.

The alliance has dealt with broken promises before, and relations suffered. We saw this most recently in 2009, when Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama reneged on a 2006 Japanese promise to relocate troops from Okinawa to Guam, contingent on relocating Futenma to a replacement facility in northern Okinawa. The U.S. came down hard on Hatoyama. It was only after he stepped down that alliance relations could be reset and the process of rebuilding trust could begin.

The F-35 may very well be delivered on time and on cost. However, this doesn’t appear to be the case right now. Although the U.S. can’t be held legally responsible for changes in price or delivery dates under FMS rules, there will be political damage. The U.S. needs to think about how to manage this damage with its closest ally in the Asia-Pacific if the F-35 can’t be delivered as promised.

Worse, what to do if Japan cancels all or part of its order? Japan has a shrinking budget and needs new fighters. Any changes will put Japan in a precarious situation. While the other options available to the Defense Ministry weren’t 5th generation fighters, it nevertheless had other options better suited to aid its collapsing defense industry. Japanese officials are counting on the U.S. to deliver on its promise, much like the U.S. counted on Japan to deliver on its 2006 promise. Hatoyama showed the alliance how not to renege. Is the United States prepared to do any better regarding its F-35 promises?

Jeffrey W. Hornung is associate professor at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Honolulu. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, the U.S. Pacific Command, the U.S. Department of Defense, or the U.S. government.

[Ryan Ruck]

Japan F-35 Order Tab Set At $10 Billion

May 5, 2012

Japan will pay an estimated $10 billion (¥802 billion) for its order of 42 F-35 stealth jets at a cost of roughly $240 million (¥19.2 billion) per plane, the U.S. Defense Department reported to Congress, revealing price projections for the first time.

Tokyo has selected the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter produced by a U.S.-led consortium as its next-generation mainstay fighter over various other candidates, including the Eurofighter Typhoon that was aggressively promoted by a European group.

Japan is hoping to procure four F-35s by March 2017, and the Pentagon is expected to start mass producing them at domestic plants in 2019 at the earliest.

While the final, official sales price has yet to be disclosed, the Defense Ministry estimates the fuselage alone will cost around ¥8.9 billion. The sales price per unit includes training and other costs.

Defense Minister Naoki Tanaka has already said Tokyo may cancel the order if the jets' delivery is delayed or the price tag hiked.

[Ryan Ruck]

British Government Forced Into U-Turn On Royal Navy Fighter Jets

Ministry of Defence is to revert to Labour's original plan – dismissed by PM as 'more expensive and less capable'

May 9, 2012

The Ministry of Defence is to abandon plans to buy the preferred fighter for the Royal Navy's new aircraft carriers, in an embarrassing U-turn for David Cameron.

The prime minister personally endorsed the decision to equip the over-budget carriers with "cats and traps" so they could catapult and recover a version of the F-35 joint strike fighter (JSF) from their decks.

But the cost of converting the carriers has already reached £2bn, and the JSF model Downing Street wanted has been beset by delays and technical problems.

The aircraft will now not be ready until 2023 at the earliest, forcing the government to revert to Labour's original plans to buy the less capable jump jet model.

Philip Hammond, the defence secretary, is due to make an announcement in the Commons on Thursday explaining the about-face, which was approved by the National Security Council on Tuesday.

He had hoped to persuade Downing Street to make the move at the end of March, so the MoD could finalise its budget before the new financial year. But Cameron is understood to have blocked the move, insisting the Treasury undertake a new analysis of the costs, while the MoD was told to check its own calculations again.

The prime Mminister has now had to concede to Hammond, and will face taunts from Labour, which denounced the JSF "upgrade" when it was announced with some fanfare in the 2010 strategic defence and security review (SDSR).

"The decision to revert was clear cut," said a senior defence source. "The government could not accept the delays. Once the facts had changed, it would have been wrong to plough on. Ministers always said they wouldn't be afraid to change course."

The government will argue there are benefits to U-turning now. Without the complex conversion to cats and traps, the first new carrier could be ready for service by 2018, two years ahead of schedule.

Though the navy will not have the JSF it wanted, the alternative model is already in production and the MoD can expect the first delivery of aircraft in 2016.

But the announcement is a rebuff to Cameron and his deputy, Nick Clegg.

