Wednesday, December 8, 2010
"Korean Peninsula Headed Toward War"
Dr. Victor Cha, Senior Adviser and Korea Chair for the Center for Strategic and International Studies, published an article on Tuesday in the Chosun Ilbo that begins "There is a real possibility of war on the Korean Peninsula." A little about the Dr. Victor Cha...
Dr. Cha has a reputation for being more 'hawkish' towards the Korean situation than other policy advisors over the last several years. The advantage of being the voice of an alternative, more hawkish policy analyst over the last several years however is that all his dovish critics have an undisputed history of failure in dealing with North Korea. Dr. Cha was President Bush's top advisor on North Korean affairs, and is a former Director for Asian Affairs in the White House's National Security Council. During six-party talks under the George W. Bush administration, Dr. Cha was one of the US folks at the table with North Korea.
The article has been reprinted in this CSIS blog post. The article articulates the reasons why "war is a real possibility" discussing the pressures on South Korea to act and the confidence North Korea takes actions with. Diplomats often talk about miscalculations. This article suggests the Korea situation has potentially already raced passed the point of miscalculations and is simply waiting for a trigger moment that proves it.
Today, December 8th, 2010, was the first snow of the winter in Seoul. The winters are quite cold and have historically held through March. The weather is not a trivial consideration, because if indeed the situation on the Korean Peninsula is headed towards war, then the impact of war to civilians along the DMZ at the onset of the Korean winter has enormous ramifications. This is the worst possible time of the year for threats to homes of civilians in South Korea, which may explain to some degree North Korea's timing.
What I find interesting are the recommendations for how to prevent the war, because it is a prescription intended to reset the calculus of all sides with more clarity. From the article: So what should the U.S. do? Obama’s military exercising with South Korea and Japan is the right first step. But there are two more steps. First, serious consideration should be given to augmenting U.S. troop levels in Korea. This is the ultimate symbol of the deterrence and will impose real costs on the North for its actions, who seek the removal of these forces.
Second, the U.S., South Korea, and Japan should seek a resolution from the UN authorizing the use of force in self-defense at the next North Korean provocation. China will oppose both measures, in which case it should stop North Korea’s provocations. Third, the U.S. should enlist Russia to begin informal talks with North Korea about nuclear deterrence. The purpose of such talks would be to undercut any false notions Kim might have that a few nukes in the basement permit him to provoke recklessly. These are extreme measures but they befit the gravity of the situation.
Lets examine all three recommendations one at a time.
The first recommendation is to augment U.S. troop levels in Korea. As of May 1, 2010 there were ~28,500 total US force personnel in South Korea. Of that ~28,500, the Eighth United States Army has ~22,000 personnel broken down as follows: 2nd Infantry Division .................................................. ~8,000 personnel
19th Expeditionary Sustainment Command ............ ~4,000 personnel
1st Signal Brigade .................................................. ....... ~3,000 personnel
35th Air Defense Artillery Brigade ............................ ~1,000 personnel
65th Medical Brigade .................................................. . ~3,000 personnel
501st Military Intelligence Brigade ........................... ~3,000 personnel
There are some additional ground forces in small numbers as part of United Nations Command which includes Marine Corps Forces - Korea and Special Operations Command - Korea. Those personnel totals are not listed here.
The remaining ~6,500 personnel are part of the Seventh Air Force which is centered around the 8th Fighter Wing, the 51st Fighter Wing, 731st Air Mobility Squadron, 694th Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Group, 5th Reconnaissance Squadron, and Detachment 1, 33rd Rescue Squadron.
There are also about ~300 personnel assigned to US Naval Forces, Korea.
This leads to several questions, the first being how many troops and what kind of troops? I am not sure the US Army has any available brigades right now, and to make matters worse I don't think the US Army has much equipment left on their MPS ships either. The Marines have done a good job keeping their MPS ships ready to sail, but I am not sure about the Army. Would we commit our reserve, the 3rd Marine Division, with no infrastructure in place at the start of winter? I hope not.
