The Endangered F-35

[American Patriot]

they should only fly it in bad weather over enemies then

[vector7]

When Money is No Object: the Strange Saga of the F-35

March 04, 2013

Concurrent Production’ Exacerbates Multiple Problems

by LEE GAILLARD

On 14 January, very shortly after the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) released its 2012 annual report on progress in various Pentagon programs (including a 16-page section on the F-35), Turkey announced a one-year delay in the purchase of its first two Lockheed Martin F-35 Joint Strike Fighters. Why? ”High cost yield” and flight and combat capabilities that “are not at the desired level yet”. In short, the F-35 doesn’t work and it’s too expensive. (See GlobalFlight.)

That’s just the tip of the iceberg for what is the most expensive military procurement program in history. While some will argue that the key word in the Turkish statement is “yet”, one must ask whether Turkey or the United States and all other partner F-35 nations will ever get what they were initially promised.

Several sources (Aviation Week & Space Technology, FlightGlobal, et al.) have provided briefer summaries of the DOT&E’s F-35 annual report. But few examine the implications of what the DoD has published, or ask questions that should have been asked years ago.

For its competition against Boeing’s X-32, Lockheed Martin built two X-35 prototypes, the first of which flew on 24 October 2000; the first Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) version flew about six years later, on 15 December 2006. Now, over 12 years since that first flight, roughly 65 F-35 airframes have been delivered—43 of them produced during 2011 and 2012; the 100^th aircraft is now on the assembly line.

Not one is combat capable. Even in training flights they face restrictions.

We are dealing with an aircraft that has been produced and tested in fits and starts, hobbled by a massively expensive and ineffective program of what is euphemistically called “concurrent production” where you build, fly, test, repair, redesign, retrofit, re-test—all at the same time, a process patented by R. Goldberg; money is no object.

Part of the problem is, of course, that Lockheed Martin presented us with two versions of what Detroit would call a ‘concept car’: a one-off only superficially representative design smaller and lighter than the actual fighter of which it was supposed to be a working prototype. The X-35A flew only 27 test flights in the one-month period before its test regimen ended on November 22; the X-35B (converted from the –A) flew 48.9 hours of tests in 66 flights during the roughly six weeks from June 23 to August 6, 2001. And the –C variant’s test regime lasted less than a month—from February 12 to March 10, 2001: 73 test flights totaling 58 hours (including 250 carrier-type landings on the runway at Patuxent River; no mention of how successful the arresting hook turned out to be). For the most part, then, test sequences of roughly one month with flights averaging less than an hour each.

Under those conditions, what kind of ‘wring-out’ testing could these two aircraft do that would reveal future problems with transonic buffet, wing roll off, and the other significant issues that appeared from the start during testing of LRIP aircraft? Thus, when the Pentagon signed on the dotted line for the first lot of LRIP F-35s, it was buying an untested, larger, heavier paper design that hugely increased risks in any ‘concurrent production’ program. We are now facing the consequences.


F-35 Lightning in flight.

For all F-35 versions, according to the DOT&E report, the pilot’s helmet-mounted display system doesn’t work; the F-35C is not yet carrier-qualified because the tail hook didn’t work, had to be redesigned, and only now is being re-tested; the ejection seat in all models would put pilots at serious risk in any non-level flight mode above 500 knots (i.e., most dogfight scenarios); since flight control software is itself still under development, the computerized flight control system lacks crucial intended capabilities; key structural components have cracked and require redesign. The list goes on. Yet Lockheed Martin’s Fort Worth plant keeps churning out F-35s in all their defective glory. And those aircraft already produced now need retrofits of software and flight critical hardware.

Let’s take a closer look.

Structural Problems

In the recently released DOT&E report on 2012 F-35 testing and development, we observe that:

* High-speed high-altitude flight results in delamination and heat damage to the horizontal stabilizers and their stealth coatings (pages 30, 32, and 33 in the DOT&E report; all further numbers in parentheses refer to this report);

* A cracked wing carry-through bulkhead (36) halted durability testing for over a year until it could be analyzed and repaired;

* Weakness in the auxiliary air inlet doors on the -B version led to redesign and retesting and time lost (32);

* A crack was found in a forward rib of the F-35A’s right wing root—in addition to the similar crack reported on in the FY11 DOT&E Annual Report (36);

* A crack was found in the right engine thrust mount shear web (37);

* Multiple cracks appeared in the lower fuselage bulkhead flange (37), effectively halting F-35B testing;

* All this in addition to earlier cracks discovered in the –B’s right side fuselage support frame as well as under a wing where a pylon and its weapon get attached (37)—and yet another in an internal support structure.

All may require redesigning of parts and subsequent added weight (since strengthening weak parts often involves adding mass to the component as part of the redesign) when for two of the F-35 versions there is less than a one-percent weight gain margin left for the entire remaining development process, and only a one percent margin available to the F-35C. “Managing weight growth with such small margins will continue to be a significant program challenge” (32); that’s an understatement. Then there’s the issue of retrofit to aircraft already delivered and others on the production line. (There are, of course, other structural issues not listed here—such as the drive shaft for the lift fan (31), now undergoing its second redesign, plus damaged door attachments (31), etc., etc.) Trenchant DOT&E observation: “Results of findings from structural testing highlight the risks and costs of concurrent production with development” (37).


Some obvious questions:

* Why yet another ‘spiral development/concurrent production’ program when the same kinds of major problems and expenses had appeared years earlier with the V-22 Osprey during whose development 30 Marines were killed?

(Not to mention our similar ‘concurrent development’ fiasco involving the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS): as Rear Adm. Tom Rowden wrote recently in the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, “In the interest of quick delivery to the fleet, ship design began before requirements were finalized, and building started before designs were stable.” No wonder the Navy has conceded that “LCS vessels are only rated for Combat 1+ levels—lower than a tanker” [as quoted by Mike Fabey in Aviation Week’s January 28, 2013 Defense Technology Edition]. Pathetic. Reminiscent of the current barely Block 1 training capabilities of the F-35?

* What was missing from wind tunnel tests and 3D computer modeling studies of flow, weight, and stress that permitted the cracking found in that wing carry-through bulkhead and other basic structural weaknesses to get through?

* Why weren’t two representative pre-production aircraft put through the wringer with several months of test flights to find these areas of stress and their causes before completion of final design and authorization of Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP)?

Performance Shortfall

Performance—where the chickens come home to roost. The intended performance envelope for the F-35 is, roughly speaking: altitude capability of 50,000 feet; 700 kts./Mach 1.6 airspeed; maximum g rating of 9.0 (-A), 7.0 (-B), 7.5 (-C) ; turn performance of 5.3 sustained g’s (-A), 5.0 sustained g’s (-B), and 5.1 sustained g’s (-C); acceleration from Mach O.8 to Mach 1.2 intended to be within 65 seconds (See Aviation Week.); angle of attack (AoA) capability to 50 degrees.

At the moment, however, this all seems wishful thinking. Undeveloped software, combined with disappointing results in real-world flight tests (“results of air vehicle performance and flying qualities evaluations”

(30) ) have triggered flight restrictions and rolled back overly optimistic Key Performance Parameters (KPPs). For these and a variety of conditions that should not be occurring, flights are limited to top speeds of 550 (not 700) kts. (38) and altitudes of 39,000 feet (38) rather than 50,000 feet; AoA to be no greater than 18 degrees (vs. 50 degrees)…as well as the imposition of other “aircraft operating limitations that are not suitable for combat” (38). KPPs for sustained g’s in a turn have been weakened—by 20 percent for the –A (5.3 down to 4.6)(30), by 10 percent for the –B (5.0 down to 4.5) (32), and by 2 percent for the –C (5.1 down to 5.0) (33). Transonic acceleration from Mach 0.8 to M. 1.2 suffers significantly: with the –A version, it takes 8 seconds longer; 16 seconds longer with the –B; and a worrisome 43 seconds longer with the –C…an increase of about two thirds. Although the F-35 is essentially a strike aircraft, acceleration capability could be critical in combat.

Transonic roll-off (where one wing loses lift sooner than the other when a shock wave forms at the top of the wing as the airflow reaches the local speed of sound) and buffet (or shaking of the entire aircraft) as more surfaces form shock waves and boundary layer flow becomes turbulent—both were more serious than expected in the –B and –C versions, especially with the latter, whose wingspan is greater than that of the other variants: another possible problem in a combat situation.