The decision over which fighters would be used on the two new Queen Elizabeth-class aircraft carriers was one of the most significant announcements in the SDSR and came as the government approved redundancy rounds and budget cuts for all three services. The aircraft carrier Ark Royal was scrapped, along with the Harrier jump jet fleet, to save money that was needed to fund the new carrier programme.

Cameron pushed the military to ditch the F-35B version of the JSF, an aircraft that can take off and land in a similar way to a Harrier. Instead, he and Clegg chose the F-35C, which has a longer range and can carry more weapons.

Explaining the decision to MPs, Cameron said Labour had got it "badly wrong", and insisted changing the carriers to cats and traps would make it easier for the navy to work with France and the US.

One defence source distanced the MoD from this argument, saying it was "meaningless window dressing", but admitted the costs and delays of the carrier variant of the JSF – and the money that would need to be spent on converting the carriers – had forced Hammond's hand. The navy will hope that the second aircraft carrier, which was due to be mothballed as soon as it was completed, will now be reprieved and made ready for service.

Jim Murphy, the shadow defence secretary, has repeatedly criticised the SDSR, and said the confusion over which JSF would end up on the carriers was a "mess entirely of ministers' own making.

"The government's chaotic carrier policy totally undermines their credibility on defence. This is a personal humiliation for David Cameron, who will have to return to Labour's policy, which he previously condemned. This is a strategically vital element of the equipment programme on which our security and thousands of jobs depend and yet ministers have treated it with hubristic incompetence.

"Scrapping the Harriers to leave Britain without aircraft to fly from aircraft carriers for at least a decade appears increasingly inexplicable. We need a plan to restore Britain's power and prestige at sea, which was so damaged by the discredited defence review, and there are crucial questions on cost and capability ministers must answer."

The government maintains Labour's criticisms are opportunistic, pointing to a £38bn defence budget "black hole" left by the previous government.

[Ryan Ruck]

The Jet That Ate the Pentagon

The F-35 is a boondoggle. It's time to throw it in the trash bin.

April 26, 2012

The United States is making a gigantic investment in the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, billed by its advocates as the next -- by their count the fifth -- generation of air-to-air and air-to-ground combat aircraft. Claimed to be near invisible to radar and able to dominate any future battlefield, the F-35 will replace most of the air-combat aircraft in the inventories of the U.S. Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and at least nine foreign allies, and it will be in those inventories for the next 55 years. It's no secret, however, that the program -- the most expensive in American history -- is a calamity.

This month, we learned that the Pentagon hasincreased the price tag for the F-35 by another $289 million -- just the latest in a long string of cost increases -- and that the program is expected to account for a whopping 38 percent of Pentagon procurement for defense programs, assuming its cost will grow no more. Its many problems are acknowledged by its listing in proposals for Pentagon spending reductions by leaders from across the political spectrum, including Rep. Barney Frank (D-Mass.), Sen. Tom Coburn (R-Okla.), President Barack Obama's National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform, and budget gurus such as former Sen. Pete Domenici (R-N.M.) and Alice Rivlin, former director of the Congressional Budget Office and Office of Management and Budget.

How bad is it? A review of the F-35's cost, schedule, and performance -- three essential measures of any Pentagon program -- shows the problems are fundamental and still growing.

First, with regard to cost -- a particularly important factor in what politicians keep saying is an austere defense budget environment -- the F-35 is simply unaffordable. Although the plane was originally billed as a low-cost solution, major cost increases have plagued the program throughout the last decade. Last year, Pentagon leadership told Congress the acquisition price had increased another 16 percent, from $328.3 billion to $379.4 billion for the 2,457 aircraft to be bought. Not to worry, however -- they pledged to finally reverse the growth.

The result? This February, the price increased another 4 percent to $395.7 billion and then even further in April. Don't expect the cost overruns to end there: The test program is only 20 percent complete, the Government Accountability Office has reported, and the toughest tests are yet to come. Overall, the program's cost has grown 75 percent from its original 2001 estimate of $226.5 billion -- and that was for a larger buy of 2,866 aircraft.

