01-19-2009 18:15
Obama May Send Envoy to North Korea

By James Laney

U.S. President-elect Barack Obama, left, and his wife Michelle wave at the
“We Are One” concert, one of the events of Obama’s inauguration celebrations,
at the Lincoln Memorial in Washington, Sunday. / AFP-Yonhap

The goal of both Seoul and Washington is a non-nuclear, peaceful peninsula. The North's goal is to survive with its sense of dignity intact. The great question is whether these can be reconciled and how the new Obama administration might try.

The end of the Korean War left the issue of who won unresolved, and that shadow has cast a pall over efforts to bring closure ― and peace ― to this day.

The North in its gravely weakened state and despite its huge military, has no prospect of triumphing. Its ambition is to survive and its trump card is its nuclear program.

The South, on the other hand, has become a democratic nation and an economic powerhouse, respected around the world and a model for emerging nations.

Having lost in every realm of competition, the North is thus extremely sensitive about its pride and seeks at every turn to ``win" points against its southern neighbor, even to the point of retaliating by measures not in its own interest. Its sole claim to international attention is having entered the select group of nuclear states.

But its viability is compromised by uncertainty surrounding the health of its leader, questions about orderly succession and its dire economy. As a result, the future of a nuclear North Korea poses huge, urgent problems for the South, the U.S. and the region.

Through several public statements, Obama has indicated how his administration might approach the situation. He has said ``we will be firm and unyielding and our commitment to a non-nuclear Korean peninsula.''

To that end there must be ``verifiable elimination of all North Korea's nuclear weapons programs, as well as its proliferation activities, including with Syria.'' To achieve this, he is prepared to enter into ``direct, sustained, and aggressive diplomacy'' in cooperation and with the support of the six-party process.

What are some of the implications of ``direct, sustained and aggressive diplomacy'' as an approach to the North? President-elect Obama has made a strong point of being willing to meet directly, without precondition, with the leadership of nations with whom the United States has issues of contention, not precluding sending envoys with international reputations and who enjoy the implicit trust of the president himself, to take a fresh look at the overall situation. Too often, these talks have been seen as a reward for meeting prior conditions. In fact, they are necessary if we are to have any kind of leverage on how things play out in the North.

The urgency of direct talks cannot be overstated. A greatly weakened nuclear state poses a threat not so much by its use of such weapons aggressively, but of their ultimate disposition should the state collapse. Non-engagement, no matter how justifiable from a moral or domestic political point of view, is the most dangerous course.

Of course, any direct talks must be undertaken on behalf of the South, not at its expense. Certainly, they must not be understood as diminishing the South's relationship with the United States.

The United States and the South act from a position of overwhelming superiority. The self-imposed isolation of the North with its consequent weakness makes it very vulnerable, both in its sense of dignity and security. Talks will not succeed until the North feels securely enough to be able to relinquish its nuclear arsenal.

Given its precarious state, is that achievable? And will the North's military acquiesce in such a loss of power and status? One can be forgiven for being skeptical of an affirmative answer. Nevertheless, such questions can only be answered, and the answers can only be tested, by the direct and sustained approach Obama proposes.

One of the things that has bedeviled all talks until now is the unresolved status of the Korean War. A peace treaty would provide a baseline for relationships, eliminating the question of the other's legitimacy and right to exist.

Lacking such a peace treaty, every dispute presents afresh the question of the other side's legitimacy. Only with a treaty in place will both sides be relieved of the political demand to see each move as conferring approval or not. After more than a half century, it is time to come to terms with existence simply as a fact, and not see it as a concession.

The absence of diplomatic engagement led the North to break the 1994 Agreement, expand its nuclear program, and to test a nuclear device in 2006. Yet from 1994 to 2003, the freeze at the Yongbyon plant meant there was no production of plutonium or weapons and a corresponding period of diminished tension on the Korea peninsula, giving the South the time and opportunity to move from an emerging to a developed economy and a favored place in the world of international economics. Despite questions about a secret uranium program, Yongbyon was where the action was, and by breaking off engagements, we lost our leverage.

There is a possibility the new President might send a high-level envoy such as Henry Kissinger, Bill Perry, or Sam Nunn to Pyongyang. These men all have established reputations and are known to be astute and tough. They would go with presidential authority to discuss every issue, including a possible peace treaty and normalization in exchange for a verified non-nuclear peninsula.

The greatest threat North Korea poses is not one of deliberate aggression but its instability as a state with nuclear weapons. Its weakened economy and the uncertainties surrounding the orderly succession of leadership make it urgent that the United States and South Korea coordinate their efforts in an aggressive initiative of engagement.

It may not work. But without the effort, there can be little plausible hope for a non-nuclear, peaceful Korean Peninsula. That is the challenge President Obama faces.