Some fighter pilots offered their comments on FlightGlobal: ” ‘What an embarrassment, and there will be obvious tactical implications,’ another highly experienced fighter pilot says. ‘[It's] certainly not anywhere near the performance of most fourth and fifth-generation aircraft.

‘At higher altitudes, the reduced performance will directly impact survivability against advanced Russian-designed “double-digit” surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems such as the Almaz-Antey S-300PMU2 (also called the SA-20 Gargoyle by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization), the pilot says. At lower altitudes, where fighters might operate in the close air support or forward air control role, the reduced airframe performance will place pilots at increased risk against shorter-range SAMs and anti-aircraft artillery” ( See GlobalFlight).

A few questions:

Why didn’t earlier wind tunnel tests and computational fluid dynamic modeling predict problems involved in maintaining intended sustained g’s in a turn?

Why was not poor F-35 transonic acceleration also predicted—especially for the F-35C, whose eight feet greater wingspan contributes to the significantly larger Mach Cone (the zone of disturbed air behind the shock wave system generated by an aircraft at supersonic speed) that must be dragged during the transonic regime?

Why was there not greater fuselage application of area rule (that pinched waist so visible on the ubiquitous T-38 supersonic trainer), thatbrilliant 1950s design breakthrough by aerodynamicist Richard Whitcomb specifically to minimize transonic drag?

For the –B model, the lift fan may have prevented such a waist pinch. But why have this tail wag the dog, mandating that commonality be based on the least aerodynamic of the three variants when fuselage area rule could well have been applied to the –A and –C versions, establishing a common baseline design of improved transonic efficiency and performance across the 2243 aircraft intended (in current projections) for the Air Force and the Navy—plus all international customers not intending to order the specialized STOVL version that will be produced in the smallest numbers? Pinched-waist commonality would seem to make sense for the vast portion of the fleet numbering more than four times the 540 –B variants tentatively listed for the Marine Corps and the Royal Navy. As it is, given unique differences in wingspan and arresting gear requirements and STOVL mechanical provisions, each version already differs from the other two versions. Commonality? But applying area rule to 75 per cent of F-35s produced would have added commonality where it is most needed, cutting transonic acceleration time while improving combat efficiency, range, and speed.

Weapons and Guidance Glitches

Most weapons tested for compatibility and safe release have worked so far, but under 1-g conditions in level flight. Have possible wind tunnel-based concerns about post-release unstable airflow around wing and fuselage attachment locations prevented more combat-realistic testing under higher g’s and in banking or diving modes?

Then there’s the high-tech computer-linked helmet-mounted display system that will control these weapons (already in use with other aircraft and in other air forces)—classified as “deficient”. Doesn’t work. Why? “Expected capabilities that were not delivered” (35) include latency problems with the distributed aperture system (DAS) in the helmet-mounted video display. Latency—some call it ‘transport time’—is the time between aircraft sensors’ signal acquisition and its transmission and projection in readable format on the pilot’s helmet video display. Currently at .133 seconds, that time delay of over an eighth of a second then has to be added to the pilot’s additional physical response time of about .15 seconds if he or she is to react to the data displayed and launch a weapon. In dogfights with closing speeds of over 1000 knots, this cumulative delay of more than a quarter of a second can be potentially fatal, and the latency-derived .133 second margin of error in initial aim point stands as an unacceptable contributor to this dangerous combat deficiency. Then add in deficient “night vision acuity,” excessive jitter that degrades data and images, inconsistent bore sight alignment, distracting “green glow” seepage from other avionics, imagery and data unable to be recorded (35). So—those high-tech air-to-air missiles and guided bombs cannot even be launched.

And the 25mm four-barrel rotating cannon with its 180 shells? Intended only for the Air Force F-35A version; -B and -C versions have no cannon, but will require external gun pods mounted by ground crews. Why did F-35 designers intentionally ignore the F-4 dogfighting débacle in Vietnam? The F-4—with no internal cannon and radar-guided Sparrow missiles that did not work at short range—could not shoot down the MiG-17s and MiG-21s thrown against them. Gun pods then provided a poor interim solution before the F-4E was redesigned to carry an internal 20mm cannon.

Now we have the F-35—“F” for its “Fighter” role, although it seems primarily an expensive attempt to replace early model F/A-18s and the Marines’ subsonic AV-8B Harrier II STOVL aircraft in their ground attack roles. (Ironically, what Hussein’s tank crews feared most was the A-10 Warthog with its GAU-8/A Avenger seven-barrel 30mm cannon, which tore them to bits from above, where their armor was thinnest.)

Why, then, in the DOT&E report are there no results listed from airborne firing tests of the F-35A’s cannon? If there have not yet been such tests, has a qualifying 25mm shell even been chosen? (We remember what inappropriate propellant selection did to M-16 rifle performance in Vietnam…) Such testing early on will be crucial in determining the effect of recoil shock on the aircraft’s structure and engine operation. Not to mention effects of the muzzle blast and combustion gasses on adjacent stealth coatings given that heat from air friction and radiational heating from the afterburner seemed to do such a job on the skin and coatings of the horizontal stabilizers.

No discussion. So—cannon not tested and other external and internally carried weapons for all practical purposes unlaunchable because of “deficient” sighting system available to pilots, thus rendering all F-35s produced so far as little more than expensive aerial targets for their adversaries.

Vulnerability Increased, Combat Survivability Jeopardized

* In the live fire test and evaluation, “None of the F-35 variants met the operational requirement for the HEI threat” posed by fragments and damage from a 30mm high explosive incendiary (HEI) shell (41). The Mirage 2000, MiG-29, and the Su-27 and its derivatives (these in service with a number of countries)—and the T-50/PAK-FA shaped for stealth and now in development—all carry 30mm cannon and could be considered potential adversaries for the F-35.

* But, given the F-35’s basic design, it’s not just 30mm shells that pose a threat: any 20mm, 7.62mm, 5.56mm round from the ground or fragments from the smallest of shoulder-launched antiaircraft missiles penetrating the F-35’s skin could trigger catastrophic loss of aircraft. The –A and –C variants have massive volumes of fuel surrounding the engine inlets, and the 270-volt electrical system provides ample charge for a fatal spark in the air/fuel mixture. Since the fuel is also being used as a heat sink to cool avionics and other systems (and has considerable trouble doing so on hot summer days), it is already at an elevated temperature.

Furthermore, this pre-heated and volatile fuel is being used as the operating liquid in the –B’s “fueldraulic system” that swivels the extremely hot engine exhaust nozzle during STOVL mode. (Eaton supplies the VDRP fueldraulic boost pump and the 4000 psi hydraulic power generation system.) What happens when a stray rifle bullet nicks a fueldraulic line and raw fuel sprays at 4000 psi into the broiling engine bay next to the 1500-1700 degree exhaust nozzle?
* All F-35 models rely on a highly computerized fly-by-wire flight control system, with primary avionics bays nested in the lower forward fuselage—where they are most susceptible to ground fire. With even one hit to that flight control computer, the pilot immediately loses control of the aircraft and must eject.

*And that poses a further problem: the Air Force found the early LRIP pilot escape system to be a “serious risk” since “interactions between the pilot, the ejection seat, and the canopy during the ejection sequence …are not well understood” (38). So—don’t get into a dogfight with MiG-29s or Mirage 2000s or Su-27s or PAK-FAs or any other fighter armed with 30mm cannon, and don’t bail out if you survive their cannon fire? (We are reminded of equivalent survivability issues with the MV-22 Osprey, which cannot autotrotate to a safe landing if both engines fail, nor has it ever been tested in a power-out dead-stick landing: its glide ratio is abysmal, its fuselage is brittle (composites), and it has no crew ejection seats; yet it’s been in full production for the Marines and the Air Force for several years.)

F-35B: STOVL Missions Raise Risks

That the F-35B’s lift fan system remains untested against live fire while in operation (when its rotating blades would be most failure prone) is probably irrelevant since AV-8B Harrier II-type vertical landings on unprepared surfaces just behind front lines will be problematic at best and even downright dangerous for the F-35B.