Hundreds of F-35s will be built before 2019, when initial testing is complete. The additional cost to engineer modifications to fix the inevitable deficiencies that will be uncovered is unknown, but it is sure to exceed the $534 million already known from tests so far. The total program unit cost for each individual F-35, now at $161 million, is only a temporary plateau. Expect yet another increase in early 2013, when a new round of budget restrictions is sure to hit the Pentagon, and the F-35 will take more hits in the form of reducing the numbers to be bought, thereby increasing the unit cost of each plane.

A final note on expense: The F-35 will actually cost multiples of the $395.7 billion cited above. That is the current estimate only to acquire it, not the full life-cycle cost to operate it. The current appraisal for operations and support is $1.1 trillion -- making for a grand total of $1.5 trillion, or more than the annual GDP of Spain. And that estimate is wildly optimistic: It assumes the F-35 will only be 42 percent more expensive to operate than an F-16, but the F-35 is much more complex. The only other "fifth generation" aircraft, the F-22 from the same manufacturer, is in some respects less complex than the F-35, but in 2010, it cost 300 percent more to operate per hour than the F-16. To be very conservative, expect the F-35 to be twice the operating and support cost of the F-16.

Already unaffordable, the F-35's price is headed in one direction -- due north.

The F-35 isn't only expensive -- it's way behind schedule. The first plan was to have an initial batch of F-35s available for combat in 2010. Then first deployment was to be 2012. More recently, the military services have said the deployment date is "to be determined." A new target date of 2019 has been informally suggested in testimony -- almost 10 years late.

If the F-35's performance were spectacular, it might be worth the cost and wait. But it is not. Even if the aircraft lived up to its original specifications -- and it will not -- it would be a huge disappointment. The reason it is such a mediocrity also explains why it is unaffordable and, for years to come, unobtainable.

In discussing the F-35 with aviation and acquisition experts -- some responsible for highly successful aircraft such as the F-16 and the A-10, and others with decades of experience inside the Pentagon and years of direct observation of the F-35's early history -- I learned that the F-35's problems are built into its very DNA.

The design was born in the late 1980s in the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), the Pentagon agency that has earned an undeserved reputation for astute innovation. It emerged as a proposal for a very short takeoff and vertical-landing aircraft (known as "STOVL") that would also be supersonic. This required an airframe design that -- simultaneously -- wanted to be short, even stumpy, and single-engine (STOVL), and also sleek, long, and with lots of excess power, usually with twin engines.

President Bill Clinton's Pentagon bogged down the already compromised design concept further by adding the requirement that it should be a multirole aircraft -- both an air-to-air fighter and a bomber. This required more difficult tradeoffs between agility and low weight, and the characteristics of an airframe optimized to carry heavy loads. Clinton-era officials also layered on "stealth," imposing additional aerodynamic shape requirements and maintenance-intensive skin coatings to reduce radar reflections. They also added two separate weapons bays, which increase permanent weight and drag, to hide onboard missiles and bombs from radars. On top of all that, they made it multiservice, requiring still more tradeoffs to accommodate more differing, but exacting, needs of the Air Force, Marine Corps, and Navy.

Finally, again during the Clinton administration, the advocates composed a highly "concurrent" acquisition strategy. That meant hundreds of copies of the F-35 would be produced, and the financial and political commitments would be made, before the test results showed just what was being bought.

This grotesquely unpromising plan has already resulted in multitudes of problems -- and 80 percent of the flight testing remains. A virtual flying piano, the F-35 lacks the F-16's agility in the air-to-air mode and the F-15E's range and payload in the bombing mode, and it can't even begin to compare to the A-10 at low-altitude close air support for troops engaged in combat. Worse yet, it won't be able to get into the air as often to perform any mission -- or just as importantly, to train pilots -- because its complexity prolongs maintenance and limits availability. The aircraft most like the F-35, the F-22, was able to get into the air on average for only 15 hours per month in 2010 when it was fully operational. (In 2011, the F-22 was grounded for almost five months and flew even less.)

This mediocrity is not overcome by the F-35's "fifth-generation" characteristics, the most prominent of which is its "stealth." Despite what many believe, "stealth" is not invisibility to radar; it is limited-detection ranges against some radar types at some angles. Put another way, certain radars, some of them quite antiquated, can see "stealthy" aircraft at quite long ranges, and even the susceptible radars can see the F-35 at certain angles. The ultimate demonstration of this shortcoming occurred in the 1999 Kosovo war, when 1960s vintage Soviet radar and missile equipment shot down a "stealthy" F-117 bomber and severely damaged a second.

