Twenty Years After the Fall of Communism
Twenty Years After the Fall of Communism
Submitted by JR Nyquist on Mon, 29 Nov 2010
I continue my conversation of last week with former KGB analyst and scholar, Victor Kalashnikov. This week I asked the former KGB lieutenant colonel about the motives of Russian policy-makers. He brushed aside questions of ideology, noting that "different motives are now in place."
And yet, the strategies used by today's Russian leaders appear to be Soviet strategies. "Just to bring you closer to the crucial questions," confided Kalashnikov, "a couple of facts need to be acknowledged.
There are still plenty of Stasi [communist secret police] officers in Germany, and many of them refuse to cooperate with the German authorities, stressing they only could do that if they got the okay from Moscow. They stay attached to the Russians, and loyal. It sounds like, after the end of the Second World War, the Germans would refuse to cooperate on account of their loyalty to Hitler."
Kalashnikov is telling us that the former communist secret police of East Germany remain loyal to bosses in Moscow. And these bosses still exercise authority. "There is a very serious problem regarding the history of East Germany," continued Kalashnikov. "I talked to several historians here in Berlin. From them I heard they are reconsidering the GDR [i.e., communist East Germany]. According to new archive materials, the impact of the Soviet Union on the GDR was much higher than previously thought. The influence was pervasive. The GDR was nothing but a tool of Moscow's military policy. So it was an enormous entity [where] the main sociological issue was not the working of the GDR according to Marxist doctrine, but its existence as a military formation.
The KGB maintained, like in Angola, networks for controlling and managing personnel; so the control was from Russia. It was simply overwhelming control. The problem now is that German official authorities and institutions, responsible for the archives, are extremely reluctant to see the linkages between East Germany and the Soviet Union. I talked to a top guy responsible for archives related to the KGB and Stasi.
Most of the documents produced by Stasi have a stamp showing delivery to the Soviet "friends." Now German researchers do not seriously attempt to trace further what that information was used for; or what the Soviet instructions were in such and such an operation. They don't want to press Moscow for answers.
They don't want to make Moscow angry. From this we see that our whole concept of the history of Stasi is on very shaky ground; because the links leading back to Moscow have been lost, and there is no political will to investigate."
What Kalashnikov attributes to German researchers may be attributed to the researchers in all Western countries. There is very little curiosity in discovering what Moscow was up to during the late Cold War (whether in Germany, sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America or the Middle East).
There is the sense, as well, that any effort to investigate past Russian moves and motives will make the Kremlin angry, and complicate present relations. "When the first non-Communist government came to power in East Germany," Kalashnikov explained, "they took over the Stasi archives, and some people within the new government issued instructions to eliminate or destroy all materials related to the so-called West Arbeit [work]. All materials have been destroyed, practically everything. Not to raise too sensitive a point in the relationship between the GDR and West Germany, but those materials were delivered to Moscow, and I had them at my table in Moscow.
Now I learn that nothing of the kind remained in East Berlin. At the beginning of the 90s, Americans came into possession of some of those files regarding East German espionage. But this is a small percent of the whole. In other words, the bulk of the information about Stasi spying on the West just disappeared."
Kalashnikov was one of a "limited number of people" involved with the magically disappearing intelligence documents, which are now stored in Russia. "I was involved in processing them in Moscow," says Kalashnikov. "Here in the West there is next to nothing.
The German officials do not make a serious effort to find out anything. In Moscow, as you know, research programs on the late Cold War made a very slow start under Yeltsin and were stopped completely. Now we can learn almost nothing. That is the situation regarding Stasi activity. There is a huge Terra Incognita involving this material.
Many officials feel that Stasi is still alive, still there. In whose interest were the documents destroyed or removed to Moscow?
Let me repeat the main point.
According to new research, the countries of central Europe appeared to be under comprehensive control from Moscow during totalitarian times. The control from Moscow went into every detail of personnel management, and all appointments.
Now, in spite of all the work done for the last twenty years, the main issues related to the links between East European countries and Moscow are unresolved. It is still a big mystery what Moscow wanted from them, or the mechanisms of control.
We also see links between these countries and the Third World.
I have also heard that after the collapse of East Germany the agents of East Germany continued to work in the Middle East, still functioning, still reporting to Moscow. So probably they are still in operation today. I would not exclude that networks are still engaged in serious business. This would indicate Moscow's high level of efficiency."
Kalashnikov is telling us about networks of operators. These networks are extensive and sophisticated. They are multinational, and exist in business and government, through education and science, through the media and religious institutions. "I had thought the Germans understood this situation better," said Kalashnikov. "But they do not.
They do not understand what operations were undertaken, for what purpose. I was in a conference on intelligence, where they invited former East Bloc intelligence officers. The Germans stressed that they have no contacts with Russian military intelligence [GRU]. There have been repeated attempts to involve the GRU in exchanges and cooperation. The GRU repeatedly declines. They stay absolute separated. Probably, this arouses interest as to their intentions.
The Germans see the GRU as an independent unit. That suggests yet again that the military GRU element is the main structure within Russian power institutions.
This is the biggest mystery of all.
What were the GRU's targets during the Cold War?
What were its objectives?
It appears that studies on late communism in Germany are much less advanced than what I had expected."
Kalashnikov is suggesting that the key power-bloc in Russia, in terms of national strategy, is the Russian General Staff. "I am convinced that the military policy is the core of Russian policy overall," says Kalashnikov, "the General Staff being the real masterminds of the international strategy of Moscow.
The GRU is the core of that center.
As to their way of thinking, Americans and Canadians have a limited idea of this.
I was struck when the ministry of defense here in Berlin said, 'Up to now we have a limited idea of the Soviet plan.' So they are just going in the same circle that says there was a democratic movement that removed the communists, and there was a good man named Gorbachev who launched all these movements.
There is no comprehensive concept of Soviet strategy at the end of the Cold War, transformed into what we have now. I still cherish the idea that the knowledge here in this city [Berlin] is somewhat more serious and extent. But I learned that practically all archives were destroyed. The real issue, the crucial links between East Berlin and Moscow, remain under layers of secrecy, speculation, and all sorts of legends. Extraordinary!"
I could not resist asking the former KGB insider whether the Soviet government actually survived the so-called collapse of communism. "The Soviet government still continues," said Kalashnikov without hesitation. "To prove that, look at the situation with the Russian archives. We have here, in the former socialist countries, more or less a sort of openness regarding files of defense ministries and so on. Now, the difference to Moscow is, under the Russian Federation, such papers are still operational. They are still secret. They are still part of the continuity dating back to Soviet times. So the regime survived.
The story continues, in a somewhat similar direction. Even the papers related to the Second World War are still secret. Many historians show surprise as to why. We are more than sixty years past this time. But many decisions, facts and operations, are part of Soviet and Russian practices that continue. This illustrates, once again, that we have one and same line of development from Bolshevik times, to late Soviet, up to our day.
Against and despite all the rhetoric otherwise; I repeat, there is no serious prospect or political will to scrutinize the most basic links between Moscow and European capitals, starting with the end of the Second World War. The Russians also keep their methods of control over the Eastern Bloc a secret.
Why? Because it is still operational.
So the GRU declines contacts, because they continue the same strategies as before."
And what was the aim of those strategies? Perhaps in next week's installment, Victor Kalashnikov will offer us a few more tantalizing insights.
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Originally Posted by Rick Donaldson
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