Despite best USMC intentions regarding close air support and the F-35B’s specialized STOVL capabilities, discussions had already begun three years ago on ways to “limit heat damage to carrier decks and other surfaces,” very possibly leading to “severe F-35 operating restrictions and or costly facility upgrades, repairs or both” (http://www.dodbuzz.com/2010/07/19/js...ixed-trautman/). Indeed, Bill Sweetman (in his Ares blog for Aviation Week) quotes from a Navy report issued in January of 2010 which “outlines what base-construction engineers need to do to ensure that the F-35B’s exhaust does not turn the surface it lands on into an area-denial weapon.

And it’s not trivial.

Vertical-landing ‘pads will be exposed to 1700 deg. F and high velocity (Mach 1) exhaust,’ the report says. The exhaust will melt asphalt and ‘is likely to spall the surface of standard airfield concrete pavements on the first VL.’ (The report leaves to the imagination what jagged chunks of spalled concrete will do in a supersonic blast field.)” Heat-resistant reinforced concrete, special sealants…the list goes on. And what about that unprepared field, where debris thrown up and sucked into the intakes as the F-35B touches down causes incapacitating foreign object damage (FOD) to the aircraft’s engine? And what would be long-term effects on carrier decks? Not a pleasant scenario. Discussion of these problems—and their solutions—do not appear in the 2012 DOT&E report.

F-35C: Carrier Capabilities in Jeopardy

Carrier capability is currently nonexistent: the F-35C is therefore unable to perform carrier-based missions for which it was designed.

* Arresting hook: not operational—could not catch the cable and had to be entirely redesigned. A basic design issue is that the distance between the F-35C’s main landing gear (MLG) and the tail hook is too short, providing insufficient time after passage of the main wheels over the wire for it to bounce up and be snagged by the hook. The new hook, with a sharper point, is now being tested on an arresting cable-equipped runway simulating a carrier deck. Unfortunately, these tests have been less than fully successful. In addition, the situation has now morphed into a systems engineering issue in that a recent study shows “higher than predicted loads” (39) being passed from the hook to the airframe. Will further cracking soon occur in key support frames to which the hook system is attached, requiring additional redesign of basic structure and adding yet more weight?

* Significant carrier landing approach problems: when “30 degrees of flaps are required to meet the KPP for maximum approach speed of 145 knots at required carrier landing weight” (33), poor handling qualities result; a 15-degree flap setting improves handling (33) but raises approach speed above the KPP limit. (And higher touch-down speed will further degrade arresting cable bounce time needed for the arresting hook even as it further increases stress on the aircraft’s tail hook mounting points.)

* The need for 43 additional seconds to accelerate from Mach .8 to Mach 1.2 (33), along with more severe transonic buffeting and wing roll off than in the other two variants, suggests that the –C has become essentially a subsonic aircraft in both air-intercept and ground-attackmodes.

* Tactical data transfer: doesn’t work—pilot cannot transfer video data or crucial recorded mission data to the carrier’s intelligence system, and the carrier cannot receive Link 16 datalink imagery transmissions (39).

* Maintenance Repair & Overhaul (MRO) datalink: inoperable—“design of the JSF Prognostic Health Maintenance downlink is incomplete” (39)—as are so many other software-reliant systems. (How do you deliver an aircraft—or more than 65 of them—when basic parts or systems have not yet even been designed?!) Result? An efficient pre-landing prognostic maintenance transmission becomes a lengthy and inefficient post-mission diagnostic analysis. And, as in so many other time-consuming cases with the F-35, once design is complete, more time will have to be wasted in regression testing of the revised system for all versions of this aircraft (see below for further examples).

In short, it would seem that the Navy has a 5^th-generation ‘supersonic’ carrier-based strike fighter that struggles in the transonic regime, has significant speed or handling problems during landing approach, is currently equipped with a tail hook that does not work, and—once on board—cannot download crucial mission data or essential maintenance requirements.

* Mission Availability, Reliability, and Maintenance With this Prognostic Health Maintenance datalink inoperable, the degrading of efficient MRO operations has an obvious impact on subsequent aircraft reliability. Meanwhile, concurrent development has forced the incorporation of other unproven and immature subsystems into the overall JSF systems package with predictable results on reliability. Mean flight hours between flight critical failure were 40 percent below expectations for the F-35A, 30 percent below for the F-35B, and 16 percent below for the F-35C (41).

* Corrective measures related to these critical failures? The F-35A’s mean corrective maintenance time is 2 to 3 times the period allotted. For the –B, it’s 78 percent more than time allowed, and 65 percent over for the –C (42). Massive immaturity of the Joint Technical Data (JTD) maintenance program and the Autonomic Logistics Information System (ALIS) require multiple workarounds (42) by the maintenance crew and further compromise aircraft availability, causing frustrating additional operational delays. Indeed, regarding those USMC F-35Bs deployed to Yuma, AZ: “Without a certified and functional ALIS system, the aircraft are essentially inoperable” (http://www.flightglobal.com/news/art...crisis-376590/).

It’s little surprise that the Air Force’s Operational Utility Evaluation (OUE) that ran for two months from September through November, 2012, “included no combat capabilities” (27) because the overall system itself was still under development and so immature that “little can be learned about operating and sustaining the F-35 in combat operations from this evaluation” (27). But they did discover the disconcerting impact of the critical failures and maintenance problems listed above:

* Mission availability rate for the F-35A consequently averaged less than 35 percent, “meaning three of nine aircraft were available on average at any given time” (38);

* And for those ‘available’ aircraft, reports from the field at Eglin indicate that pre-flight prep for the F-35 requires roughly 44-50 maintenance man-hours, close to double the total maintenance man-hours per flight hour for the F-16.

* Despite that extended pre-flight prep, cumulative air abort rates for both the –A and –B variants averaged roughly five aborts per 100 flight hours—despite the “goal of 1.0 air abort per 100 flight hours as a threshold to start an evaluation of the system’s readiness for training” (author emphasis; 38). Readiness for combat? Not mentioned.

Software: The Noose That’s Strangling the F-35

In a nutshell, the software just isn’t ready. We’re no longer climbing into P-51s. Since at least the F-16, software has been absolutely essential for onboard computer systems that maintain stability of fly-by-wire aircraft whose design intentionally places them on the thin edge of instability to permit almost instantaneous change in flight path—crucial in a high-speed dogfight or in avoiding a SAM. Without such computers and software, pilots cannot control the aircraft.

Now take the F-35 and all its automated functions—from helmet-cued weapon sighting to datalink sensor transmissions to other aircraft and…the list goes on. It is said that the F-22 Raptor, the F-35’s older brother, has 2.2 million lines of computer code; a recent estimate for the F-35’s Block 3 (combat capable) mission systems software postulates that the aircraft’s own computers will harbor approximately 8.6 million lines of software code—not counting even higher requirements in related ground systems.

Yet “Block 3i software, required for delivery of Lot 6 aircraft and hosted on an upgraded processor, has lagged in integration and laboratory testing” (34).

Block 2B software is what is required for only the most basic “initial, limited combat capability for selected internal weapons (AIM-120C, GBU-32/31, and GBU-12)” (34), yet DOT&E admits that “the program made virtually no progress in the development, integration, and laboratory testing of any software beyond 2B” (author emphasis;34)—i.e., no tangible progress toward anything resembling real combat capability.

In the wishful thinking department, full combat System Design and Development capability is tentatively scheduled for Block 3F software to be installed starting with production Lot 9 (34), which means on airframe number 214 at the earliest…possibly sometime in 2017.

As for that Block 3i software, those Lot 6 aircraft are already on the assembly line (starting with airframe number 96); while delivery may begin in 2014, don’t hold your breath: given program history to date, this mission software may well not be ready and Lot 6 aircraft will be in danger of being undeployable—not much better than ‘hangar queens’ so often grounded for other glitches. (Will Turkey have waited long enough?)

How bad is it?

It’s all summarized in that Pentagon report: “Flight restrictions blocked accomplishment of a portion of the planned baseline test points until a new version of vehicle systems software became available” (33). And when it comes to internal weapons release and guidance, “basic mission systems capabilities, such as communications, navigation, and basic radar functions” (34), and more—fully coded software is essential.