The bottom line: The F-35 is not the wonder its advocates claim. It is a gigantic performance disappointment, and in some respects a step backward. The problems, integral to the design, cannot be fixed without starting from a clean sheet of paper.

It's time for Defense Secretary Leon Panetta, the U.S. military services, and Congress to face the facts: The F-35 is an unaffordable mediocrity, and the program will not be fixed by any combination of hardware tweaks or cost-control projects. There is only one thing to do with the F-35: Junk it. America's air forces deserve a much better aircraft, and the taxpayers deserve a much cheaper one. The dustbin awaits.

[Ryan Ruck]

USAF: F-35B Cannot Generate Enough Sorties To Replace A-10

May 16, 2012

The US Air Force has concluded that the short take-off vertical landing (STOVL) Lockheed Martin F-35B- model aircraft cannot generate enough sorties to meet its needs; therefore the service will not consider replacing the Fairchild Republic A-10 Warthog close air support jet with that variant.

Meanwhile, the USAF and the US Navy are hoping to more closely integrate their forces as part of the US Department of Defense's (DoD) new AirSea battle concept.

"The F-35B is well-suited to support of the Marine Air Ground Taskforce (MAGTF) in very austere locations," says USAF chief of staff Gen Norton Schwartz, speaking at an event hosted by the Brookings Institution in Washington, D.C. "But the reality is, is that scenario is not a high sortie generation scenario."

The USAF and the US Navy need greater sortie generation rates than the F-35B can provide, Schwartz says.

"What we think is needed is high sortie generation in order to provide persistence over the target and to engage the variety of targets that may exist," he says. "Not in a confined battlespace, but more on a theatre basis."

The F-35B is an interesting aircraft, Schwartz says. But while the USAF had at one time considered the variant as a potential replacement for the A-10, given the fiscal constraints the services faces and the need to generate more sorties, the USAF will not buy the F-35B, he says.

Retired Lt Gen George Trautman, a former US Marine Corps (USMC) deputy commandant for aviation, disputes Schwartz's assertion that the F-35B cannot generate as many sorties as the A or C model aircraft.

"The F35B has highest sortie generation rate among the three JSF [Joint Strike Fighter] variants," Trautman says. "There may be other reasons the air force doesn't want the B, but sortie rate isn't a factor."

In fact, the USMC's concept of operations depends on the STOVL variant generating more sorties more rapidly than other JSF models, says retired USMC Lt Gen Emerson Gardner, a former naval aviator.

The key performance parameters (KPP) for the F-35 require higher sortie rates for the B-model at four sorties per day. The A and C models are only required to generate three sorties per day.

"So far in SDD [System Development and Demonstration], all three variants are on track to exceed their KPPs at the completion of SDD," Gardner says. "The B looks to come in at about six sorties per day, the A at about 3.5 and the C at close to four."

While USAF will not consider buying the F-35B, the service is fully committed to buying its own conventional take-off F-35A variant. Fighters like the stealthy F-35 are not in any danger of being replaced by unmanned combat aircraft anytime in the near future because those machines are not yet capable of flying in airspace protected by advanced integrated air defence systems.

"The reality is, is that at least in the current [generation], a remotely piloted aircraft cannot survive in contested airspace," Schwartz says.

Stealthy fifth-generation fighters, the Northrop Grumman B-2, the nascent USAF Long Range Strike Bomber (LRS-B), are critical capabilities for the US military to operate inside anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) environments.

Those types of aircraft "will allow us to operate within contested airspace and assert our access," Schwartz says, "Which is the fundamental tenant of AirSea battle."

The DoD's new AirSea battle concept, while still integrating the USMC and US Army, is primarily driven by the USN and USAF. At its most basic level, the concept calls for the seamless integration of USN and USAF assets so that the two service's aircraft, ships, submarines and space assets all work together, says USN chief of naval operations Admiral Jonathan Greenert.

"Our links need to be similar," Greenert says, "Or minimally compatible."