Surging forces on the ground is a lot easier said than done, and while I would agree with Dr. Cha that it would send a message, the force would have to be of sufficient size to insure the message is delivered. That means at least 2 or 3 US Army combat brigade teams, and I don't believe those forces exist for purposes of strategic communications - and the cost is not trivial.
The impact of moving US troops to South Korea would be significant, and not only for North Korea. That might actually be a good thing though. If the United States adds an additional 10,000 personnel to South Korea, and drives equipment into position - the South Korean population is going to notice real quickly. That presence of additional forces will make a significant impact to the political options for South Korea, but more likely the impact would be to limit South Korean options politically. While I agree North Korea would reevaluate their position with the reinforcement of US forces by additional Army BCTs, I don't see this as practical unless the shooting actually breaks out.
Ultimately, the only additional military forces that can 'surge' to the Korean Peninsula will be either Navy or USAF. In my opinion, that clarifies things considerably, because now you know what capabilities you have to address the problem. Will Pyongyang be intimidated by aircraft carriers and warships? Probably not, but I do know Pyongyang seems to go ape **** every time a submarine surfaces in Chinhae or Bosan. Some naval platforms are more intimidating to North Korea than others, because North Korea has very few effective defense capabilities against some naval platforms - like submarines.
The second recommendation calls for a resolution from the UN authorizing the use of force in self-defense in response to the next North Korean provocation. That might work as a deterrent, but South Korea doesn't need the UN's permission to defend their nation from a North Korean attack. I would support this action, but I also agree with Dr. Cha that China is likely to veto any resolution put up to a vote. While this is a practical step to increase pressure on China, I am unsure what it solves if indeed South Korea, Japan, and the US require Chinese assistance for a peaceful resolution - which for the record, is exactly how I read the US policy right now.
The third recommendation is quite interesting, as it calls for the U.S. to enlist Russia to begin informal talks with North Korea about nuclear deterrence. That is certainly an interesting idea, but it raises the question whether it frames the confrontation between South Korea and North Korea into a context of a nuclear standoff. I am not sure the results can be predicted well if the starting point for Russia is that North Korea faces nuclear attack, and requires additional nuclear deterrence assistance from Russia. If a confrontation is highly probable, then doesn't that suggest avoiding putting confrontations into a nuclear context? I would think so.
I believe the analysis by Dr. Cha regarding how events are unfolding is spot on, although I disagree with his recommendations for action. There are two things that I think need to be considered.
First, will North Korea be attacking soon or will there be another 8 month pause before another military provocation? I don't believe there is any question that if North Korea attacks, South Korea will be responding very hard to North Korea. I also believe that right now, everyone believes North Korea will attack again at some point in the future. Time is an unknown right now, so it seems to me that all diplomatic efforts should be focused on extending the time between now and the next attack.
Second, why does a message or response to North Korea need to be an overt, conventional military attack? North Korea is a paranoid, centrally controlled, tight fisted regime that is generations behind in capabilities civilians in most western nations take for granted, so why couldn't, or shouldn't, a unified response be a more irregular approach that targets the paranoia while trying to generate enough confusion to turn the regime against itself? The number of indirect, non-conventional military options available to South Korea and the US are pretty large, for example, the winters are just as cold in North Korea as they are in South Korea, and I would hate to see the heat turned off for all those elite party members in Pyongyang.
My point is this: I agree completely that confrontation is coming to the Korean Peninsula because South Korea's stated defense policy to future attacks combined with the comfortable position of the North Koreans who feel secure behind a nuclear umbrella almost insures it. However, I disagree that this is headed towards a conventional war, because I am not convinced it is. Skirmish maybe, but major conventional conflict? Not yet.
What we have seen in 2010 on the Korean Peninsula is more akin to a shadow war, and I would expect a lot more of that - from all sides.
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