Yet aircraft are being delivered with major variances that defer testing and add “a bow wave of test points that will have to be completed in the future” (34), while such regressive testing of systems that should have been tested earlier but were forced to be deferred massively complicates any results-based linear (not concurrent) testing and development program. At the time of the report’s release, even the minimal capability of Block 1 software included in delivered aircraft was deficient by 20 percent (34).

Block 2A software was delivered to flight test four months late and 50 percent deficient (34). Let the report speak for itself: “Testing needed for completion of the remaining 20 percent of Block 1 capabilities and 50 percent of Block 2A capabilities will have to be conducted while the program is introducing Block 2B software to flight test. Software integration tasks supporting Block 2B (and later increments) were delayed in 2012 as contractor software integration staff were needed to support Block 2A development, test, and anomaly resolution” (35).

So much for any attempt to install mission and flight control software in any logical sequence where later and more complex versions can build on a foundation of previously installed systems. And that’s just a small sampling. Sounds like absolute chaos.

Who is the supervisor for software development? For software integration? Why haven’t they been replaced?

Better yet, why hasn’t software development and integration, at this point, been transferred to a different vendor?

These seem to be some basic questions that no one is asking.

Equally depressing news has appeared in previous Pentagon annual reports on the F-35, and surely these reports have been distributed to members of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees.

Why have they taken no action regarding the mismanagement of the most massive and expensive military procurement program in our history?

More important, when will they start to do so?

[MinutemanCO]

If I performed at this level in my current position, I would remain employed for about a day. And I don't charge millions of dollars for my professional services. My superiors actually expect me to produce highly functioning, successful projects. And on time.

The tale of the F-35 just seems reprehensible to me.

[vector7]

F-35 design problems make night flying impossible, increase risk of being shot down, U.S. pilots warn

Lee Berthiaume, Postmedia News | 13/03/06 | Last Updated: 13/03/06 6:17 PM ET
More from Postmedia News


Handout F-35 manufacturer Lockheed Martin is refusing to comment, but the report’s revelations will likely give Canadian military planners pause as they continue assessing options for replacing Canada’s aging CF-18s.

OTTAWA — It seems U.S. fighter pilots have lost that loving feeling for their new F-35 stealth jets.

At least that’s the impression given in a scathing Pentagon report leaked this week that identifies a huge number of problems facing the U.S. military’s F-35 fleet — including fears that it can easily be shot down.

From radars that don’t work, to blurry vision from the aircraft’s sophisticated helmet, to an inability to fly through clouds, the report, which includes pilot comments, paints a picture of a jet nowhere near ready for real-life operations.

F-35 manufacturer Lockheed Martin is refusing to comment, but the report’s revelations will likely give Canadian military planners pause as they continue assessing options for replacing Canada’s aging CF-18s.

The February report from the Pentagon’s chief testing office is based on trial run at the U.S. military’s Eglin Air Force Base in Florida from September to November of last year.

The testing, which was supposed to determine whether aircraft the U.S. had already bought from Lockheed Martin were good enough to start training U.S. fighter pilots with, was actually supposed to take place in August 2011.

But it had to be postponed because a number of critical issues were identified in the aircraft — the majority of which remained unresolved more than a year later.

Because those problems — including issues with the ejector seat — hadn’t been resolved, only experienced U.S. Air Force pilots were allowed to participate in the two-month test.

In addition, a second aircraft had to follow the first at all times, and engine starts had to be monitored with a special equipment to reduce the likelihood of a fire.

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Even then, the testing was extremely basic and “did not cover . . . in essence, everything that makes the F-35A a modern, advanced fighter,” reads the report, obtained by the Washington-based watchdog group Project on Government Oversight.

“Aircraft operating limitations prohibit flying the aircraft at night or in instrument meteorological conditions,” the report reads, “hence pilots must avoid clouds and other weather.

“These restrictions are in place because testing has not been completed to certify the aircraft for night and instrument flight,” the report adds. “The aircraft is also currently prohibited from flying close formation, aerobatics, and stalls.”

The report also notes that the F-35A, which is the version the Harper government had intended to buy, “does not yet have the capability to train in . . . any actual combat capability, because it is still early in system development.”

Meanwhile, feedback from the four pilots chosen to take part in the testing was also extremely critical of the aircraft.

The pilots, all of whom had at least 1,000 hours in other U.S. fighter jets, complained that the radar was often not working, their state-of-the-art helmets gave them double-vision or blurry vision, and their flight suits were too hot.

They also blasted a design feature that made it difficult if not impossible to see “aft,” or behind them — a serious threat to the aircraft’s ability to fight.

“The head rest is too large and will impede aft visibility and survivability during surface and air engagements,” one pilot was quoted as saying. “Aft visibility will get the pilot gunned (killed) every time.”

The report also found problems with maintaining the F-35s.

For example, mechanics are supposed to be able to remove the aircraft’s engine and install a new one in two hours, but the mean time was 52 hours — or more than two days.

The aircraft also experienced difficulties when the overnight temperature dropped below 15 degrees Celsius — an occurrence that will be extremely common in Canada.

“To mitigate this problem, maintenance crews put jets in heated hangars overnight,” the report reads.

“Moving jets in and out of a hangar to keep them warm involves five personnel for three to four hours per shift. The parking of flyable jets in hangar also interfered with maintenance because these flyable jets occupied space that would otherwise be used for jets requiring repair.”

The report also found the aircraft were not as reliable as expected as many required more maintenance than anticipated.

The entire U.S. F-35 fleet was grounded two weeks ago when a crack was found in a test aircraft’s engine, the second such grounding in as many months. The F-35s are now allowed to fly again.

The report comes at a critical time as the U.S. Defense Department is facing billions in budget cuts and there are concerns the stealth fighter, which has been plagued by delays and cost overruns, will become a casualty.

The Harper government pushed the reset button on its plans to purchase the F-35 last year after National Defence put the full cost of Canada buying and operating 65 of the stealth fighters until 2052 at more than $45 billion.

This came after years of criticism over what has been seen as the Conservatives’ refusal to fully disclose how much the F-35s would cost, and after the auditor general raised serious concerns about the Defence Department’s handling of the file.

Bureaucrats have been ordered back to the drawing board to again examine what missions Canada’s jets will perform in the future, what threats they will face, and what fighter capabilities are currently available.

The Royal Canadian Air Force will lead the review with support from other federal departments, while a panel of independent experts has been tasked with monitoring the process to ensure it is rigorous and impartial.

While no timelines have been laid out, a final report will be produced to guide the government as it contemplates the next step in replacing the CF-18s.

[Ryan Ruck]

Wow, I thought the F-35 was supposed to have a groundbreaking sensor suite. So much for that...

[American Patriot]

Ground-breaking... don't say that to pilots, eh...

LOL

[Ryan Ruck]

Good point! Guess they are after all!

[vector7]

Test Pilots: Stealth Jet’s Blind Spot Will Get It ‘Gunned Every Time’

• By David Axe
• 03.07.13
• 6:00 PM

The F-35′s rearward visibility is limited. Photo: Lockheed Martin

The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, the military’s expensive main warplane of the future, has a huge blind spot directly behind it. Pilots say that could get them shot down in close-quarters combat, where the flier with the better visibility has the killing advantage.

“Aft visibility could turn out to be a significant problem for all F-35 pilots in the future,” the Pentagon acknowledged in a report (.pdf) obtained by the Project on Government Oversight, a Washington, D.C. watchdog group.

That admission should not come as a surprise to observers of the Joint Strike Fighter program. Critics of the delayed, over-budget F-35 — which is built in three versions for the Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps — have been trying for years to draw attention to the plane’s blind spot, only to be dismissed by the government and Lockheed Martin, the Joint Strike Fighter’s primary builder.

The damning report, dated Feb. 15, summarized the experiences of four test pilots who flew the F-35A — the relatively lightweight Air Force version — during a September-to-November trial run of the Joint Strike Fighter’s planned training program at Eglin Air Force Base in Florida.

The report mentions a number of shortfalls of the highly complex F-35, including sensors, communications and aerial refueling gear that aren’t yet fully designed or just don’t work right.

No aspect of the report is more damning than the pilots’ critiques of the F-35′s rearward visibility. “All four student pilots commented on the out-of-cockpit visibility of the F-35, an issue which not only adversely affects training, but safety and survivability as well,” the report states.