Eventually, if everything goes according to the USAF and USN vision, a USAF Boeing E-3 Sentry or USN Northrop Grumman E-2D Hawkeye could seamlessly share a common picture with an Aegis cruiser and F-22 or Boeing F/A-18 at the same time.

The two services are already working on a next generation data-link to share all that information, Schwartz says. But for existing legacy platforms, there will need to be "gateways", like the Battlefield Airborne Communications Node (BACN).

But there is the danger of information overload. At the senior leadership level, the air or maritime joint component commanders might not need to know all of the detailed information that the other needs. Already, there might be too much extraneous data, Greenert says. In the future, that information will need to be filtered properly.

"I don't want to everything that the air component commander knows," he says. "We're already almost overloaded from that perspective we want to share what the...critical contacts of interest are cross domain."

[Ryan Ruck]

Flight Blindness

Why F-35 pilots suddenly have the jitters

June 18, 2012

A host of problems plague the military's newest jet fighter, the F-35, but one of the simplest yet most troublesome is identified in a new government audit as unreadable "symbology."

The problem exists inside a small item at the heart of what makes the F-35 the world's most sophisticated aircraft -- if only it could be made to work. Namely, the pilot's helmet visor. On the world's most advanced, fifth-generation military aircraft, the visor is meant to be much more than a sun shield. It is supposed to do wondrous things.

Acting like a small, see-through movie screen, it is designed to display data showing how the plane is performing, where enemy targets are, and which weapons the pilot can use to handle them. As the pilot swivels his head, the display is meant to adapt, creating a direct link -- as in a science-fiction movie -- between the pilot and the aircraft's unprecedented computing power.

The visor is, according to the Government Accountability Office's latest annual report on the F-35's development, "integral to the mission systems architecture." In other words, the plane was more or less designed around the unique capabilities of that fancy helmet appendage.

Just one problem: It doesn't work. In flight tests, the visor's "symbology" has evidently been unreadable, because the plane itself has been bouncing up and down in the air more than expected. The effect is probably like trying to read an e-book while riding a bicycle along a boulder-strewn path.

"Display jitter," the GAO report says in a footnote, "is the undesired shaking of display, making symbology unreadable ... [due to] worse than expected vibrations, known as aircraft buffet."

Unfortunately for the plane's designers, jitter and buffeting are only part of the problems undermining the visor's use. The others are a persistent delay in displaying key sensor data -- making the visor symbols outdated as the aircraft streaks through the air at speeds up to 1,200 mph -- and an inability to show night vision readings properly.

So what's the big deal? It's just a visor. Well, the GAO report says "these shortfalls may lead to a helmet unable to fully meet warfighter requirements -- unsuitable for flight tasks and weapons delivery, as well as creating an unmanageable pilot workload, and may place limitations on the [F-35's] operational environment."

In short, if the visor doesn't work, the plane may not be able to do all the impressive things that the Pentagon is spending more than $1.5 trillion -- over the next 30 or so years -- to make it do. The GAO said this alarm was sounded by the program officials interviewed by its investigators.

A new visor is under development, at an estimated cost of just $80 million, so the Air Force may have a backup if the original visor's kinks cannot be worked out. But according to the GAO, the alternate visor won't be as capable. An Air Force spokesman did not respond to a request for comment, but DODBuzz.com quoted the F-35 program director in March as promising that the helmet troubles are "being addressed."

The director, Vice Adm. David Venlet, told a defense conference that the plane was just having "normal teething problems."

A few things went well for the F-35 program last year. A version being made for the Marines, capable of short takeoffs and landings, "performed better than expected" in flight tests. And the Air Force was able to double the number of test flights it performed the previous year. The volume of changes made to engineering drawings of the plane's components every month -- even while the plane is in early production -- has started to decline.

But there wasn't a lot of other good news in the report. Although the program was extensively restructured by senior Pentagon officials last year, by adding many millions of dollars and stretching out key deadlines, it still managed to meet only six of its eleven objectives for the period. Many of these goals were administrative. Among the uncompleted tasks: an interim upgrade of the plane's software and a redesign of its tailhook.

The plane has had no difficulty being launched by catapults, a key prerequisite for its use by the Navy aboard aircraft carriers. But so far, it has not been able to use its tailhook to catch a cable and stop suddenly -- which is also, well, crucial for operations on an aircraft carrier. Generally speaking, Navy pilots need a place to land when their missions are complete.

