Intelligence Brief: Iran and the U.S. Maneuver Carefully Toward Confrontation
Drafted By:
http://www.pinr.com
In the latest edition of the
New Yorker, journalist Seymour Hersh argues that the United States is currently in the process of planning an attack on Iran. The purpose of the plan, according to Hersh, is to eliminate Iran's nuclear research program. The Bush administration believes that Iran's nuclear research program is part of a covert Iranian strategy to develop nuclear weapons.
While there is no doubt that the Bush administration has drawn up contingency plans for an attack on Iran, it is unlikely that in the immediate future Washington will execute an attack on Iran's nuclear facilities. Indeed, after Hersh's article hit the press, the Bush administration was quick to reassure that while the military option remains on the table, it is seeking a "diplomatic" solution to the current dispute. President George W. Bush himself labeled Hersh's claim as "wild speculation."
Although the United States is perfectly capable of launching air strikes on Iran,
such a scenario could have a very negative effect on U.S. interests. The negative outcomes that are part of this policy may outweigh the positives. The negative outcomes involved in an attack were outlined by PINR on March 2: "The U.S. military is overburdened by the ongoing insurgency in Iraq, making a realistic ground invasion of Iran improbable. While strategic air strikes are certainly an option, it is unlikely that such strikes would destroy completely Iran's nuclear research program. Furthermore, an actual attack on its facilities would probably hasten Iran's drive toward nuclear weapons, similar to the effect that Israel's 1981 strike on the Osirak reactor in Iraq had on Baghdad." There is also the very real concern that an attack on Iran would cause it to exercise its levers of power in neighboring Iraq, using its power brokers to increase instability.
In addition to the above strategic costs, there are also economic repercussions. The price of oil currently stands at US$68 a barrel, and any instability introduced to the Middle East will raise this price substantially. The economies in oil dependent countries are already suffering from sustained high oil prices, and as the price of oil moves higher it will cause further damage to these economies.
Even without an attack, any sanctions placed on Iran that include its energy industry will also cause an escalation of oil prices.
The above drawbacks explain why the current government in Tehran thinks that it can defy the United States and the E.U.-3 (France, Germany and the United Kingdom). For Tehran, the U.S. and the E.U.-3 have limited leverage options at their disposal. Tehran does not believe that the United States will initiate air strikes, and thinks that it can buy time and use Washington's current exposed position to accelerate its nuclear research program. Indeed, while Iran may not have an active nuclear weapons program, the further that it proceeds in nuclear research the closer that it comes to having the potential to quickly and efficiently develop a nuclear weapons arsenal.
It is very likely that Tehran sees nuclear weapons as an essential part of its drive for regional power. As PINR Senior Analyst Dr. Michael A. Weinstein examined in an in-depth analysis of Iran's regional strategy, "When the positives and negatives of Iran's strategic situation are weighed, it becomes clear that the complex balance of opportunities and threats provides the opportunity for Iran to try to expand its regional power at considerable risk."
According to Weinstein, "The best-case scenario for Iran is that the U.S. military is forced to withdraw from Iraq, leaving Iran with a dominant sphere of influence over a Shi'a-dominated Iraq or a breakaway Shi'a mini-state in the south, and that Iran is able to achieve nuclear weapons capability. Were this outcome to occur, Iran would be the dominant power in the Persian Gulf, displacing the United States."
[See: "Iran's Bid for Regional Power: Assets and Liabilities"]
Iran's current U.N. declared deadline for halting uranium enrichment will come at the end of April. If Iran does not halt uranium enrichment by the deadline, Washington has said that it will attempt to punish Iran more concretely, with measures including sanctions. But placing sanctions on Iran may not have the desired effect since it is far from clear whether Russia or China will approve of any sanctions regime, especially one that targets Iran's energy exports. A sanctions regime without the support of Russia and China would have a limited effect on Iran.
Therefore, the conflict between the U.S., E.U.-3 and Iran continues forward, much as it has for the past three years. The U.S. has a clear policy of preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Iran has a clear policy of preventing the U.S. from halting its robust nuclear research program; Tehran's more murky policy may be to develop and acquire nuclear weapons that will assist it in increasing its regional power. The two countries will continue to spar with each other, both playing a potentially hazardous game where any substantial move by either side could rapidly damage both countries' interests.
Both the U.S. and Iran continue to take little steps toward confrontation. Washington wants to prevent, or at least delay, Iran's move toward controlling the nuclear fuel cycle, and Tehran is testing Washington's limits since it believes that military action against it is unlikely and that the U.S. is in a weak position to confront Iran effectively. [See:
"Intelligence Brief: Iran Tests Washington's Limits"]
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