The Joint Strike Fighter is a stealth plane designed to avoid detection by radar, but if it ends up in a short-range dogfight, a distinct possibility even in this high-tech age, it’s the pilot’s eyes that matter most.

Meant to replace almost all of the military’s jet fighters at an initial cost of more than $400 billion, the F-35 has a clamshell-style windshield with a good view to the front and sides. But it’s got no line of sight to the rear, which is blocked by the pilot’s seat and the plane’s upper fuselage spine. Today’s A-10s, F-15s, F-16s, F/A-18s and F-22s, by contrast, have so-called “bubble canopies” with good all-round vision.

The limitations of the F-35′s canopy are “partially a result of designing a common pilot escape system [a.k.a. ejection seat] for all three variants to the requirements of the short-take-off and vertical landing environment.” In other words, the Joint Strike Fighter’s windshield is constrained by the need to fit a standard ejection seat and the downward-facing engine of the Marine Corps variant, which allows that model to take off and land vertically and is located directly behind the cockpit.

The pilots, who formerly flew A-10s and F-16s, didn’t seem interested in excuses. Their comments, quoted in the report, are scathingly direct.

“Difficult to see [other aircraft in the visual traffic] pattern due to canopy bow,” one said.

“Staying visual with wingman during tactical formation maneuvering a little tougher than [older] legacy [jets] due to reduced rearward visibility from cockpit,” another added.

Said a third, “A pilot will find it nearly impossible to check [their six o'clock position] under G [force].”

“The head rest is too large and will impede aft visibility and survivability during surface and air engagements,” one pilot reported.

Most damningly: “Aft visibility will get the pilot gunned every time” during a dogfight.

The pilots’ sentiments echo warnings by Pierre Sprey, one of the original designers of the A-10 and F-16. Joined occasionally by former national security staffer Winslow Wheeler and ex-Pentagon test director Tom Christie, Sprey has repeatedly spoken out against the military’s tendency to downplay pilot visibility in recent warplane design efforts. At a presentation in Washington six years ago, Sprey told Danger Room that the F-22, also built by Lockheed Martin, featured a more limited view from the cockpit than the company’s older F-16 — and that the F-35, then still in early design and testing, would be far worse still.

Lockheed and the military’s response has been to tout the benefits of the Joint Strike Fighter’s sensors, which Lockheed vice president Steve O’Bryan last year characterized as “world-beating.” The F-35 has six wide-angle cameras installed along the fuselage that are supposed to stream a steady, 360-degree view directly to the pilot’s specially designed helmet display. In essence, the warplane should see for the pilot.

But the helmet display doesn’t work yet, another shortfall highlighted by the Pentagon report. For now — and perhaps forever if the display’s problems don’t get resolved — Joint Strike Fighter pilots rely solely on their eyes for their view outside the jet. And their vision is incomplete owing to the F-35′s design compromises.

“There is no simple relief to limitations of the F-35 cockpit visibility,” the report states. Instead, the Pentagon admits it is more or less hoping that the problem will somehow go away on its own. “It remains to be seen whether or not, in these more advanced aspects of training, the visibility issues will rise to the level of safety issues, or if, instead, the visibility limitations are something that pilots adapt to over time and with more experience.”

But wishful thinking is no basis for warplane design. Especially when the plane in question is supposed to form the backbone of the entire U.S. air arsenal.

[Ryan Ruck]

Expensive F-35 Fighter At Risk Of Budget "Death Spiral"

March 15, 2013

It's called the "death spiral," and America's newest warplane, the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, is in danger of falling into it before the plane has even gone into service.

The term - recently invoked by top brass involved in the F-35 program - refers to a budgeting Catch-22 that plagues the defense industry. To keep the cost per airplane low, you need to build and sell a lot of planes. But in tough economic times, governments cut orders to save money. That pushes up the cost per plane, leading to more cancellations, pushing up the cost, leading to more cancellations. And so on.

The U.S. military is in the process of making tough decisions due to mandatory budget cuts from sequestration which went into effect March 1 and could lop off $46 billion of Pentagon spending this fiscal year.

Earlier this year, Pentagon budgeteers crunched the numbers on Lockheed Martin Corp's F-35 in an exercise that spoke volumes about the troubles facing the world's most expensive weapons system and the Navy's uncertain commitment to it.

Postponing orders for about 40 of the 260 Navy models of the plane, which will take off from and land on aircraft carriers, would save money in the short-term, according to several defense officials familiar with the analysis, which has not been made public.

But it would also add from $1 billion to $4 billion to the eventual price of the F-35 program, already at a record-setting $396 billion.

Seven years behind schedule and 70 percent over early cost estimates, the stealthy F-35 "Lightning II" appears to have overcome myriad early technical problems only to face a daunting new question: is it affordable in an era of shrinking defense budgets?

According to a congressional watchdog agency, the average price per plane has already almost doubled from $69 million to as much as $137 million since the F-35 program began in 2001. Any further price rise could scare off potential buyers -including vital foreign customers.

"It's a house of cards," said one senior defense official who is familiar with the F-35 program, but was not authorized to speak publicly. "We have finally started improving performance on the program and efficiency in testing, and bang, we get this budget challenge."

Steve O'Bryan, one of Lockheed's top F-35 executives, says the company has already cut F-35 production costs by 50 percent, and is making progress on flight tests and software development.

"While there are still challenges and room for improvement, the program is heading in the right direction and we see no insurmountable obstacles to delivering the F-35 and its unprecedented 5th generation capability to our three U.S. service and international customers," he said.

BULLET PROOF?

Built by Lockheed and designed to be the next-generation fighter jet for decades to come for the U.S. Air Force, Navy and Marines, as well as key U.S. allies in Asia and Europe, the F-35 appears bullet-proofed against cancellation.

There are no other new fighter jets in the pipeline; the U.S. military's fleet of warplanes is aging; and 10 allies including Britain, Japan and Israel are deeply invested.

Manufacturing - and jobs - spread across 46 states ensure a vital layer of political protection as well.

With 10 million lines of software code onboard, and another 10 million lines in its logistics and ground systems, the F-35 is a flying computer with radars and other sensors that can see enemy threats 200 miles away in any direction.

In what was meant to be a money-saving move, U.S. officials designed the F-35 as one basic fighter (with three variants) to replace a dozen warplanes flown by the U.S. Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps, as well as U.S. allies worldwide.

The U.S. armed forces currently plan to buy 2,443 F-35s in total, comprising 1,763 A-models for the Air Force, 420 B- and C-models for the Marines, and 260 C-models for the Navy. Foreign orders are now slated to total 721.

The Marine Corps, under pressure to replace its aging fleet of Harrier AV-8B "jump jets", Boeing Co F/A-18 Hornets, and EA-6B Prowlers, is scheduled to be the first U.S. military service to use the jet, by late 2015.

Given the tight schedule and huge cost of keeping its aging current fleet flying, top Marine Corps officials are vigilant about the program and the budgetary risks it faces.

"Any delay in fielding the F-35 brings added risk to the Marine Corps' ability to execute our mission as the nation's crisis response force and it affects our ability to augment U.S. Navy carrier air wings," Lieutenant General Robert Schmidle, Deputy Commandant of Aviation, said in a statement to Reuters.

Schmidle and other planners at the Pentagon are desperate to avert the "death spiral" that gutted the Air Force's plan to buy 750 F-22 Raptor stealth fighters down to just 187 jets.

Behind closed doors, some U.S. officials fret that sequestration budget cuts could trigger a similar dynamic on the F-35, which has already seen 410 orders pushed back beyond 2017.

Depending on how the cuts are implemented, the purchase of up to nine F-35s could be deferred in fiscal 2013 alone, Navy and Air Force officials have said. That might not seem like much out of more than 3,100 destined for U.S. and foreign clients.

But initial calculations show that while cutting nine jets would save about $1.3 billion, it would also raise the cost of the remaining aircraft by nearly $800 million, said one defense official, who was not authorized to speak publicly.

The Pentagon budget analysis, which Reuters is reporting for the first time, found that postponing the 40 Navy C-model jets would raise the cost of the Navy version by about $4.5 million per plane, and add between $1.5 million to $2.6 million to the per-plane cost of the Air Force and Marine Corps versions, according to several defense officials familiar with the study.