Venlet has called the tailhook troubles "a damping-bouncing issue" that could not have been foreseen. It is being redesigned, but the GAO warns that "other aircraft structural modifications may also be required." The discovery of cracks in the plane's bulkhead, an upright wall in its fuselage, will require costly repairs, and other parts are showing unexpectedly early signs of wear. Flight tests so far have shown "different structural loads than predicted," the GAO disclosed, a sure sign that unplanned work lies ahead. "Aircraft reliability and parts shortages" contributed to testing shortfalls last year.

In an October report, a special testing team of Air Force, Navy, and British officers found shortcomings in "aircraft handling characteristics and shortfalls in maneuvering performance," according to a GAO summary of the officers' report. Besides flagging the troubled helmet, they complained about poor management of spare parts supplies, excessive repair time for the plane's delicate radar-absorbing skin, and "poor maintainability performance."

The Pentagon has increasingly been at loggerheads with the chief contractor, Lockheed Martin, over the work ahead. Already, cost overruns on four early production contracts have totaled $1 billion, with the government on the hook to pay just over two-thirds this amount. But Uncle Sam's ambition is still to buy 365 of the planes (out of 2,457) at a cost of $69 billion, before completing so-called developmental flight tests - the spins in the sky that are needed to make sure everything is operating properly.

Until those tests are finished, the GAO said -- repeating a theme the government watchdog has sounded for the past seven years -- the F-35 program is "very susceptible to discovering costly design and technical problems after many aircraft have been fielded." The auditors expressed worry as a result that the Pentagon may not be able to afford the program in its current form and urged that it conduct a study now of the impact of future budget cuts.

In a written reply, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense David G. Ahern said the Pentagon conducts such studies all the time, but "does not believe there is value" in making them public. He also said that any such analysis would have to consider the impact of any cuts in a broad context, including the "industrial base," the size of the existing fighter fleet, and Washington's deals to sell the plane to foreign allies.

Here's how the F-35 sighting system is supposed to work...

YouTube: F-35 JSF Distributed Aperture System (EO DAS)

[Ryan Ruck]

Navy Admiral Hints At Jettisoning F-35 Fighter

July 10, 2012

The chief of naval operations has penned an opinion column that has military analysts buzzing over whether it signals the Navy may be the first military branch to jettison the costly F-35 stealth fighter jet.

Adm. Jonathan W. Greenert’s column in the current issue of Proceedings magazine questions the value of radar-evading technology, or stealth, in flying to a target and bombing it in a world of rapidly improving radars.

At the same time, the Navy’s top officer champions the future of unmanned planes and standoff weapons such as ship-fired cruise missiles. Adm. Greenert also mentions the ongoing budget-cutting environment in Washington.

The Navy has planned to buy about 480 of the aircraft-carrier version of the F-35, even as the stealth fighter jet’s costs have skyrocketed and the Navy prepares to shrink its fleet of ships for lack of money.

To military analysts, all of Adm. Greenert’s points add up to a conclusion that the Navy is having second thoughts about pouring billions of dollars into the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter.

Not true, says the admiral’s spokesman.

“Those reports are wrong,” NavyLt. Nate Curtis said. “The CNO [chief of naval operations] has stated he is committed to the Joint Strike Fighter.

“The CNO was not talking about a commitment to the Joint Strike Fighter. That isn’t the issue. He was talking about stealth in the future and looking at the return on investment. That’s what he talks about in that article,” Lt. Curtis said.

That has not stopped analysts from conjecturing about the Pentagon’s most expensive acquisition program in an era of mounting federal debt.

“Adm. Greenert’s controversial — and, potentially, hugely consequential — article raises several interesting points, among which is the contention that advances in sensing capabilities and electronic and cyberwarfare will increasingly degrade America’s stealth arsenal,” wrote Mackenzie Eaglen, an analyst at the American Enterprise Institute. “This is not news. What is news, however, is the head of the Navy signaling a tepid commitment to the military’s largest acquisition program.”

In his column, Adm. Greenert does not mention the fighter by name, but he does note the limits of stealth technology. And the Navy is buying only one stealth aircraft — the F-35.