"Cutting tails to pay bills is inefficient. Whether it's nine planes in one year, or 40 across the (future years defense plan), you're going to pay later," said one of the officials. This official and others cautioned that the studies were hypothetical for now.

Air Force Lieutenant General Christopher Bogdan, the often blunt F-35 program chief, invoked the dreaded "death spiral" this week as he pounded on the need to cut costs and keep foreign orders - which will account for half of all F-35s produced through 2017 - on track.

"The one thing that our partners care most about is how much this airplane is going to cost," he said. "If ... we want to sell the 600-plus airplanes to our partners and a couple hundred more projected to our (foreign military) customers, we better be darned sure we keep reducing the price on this airplane."

Even a two-year delay in Turkey's initial order of two jets had added $1 million to the cost of each of the remaining planes in the original order year, Bogdan told a defense conference.

No one knows exactly how much of a price tag will be too much to bear for countries like Australia and Canada, whose F-35 orders are already on shaky ground. "The tipping point will be different for each country," said one U.S. official.

In Australia, defense contractors involved in building the new jets are worried that $5.5 billion in expected orders will be in jeopardy if Canberra cuts its plans to buy 100 jets by 30 to 50 jets, as many experts expect.

Lockheed remains optimistic that international orders will hold up and even grow. South Korea is expected to choose the F-35 as the winner of a 60-jet competition to be decided this summer, and U.S. officials this week said Singapore may order more than a dozen F-35s in coming weeks.

Other allies, like Japan, see no going back on the fighter.

A senior official at Japan's Defense Ministry said it was keeping a close eye on cost and schedule risks, but there were no plans to change Tokyo's order for 42 planes: "If we don't buy until all the glitches are eliminated, it would be too late."

NAVY IS WARY

The Air Force is considering a slightly less capable version of the plane for its initial use, but the Navy is reconsidering the size of its order.

Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Jonathan Greenert this week ruled out scrapping the Navy's entire F-35C order, but said the Navy was thinking about how many jets it really needs.

Greenert last year ordered a study on equipping each aircraft carrier air wing with just one squadron of F-35s instead of two, according to defense analyst Loren Thompson. The Navy is also developing several unmanned planes, although military officials insist they will never completely replace manned fighters on carriers.

Bogdan said cutting the Navy's order too far would have serious consequences. "There is actually a 'do not go below' type of calculation, which says, if you get below the minimum production quantity on one of these variants, the price starts shooting up tremendously," he told the conference.

The Pentagon's Cost Analysis and Program Evaluation office recently forecast that the F-35's cost would rise by 9 percent if Washington only bought 1,500 jets and foreign partners stuck to their orders, according to a Government Accountability Office study, first reported by Reuters. The cost would surge 19 percent if Washington bought 1,500 jets and the partners none.

"If you cut any of these aircraft, the cost of each remaining one goes up," consultant Thompson said. "At some point soon, you're at risk of undermining the whole business case for the F-35 as an affordable new fighter."

The F-35's worsening fiscal challenges come just as advocates, and some independent analysts, say the often-troubled fighter development project is getting back on track after years of setbacks - which included two engine-related groundings this year - and expensive retrofits.

The F-35 "is now moving in the right direction after a long, expensive and arduous learning process," the GAO study concluded, although it said long-term affordability remained a big concern.

Top Pentagon officials are vowing to shelter the F-35 from the latest budget crisis, if they can.

"We'll try to protect the F-35," the Pentagon's chief weapons buyer, Frank Kendall, said this week. "There's no question about its priority.

[Toad]

http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2...-warplane-f-35

Exclusive: U.S. Air Force to move forward target date for F-35 use

May 20, 2013|Andrea Shalal-Esa | Reuters



WASHINGTON (Reuters) - The U.S. Air Force plans to start operational use of Lockheed Martin Corp.-built F-35 fighter jets in mid-2016, a year earlier than planned, using a similar software package as the Marine Corps, two sources familiar with the plans said on Monday. The Air Force's decision to accelerate its introduction with a slightly less capable version of the F-35 software package means the planes will carry fewer weapons at first, although the software will later be upgraded to the final version, said the sources, who were not authorized to speak publicly.

Air Force spokeswoman Ann Stefanek said a final decision had not been made and declined to comment further. A spokesman for the Pentagon's F-35 program office declined to comment.

The decision reflects the military's desire to start using the new warplanes, which are already rolling off the assembly line at Lockheed's sprawling Fort Worth, Texas, plant, even as military officials continue to test the plane.
"This decision gets that (U.S.) fifth-generation capability out on the front lines that much sooner," said one of the sources familiar with the Air Force's plans. "It also sends a message about confidence in the program to Congress and the international partners."
Former Air Force Secretary Michael Wynne said accelerating operational use of the new warplane would allow the Air Force to learn more about the F-35's integrated battle management system.

"This is not just about replacing aging F-15's or F-16's; it is about changing the order of battle and truly embracing a integrated form of warfare where the F-35 manages the targeting and directs supporting fire at the same time as providing more precise aim points," Wynne told Reuters in an email.
The Air Force, Marines and Navy must report to Congress by June 1 on their target dates for initial operational capability, or IOC, which marks the point when the services have enough planes on hand to go to war if needed. Actual deployments usually lag IOC dates by about a year.
The sources said the services would send Congress a list of target or "objective" dates for declaring initial operational capability and a list of "threshold" dates, or deadlines.

The Marines Corps is sticking to its plan to begin early operational use in mid-2015 of its F-35B jets, which can take off and land like a helicopter. It will be the first of the three U.S. military services to start using the jets.
Its threshold is the end of 2015. The planes will run the F-35's 2B software, which will give the Marines an initial war fighting capability that includes some air-to-air skills, the ability to strike targets on the ground and carry several internal weapons, including laser-guided bombs.

Lockheed on Monday said one of its F-35 B-model planes completed the first-ever vertical takeoff on May 10, demonstrating a capability needed for repositioning jets in areas where they cannot perform a short takeoff.


The Navy has set mid-2018 for starting operational use of its C-model F-35, which is designed for use aboard U.S. aircraft carriers. Its deadline or threshold date is early 2019.

The Air Force decision marks a reversal from its earlier insistence that it needed the final 3F software package and comes after a Pentagon report cited China's development of two new fifth generation fighters over the past year.
The Air Force began studying the possible change several months ago. Lieutenant General Charles Davis told reporters in March that it might make sense to declare initial operating capability earlier than initially planned, given that the weapons on board would be suitable for basic war fighting needs.

The Air Force will have about 100 F-35s by 2016, when it plans to declare the planes ready for operational use.
The Pentagon's program chief, Lieutenant General Christopher Bogdan, told lawmakers last month he was "moderately confident" that the 2B software -- and the associated 3I software being developed for international buyers -- would be completed in time for the planned Marine Corps IOC in mid-2015.

The Air Force jets would use the 3I software, which will include a technology refresh with improved memory processors for some sensors on board.
Bogdan said it was not as clear that work on the final software package would be done in 2017, when the Air Force initially planned to declare IOC.
The final 3F software will support use of the aircraft's full war fighting capability, with additional internal and external weapons, and more advanced air-to-air and air-to-ground capabilities.

(Reporting by Andrea Shalal-Esa; Editing by Dan Grebler and Michael Perry)

[Toad]

http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123351580

F-35A completes 1st in-flight missile launch

6/6/2013 - EDWARDS AIR FORCE BASE, Calif. (AFNS) -- An F-35A conventional takeoff and landing aircraft completed the first in-flight missile launch of an AIM-120 over the Point Mugu Sea Test Range, June 5.

It was the first launch where the F-35 and AIM-120 demonstrated a successful launch-to-eject communications sequence and fired the rocket motor after launch -- paving the way for targeted launches in support of the Block 2B fleet release capability later this year.

The Air Force F-35A variant has seen significant development in training and operations recently including the beginning of pilot training at Eglin Air Force Base, Fla., the delivery of the first operational test aircraft to Edwards and Nellis Air Force Base, Nev., the first operational aerial refueling and the completion of high angle of attack testing.

[Ryan Ruck]

I've got to hand it to them no matter the cost, they are just pushing right on with the F-35 program. Although I'm not sure with the international investors that they have any choice but to do that.

It will certainly be a decent plane if they can get all the systems (namely the helmet/visual system) working properly.

[Toad]

I've got to hand it to them no matter the cost, they are just pushing right on with the F-35 program.

"We've spent too much money to quit now!"

My Mom had a Ford truck that was just a lemon from day 1. I have no idea how much she spent in trips to the garage to get things looked at and tweeked but it got to the point where whenever my brother or I told her it was just time to seel that POS and get something reliable her immediate respose was always "I have too much money in this truck to sell it now!" That thing was just a money pit.

[American Patriot]

hehehehe throw money at it, that'll fix it! lol

My sister and her husband... bought a house in 1977 in Detroit. We've been pleading with them to "GET OUT".

Nope... "too much money in it to leave now...."

/shrug

[Toad]

http://www.navyrecognition.com/index...k=view&id=1080

Kongsberg JSM anti-ship missile fitted in the Internal Bay of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF)



Kongsberg and Lockheed Martin have completed a fit check of the Joint Strike Missile (JSM) in the internal carriage bay of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) aircraft.This test follows just four weeks after the JSM conducted a fit check on the external pylons.


As part of this second fit check, the JSM was loaded into the JSF's internal carriage bay and conducted a series of tests to prove the physical characteristic of the JSM complies with the requirements for internal carriage.

"JSM is a true fifth generation missile. The first long-range, stealthy and passive, sea- and land target precision strike missile developed for the JSF. The combined capability of the JSF and JSM provides JSF users with unique and innovative strike capabilities”, says Harald Ånnestad, President Kongsberg Defence Systems.

JSM is designed as a long-range, low-observable stand-off weapon able to engage both land and naval targets. It has been specifically engineered for internal carriage on the F-35A and F-35C variants of JSF to enable the aircraft to maintain its stealth characteristics.

-- High probability of penetrating air defense systems through a combination of capabilities such as low radar signature, super sea-skim, variable speed, range and high-g maneuvers
-- Automated Target Recognition with Imaging target seeker for discrimination between red, white and blue ships.
-- Advanced engagement planning system which exploits the geography in the area of operations.
-- Target library including hit-point, fuze setting and optimal end-game.
-- A two-way networking data link will provide Target Update, Re-Targeting, Mission abort and Bomb Hit Indication (BHI)

[Toad]

EDWARDS AIR FORCE BASE, Calif., (June 5, 2012) An F-35A conventional takeoff and landing (CTOL) aircraft conducts the first in-flight launch of an AIM-120 C5 missile. The aircraft, known as AF-1, launched the missile over the Point Mugu Sea Test Range from its internal weapons bay. (U.S. Navy photo courtesy of Lockheed Martin by Matt Short/Released

[Ryan Ruck]

Nice!

[Toad]

http://israel-aircraft-avions.blogsp...rnational.html

Friday, June 28, 2013
(En) Israel Will Be First International Customer To Fly Operational F-35 Units

Though late to sign on to the network of nations purchasing the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, Israel will be the first international customer to operate the fifth-generation fighter, Aviation Week’s David Eshel reports. “Israel will become the first non-U.S. operator of the F-35 in the world,” said Steve O’Bryan, Lockheed Martin’s vice president for F-35 program integration and business development in an interview at the Paris air show. The first F-35I combat squadron is expected to achieve initial operational capability in 2018. Eight other countries have already committed to the program with firm contracts.


“The F-35 fighters going into service with these users will use different initial versions that will be upgraded later into the latest version, as it becomes available,” O’Bryan said. That mean F-35s will be tailored to individual nations, he says. “Specific capabilities developed for certain users will remain exclusive, and open to other users only with the original user’s consent. For example, the software blocks pertaining to the Norwegian anti-ship missile will not be available to other F-35 operators except Norway, unless it decides to sell those missiles to one of the F-35 users. The same goes to the Rafael Spice 1000. Similarly, the advanced electronic warfare, data links and specific software modes developed for the Israeli air force will remain unique to Israel and not delivered to any other user. These capabilities will also be fully integrated with the aircraft capabilities, adhering to the stealth characteristics of the aircraft, particularly, at specific apertures cleared for the Israeli systems integration in the lower fuselage and leading edge,” he said.The first Israeli pilots plan to arrive at Eglin AFB, Fla., for training on the F-35A in early 2016 (Aviation Week, 17 June 2013). The first aircraft is tentatively set to be delivered to the Israel air force toward the end of that year, and arrive in Israel in 2017. These F-35Is will be produced under Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) lots 8, 9 and 10. By that time, all 19 aircraft included under the $2.75 billion order will be delivered to the IAF under the current five-year plan. A follow-on order for more F-35Is is expected in 2018, under the next five-year plan. As the new fighter enters full-production rate, volumes are expected to increase, leading to proportionally lowering cost, expected to drop below $85 million in then-year dollars. Financing of this follow-on procurement is already under discussion with the U.S. Jerusalem is seeking creative ways for Washington’s agreement to guarantee payment for these planes, including the foreign military sales budget allocated annually to Israel. If this concept is approved, Israel will be required to pay for the interest but will be able to commit willingly to follow-on orders and receive the second squadron immediately after the first is delivered.

“With the F-35 Israel is expected to receive the AIM-9X short-range air/air missile (AAM) and the Raytheon AIM-120 AMRAAM Beyond Visual Range (BVR) AAM,” O’Bryan added. The F-35 currently carries the Raytheon AIM-9X Block at the outboard under-wing stations, in non-stealth configuration, as the current Block I missiles cannot be carried internally. This shortcoming will be corrected in Block II, which is to follow soon.

Nevertheless, the optimal weapon carriage for the F-35 comprises exclusively the AMRAAM missiles, enabling the fighter to maximize its “see-first, shoot-first, kill-first” strategy. The next generation BVR-AAM will offer both active and passive guidance techniques, offering effective intercept ranges in excess of 100 km. This makes part of the argument not to include the Rafael Python V missile in the aircraft configuration; the next generation Python VI will be designed to fit the new fighter. Yet, according to IAF sources, a decision whether to use a derivative of the Stunner or a brand-new AAM has yet to be made.
F-35s are prepared to fight air combat as a “networked formation,” sharing all information between all members at all time. The data link used for this process, called MADL, will also be available to all F-35 operators. In addition, Harris Multi-Function Advanced Data-Link (MADL) terminals could be installed on certain support elements, to extend information sharing and update the data available to the stealthy F-35 formation. In addition, the F-35 is now offering Link-16 connectivity and would obviously include a satellite link as well, providing secure, low-probability-of-detection communications on extended range missions.

In August 2012 Lockheed Martin received a $206 million award from the U.S. Navy Naval Air Systems Command, covering the development and integration of Israeli systems in the F-35A. Part of a larger package, the integration support agreement with Lockheed Martin covers a $450 million program to enhance Electronic Warfare (EW) equipment on the F-35, and integrate Israeli-unique systems beginning in 2016.

The US Navy recently received its first F-35C Lightning II that joined the training fleet at Eglin AFB. Israeli pilots are expected here by 2016, toward the handover of the first F-35Is to Israel, in 2017.

“The advantage of this F-35 for the Israel air force is not about higher performance or a specific weapon capacity, but the ability to understand the battlespace, identify, locate targets from standoff range and neutralize them before being engaged,” Brig. Gen. Hagi Topolanski, Chief of Air Staff and Deputy Israeli Air Force Commander, told Aviation Week in a recent interview (Aviation Week subscription required). “These capabilities are meaningful in dealing with modern fighter aircraft and advanced SAMs. While the F-35 has its limitations, it can take on and win against any threat currently available in-theater. Its ability to independently collect, assess and process a battlespace situational picture, and strike those targets by itself, from standoff range, is providing a qualitative edge over anything the enemy can confront with, in the foreseeable future.”

Israel insisted upon a number of requirements throughout the procurement negotiations on the F-35I. Those included the adaptation of the baseline F-35A including all its systems, to the Israeli air force’s operational environment, which will require some necessary additions. “Our F-35I will be equipped with our specific networks, armament and electronic warfare, among them the Spice autonomous EO guided weapon. It will also carry the AIM-9X2 air-to-air missile, which will become the first platform in the IAF to employ this advanced air-to-air missile. We also plan to continue and pursue the development of future air-to-air missiles; we are still evaluating the cost/performance trade-off between a common air-to-air and air-to-ground missile and a dedicated AAM design,” Topolanski explained. “Assuming the F-35 will offer the capabilities it is planned to deliver, it will bring a new dimension to air battles as we know today.”