“We appear to be reaching the limits of how much a platform’s inherent stealth can affordably get it close enough to survey or attack adversaries,” Adm. Greenert says in a magazine that serves as a sounding board for active and retired officers. “And our fiscal situation will continue to require difficult trade-offs, requiring us to look for new ways to control costs while remaining relevant.”

The admiral, a former submarine commander now in the first year of a four-year term, writes of advances in radars and computers that can detect even the best stealth planes as they near a target.

“The Navy has been sending signals for a long time,” said Winslow Wheeler, an analyst at the Center for Defense Information, a budget reform group. “The most recent Greenert comments in Proceedings shows that longstanding information, available for decades, about the vulnerability of stealth to long-wavelength radars is beginning to sink in as the realizations of the gigantic dollar, tactical and reliability costs escalate.”

Designed as a multipurpose fighter to replace the Air Force’s F-16 Falcons and the Navy’s F-18 Hornets, the F-35 now carries a price tag of $395.7 billion for 2,443 planes.

It has suffered technical failures and huge cost overruns, prompting Sen. John McCain, Arizona Republican, in December to call it “both a scandal and a tragedy.”

The Government Accountability Office reported in June that total acquisition costs in the past five years ballooned 42 percent, to $395 billion. Full-rate production now is not scheduled to begin until 2019, a six-year delay.

In the most recent Pentagon budget review, in which $487 billion was cut from the 10-year spending plan, Defense Secretary Leon E. Panetta opted to stretch out procurement but not terminate the program.

The services know, however, that another wave of budget cuts is looming — about $500 billion if Congress cannot agree on a deficit-reduction plan by January. In that case, analysts say, several procurement budget lines will be in jeopardy, including the F-35.

The GAO criticized the Pentagon for its big bet on “concurrency” — that is, developing and producing the plane at the same time. The Pentagon is buying 365 F-35s before developmental flight tests are completed.

Said the GAO: “Development of critical-mission systems providing core combat capabilities remains behind schedule and risky. To date, only 4 percent of the mission systems required for full capability have been verified. Deficiencies with the helmet-mounted display, integral to mission systems functionality and concepts of operation, are most problematic.”

[Ryan Ruck]

New £150million Combat Jet Is Banned From Flying In Bad Weather Because It Could Explode

January 20, 2013

It's considered to be the world's most sophisticated superfighter jet, but Britain's new £150million combat aircraft has been banned from flying in bad weather for fears it could explode.

Engineers working on the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter have found the jet's fuel tank could explode if hit by lightning.

According to reports, the aircraft, which is hoped to enter service for both the RAF and the Royal Navy in five years' time, has also been made more vulnerable to enemy attack than the aircraft it is set to replace, after its weight was reduced in an attempt to increase fuel efficiency.

The Telegraph has reported the revelations were disclosed in a leaked report from the Pentagon's operational test and evaluation office, which states that, until a device in the fuel tank is redesigned, test-flying within 25 miles of thunderstorms is 'not permitted'.

Several other problems have been identified with the plane, including a fault in the design of the fuel tank which means it is unable to rapidly descend to low altitude.

A handful of cracks were also discovered in the tested aircraft during examinations by the United States Air Force and the aircraft's manufacturer Lockheed Martin.

The report states: 'All of these discoveries will require mitigation plans and may include redesigning parts and additional weight.'

A Lockheed Martin spokesman has said the manufacturer does not consider the latest problem a 'major issue'.

The spokesman said: 'We have demonstrated very good vulnerability performance and we continue to work with the Joint Programme Office.'

The short take-off and vertical-landing version of the F-35B is due to become Britain's replacement for the Harrier.

The new fighter jet has been designed to be practically invisible to radar and has a top speed of 1,300mph and a range of 1,450 miles, compared to the Harrier's 700mph and range of 350 mile range.

The latest revelation is the second blow to the programme in recent weeks, after Canada pulled out of a deal to buy 65 of the aircraft last month.

And while the US is buying 2,500 F-35s for £254bn, Britain is committed to buying only 48, although the final decision will depend on the role of the Royal Navy's two new carriers in the future and whether the price of the aircraft falls, as is expected.

A Ministry of Defence spokesman said: 'All variants of F-35 are currently within the Development Test phase and minor issues like this are common during this early stage of the overall programme.'