One of the advantages of the F-35 is the aircraft’s ability to fly long-range missions with internal weapons, accelerate faster and maintain higher speed, compared to current F16s or F-15s or any of the opposing force combat aircraft (flying with internal fuel). To further extend the F-35’s range, Lockheed Martin is exploring an innovative concept from Israel, of using unique drop tanks, developed by Elbit Systems Cyclone. Designed in a similar concept to the F-22 under-wing drop tanks, these tanks, each containing 425 gal. of fuel, will use special attachment pylons that would completely separate from the wing, regaining full stealth capability after separation. An additional 900 gal. of fuel will significantly extend the F-35I range, enabling the IAF to operate its new stealth fighter at the “outer ring” of operation without mandatory aerial refuelling.

[Ryan Ruck]

South Korea jumpng ship on the F-35 program?

South Korea Looks Ready To Order 60 Boeing F-15SEs

August 19, 2013

South Korea appears poised to order 60 Boeing F-15SE Silent Eagles for its F-X Phase 3 competition, throwing a lifeline to the venerable fighter’s production line and offering the manufacturer an opportunity to improve it for future contests.

Seoul’s Defense Acquisition Program Agency says it has excluded one contender — identified by local media as EADS, offering the Eurofighter Typhoon — because the bidder, with the aim of reducing its price, changed previously agreed upon conditions of its offer without consent. The contentious change was EADS’s alteration of its offer from 45 single-seaters to 54, and 15 two-seat Typhoons to six, says Yonhap news agency.

Yonhap says the third contender, the Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning, has also been excluded, because its bid did not meet the budget, 8.3 trillion won ($7.5 billion). Lockheed, however, is refuting this assertion, saying it “has not to date received an official notification from the Republic of Korea regarding the results of the price bidding for the F-X Program. The F-X source selection process has multiple phases and we will continue to work closely with the U.S. Government as they offer the F-35 to Korea.”

Boeing is not yet assured of a contract, however, and the air force is likely to keep pushing for the F-35, the type that it has always wanted for the competition.

The F-15SE is a proposed upgrade of the F-15 with features to control radar reflections, but to get into production it needs the South Korean order. Without F-X Phase 3, F-15 production may end in 2019 — and earlier for long-lead items—when the last of 84 new-build F-15SAs for Saudi Arabia are due to be delivered. F-X Phase 3 would prolong production until 2021, 49 years after the type’s first flight.

Boeing’s fighter has had several advantages in the program. Already in South Korean service, it has probably been the cheapest contender, a key advantage given the inability of the agency, constrained by parliament, to consider above-budget bids. Last month it rejected all offers because they exceeded the budget; it then called for new proposals from the competing companies. Lockheed Martin not only had to deal with the high cost of the F-35; it also had to offer the aircraft through the U.S. government’s foreign military sales arrangements, which links the price paid by the customer to that paid by Washington.

An additional advantage of the F-15 is that its major assemblies are already in production by Korea Aerospace Industries. So local manufacturing content, demanded by the agency, should not have driven up costs as much as it did for the other two. The F-15 offers a considerable payload-radius, although all three types meet the requirement in that respect. The type also comes from the U.S., which underwrites South Korean security.

Deliveries of F-15Ks for South Korea and similar F-15SGs for Singapore ended in 2012. Deliveries of Saudi Arabia’s new aircraft are not due to begin until 2015, although Boeing has already rolled out the first and is upgrading 70 F-15Ss to the F-15SA configuration. South Korea bought 61 F-15Ks under F-X Phases 1 and 2. One crashed.

The F-15SE has canted tail fins and can carry four bombs or air-to-air missiles internally, thanks to modified conformal fuel tanks that are optionally attached to the fuselage sides. A new BAE Systems digital electronic warfare system frees up space for more fuel and the airframe is treated with radar absorbent material. Since the F-15K won earlier F-X competitions with a mechanically scanning radar, Boeing has fitted the F-15 with the Raytheon APG-63(v3) radar, which has an active electronically scanning antenna. Since that radar has been sold to Singapore, it is presumably available to South Korea.

Jefferies aerospace analyst Howard Rubel says Boeing’s pursuit of the contract probably underscored its ongoing industrial cooperation with Korean aerospace producers. “The deal would represent a significant success for Boeing and indicate that its efforts to improve the F-15’s survivability have made progress,” he wrote in an Aug. 19 note to his clients. “The range and payload of the plane far exceed the capability of the F-35.”

But Rubel also stressed that the competition is not over until a deal is signed. “Much can happen between one round and the final contract,” he notes. “From Lockheed Martin’s point of view, a win would reinforce the company’s point that stealth and other F-35 system capabilities dominate such factors as range, payload or one versus two engines.”

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F-35: Looking at most expensive weapons system ever


February 13, 2014, 3:52 PM

Update: The 60 Minutes report "The F-35" aired on Feb. 16, 2014. David Martin is the correspondent. Mary Walsh, producer.

60 Minutes gets an inside look at what makes the $400 billion F-35 joint strike fighter the most expensive weapons system in history.

Watch David Martin's report on Sunday, Feb. 16 at 7 p.m. ET/PT.



In the rush to stay ahead of China and Russia, the Pentagon started buying the F-35 before testing it, breaking the traditional “fly-before-you-buy” rule of weapons acquisition. Now taxpayers are paying the price for mistakes that weren’t caught before production began. A Pentagon document obtained by 60 Minutes catalogues the “flawed . . . assumptions” and “unrealistic . . . estimates” that led to a $163 billion cost overrun on what was already the highest priced weapons system in history. David Martin reports on the problem-plagued program and the battles the Pentagon has fought with the plane’s manufacturer, Lockheed Martin, to bring the costs under control. He also gets a firsthand look at some of the plane’s game-changing technology for a story to be broadcast on 60 Minutes, Sunday, Feb. 16 at 7 p.m. ET/PT. “We started buying airplanes a good year before we started test flights,” says Frank Kendall, the Pentagon’s chief weapons buyer. “I referred to that decision as acquisition malpractice.” Kendall says the program is now under control, but says,“We need to face the truth in this business. We need to understand what works and what doesn’t.”

A lot didn’t work for the state-of-the-art jet, which the Air Force, Navy and Marines are all counting on to replace virtually all of their current jet fighters. Mistakes included simple things like running lights that didn’t conform to FAA standards and tires that wore out much faster than expected. “Tires aren’t rocket science,” says Lt. Gen. Chris Bogdan, the man in charge of the F-35 program. “We ought to be able to figure out how to do tires on a multibillion dollar, highly-advanced fighter."

“Long gone is the time when we will continue to pay for mistake after mistake after mistake,” Bogdan vows. On a tour of the assembly line in Fort Worth, Texas, Bogdan told 60 Minutes, “I know where every single airplane in the production line is on any given day,” and that “Lockheed Martin doesn’t get paid their profit unless each and every airplane meets each station on time with the right quality.”

Another Pentagon document obtained by 60 Minutes states that “progress is sufficient” to increase production but warns that the plane’s software “is behind schedule” and “reliability . . . is not growing at an acceptable rate.” If the technological problems of the most complex aircraft ever built can be solved, the F-35 will give American pilots an astounding edge in combat -- the ability to see their enemies before those enemies are aware of them. According to Marine Lt. Gen. Robert Schmidle, “The range at which you can detect the enemy as opposed to when he can detect you can be as much as 10 times further.”

Key to that advantage is a half-million dollar computerized helmet which projects a 360 degree picture of the battle space onto the pilot’s visor. Martin was the first person without a security clearance allowed to try out the helmet and experience firsthand its ability to see through the structure of the airplane so pilots can see what’s directly beneath them.

The Pentagon is counting on the F-35 to control the air against a new generation of warplanes currently being tested by China and Russia. “Air superiority is not a given,” says Air Force Chief Gen. Mark Welsh. “If we can’t provide it, everything we do on the ground and at sea will change.”

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